Hartford Insurance v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc.

DAVIS, Judge. This appeal arises out of an insurance subrogatipn claim filed on September 7, 1990 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County by Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford), appellant, against the State of Maryland (State) and Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc. (Manor), appellees. The suit sought to recover $38,241.40 plus costs and expenses paid out to appellant’s insured, William Wewer, for injuries and damages suffered in an automobile accident. ²²⁸ On November 28,1990 the State filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. On December 4, 1990 the motion was denied.

After discovery commenced, Manor filed a cross-complaint against the State. On September 25, 1991 Manor filed an amended cross-complaint against the State. On October 23, 1991 the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment opposed by appellant and Manor. On January 9, 1991 a hearing was held on the motion before the Honorable William M. Cave.

After oral argument, the court granted the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment against appellant and sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of Manor against appellant in order to make both judgments final and appealable. On January 24, 1992 the court entered a written order to this effect. On February 6, 1992 appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court. Appellant presents the following issues for our review: 1) Whether the trial court erred in granting the State of Maryland’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 2) Whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., sua sponte.

For the following reasons, we shall affirm the orders of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, granting summary judgment in favor of Manor and the State. FACTS On August 20, 1988 Robert Lee Griffin was involuntarily committed to the Springfield State Hospital Center in Sykesville, Maryland, an inpatient facility for the mentally ill operated by the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. He had been transferred from Frederick Memorial Hospital, where two physicians had certified that Griffin met the criteria for involuntary admission. Under Md. Health-Gen.Code Ann. § 10-616(a)(2)(iii), the examining physician must certify that, among other things, involun ²²⁹ tary admission is needed for the protection of the patient or another.

At the Center, Griffin was placed in the Solomon Ward, a high-security admissions ward reserved primarily for acutely disturbed patients. Between August 20, 1988 and October 19, 1988, pursuant to state statute, Griffin was given several hearings, in which it was determined each time that he was not competent for release. On October 28, 1988 Griffin was discovered missing from the facility. He had last been seen at 2:45 p.m. by the staff on the ward.

In an affidavit, Guy Garheart, Chief of Police at Springfield Hospital Center, stated that Springfield’s elopement policy was fully enforced in the case of Griffin’s elopement. Once Griffin was discovered missing, identifying characteristics were relayed to the appropriate law enforcement agency along with a request that the agency send out a teletype concerning the elopement. Griffin was described as having a scar on his left forearm and wearing a brown jacket. On October 31, 1988 Montgomery County Police officers found Griffin wandering the streets of Bethesda, Maryland.

Believing him to be homeless and in need of emergency shelter, the officers took Griffin to the Manor Inn of Bethesda located at 11410 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, where he was given a room. Manor provided the room pursuant to a thirteen-year-old verbal agreement with the Montgomery County Department of Social Services, wherein Manor agreed to provide overnight shelter to homeless and wayward persons in exchange for a single rate of $54.00 plus tax of 10 percent. The officers did not notify Springfield Hospital or the State Police of their contact with Griffin. On the morning of November 1, 1988 an employee of Manor parked a 1985 Chevrolet van in the parking lot of the Manor Inn, directly in front of Griffin’s room.

The employee exited the van, left the doors unlocked, and left the keys in the ignition. Manor disputed that the van was left ²³⁰ unattended, claiming that the employee was working in the vicinity. Another Manor employee then saw Griffin get in the van and drive away. Approximately thirty minutes later, appellant’s insured, William Wewer, was travelling southbound on East Avenue at the intersection with Bradley Boulevard in Bethesda.

At the same time, Griffin was in the stolen van travelling eastbound on Bradley Boulevard. According to the State Accident Report, Griffin weaved on the roadway, crossed the centerline at a high rate of speed, drove over the curb onto East Avenue, and struck Wewer, who had stopped his 1984 Porsche 944 at a stop sign. As a result of the collision, Wewer’s vehicle was a total loss. Wewer also sustained personal injuries.

Pursuant to an insurance policy, appellant compensated Wewer $38,-241.40 for the total loss of his vehicle, personal injuries, lost wages, and pain and suffering. In its complaint, appellant alleged various counts of negligence against the State and Manor. Appellant alleged that the State had a duty to supervise Griffin properly and to detain him, and that the breach of this duty had been a proximate cause of Wewer’s injuries. Appellant also alleged that the negligence of Manor’s employee was a proximate cause of the insured’s injuries.

Following a hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. The court reasoned that the State owed no duty to Wewer since he was not in a group identifiable to the State prior to the accident. The court, sua sponte, determined as to Manor that the theft of the car and subsequent accident were not foreseeable, and therefore appellant could not show the necessary causation. Appellant appeals both orders of the court.

LEGAL ANALYSIS It is well settled that summary judgment procedure is not a substitute for a trial but merely a preview to determine whether there exists a factual controversy re ²³¹ quiring trial. Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 316 Md. 418, 422 , 559 A.2d 371 (1989). Where the moving party has set forth sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must show with some precision that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact.

Id. If there is any genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment would not properly be granted. Id. A material fact is one that will “somehow affect the outcome of the case.” Seaboard Surety v. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 242 , 603 A.2d 1357 (1992) (citations omitted).

A dispute as to a fact “relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 242-43 , 603 A.2d 1357 , quoting Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Board of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40 , 300 A.2d 367 (1973) (emphasis in original). Similarly, “[i]n a summary judgment proceeding even where the underlying facts are undisputed, if those facts are susceptible of more than one permissible inference, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law, but should be submitted to the trier of fact.” Foy, 316 Md. at 422-23 , 559 A.2d 371 , quoting Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138 , 265 A.2d 256 (1970) (citations omitted). Appellate review of a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment is also well settled: In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court has the same information from the record and decides the same issues of law as the trial court. It follows then that the proper standard for reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion should be whether the trial court was legally correct.

