Harper v. Harper

WEANT, Judge. The parties in this case, Sylvester E. Harper and Amaryllis M. Harper, currently making their second appearance before this Court, have already received considerable attention from the legal community; their divorce provided the Court of Appeals with the opportunity to adopt new standards governing the application of Maryland’s Marital Property Act [Property Disposition in Divorce Annulment Act, Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. (1980 Repl.Vol., 1981 Cum. Supp.) §§ 3-6A-01 through 3-6A-07]. See Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54 , 448 A.2d 916 (1982).

In that decision, the Court of Appeals partially reversed this Court’s holding in ¹⁹⁵ Harper v. Harper, 49 Md.App. 339 , 431 A.2d 761 (1981), and remanded the case to the trial court with orders that it: determine the source of the funds contributed to the real property and the marital residence by each of the spouses and the marital unit; . . . determine the extent to which the property and the marital residence are to be characterized as nonmarital or marital; ... determine the value of the marital property; and make an equitable distribution of the value of the marital property with due regard being given to all of the relevant factors. Harper, 294 Md. at 82 , 448 A.2d 916 . Pursuant to this mandate, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County concluded that: (1) the residence of the parties, located at 1206 Louis Road, was marital property, (2) the total value of all the marital property, including the residence, was $52,451.40, and (3) a monetary award was necessary in view of the parties’ interests in the marital property, and ordered Mr. Harper to pay Mrs. Harper one-half the total value of the property ($26,225.70) as a marital award within one year of the date of the decree. Disgruntled with the decision, Mr. Harper appeals, raising two issues for our consideration.

A précis of these issues follows: I. Whether the lower court erred in determining that the 1206 Louis Road residence was “marital property.” II. Whether the lower court erred in finding that there was no agreement between the parties removing the residence from inclusion as marital property. I. Appellant’s dissatisfaction with the trial court’s decision stems from its characterization of the Harpers’s marital residence as “marital property” pursuant to Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 3-6A.....01(e), and the inclusion by the court of the value of that residence in its calculation of the monetary award to Mrs. Harper. Id., § 3-6A-05. ¹⁹⁶ Appellant accepts all other findings of fact made by the court regarding the parties’ other properties, and the acquisition of the lot and marital residence itself, including the court’s conclusion that the lot upon which the home was constructed was 59% nonmarital and 41% marital property.

The appellant takes the position that the residence, which he characterizes as a “permanent improvement” to the lot, “should be held under the same ownership rights as the land itself,” i.e., 59% nonmarital and 41% marital. Based on this reasoning, he urges this Court to remand the case to the trial court for a recalculation of the monetary award to Mrs. Harper in accordance with his interpretation of Harper, supra. Because our reading of the Court of Appeals’ decision does not support Mr. Harper’s position, we will decline his request. For the reason that neither party contests the trial court’s determination that the lot upon which the marital residence was built was 59% nonmarital property and 41% marital property or that the two other (unimproved) lots acquired during the marriage were each entirely marital property, we need be concerned only with the correctness of the court’s determination regarding the residence itself.

The trial court concluded that [b]ecause the marital residence was paid for entirely out of marital funds, it is also to be characterized entirely as marital property. Mr. Harper made mortgage payments and paid for upkeep from his salary during the marriage; no monies used for these purposes derived from gifts or inheritances to Mr. Harper. Notwithstanding Mr. Harper’s contention that his wife contributed virtually nothing, monetarily or otherwise, to the construction and maintenance of the home, the residence is marital property because all funds for its construction and upkeep were acquired during the marriage by other than inheritance or gift from a third party. See section 3-6A-01(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. ¹⁹⁷ The accuracy of this observation is seen in that Act, wherein “marital property” is defined as: all property,