Harden v. Mass Transit Administration

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We are here presented with the question of whether appellee, Mass Transit Administration (MTA), is required by the interplay between Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol., 1975 Cum. Supp.) Art. 48A, §§ 538-546 inclusive and Code (1957, 1970 Repl.

Vol., 1975 Cum. Supp.) Art. 66V2, § 7-101 to maintain “no fault” insurance for its passengers providing medical, hospital and disability benefits. We conclude, as did the Court of Special Appeals in Harden v. Mass Transit Adm., 27 Md. App. 590, 342 A. 2d 310 (1975), and the trial judge (Grady, J.), that it is not. Appellants, Joseph Harden et al. (Harden), suing “in their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have sustained personal injuries resulting in ⁴⁰² medical expenses and/loss of income while passengers on buses owned and operated by [MTA],” brought a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of Baltimore City.

MTA and its insurer, Transit Casualty Company (Transit Casualty), also an appellee here, were named parties defendant. The petition for declaratory relief was filed March 22, 1974. It alleged: MTA is an agency of the Maryland Department of Transportation. It is authorized by statute to own and operate buses to provide rapid transit and bus service to the citizens of the State.

It was the owner and operator of the buses here involved. Transit Casualty is its insurer and provided the motor vehicle liability insurance covering MTA’s buses. The insurance was issued subsequent to January 1, 1973. Each of the petitioners was injured subsequent to July 1, 1973, while passengers on MTA buses.

Each petitioner applied to Transit Casualty “for ‘medical benefits’ and ‘economic loss’ benefits resulting from medical expenses and loss of income suffered as a result of injuries received” by them in these accidents. Although “all necessary forms were submitted to [Transit Casualty] with all necessary documentation,... [it] has refused to pay the said claims.” This failure was said to be in violation of what was then Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.) Art. 48A, § 539 and § 543 (b). 1 The failure of MTA to maintain ⁴⁰³ this insurance was said to be in violation of what was then Code (1957, 1970 Repl.

Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.) Art. 66V2, § 7-101. 2 It was the position of MTA and Transit Casualty that MTA was “not controlled by or rendered liable to the provisions of the [aforementioned statute] and that [Transit Casualty was] not controlled by or rendered liable to the provisions of the [aforementioned statute].” The petition sought (1) a declaratory judgment that MTA and Transit Casualty were in violation of the previously mentioned statutes, (2) “[t]hat judgment be entered against [them] on ⁴⁰⁴ behalf of the Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated in the amount of Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000.00),” (3) that the plaintiffs “be allowed their costs and expenses including reasonable attorneys’ fees,” and (4) that they "be allowed interest at the rate of l1/2% per month accounting from a period of thirty days after satisfactory proof of claim had been made to [Transit Casualty].” The petition did not allege that under the interpretation of the statute by MTA the statute was unconstitutional. Such a contention was made, however, before the trial judge. 3 The demurrer filed by MTA and Transit Casualty was treated by the trial judge as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the holding in Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 411 , 237 A. 2d 35 (1968). The declaratory judgment held that MTA and Transit Casualty were not in violation of the provisions of Code (1957,1972 Repl.

Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.) Art. 48A, §§ 538-546 ⁴⁰⁵ “by their failure to provide ‘medical benefits’ and ‘economic loss’ benefits pursuant to [that] statute,” that MTA, as “an instrumentality and agency of the State of Maryland, is not covered by the provisions of Art. 48A, Sections 538-546, and [Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.) Art.] 66V2, Section 7-101,” and that “consequently, the Defendant, Transit Casualty ... , as the carrier of insurance on [MTA] vehicles, is also not covered thereunder . . . .” Harden contends here, as was done in the Court of Special Appeals, that (1) the statutory language of Art. 48A, §§ 538-546 and Art. 66V2, § 7-101 is plain and unambiguous, (2) that it was the legislative intent to include MTA within the purview of the statutes, and (3) that to exclude MTA from the coverage of these statutes would be a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

I and II The first two contentions are interrelated and will be discussed together, as they were in the Court of Special Appeals. MTA was established as a part of the Department of Transportation by Chapter 253 of the Acts of 1971 which amended Code (1957) Art. 41, § 207D. 4 It is the successor to the Metropolitan Transit Authority. Its authority is derived from Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) Art. 64B.

Under that article it is vested with wide authority in “the Metropolitan Transit District, comprising the territory lying within the boundaries of the City of Baltimore and the counties of Baltimore and Anne Arundel.” ⁴⁰⁶ Harden places great reliance on the fact that bills have been introduced into the General Assembly to specifically exclude MTA from the coverage of the “no fault” statute, which bills failed of passage. Hence, he draws an inference of legislative intent that the statute should be interpreted as Harden interprets it. This is a weak reed upon which to lean. It could equally be argued that the General Assembly thought it perfectly plain that MTA was not included within the framework of the statute and, therefore, no amendment was necessary..

In Hearst Corp. v. State Dep’t of A. & T., 269 Md. 625, 645 , 308 A. 2d 679 (1973), Judge Singley referred for the Court to United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 310-11 , 4 L.Ed.2d 334 , 80 S. Ct. 326 (1960), where the Court said that nonaction by Congress after an adverse court decision “affords the most dubious foundation for drawing positive inferences.” The statement is equally applicable here. The rules relative to statutory construction have been stated many times by this Court. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent and in ascertaining that intent the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. Md.-Nat’l Cap.

P. & P. v. Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 555-56 , 325 A. 2d 748 (1974), and Greenbelt Consumer v. Acme Mkts., 272 Md. 222, 226 , 322 A. 2d 521 (1974). A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393-94 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973), and Maryland Nat’l Bk. v. Comptroller, 264 Md. 536, 541, 287 A. 2d 291 (1972). A court may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form.

