Harris v. State

Anderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, William Harris, Jr., was tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore by a jury, Judge Dorf presiding, for murder arising out of an armed robbery and for armed robbery. He was found guilty of murder in the first degree, without capital punishment, and attempted armed robbery. A sentence of life imprisonment was imposed upon the murder conviction and a sentence of twenty years was imposed upon the attempted armed robbery conviction, to run consecutively.

Three contentions are raised by appellant on appeal. They are: 1) That the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the confession of an accomplice. ⁶⁶⁰ 2) That the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to return verdicts of acquittal if it found the defendant’s confession to be involuntary. 3) That the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant’s motion for a mistrial because of the prosecutor’s remarks in his closing argument. I Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the statement of William Shelton, alleged accomplice of appellant. Shelton was called as a rebuttal witness for the State.

Shelton testified that he was in the vicinity of Proctor and Preston Streets, in Baltimore, when he saw five or six boys grab a man named Martin and pull him into an alley. Martin was assaulted and robbed and Shelton admitted participating 1 before fleeing from the scene. Shelton implicated appellant by testifying that Harris was at the scene of the robbery, and that Harris, just prior to the robbery, had shown him a .25 caliber automatic and put it up to his face. Shelton indicated that he heard a shot after he had run about a block and a half from the scene.

The witness then stated that he encountered Harris about twenty-five minutes later still in the vicinity of the crime at the corner of Greenmount and Preston. According to Shelton, appellant asked him for money. Shelton replied that he had none and asked Harris “why he shoot the man.” Shelton testified that appellant answered by saying that he had to shoot the man because “the man had seen his face and he didn’t want the man to pick' no photograph out on him.” On recross examination, Shelton admitted to several prior convictions and acknowledged that an agreement had been made with the State for him to plead guilty to ⁶⁶¹ a lesser charge with reference to his involvement in the same crime in return for his testimony against the defendant. On redirect examination, following the above recross examination, the State introduced, over defense counsel’s objection, a signed statement made by Shelton to police officers after his arrest which substantiated his direct testimony at trial.

Harris contends that prior consistent, statements of a witness are admissible only when the witness has been impeached on the basis of having made prior inconsistent statements. Appellant cites Stocksdale v. Cullison, 35 Md. 322 , in support of his contention and concludes that since Shelton had not been impeached in this manner it was error to admit the statement. We do not agree with appellant’s reasoning. The general rule in this State governing the admission of consistent statements does not depend on the manner of impeachment as appellant alleges.

According to the Court of Appeals, in Gill v. Staylor, 93 Md. 453, 468 , the rule was originally laid down in Cooke v. Curtis, 6 H. & J. 93 , “that where the credibility of a witness is attacked by the opposite party his prior declarations may be given in evidence to show his consistency.” See also Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Davison, 30 Md. 92 . In Stocksdale v. Cullison, supra, at p. 326, the Court said: “The general rule is, that evidence that the witness has on other occasions made statements similar to what he testified in the cause is not admissible; unless where a design to misrepresent is charged upon the witness in consequence of his relation to the party or to the cause; in which case it seems it may be proper to show that he made a similar statement before that relation existed.” See also Cross v. State, 118 Md. 660, 670 ; American Stores v. Herman, 166 Md. 312, 316 . Defense counsel’s recross examination of Shelton, as revealed by the record, includes references to the wit ⁶⁶² ness’s prior convictions and questions exploring the nature of an alleged agreement between the State and Shelton for the latter to testify in exchange for the State accepting a guilty plea to lesser charges.

It also includes a general factual probing by defense counsel of Shelton’s previously given testimony in an attempt to expose possible confusion or uncertainty on the part of the witness. Shelton’s statement was offered and admitted for the sole purpose of establishing the witness’s credibility. The foundation for its admission was established — the spectre of a “design to misrepresent” as a consequence of Shelton’s “relation to the party or to the cause” was clearly raised in defense counsel’s recross examination in regards to plea-bargaining. II In his second contention,