Heat & Power v. Air Products, 320 Md. 584, 591-92 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990) (citations omitted). With the applicable standard of review in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case. ²³² Manor Inn Appellant contends that Manor is liable for Wewer’s injuries pursuant to a violation of Md.Transp.Code Ann. § 21-1101 by the employee of Manor who left the keys in the van’s ignition. Appellant argues that violation of this statute is legally sufficient evidence of negligence that should have precluded summary judgment. “The violation of a statute may furnish evidence of negligence,” Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 124 , 591 A.2d 507 (1991), citing Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259-60 , 206 A.2d 148 (1965), “but only where the person alleging negligence is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of the kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent.” Kenney, 323 Md. at 124 , 591 A.2d 507 . Similarly, “[e]ven though the violation of a statute may create a prima facie presumption of negligence, the mere breach is not per se enough to make a violator thereof liable for damages.” Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 65 , 155 A.2d 698 (1959).

It is incumbent upon the plaintiff “to show not only a duty owed to the plaintiff and a breach thereof, but also to establish that the breach of that duty had not been interrupted by a break in the chain of causation.” Id. In other words, the negligence must be a proximate cause of the injury. Erie Ins. Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 84 , 585 A.2d 232 (1991).

The pertinent provision of the Transportation Article, § 21-1101, entitled Unattended Motor Vehicle, reads as follows: (a) Duty of driver upon leaving unattended vehicle. — Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person driving or otherwise in charge of a motor vehicle may not leave it unattended until the engine is stopped, the ignition locked, the key removed, and the brake effectively set. “The purpose * * * [of the statute] was either to prevent some unauthorized person from starting a car or to prevent ²³³ the start of a car by gravity. In either case the object was protection of the public.” Liberto, 221 Md. at 65 , 155 A.2d 698 , quoting Hochschild, Kohn & Co. v. Canoles, 193 Md. 276, 283 , 66 A.2d 780 (1949). Similarly stated, “[t]he duty to the public created by the statute was primarily to protect against a theft of or tampering with a motor vehicle and to prevent them from moving under their own momentum should the brakes fail.” Liberto, 221 Md. at 66 , 155 A.2d 698 . The Court of Appeals has held that leaving a key in the ignition of an unattended vehicle would be a violation of the statute and such violation may be evidence of negligence.

Khoyan v. Turner, 255 Md. 144, 147 , 257 A.2d 219 (1969). “The term ‘unattended motor vehicle’ has been held to mean ‘without anyone present [in the vehicle] who is competent to prevent any of the probable dangers to the public.’ ” Collins v. Luper, 12 Md.App. 109, 113 , 277 A.2d 445 , cert. denied, 263 Md. 716 (1971), quoting Lustbader v. Traders Delivery Co., 193 Md. 433, 439 , 67 A.2d 237 (1949). It is uncontroverted that the Manor employee who drove the van left the key in the ignition. The employee was also far enough away to render the van clearly “unattended.” Thus there was a violation of the statute that could be evidence of negligence. See Khoyan, supra.

Our analysis, however, does not end there. Appellant must still prove that Manor breached its duty of care to Wewer and that the breach was the proximate cause of his injuries. Brill v. Wilbanks, 222 Md. 248, 249 , 159 A.2d 657 (1960). As the Court of Appeals stated in Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16 , 264 A.2d 851 (1970): Proximate cause ultimately involves a conclusion that someone will be held legally responsible for the consequences of an act or omission.

This determination is subject to considerations of fairness or social policy as well as mere causation. Thus, although an injury might not have occurred “but for” an antecedent act of the defendant, liability may not be imposed if for example the ²³⁴ negligence of one person is merely passive and potential, while the negligence of another is the moving and effective cause of the injury. Bloom v. Good Humor Ice Cream Co., 179 Md. 384 , 18 A.2d 592 (1941), or if the injury is so remote in time and space from defendant’s original negligence that another’s negligence intervenes. Dersookian v. Helmick, 256 Md. 627 , 261 A.2d 472 (1970); Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62 , 155 A.2d 698 (1959).

The lower court found that the negligence of the Manor employee was merely passive, so the company could not be held responsible “for the actions of Mr. Griffin in negligently running into somebody.” The court also noted that violation of the statute “does not per se give rise to liability when the injury is caused by an intervening person who comes and negligently operates that motor vehicle.” Before we address the lower court’s decision, we believe that a brief discussion of cases that have interpreted the Unattended Vehicle statute would be helpful. We first note that, while the Courts of this State have never definitively held that the Unattended Vehicle statute applies to vehicles parked on a private roadway, Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 116 , 128 A.2d 617 (1957); see McAllister v. Driever, 318 F.2d 513, 516 (4th Cir.1963), the statute still may be used as a standard of care. Waltzinger, supra. The Manor Inn parking lot is apparently open and accessible to the public.

The public faces the same dangers from unattended vehicles as it would on the street or in a public parking lot. We decline, however, to hold definitively that § 21-1101 applies to vehicles parked on private property. We merely assume for the purposes of our discussion in this case only that the statute is applicable. Turning to the history of the statute, in Hochschild, Kohn & Co. v. Canoles, 193 Md. 276 , 66 A.2d 780 (1949), the Court was faced with the application of Md.Ann.Code art. 66V2, § 192 (1947 Supp.), a provision virtually identical to today’s Unattended Vehicle statute.

In Hochschild, the defendant’s driver left his vehicle unattended, running, with ²³⁵ the brake improperly set. The truck then started to roll down a hill where it eventually struck the plaintiff. The lower court found defendant liable, and the company appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding that the defendant’s negligence was a violation of the statute and a proximate cause of the accident.

Id. at 284, 66 A.2d