Harris v. Bowie

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case originated as an action for negligence brought by the plaintiff-appellee, Theodore Carl Bowie, against the defendant-appellant, Rebecca Linda Harris, to recover for injuries sustained by the appellee when he was struck by the automobile operated by the appellant. The case was submitted to a jury and one of the questions that was left to its decision was, whether the evidence showed the existence of a sidewalk on the north side of Alder Street so that they could further find that the plaintiff was in a crosswalk when he was struck by the defendant’s car. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and from the judgment entered thereon this appeal was taken.

The circumstances surrounding the happening of the accident are as follows. On December 17, 1965, at about 4:35 p.m., ⁴⁶⁷ the appellee was crossing Pennington Avenue from east to west on his way to Cleve’s Bar, situated on the north west corner of Alder, a dead-end, unpaved street, forty feet wide and approximately one block long, debouching at the west side of Pennington Avenue. The appellant was, at the same time, operating her automobile in a southerly direction in the curb lane of Pennington Avenue, which runs approximately north and south at this point and is a four lane boulevard. The plaintiff testified that he looked both ways before starting to cross and that on seeing southbound traffic in both lanes about a block away he thought he had time to cross.

On reaching the center of the street he saw two southbound cars about half a block away with the car in the curb lane about one and one-half car lengths behind the car in the left lane. The appellee stated that the next time he looked the appellant’s car was about four feet from him and that he began to run and had one foot on the curb when he was struck. The appellant’s vehicle was in the curb lane at all times and there were no skid marks or indications that she .swerved to avoid striking the appellee. The appellant contends that the court should have ruled as a matter of law that there was no sidewalk on Alder Street instead of submitting the issue to the jury and further, that as this would mean that there was no crosswalk across Pennington Avenue, the plaintiff would be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

We do not agree with this contention. The importance of the fact of the existence, vel non, of a crosswalk is the duty of care owed by pedestrians and motorists. In general the law is that a pedestrian has the right of way in a crosswalk while a motorist has the right of way between street crossings. Code (1957), Article 66yi, Section 236.

This is not to say that a pedestrian may blindly step into the path of an oncoming automobile simply because he is in a crosswalk, nor does it mean that he is negligent per se if he crosses in the middle of a block. The place where he crosses, whether it be in the middle of the block or in a crosswalk, simply causes the greater burden of care to rest on the pedestrian or the motorist. Henderson v. Brown, 214 Md. 463 , 135 A. 2d 881 . The definitions for crosswalk, sidewalk and other relevant ⁴⁶⁸ terms used here are defined in Code (1957), Article 66j4, Section 2(a) as follows: “(9) Crosswalk.

Any portion of a roadway distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other marking on the surface or that portion of a roadway ordinarily included within the prolongation or connection of the lateral lines of sidewalks at intersections. “(52) Sidewalk. That portion of a street between the curb lines, or the lateral lines, of a roadway, and the adjacent property intended for the use of pedestrians. “(47) Roadway. That portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel. “(20) Intersection. The area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or if none, the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or