Harrison v. Motor Vehicle Administration

W. ALBERT MENCHINE, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned. This litigation involves two separately filed cases in two circuit courts, each seeking the same relief—denied by one court—granted by the other. Case No. 1—(Harrison) Arthur L. Harrison, Sr. (Harrison) filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court for Charles County against the Motor Vehicle Administration of the Department of Transportation (MVA), seeking a declaratory judgment that his motor vehicle driving and registration privileges had been illegally suspended and that a mandatory injunction be issued to compel restoration of those privileges. The Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF) intervened in the proceedings.

The relief sought was denied. Harrison appealed. Case No. 2—(Thacker) Clifton Lewis Thacker (Thacker) filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the Motor Vehicle Administration of the Department of Transportation (MVA), seeking a declaratory judgment that his motor vehicle driving and registration privileges had been illegally suspended and that a mandatory injunction be issued to compel restoration of those privileges. The Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF) intervened in the proceedings.

The relief sought was granted. MVA and MAIF appealed. When the separate appeals reached the Court of Special Appeals, on motion by MVA and MAIF and with the consent of Harrison and Thacker, that court consolidated the cases for purposes of oral argument and decision. A brief history of the commencement and subsequent amplification of the State’s determination to accord a meas ⁶³⁸ ure of amelioration to the economic havoc visited upon the persons and the families of those injured and killed by financially irresponsible negligent motorists will provide a useful preface to our discussion of the cases.

The first State plan to deal with the problem was by the passage of ch. 498, Laws of 1931. This statute required the suspension of the driving and registration privileges of negligent uninsured motorists against whom final judgments had been entered which were not paid within 30 days. The statute provided for the return of the privileges only when: (1) the amounts specified in the Act had been credited upon the judgments, or (2) the court in its discretion had authorized the payment of the judgments in installments. The plan failed to achieve relief and was followed by the passage of ch. 836, Laws of 1957 whereby the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF) was created.

Funding of UCJF was provided in the first instance by $1.00 assessments against insured motorists and $8.00 assessments against uninsured motorists and an assessment of lh of 1% against motor vehicle liability insurers in 1958 and by continuing assessments thereafter against those insurers. The Act made no provision for compulsory insurance. Administered by a board comprising the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, the Commissioner of Insurance, and four representatives of insurers, the Act provided for payment to qualified judgment creditors from the State Treasury within the statute’s prescribed limits upon assignment of the judgment to UCJF. The then existing provisions of law governing the suspension and return of driving and registration privileges were continued in force and were supplemented by restrictions of a very stringent nature respecting their return in cases where UCJF had paid judgments pursuant to the Act, i.e.: “145Y.

Registration, etc., not restored until fund is reimbursed. (a) Where the license or driving privileges of any person, or the registration of a motor vehicle registered in his name, have been suspended or revoked under the ⁶³⁹ Motor Vehicle Financial-Responsibility Law of this state, and the treasurer has paid from the fund any amount in settlement of a claim or towards satisfaction of a judgment against that person, the suspension or revocation shall not be removed, nor the license, privileges, or registration, restored, nor shall any new license or privileges be issued or granted to, or registration be permitted to be made by, that person until he has— (1) Repaid in full to the treasurer the amount so paid by him, together with interest thereon at four per centum (4%) per annum from the date of such payment, or has undertaken in writing, in the manner provided in section 145L, to repay to the treasurer the sum to be paid under a settlement, or has obtained a court order permitting payment of the amount of his indebtedness to the fund to be made in installments; and (2) Satisfied all requirements of said Motor Vehicle Financial-Responsibility Law in respect of giving proof of ability to respond in damages for future accidents.” The judgments extended against Harrison and Thacker occurred during the lifetime of the UCJF. Neither repaid or agreed to repay the treasurer. Neither obtained a court order permitting payment of the judgments in installments.

The current State plan to lessen the economic loss resulting from financially irresponsible motorists was initiated by ch. 73, Laws of 1972, creating MAIF. Under its provisions compulsory insurance covering all motor vehicles was required for the first time. Under this statute MAIF occupied a dual role: (1) as an insurer required to provide insurance coverage to motorists unable to obtain the same from private insurers and (2) as successor to UCJF to pay, within specified limits, judgments entered against: (a) uninsured motorists who operated motor vehicles despite penal statutes; (b) known motorists beyond the reach of legal process, and (c) unknown operators of undiscovered vehicles. The legislative design to continue the stringent restrictions respecting return of license and registration privileges under MAIF as successor to UCJF is shown by ⁶⁴⁰ the plain language of the creating statute as will be shown.

