Hartford Insurance v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc.

BELL, Judge. The issue this case presents involves causation, proximate and superseding. This case arose when an escaped patient from a State-operated hospital for the mentally ill stole a van that had been left unattended, with the keys in the ignition, and, while driving the van, subsequently struck another automobile, causing personal injury and property damage. The injured driver, Robert Wewer (“Wewer”), having been com ¹³⁹ pensated for his injuries, pursuant to an existing insurance policy, his carrier, The Hartford Insurance Company, the petitioner, sued the State of Maryland (“the State”) and Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc. (“Manor Inn”), the respondents, for negligence, seeking to recover what it paid out in connection with Wewer’s claim.

The Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered summary judgment in favor of both defendants and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Hartford Insurance Company v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., et al., 94 Md.App. 225 , 617 A.2d 590 (1992). We granted certiorari to consider the State’s duty to warn when the injured person is not a member of an identifiable class and whether, in this case, the negligence of the thief, rather than Manor Inn’s negligence, which facilitated the theft, was the proximate cause of the accident. I. Robert Lee Griffin (“Griffin”) was involuntarily committed to the Springfield Hospital Center, an inpatient facility located in Sykesville, Carroll County, Maryland and operated by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for the treatment of mentally ill individuals.

The certification pursuant to which he was admitted indicated that admission was necessary for his protection or for the protection of another. Consequently, Griffin was placed on a high security ward for acutely disturbed patients. He subsequently eloped from Springfield. Three days after he was discovered missing, Griffin turned up in Bethesda, Maryland.

Not being aware that Griffin had eloped and believing that he was homeless and in need of emergency shelter, Montgomery County police officers took Griffin to the Manor Inn. Pursuant to an agreement with the Montgomery County Department of Social Services, he was assigned a room for the night. Springfield was not notified. On the following morning, an employee of Manor Inn parked a laundry van in front of Griffin’s room, leaving it unattended, with the doors unlocked and the keys in the ignition.

Griffin was seen entering the van and driving away. ¹⁴⁰ Approximately thirty minutes later, he negligently drove the van into Wewer’s car, which was stopped at a stop sign. 1 Having compensated its insured, but believing that, together, the negligence of the State and of Manor Inn was the proximate cause of the accident, the petitioner filed suit against them seeking to recover what it paid out. As to the State, the petitioner relied on the State’s duty to supervise and detain Griffin. The negligence it alleged as to Manor Inn was its employee leaving the van unattended with the keys in the ignition. Manor Inn filed a cross complaint against the State in which it also alleged the State’s negligence in failing properly to supervise and detain Griffin.

The State moved for summary judgment against both the petitioner and Manor Inn, both of whom opposed it. Following a hearing, the court granted the motion and, notwithstanding that Manor Inn did not move for summary judgment with respect to the petitioner’s claim against it, sua sponte, entered summary judgment in favor of Manor Inn. 2 As to the State of Maryland, the court said: See, that is where I think the difficulty really is. You say it is a duty to identifiable persons as opposed—as you saying, it is a duty to persons who they might reasonably foresee this injury resulting. That is the causal connection, but that—your client, your insurer was not identifiable until after he stole the car and ¹⁴¹ ran into her.

So, it would have no way of warning her because they didn’t know who it was. !¡t $1 iji * # # Even the California case doesn’t give liability that it is foreseeable that they know he is going to—that he stab or shoot people, and still no liability even in California they negligently release him, the psychiatrist evidently lets him go. At this point the only exception they carved out when they have knowledge of specific, identifiable people against whom he may commit these violent acts. They have a duty to warn to those people that look out, here he comes. And only those that are identifiable, that, that they have the previous knowledge and notice of, and that is still my understanding of what Judge Lowe was saying in the [Furr v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 53 Md.App. 474 , 454 A.2d 414 , cert. denied, 296 Md. 60 (1983)] case.

As to Manor Inn, the court “determin[ed] their negligence was merely passive, and they cannot be held responsible for the actions of Mr. Griffin in negligently running into somebody.” It explained further: The question, Is it foreseeable that if you leave your keys in your car that somebody with a dangerous propensity is going to come and steal the car—I don’t see what difference it makes whether it occurs within a reasonable proximity of where the car was parked or it occurs a day later or five days later or one block or several blocks except an argument that may be made that if it is passive negligence, but it is a contributing factor, leaving the keys in, it is foreseeable that an unqualified driver may steal the car. I don’t see it necessarily foreseeable. It sounds more to me like you are dealing in possibilities rather than probabilities or foreseeables. But, let’s assume that then if they are saying that once it is reported stolen and they have an opportunity to endeavor to get the car back, the fact that somebody after several days later runs into somebody else, ¹⁴² that is so far remote even from the passive negligence that there is a sensation in the violation of the statute.

