Hardy v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.

GARY S. GASPAROVIC, Judge, Specially Assigned. William 0. Hardy and Donna Hardy, the appellants, seek to recover the full purchase price of a motor home that they claim is defective. The appellees are Ford Motor Company, Inc., which manufactured the motor home’s chassis, and Winnebago Industries, Inc., which manufactured the coach.

The Hardys filed an eight count complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against Ford, Winnebago, and Recreation World, Inc., the Annapolis dealership that sold them the motor home. Prior to trial, the court dismissed the counts alleging negligence and breach of the Automotive Warranty Enforcement Act. 1 A jury trial was then held and, at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as to the remaining counts. The court thus rendered judgments in the defendants’ favor on the Hardys’ claims of breach of contract, breach of express war ²⁶⁵ ranties, breach of implied warranties of merchantability, breach of express warranties in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 2 breach of implied warranties in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. 3 Issues In this appeal, the Hardys argue, in essence, that I. The trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment because they presented sufficient evidence to establish that they revoked acceptance of the motor home.

II

The trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment because they presented sufficient evidence that Ford and Winnebago breached their implied warranties of merchantability.

III

The trial court erred in failing to award them a full refund under the terms of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and IV. The trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment because they presented sufficient evidence that Ford and Winnebago committed unfair and deceptive trade practices. Because we find no merit in any of these arguments, we shall affirm the judgments of the trial court. Facts William and Donna Hardy were the only witnesses presented at trial.

Mr. Hardy testified that they purchased the motor home in July of 1993 for $38,989. The day after they got the motor home, the Hardys embarked upon a cross-country trip with their two young children. ²⁶⁶ Before they left Recreation World with the motor home, the Hardys noticed a crack in the windshield. The sales manager offered to repair the windshield. Mr. Hardy declined this offer, and the sales manager assured Mr. Hardy that Recreation World would fix the problem as soon as the family returned from its trip.

The Hardys then proceeded on their way. Initially, there were no problems. According to the Hardys’ brief, “[w]hile passing through Wyoming on a Sunday evening, they heard a loud ‘metal clanking’ noise in the drive line.” Mr. Hardy explained that he noticed that “as soon as you would engage the transmission [a]nd put it into drive and start co[a]sting forward then it sounded like just metal clinking together. It was pretty loud.” Mr. Hardy called a toll-free number for Winnebago and a customer service representative directed him to take the motor home to a nearby Ford dealership.

Mr. Hardy took the vehicle to the specified dealership the next morning. The service manager there told him that the drive shaft needed to be replaced. He did not have a drive shaft in stock and advised that it would take about a week to obtain one. After receiving the service manager’s assurances that “it was okay to drive [the motor home] but the noise would just get worse and louder,” Mr. Hardy decided not to wait.

In Oregon, the Hardys noticed a burning smell coming from the back of the motor home. Mr. Hardy looked under the vehicle and observed that “the drive shaft was glowing red hot and it was actually glowing red.” He drove the motor home to the nearest Ford dealership and, because a mechanic did not work on the vehicle that day, the family spent the night in the parking lot. The next day, a mechanic readjusted the drive shaft. The burning smell disappeared, but the drive shaft still made noise.

The mechanic informed Mr. Hardy that the motor home needed a new drive shaft. Again, the dealership did not have one in stock and estimated that it would take seven to ten days to get one. Mr. Hardy called Winnebago’s toll-free fine and obtained assurances that it would be safe to drive the vehicle to California. The customer service repre ²⁶⁷ sentative from Winnebago made an appointment for the Har-dys at a Ford dealership in California.

When they reached California, the Hardys took the motor home to the third Ford dealership. A transmission specialist checked it over but declined to perform any repairs. Mr. Hardy testified that he overheard the transmission specialist telling another mechanic that “once a problem like that gets in the [F]ord vehicle they can not correct it. And to just to tell the owner whoever it was to tell them to take it back to wherever they got [it] and let them worry about it.” Mr. Hardy then called Winnebago’s toll-free number and was told it was safe to drive the vehicle back home.

