Harris v. Whiteley

Schmucker, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal raises the question whether the appellee, Seth H. Whiteley, has by virtue of his marriage such an interest in his wife’s real estate as is liable to be levied upon by his judgment creditors. There is no dispute as to the material facts of the case which are as follows: The appellees, who are husband and wife, were married in 1881. Mrs. Whiteley in 1866, while yet unmarried, acquired under the will of her grandfather, John Brooks, a vested remainder in certain real estate subject to a life interest therein given by the will to her now deceased mother, Rachel H. Matthews.

The life estate of Mrs. Matthews was not devised directly to her but was given to her brother, Isaac Brooks, in trust for her benefit. In a partition of the estate the portion of the real and personal estate applicable to the devise for the benefit of Mrs. Matthews for life with remainder to her daughter, Mrs. Whiteley, was set apart and delivered into the possession of Isaac Brooks, the trustee, who managed it until the death of the equitable life tenant, which occurred in March, 1903. Shortly after Mrs. Matthews death the appellees filed an amicable bill in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against Isaac Brooks, the trustee, reciting the nature and history of the trust and alleging that upon the death of Mrs. Matthews, the equitable life tenant, the appellee, Mary E. Whiteley, had ⁴⁴⁰ demanded of the trustee the absolute delivery to her of all of the property which he had held in trust during the life of her mother and that the trustee, although not denying her right to the property absolutely, declined to transfer and deliver it to her without the direction of some Court of competent jurisdiction. The bill then prayed that the defendant be directed to make a full report of the property which he had held as trustee and to transfer it absolutely to Mrs. Whiteley.

The defendant answered the bill admitting its allegations and consenting to the granting of the relief prayed for, and he accompanied his answer with a schedule of the real and personal estate which had come to his hands or under his control as trustee. The case was by an order of Court referred to the Auditor and Master for a report and opinion thereon. At that stage of the case the appellants, who held judgments for large amounts against the appellee, Seth H. Whiteley, intervened in the proceedings by a petition setting up the claim that Whiteley under and by virtue of sec. 7 of Art. 45 of the Code.as amended by ch. 457 of the Acts of 1898 had a vested estate for life in one-third of all of the lands held or owned by his wife, the appellee, Mary E. Whiteley, including the real estate mentioned in these proceedings which she had acquired by devise in 1866, and that their judgments had become liens on said real estate to the extent of the interest of her said husband therein. The petition further alleged on information and belief that some portion of the personal prop'erty in the hands of Isaac Brooks, the trustee, consisted of the proceeds of real estate left to Mrs. Whiteley by the will of her grandfather and the petitioners claimed that they were also entitled to an equitable lien under their judgments on such personal property.

The petitioners prayed to be made parties to the case and to have their alleged lien recognized and protected in any disposition that might be made under the Court’s direction of the real estate and also of such portion of the personalty in the hands of- the trustee as represented the proceeds of converted realty. The appellees, Whiteley and wife, answered this petition ⁴⁴¹ denying the rights of the petitioners, and the trustees demurred to it. The issue upon the petition having come to a hearing the Circuit Court dismissed the petition with costs by the order from which the present appeal was taken. The appellees also set up in their answer and relied upon an ante-nuptial contract between Mr. and Mrs. Whiteley to exeeute a deed of trust of her real estate to a trustee for her sole and separate use, but we deem it unnecessary, in the view of the' case which we take, to further advert to that instrument.

The fundamental question presented by the record is whether sec. 7 of the Act of 1898 operated to change the expectant interest in his wife’s real estate which Seth H. Whiteley took by virtue of his marriage to her in 1881, under the laws then in force, into a present vested estate for his life which is liable to be levied on by his creditors. That Act as a whole repealed and re-enacted the entire Art. 45 of the Code relating to husband and wife and made radical changes in the property interests respectively acquired by each of them in the other’s estate by virtue of entering into the marital relation. Sec. 7 of the Act which defines the interest in. his wife’s real estate which the husband takes by virtue of the marriage is the one upon which the appellants in their petition rely. That section is as follows : Sec. 7. “Every husband shall acquire by virtue of his marriage an estate for his life in one-third of the lands held or owned by his wife at any time during the marriage, whether by legal or equitable title, or whether held by her at the time of her death or not, but such estate shall not operate to the prejudice of any claim for the purchase-money of such lands, or other lien on the same ; nor shall any conveyance of such lands by the wife alone bar such estate of the husband therein.” The language used in this section would not, under the prevailing rules of construction, be held to manifest an intention on the part of the Legislature to give its provisions such retroactive operation as to disturb or impair existing property rights. ⁴⁴² In Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 507 , the Court say: “It is a sound rule of construction founded in the wisdom of the common law that whenever a statute is susceptible, without doing violence to its express terms of being understood either prospectively or retrospectively Courts of Justice invariably adopt the former construction.

A statute ought not to have a retroactive