Patapsco Trailer v. Eastern Freightways, 271 Md. 558, 563-64 , 318 A. 2d 817 (1974); and Giant of Maryland v. State’s Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 512 , 298 A. 2d 427 , appeal dismissed, 412 U. S. 915 (1973). The General Assembly is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the ⁴⁰⁷ prior law. Allers v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 684 , 309 A. 2d 476 (1973). Yet another cardinal rule of statutory construction is that repeals not express will not be found unless demanded by irreconcilability or repugnancy.

City of Baltimore v. Silver, 263 Md. 439, 456-57 , 283 A. 2d 788 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U. S. 810 (1972); Bowie v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm’n, 249 Md. 611, 618 , 241 A. 2d 396 (1968); and Planning Comm. v. Silkor Corp., 246 Md. 516, 524 , 229 A. 2d 135 (1967).

With that preamble we turn to the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. We adopt, with minor editing, that portion of the opinion in which Judge Menchine said for the court: “In sum, by Article 64B the Legislature made the Administration a State agency and vested it with extremely broad powers, giving it an autonomy qualified solely by supervisory powers granted or reserved to the Department of Transportation or the Maryland Transportation Authority. Such was the status of MTA at the time that §§ 538 through 546 5 of Article 48A were added to the Code by the passage of Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972. “The contention of Harden basically is that the interaction of Article 48A, § 539 with Article 66V2, § 7-101 6 combined to subject MTA and its insurer to an obligation to assure the payment of ‘no fault’ claims thereby authorized. They argue that the provisions of Article 66V2, § 7-101 that every owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this State shall maintain required security and that every person must comply with § 539 of Article 48A, must be interpreted as requiring MTA and its insurer to be bound by their respective obligations. “MTA and Transit Casualty counter with the alternative contentions: (a) that MTA is a State agency whose sovereign immunity protects it from ⁴⁰⁸ suit and (b) that the Legislature did not intend MTA to be within the purview of Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972. “There is a surface plausibility in Harden’s contention but it does not survive careful analysis. “Harden brushes aside the suggested defense of the State’s immunity to suit upon the ground that such immunity was waived by statute in that: (1) Article 64B, § 8 (a) declares that MTA shall: ‘Have perpetual succession, and sue and be sued in its own name and plead and be impleaded’ and (2) Article 64B, § 49 declares that MTA ‘shall be liable for its contracts and for its torts ... in connection with the performance of the duties and functions imposed in this article.’ We do not, however, see this case as one turning upon a question of immunity to suit and do not reach the issue.

Instead, we conclude that the provisions of Article 48A, §§ 538 through 546, and Article 66V2, §§ 7-101, 7-102 do not apply at all to MTA. Subtitle 1 of Article 66V2 furnishes the definitional portion of that article. In § 1-557 ‘owner’ is defined as ‘a person having the property in or title to a vehicle.’ Section 1-160 defines a ‘person’ as ‘every natural person, firm, co-partnership, association, or corporation.’ “The State and State agencies generally are regarded as not included in statutes using such words as ‘natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.’ State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643, 649 , 95 A. 956, 958 (1915); Mayor and City Council v. Baltimore Gas Co., 232 Md. 123, 135 , 192 A. 2d 87, 93 (1963). “We recognize, of course, that the State or its agencies may fall within the purview of such statutes ‘where such an intention is manifest.’ ⁴⁰⁹ Huffman v. State Roads Commission, 152 Md. 566, 584 , 137 A. 358, 365 (1927). We do not, however, regard the subject case as falling within such an exception. “The statute by which §§ 538 through 546 were added to Article 48A was of considerable complexity.

Incident to purposes to be accomplished by those sections, the statute provided for the specific repeal and reenactment of sections or subsections of Article 26; of Article 48A; of Article 66V2 and of Article 81. Yet the statute made no reference to Article 64B. We are persuaded that this circumstance strongly indicates that the statute was not intended to affect that article or to subject MTA or its insurer to the obligations imposed by Article 48A, §§ 538-546 or by Article 66V2, §§ 7-101 and 7-102. “Particularly significant, we think, is the circumstance that the statute did not address itself to Article 64B, § 44 that reads in pertinent part as follows: ‘§ 44. Insurance.

(a) Coverage; form; amount. — The Authority shall self insure or procure and maintain insurance against loss or damage to any of its properties and against liability for injury to persons or property. The Board may also purchase insurance against loss of revenue from any cause whatsoever. Such insurance coverage shall be in such form and amount as the board may determine, subject to the requirements of any agreement arising out of issuance of bonds or other obligations by the Authority. 7 (Emphasis added.)’ ⁴¹⁰ “It is instantly apparent that the Legislature left to the discretion of MTA the decision (a) whether to carry insurance or to provide self insurance as to its own liability for negligence, and (b) to fix the form and amount of any insurance coverage it might elect to carry, subject only to the requirements of ' any agreement arising out of the issuance of its bonds. 8 “The Legislature made two policy declarations in conjunction with its broad grant of power to MTA. By § 1 of Article 64B it was declared that, ‘The development of improved and expanded transit facilities... is essential for the satisfactory movement of people and goods, the alleviation of present and future traffic congestion, the economic welfare and vitality and the development of the metropolitan area of Baltimore . .. .’ By § 12 of that article it was declared that, ‘all costs incurred in constructing, acquiring, operating and maintaining the regional transit facilities shall be borne, as far as practicable, by fares charged for the service performed by the transit facilities owned or controlled by [MTA] . . . / “There is no such inconsistency between §§ 538 through 546 of Article 48A on the one hand and the provisions of Article 64B on the other as to make their separate existence so repugnant that they cannot stand together.

We decide, accordingly, that passage of Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972 did not directly nor by implication