He was further assured that if the vehicle broke down, Winnebago would come to get them. The Hardys returned home in late August of 1993, after having put 7,500 miles on the motor home. The vehicle had about 2000 miles on it when the Hardys purchased it. Mr. Hardy took the motor home to Recreation World that same day because its temporary tags were about to expire and Recreation World had arranged for new tags.

At that time, he gave the service manager a list of problems that needed repair. In addition to the drive shaft problem, he advised the service manager of problems with: the windshield, the curtain clips, the clip for the door. We had asked for an extra set of keys for the back doors because they had (inaudible). And um one of the front (inaudible) was leaking down the wheel.

And um, one wheel cover blew off. There was a piece of molding (inaudible). The medicine door the mirror on the medicine door was cracked. And um, the cover for the sink.

And there is probably something else but I can’t remember. Mr. Hardy testified that he was told that the motor home would be repaired by September 18, 1993. On September 18, however, he was told that it would take another “week or so.” The motor home was not ready in a week and, in October, Mr. Hardy learned that it had been taken to a Ford dealership for ²⁶⁸ repairs to the drive shaft. The Ford dealership returned the motor home to Recreation World in November.

Mr. Hardy went to Recreation World to test drive the motor home and discovered that “it still had the noise in the drive line.” The service manager “kindda thought that they weren’t gonna do anything else to [the drive shaft] but they would fix the rest of it....” Mr. Hardy then sent a letter to Winnebago stating that he wanted a full refund for the motor home “[u]nder the provisions of the MARYLAND LEMON LAW.” 4 He attached to the letter a list of 17 “problems that are taking Recreation World several months to repair.” 5 Winnebago replied that it would not refund the purchase price but that it would make any necessary repairs. In February of 1994, Recreation World contacted Mr. Hardy and informed him that “everything was repaired.” Mr. Hardy went to Recreation World and determined that “of the list of 17 things that I had given them they repaired ... um four or five items that had not been repaired and the drive line still had the noise in it.” Mr. Hardy informed the service manager that he was dissatisfied but the service manager indicated that “they had done pretty much everything that they were gonna do with it.” Mr. Hardy requested that Recreation World buy back the motor home but the service manager refused. Mr. Hardy then left without the motor home, indicating that he would let Recreation World know in a week what he planned to do about the matter. Mr. Hardy obtained the services of an attorney and, in March of 1994, sent a letter “rejecting and/or revoking his acceptance” of the motor home to Recreation World.

A copy of the letter was sent to Winnebago on that same date. Later ²⁶⁹ in March, a copy of the letter to Recreation World was also sent to Ford. Before the plaintiffs rested their case, Mrs. Hardy testified briefly. In response to counsel’s question, on direct examination, as to whether the value of vehicle to her had “changed after your trip out west,” Mrs. Hardy responded: “It defi[nately] has gone down.” 6 Counsel for all three defendants then moved for judgment on all counts.

The trial court granted the motions. Discussion Maryland Rule 2-519(b) provides: When a defendant moves for judgment at the close of the evidence offered by the plaintiff in an action tried by the court, the court may proceed, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts and to render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence. When a motion for judgment is made under any other circumstances, the court shall consider all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made. Where, as here, the trial is held before a jury, “other circumstances” exist and the trial court must “consider all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party.

Id. See also Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md.App. 342, 353 , 517 A.2d 1122 (1986). As we have explained: In reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment in a jury trial, this Court must conduct the same analysis as the trial court, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party____ Thus, we may affirm the grant of the motion for judgment only if, when considering evidence most favorable to appellant’s claim, we ²⁷⁰ conclude that there was insufficient evidence to create a jury question.... Martin v. ADM Partnership, 106 Md.App. 652, 657 , 666 A.2d 876 (1995) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 348 Md. 84 , 702 A.2d 730 (1997).