It is solely MAIF’s role as successor to UCJF with which we deal under the facts of these cases. The Facts Case No. 1 (Harrison) Harrison’s driving and registration privileges had been suspended on January 11, 1963 after separate judgments: (1) for wrongful death under Lord Campbell’s Act; (2) for personal injuries; and (3) for property damage, had been entered against him as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle upon the highways of Maryland. Harrison was an uninsured motorist on the date of the accident and upon application of the judgment creditors UCJF paid the judgments to the extent of the limits then prescribed by law and the judgments were assigned to that agency. On June 1, 1977—more than 12 years after entry of the aforesaid judgments and without renewal within that period—the suspensions were withdrawn and his driving and registration credentials were returned by MVA.

On July 11, 1983, however, MVA notified Harrison that his privileges would again be suspended under MVA’s contention that his privileges had been returned erroneoúsly on June 1, 1977 in violation of law. On September 3, 1983 the privileges were again suspended. This action was brought by Harrison on September 21, 1983 and the relief prayed by Harrison was denied by the trial court. Case No. 2 (Thacker) Thacker’s driving and registration privileges had been suspended in November, 1963 after a judgment for damages for personal injuries had been entered against him as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle upon the highways of Maryland.

Thacker was an uninsured motorist on the date of the accident and upon application of the judgment creditor UCJF paid the judgment to the extent of the limits then prescribed by law and the judgment was assigned to that agency. ⁶⁴¹ In June, 1977—more than 12 years after entry of the aforesaid judgment and without renewal within that period—the suspensions were withdrawn and Thacker’s driving and registration credentials were returned by the MVA. On October 19, 1983, however, MVA notified Thacker that his privileges would again be suspended on November 3, 1983 under MVA’s contention that his privileges had been returned erroneously in June, 1977 in violation of law. This action was brought by Thacker on November 2, 1983 and resulted in the passage of an order permanently enjoining MVA “from suspending the Maryland drivers license, Maryland registration plates and registration cards.” We granted certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals to resolve the difference of view in the two circuit courts. The Decision MVA acted under Transportation Article, Title 17, Vehicle Laws—Required Security, Subtitle 2, Nonpayment of Judgment, Section 17-204, that reads as follows: “§ 17-204.

Suspension of license and registration on nonpayment of judgment. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, on receipt of a certified copy of a judgment and a certificate of facts, the Administration shall suspend: (1) The license to drive of the judgment debtor; and (2) The registration of all vehicles owned by the judgment debtor and registered in this State»” 1 Maryland Code, Article 48A, § 243G (unchanged in any substantive way since its inception in ch. 73, Laws of 1972) governing MAIF’s function as successor to UCJF reads as follows: “§ 243G. Claims against Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund; transitional provisions. ⁶⁴² (a) All claims against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund existing as of the close of business on December 31, 1972, shall be transferred to and be deemed to be claims against the Fund. Any claim arising prior to January 1, 1973, which could have been made against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund after January 1, 1973, but for the repeal of § 7-635 of Article 66V2, may be made against the Fund to the extent that such a claim is not covered by a policy of insurance.

The provisions of §§ 7-606 through 7-629, inclusive, of Article 661A of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Replacement Volume), shall continue in effect with respect to all such claims covered by the provisions of this section notwithstanding any repeal of those sections generally; and, except that any reference to the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board or the board in said sections, or in any other laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, directives, legal actions, contracts, or other documents shall be deemed to refer to the executive director, all such claims shall be processed and resolved in accordance therewith.” (Emphasis added.) It will be observed that the stringent restrictions upon the return of the license and registration privileges of such judgment debtors as Harrison and Thacker as were imposed by § 145Y of § 1, ch. 836, Laws of 1957, supra, were continued in full force and effect by continuing the life of § 7-629 of Article 66V2 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Repl.Vol.) 2 in the above section in spite of the ⁶⁴³ repeal of that and other sections generally. In the subject cases neither Harrison nor Thacker has repaid or made any arrangement to repay the monies paid by UCJF to the judgment creditors from the State Treasury. Nor has either obtained a court order permitting payment in installments. But, say Harrison and Thacker, the restrictive provisions of Article 6672, § 7-629, supra, in its extended life under Article 48A, § 243G, supra, apply only when the judgment upon which suspension depends is an “enforceable judgment.” They contend that the judgments are not “enforceable judgments” because more than twelve years have passed since their obtention without action by UCJF or MAIF to renew them within a 12-year period.

For their contention that the judgments against them must be “enforceable judgments” the argument of Harrison and Thacker is somewhat convoluted. This is so because the current language of Transportation