I read that case to suggest the passive negligence of leaving the keys in the car is a violation of the statute that does not per se give rise to liability when the injury is caused by an intervening person who comes and negligently operates that motor vehicle. It wouldn’t make any difference whether he—if any of you did that, whether you would have the keys in the cars and that one thief steals it and runs into somebody, they would be negligent. The car behind it is hot wired and also run in—there is no— what do the keys to the car have to do with the fact that somebody negligently operated other than make it easier for them to steal it. In affirming, the Court of Special Appeals agreed “that, under the decision of Furr [v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 53 Md.App. 474 , 454 A.2d 414 , cert. denied, 296 Md. 60 (1983).], [the petitioner’s] insured was not a readily identifiable victim and thus the State owed him no duty of care.” 94 Md.App. at 241 , 617 A.2d at 598 .

As to Manor Inn, it said: [W]hen the key is left in the ignition of an unattended vehicle, the taking of that vehicle by an unknown or unauthorized third party who negligently causes damages is an independent and intervening factor, not reasonably foreseeable to the driver, thereby relieving the owner or person in charge of the vehicle from liability for damages caused by a third-party’s negligent driving or operation of the vehicle. Id. at 238-39 , 617 A.2d at 597 . Like the circuit court, the intermediate appellate court did not find it relevant “whether the injuries [were] remote in time or space to the negligent failure of a driver to remove the keys from the ignition.” Id. at 238 , 617 A.2d at 596 .

II

The petitioner argues that it was error for the trial court to grant the motion for summary judgment in favor of the State ¹⁴³ against both Manor Inn and the petitioner and despite Manor Inn’s failure to file a motion, to enter, sua sponte, summary judgment in favor of Manor Inn against the petitioner. Addressing the State’s judgment first, it maintains that the undisputed evidence clearly discloses that the State violated its duty to properly supervise and detain a mentally ill patient involuntarily committed to one of its facilities and that that breach of duty was the proximate cause of Wewer’s injuries. On the other hand, the petitioner recognizes that, “[u]nder the current state of the law, in the absence of a specific identifiable plaintiff, the State is exonerated for failing to properly exercise control over Mr. Griffin or any inpatient.” Nevertheless, it urges that “[t]he lack of an identifiable victim should not release the State from liability for its blatant failure to carry out its duty.” It asks that we establish a standard which would hold the State liable for its acts of negligence. With respect to Manor Inn, the petitioner argues that it was a jury question whether Manor Inn’s violation of a statute caused or contributed to Wewer’s injuries.

In this case, it is undisputed, the petitioner points out, that Manor Inn’s negligence lay in violating Maryland Code (1957, 1992 RepLVol.) Transportation Article, § 21-1101, entitled “Unattended Motor Vehicle.” That violation having clearly been shown, its causal relationship to the accident is dependent upon the primary purpose of the statute and upon the attendant circumstances. Thus, while violation of a statute is evidence of negligence, the petitioner asserts, when the violation has been shown there remains the factual determination, to be made by the jury, as to whether it was the proximate cause of the injury. It argues, therefore, that summary judgment was inappropriate. The State rejoins that it does not owe a duty to the public in general; rather it owes a duty only to a specific plaintiff, whose identity was known or knowable, who fell within the risk that the patient posed.

In other words, the State argues that the concept of duty must be limited so as to avoid liability for unreasonably remote and unforeseeable consequences. Thus, citing Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 252-253 , 492 A.2d ¹⁴⁴ 1297, 1305-1306 (1985), it asserts that when no specific plaintiff is foreseeable, it owes no duty to the general public. Furthermore, the State points out, and contends, that it could not have “foreseen that, three days after Griffin eloped from the hospital in Sykesville, he would be found in Bethesda; that county police officers would fail to heed the notice of his elopement issued to law enforcement agencies and would take him to ... [the Manor Inn] motel, rather than return him to the hospital; that a motel employee would park a [laundry] van directly outside Mr. Griffin’s motel room and leave it unlocked with the keys in the ignition, and that Griffin would steal the van and drive it negligently, causing an accident.” The State’s brief at 5. Like the Court of Special Appeals, Manor Inn argues that it was Griffin’s conduct in driving the van negligently, not its negligence in leaving the van unattended, that was the proximate cause of Wewer’s injury.

Therefore, it asserts, Griffin’s negligence constituted an independent intervening cause which was not foreseeable and which relieved it of liability for Wewer’s injuries.

III

The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to decide whether there is an issue of fact sufficiently material to be tried, not to try the case or to resolve factual disputes. Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255 , 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993). See Foy v. Prudential Insurance Company of America et al., 316 Md. 418, 422 , 559 A.2d 371, 373 (1989); Coffey v. Derby Steel Company, 291 Md. 241, 247 , 434 A.2d 564, 568 (1981). Thus, the review of the grant of summary judgment involves the determination whether a dispute of material fact exists, Gross, 332 Md. at 255 , 630 A.2d at 1160 ; Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1992), and “whether the trial court was legally correct.” Heat & Power Corporation v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591 , 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990) (citations omitted).

