Harris v. Janco Enterprises

Adkins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we are asked to hold that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Mason, J.) erred when it declined to order appellees (the employer and the insurer in a workmen’s compensation case) to reimburse appellant (the claimant in that case) for the testimony fee of an evaluating physician who testified for appellant on appeal from the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. We think Judge Mason did not err, and affirm. The facts are undisputed.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission found that appellant Harris had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by appellee Janeo Enterprises, Inc. It found a 60 percent permanent total disability by reason of this injury. Harris appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The jury found the disability arising from the accidental injury to be 100 percent. Prior to the trial of that appeal, the parties stipulated as to admissibility of most of the applicable medical reports.

Appellees, however, declined to so stipulate as to the report of Dr. Eli M. Lippman, a physician who had examined Harris more than five years after the accident, for the sole purpose of evaluating his disability and testifying at the trial. 1 They insisted on their right to cross-examine Dr. Lippman. Dr. Lippman testified at the trial (to good effect, it would seem) and then billed Harris $750. Harris asked the Com ⁶⁷⁶ mission to order appellees to pay the testimony fee. The Commission refused to do so.

Harris again appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Both sides moved for summary judgment. Judge Mason granted appellees’ motion and entered judgment for them. Harris points out, as he did below, that Article 101, § 37 (a) requires an employer to provide medical treatment and services for an injured employee, as required by the Commission.

Section 37 (c) provides that "fees and other charges for such treatment and services shall be subject to regulation by the Commission... .” In its Guide of Medical and Surgical Fees, the Commission has established a fee to be charged for medical testimony. These provisions, he argues, govern medical testimony both before the Commission and at trial on appeal, since Article 101, § 56 (a) provides that if "a claimant needs medical attention pending any appeal, . .. the Commission shall retain jurisdiction to entertain a request for additional medical treatment and attention, and may issue a supplemental order requiring the employer to furnish additional medical treatment and attention....” Harris recognizes that § 56 (a) also provides that on appeal "the practice prevailing in civil cases as to the payment of costs and the fees of medical and other witnesses shall apply.” He concedes that in the absence of pertinent statute or rule, this practice normally requires each side to pay its own medical experts. But, he says, the just-quoted provision is in conflict with the § 37 (a) language. He argues that in case of uncertainty or conflict, the Workmen’s Compensation Law should be construed in favor of the employee, in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes, Lisowsky v. White, 177 Md. 377 , 9 A.2d 599 (1939); Coats and Clark’s Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md. App. 10 , 383 A.2d 67 (1978); Keene v. Insley, 26 Md. App. 1 , 337 A.2d 168 (1975).

We have no quarrel with the general principles of law asserted by Harris. But "neither statutory language nor legislative intent can be stretched beyond the fair implication of the statute’s words or its purpose.” Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335 , 449 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1982). Here, ⁶⁷⁷ we see neither ambiguity in nor conflict between the statutory provisions in question. Properly read, their language is fatal to Harris’ position.

Section 37 (a) defines what is meant by medical treatment and services. It directs the employer to provide "for such period as the nature of the injury may require, such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, medicines, crutches, apparatus, artificial hands, arms, feet and legs and other prosthetic appliances as may be required by the Commission.. . .” It is perfectly clear that this language deals with medical services necessary or desirable to treat the effects of the injury, and not with services rendered by a physician solely for the purpose of evaluating the extent of disability in order to present testimony on that issue. Section 37 (c) authorizes the Commission to regulate "fees and other charges for such treatment” as does the similar language of §