Hart v. State

Liss, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ³⁴² On June 26,1981, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied the motion of Tedd Sidney Hart, appellant, to dismiss, on the grounds of double jeopardy, the charge against him of driving while intoxicated. The same day the appellant noted an appeal to this Court of the denial of his motion. The agreed statement of facts, entered into the record by the State incident to the appeal, is that: The state’s evidence would be that Officer Quinn on 12/12/1980 was sitting at Dundalk and Center Place in Baltimore County, Maryland. At that time he was in his marked patrol car.

He would testify he heard coming up from behind him a loud noise. He turned and saw a motorcycle. He would testify that the defendant... was the driver of the motorcycle. He would state that the defendant stopped the motorcycle at the intersection of a stop sign, that he made a left-hand on to Center Place and at that time he did a wheely or pulled the front of the motorcycle up, off the ground.

At that time the engine stalled out and the defendant got off the motorcycle and was wheeling it down the road when the officer stopped him. And at that time, Your Honor, he made the observations that are on the sheet. The sheet referred to is a report concerning the officer’s observations relative to sobriety. In its brief, the State candidly concedes: On March 20, 1981, a charging document was filed against appellant in the district court for driving while intoxicated and negligent driving.

It was stipulated that on that date appellant prayed a jury trial on the charge of driving while intoxicated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the negligent driving charge was called for trial in the District Court on March 27, 1981. The charge was read to the defendant, who offered a not guilty plea, and testimony was given by the prosecuting police officer and partially by the defendant. During the ³⁴³ course of the proceedings, the trial judge learned for the first time that a jury trial had been prayed on the driving while intoxicated charge, which was a companion case to the negligent driving charge.

The court then sua sponte struck the not guilty plea to the negligent driving charge and referred it to the circuit court for trial together with the driving while intoxicated charge. No verdict was entered as to either charge. On May 21,1981, appellant filed a motion to dismiss both charges on the ground of double jeopardy. On June 26,1981, a hearing was held on the motion in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and appellant’s motion was denied.

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed the same day. The sole question presented by the appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss. On appeal the appellant contends that the district court proceedings were sufficient to raise a double jeopardy bar to further proceedings in the circuit court on offenses contained in that charging document, particularly with regard to the driving while intoxicated charge. The State argues that the proceedings in the district court were a nullity and therefore are not a barrier to further proceedings in the circuit court on either of the charges against the defendant.

In Parks v. State, 287 Md. 11, 19 , 410 A.2d 597 (1980), the Court of Appeals observed: [O]ur cases demonstrate that when the trial court has fundamental jurisdiction over a criminal cause, its judgment is not invalidated because of an improper exercise of that jurisdiction. As noted in Parojinog [v. State, 282 Md. 256 (1978)], the State could not retry the defendant because in effect, he had already been convicted in the District Court, which conviction remained unreversed. In Block [v. State, 286 Md. 266 (1979)], the State could not retry the defendant because he had been acquitted on the merits. However, in each of these cases, the trial court had improperly exercised its jurisdiction. ³⁴⁴ Thus, under Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl.

Vol.) § 4-302 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the district court had no exclusive original jurisdiction over the negligent driving charge where the filing of the charging document preceded the demand for a jury trial and where the two charges arose from the same circumstances. In the instant case the district court had fundamental