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501(e), therefore, when the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any ¹⁴⁵ material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court shall enter summary judgment for the moving party forthwith. Gross, 332 Md. at 255 , 630 A.2d at 1160 . The determination whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and, if not, what the ruling of law should be, requires the reviewing court to resolve all inferences to be drawn from the pleadings, admissions, and affidavits, etc. against the moving party. Id. at 256 , 630 A.2d at 1160 . “In other words, all inferences must be drawn against the moving party when determining whether a factual dispute exists, even when the underlying facts are undisputed.” Id.

There are cases of this Court that hold that a trial court may enter summary judgment on its own motion. Hollander v. Lubow, 277 Md. 47, 51 , 351 A.2d 421, 423 (1976) (summary judgment can be entered in favor of all the defendants even when a motion was made by only one of them); Preissman v. Harmatz, 264 Md. 715, 721 , 288 A.2d 180, 184 (1972) (“a court may enter summary judgment on its own motion when there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact”); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 253 Md. 282, 290 , 252 A.2d 855, 860 (1969); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 411, 414 , 237 A.2d 35, 39, 40 (1968); Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 57 , 81 A.2d 232, 233 (1951). Those cases were decided prior to this Court’s adoption of Rule 2-501. That Rule, adopted April 6, 1984, effective July 1, 1984, provides that “[a]ny party may file at any time a motion for summary judgment,” Maryland Rule 2-501(a), and that “the court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maryland Rule 2-501(e) (emphasis added).

The predecessor to Rule 2-501, Rule 610 permitted the trial court to render summary judgment for the opposing party “[w]here appropriate ... even though he has not filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.” Maryland Rule 610 d 1. It was to this provision that the cases referred as support for the proposition that a ¹⁴⁶ trial court may enter summary judgment sua sponte. See Lubow, supra, 277 Md. at 51 , 351 A.2d at 423 ; Myers, supra 253 Md. at 290 , 252 A.2d at 860 ; Flournoy, 198 Md. at 57 , 81 A.2d at 233 . Rule 2-501, although it requires the filing of a motion, see section (a), by requiring the entry of judgment in favor of or against the moving party, retains the requirement of Rule 610 d 1.

Thus, it is clear that it does not contemplate, as Rule 610 d 1 did not contemplate, a court’s acting entirely on its own motion, that is to say, where none of the parties has moved for summary judgment. That interpretation is consistent with what was intended when the Rules Committee proposed, and this Court adopted, Rule 2-501. As proposed, reorganization draft rule 2-608(a), which was to become Rule 2-501(e), provided, as relevant: (a) Entry of Judgment Upon motion of a party, the court shall enter judgment in favor of the party if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Minutes, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, October 16-17, 1981 at 47.

The purpose of that sentence was stated clearly in the draft explanatory note: Section (a) sets forth the standard for the granting of a motion for summary judgment and makes it clear that a motion is in fact necessary. Consequently, a court may not grant summary judgment upon its own initiative. Id. at 48. The subcommittee was specifically asked and agreed to consider whether the court should be allowed to act on its own motion and when the rule was next presented, it had been amended to also permit entry of judgment against the moving party.

It was approved in that form and sent to the style committee. See Minutes, November 20-21, 1982 at 17-19. The only changes subsequently made to the draft rule ¹⁴⁷ were style changes, i.e. leaving the motion requirement in section (a) and treating the entry of judgment in section (e). The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Manor Inn against the petitioner sua sponte.

As we have seen, the State moved for summary judgment against both the petitioner and Manor Inn. That motion related, however, only to the petitioner’s complaint against the State, Manor Inn being involved only because of its cross-claim; it had nothing to do with and, hence, was unrelated to the petitioner’s claim against Manor Inn. Indeed, the two claims proceeded on different theories of liability. Therefore, as to the State’s motion for summary judgment, judgment could have been entered in favor of both the petitioner and Manor Inn, and against the State, even though neither had filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

On the other hand, judgment either for or, against Manor Inn on the petitioner’s claim against Manor Inn could not properly be entered, neither Manor Inn nor the petitioner having sought summary judgment as to that claim. Nevertheless, we shall decide the issue as to Manor Inn’s liability “to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.” Maryland Rule 8-131(a). There being nothing in the record to indicate that the absence of any motion for summary judgment by Manor Inn was a tactical decision by it, were we to reverse and remand, it is likely that Manor Inn would simply file a motion for summary judgment against the petitioner and a second appeal presenting the same issue between those parties would be almost inevitable. IV. “Negligence ... is conduct which falls below the standard [of care] established by law for the protection of others against [the] unreasonable risk [of harm].” William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 43, at 250 (4th ed. 1971).