I Revocation of Acceptance The Hardys first contend that the trial court erred by granting Ford’s and Winnebago’s motions for judgment as to the breach of contract claim “and all related Counts.” The Hardys assert that they presented sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that they properly revoked their acceptance of the motor home. Section 2-608 of the Commercial Law Article provides: (1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it (a) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller’s assurances. (2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.

(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them. The remedy of revocation of acceptance lies only against a seller of goods, not against a remote manufacturer. This is so because the remedy, where sue- ²⁷¹ cessful, cancels a contract of sale, restores both title to and possession of the goods to the seller, restores the purchase price to the buyer, and as fairly as possible, returns the contracting parties to the status quo ante. The remote manufacturer, having no part in the sale transaction, has no role to play in such a restoration of former positions.

Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 227 Va. 154 , 313 S.E.2d 384, 390 (1984). See also Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 329 N.C. 727 , 407 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1991); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distributors, 176 N.J.Super. 57 , 422 A.2d 101, 104 (App.Div.1980). There is no dispute that Recreation World, which is not a party to this appeal, sold the motor home to the Hardys. Citing § 2-314(l)(a) of the Commercial Law Article, the Hardys contend that Ford and Winnebago were sellers as well and were therefore subject to the revocation provisions of § 2-608.

Section 2-314(l)(a) states: “In §§ 2-8H through 2-318 of this title, ‘seller’ includes the manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or the retailer.... ” (Emphasis added.) Sections 2-314 through 2-318 concern express and implied warranties. Thus, the definition set forth in § 2-314(l)(a) is expressly limited to the warranty provisions. Cf Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba, Corp., 576 F.Supp. 312, 322-23 (D.Md.1983) (explaining that the language of § 2-314(l)(b), that “[a]ny previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the buyer and the seller in any action brought by the buyer,” applies only to actions brought under § 2-314). The definition of “seller” for purposes of § 2-608 can be found in § 2-103. that section provides: (1) In this title unless the context otherwise requires (d) “Seller” means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods.

It is clear that Recreation World was the only seller of the motor home for purposes of § 2-608. Consequently, the action for revocation did not properly lie against Ford and Winnebago. ²⁷² Even assuming, arguendo, that the Hardys could pursue a revocation claim against Ford and Winnebago, we would find that the trial court properly granted the motion for judgment. There was no dispute below that Ford manufactured the motor home’s chassis, and that Winnebago manufactured the coach. The written warranties provided by each manufacturer, which were admitted into evidence, expressed as much, and Mr. Hardy explained at trial that the Ford warranty “covers the complete chas[sis] of the [Wjinnebago” while the Winnebago warranty “applied to the coach or home part.” As § 2-608 makes clear, a buyer may revoke acceptance if, inter alia, there is a nonconformity that substantially impairs the value of the goods to him.

In Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 49 Md.App. 547, 553-54 , 433 A.2d 1218 (1981), this Court explained: A nonconformity exists when the goods are not in accordance with the obligations under the contract.... The substantiality requirement bars revocation for defects which are trivial or easily corrected ... or for those which merely make the tender somewhat less than perfect____ Whether a nonconformity substantially impairs the product’s value to the buyer necessarily involves consideration of subjective factors, i.e., the particular needs and circumstances of the individual buyer, yet proof of substantial impairment requires more than the buyer’s subjective assertion that the value of the product to him was impaired; it requires evidence from which the trier of fact, applying objective standards, can infer that the needs of the buyer were not met because of the nonconformity. It is clear that the question of whether there exists a nonconformity which substantially impairs the value to the buyer is one of fact, to be decided by the jury on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. (Citations omitted.) As to Ford, the Hardys presented evidence that the drive shaft problem was noisy and inconvenient.

They took the ²⁷³ motor home in for repairs three times during their cross-country trip, and left it at Recreation World for several months after their return. The alleged problems with the drive shaft did not prevent the Hardys from making the trip, however, and did not cause them to alter their travel plans significantly. As the trial court explained, two Ford dealers offered to replace the drive shaft