The elements of a negligence action are well settled in this State: First, the defendant must be under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury. Second, the defendant must fail to ¹⁴⁸ discharge that duty. Third, the plaintiff must suffer actual loss or injury proximately resulting from that failure. Lamb, 303 Md. at 241 , 492 A.2d at 1300 .

See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 165 , 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976); Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md. 663, 669 , 267 A.2d 114, 118 (1970); Myers v. Montgomery, 253 Md. at 291 , 252 A.2d at 861 . The first element— duty—the subject of this portion of the opinion, “has been defined as ‘an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another;’ ” it “is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627 , 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986), quoting W. Page Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on The Law of Torts, § 53, at 164 (5th ed. 1984). As to it, we have observed: [Tjhere can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes to another. It is consequently relative and can have no existence apart from some duty expressly or impliedly imposed.

In every instance before' negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which duty would have averted or avoided the injury---- As the duty owed varies with circumstances and with the relation to each other of the individuals concerned, so the alleged negligence varies, and the act complained of never amounts to negligence in law or in fact; if there has been no breach of duty. West Va. Central R. Co. v. Fuller, 96 Md. 652, 666 , 54 A. 669, 671 (1903). We have also recognized that the concept of duty as owing to all persons the exercise of reasonable care to protect them from harm has to be limited if liability for unreasonably remote consequences are to be avoided.

Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 333 , 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986). One of the mechanisms that has been utilized to accomplish that limitation is, and has been, application of the variable, foreseeability, to the determination of whether a duty ¹⁴⁹ exists. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 627 , 510 A.2d at 1083 ; Henley, 305 Md. at 333-34 , 503 A.2d at 1340 . That “involves a prospective consideration of the facts existing at the time of the negligent conduct.” Henley, 305 Md. at 336 , 503 A.2d at 1341 .

In Henley , we noted that “at least since 1928 when [Chief] Judge Cardoza wrote Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 , 162 N.E. 99 (1928), courts have given further effect to the social policy of limitation of liability for remote consequences by narrowing the concept of duty to embrace only those persons or classes of persons to whom harm of some type might reasonably have been foreseen as a result of the particular tortious conduct.” Id. 305 Md. at 333-34 , 503 A.2d at 1340 . On the other hand, “ ‘foreseeability’ must not be confused with ‘duty’. The fact that a result may be foreseeable does not itself impose a duty in negligence terms.” Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628 , 510 A.2d at 1083 . In Palsgraf a passenger who was rushing to catch the defendant’s train, jumped aboard the moving train and, when he appeared to lose his balance, was assisted by the defendant’s employees.

Their assistance caused the small package he was carrying to drop onto the tracks. Because it contained fireworks, the package exploded, causing some scales on the platform, many feet away, to fall upon and injure the plaintiff. 162 N.E. at 99 . Noting that the appearance of the package gave no clue as to its contents, the court held that the consequences to the plaintiff of the defendant railroad’s conduct even if it were tortious as to the boarding passenger, were unreasonably remote; hence, she could not recover. The Court reasoned that it was unforeseeable that the act of assisting a boarding passenger who was carrying a package would result in injury to another passenger many feet away when the boarding passenger inadvertently dropped the package.

Id. 248 N.Y. at 343-344 , 162 N.E. 99 . “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension,” it opined. Id. 162 N.E. at 100 . The duty that the State is alleged to have breached is not one that flows directly from the State to the petitioner; ¹⁵⁰ rather, it involves the State’s obligation with respect to the conduct of a third person. The general rule is “that there is no duty to control a third person’s conduct so as to prevent personal harm to another, unless a ‘special relationship’ exists either between the actor and the third person or between the actor and the person injured,” Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628 , 510 A.2d at 1083 .

See Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. at 242-44 , 492 A.2d at 1300-01 ; Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. at 166 , 359 A.2d at 552 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). 3 Although section 315 of the Restatement states the general rule, section 319 addresses a particular exception to that general rule. Entitled “Duty Of Those In Charge Of Persons Having Dangerous Propensities,” it provides: One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. We expressly adopted this section of the Restatement as the law of Maryland in Lamb, 303 Md. at 245 , 492 A.2d at 1302 . In so doing, we commented that it applied to two situations: when the actor has charge of one or more of a class of persons to whom a tendency to act injuriously is normal and where the actor has charge of a third person who has a peculiar tendency to act injuriously, of which the actor has personal knowledge or experience.

Id. at 243 , 492 A.2d at 1301 . Moreover, we recognized that section 319 is peculiarly applicable to custodial situations. Id. at 244 , 492 A.2d at 1301 , citing Prosser & Keaton, supra, § 56,