Hartlove v. Bedco Mobility, Inc.

WILNER, Judge. David Hartlove, a disabled person, had a chair-type stairway elevator installed in his home. The elevator was manufactured by The Cheney Company, Inc.; it was installed and was to be serviced and maintained by appellee Bedco Mobility, Inc. 1 On November 30, 1981, the elevator allegedly malfunctioned, causing Mr. Hartlove to fall down the steps and sustain injury. ²¹⁰ As a result of that occurrence, Mr. Hartlove and his wife Katherine filed two proceedings. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, they sued Cheney and Bedco on a variety of theories relating to the design, manufacture, and installation of the device.

In the Health Claims Arbitration Office, they filed a claim against Kimberly Nurses, Inc. As none of the papers in that proceeding are in the record before us, we cannot ascertain directly the nature of the claim made against Kimberly, but the Hartloves have acknowledged that it was based on the same occurrence and injury as the action against Cheney and Bedco. Apparently, a nurse supplied by Kimberly was employed to care for Mr. Hart-love and was negligent in leaving him in the elevator. The Hartloves filed their action in Circuit Court in July, 1982. 2 Although Cheney filed a timely response, Bedco did not. On June 27, 1983, the Hartloves moved for and obtained judgment by default against Bedco by reason of its failure to file a proper plea.

In accordance with former Md. Rule 611, notice of the judgment was sent to Bedco, informing it that it had 30 days to “take exception to this Judgment by Default.” 3 Within the 30 days, Bedco moved to vacate the judgment, asserting that it had never been served with process and that it had a meritorious defense to the action. The assertion as to non-service was supported by an affidavit of Bedco’s president that neither he nor any other officer had been served and by an affidavit of a legal assistant in defense counsel's office that he had examined the court file and found that it contained no return of service for Bedco. ²¹¹ As to its defense, Bedco contended “that it installed the stair-climber elevator properly and was never called to maintain or repair this product.” On August 25, 1983, the court granted Bedco’s motion and vacated the default judgment. At the same time, it also granted a motion of Cheney to file a plea Puis Darrein Continuance, informing the court of the claim then pending before the Health Claims Arbitration Office “in which the plaintiff in this litigation is seeking full compensation for the injuries and damages he claims to have incurred as a result of the occurrence complained of in this litigation.” At some point, the Health Claims Arbitration Panel entered an award in favor of the Hartloves in the amount of $15,000. Mutually dissatisfied (though obviously for different reasons), both sides rejected the award, whereupon the Hartloves filed a proceeding in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to upset it.

During the pendency of that proceeding, however, the Hartloves settled with Kimberly; they received $30,000 and dismissed the action. On learning of those events, Cheney and Bedco moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Hartloves had already received “complete satisfaction” of all damages through the action against Kimberly. The court granted those motions and entered judgments in favor of the defendants; this appeal ensued, in which the Hartloves challenge the entry of summary judgment against them. 4 The motions for summary judgment were based upon the notion that an injured party can receive only one satisfaction for the same wrong. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304 , 523 A.2d 1003 (1987); Grantham v. Prince George’s County, 251 Md. 28 , 246 A.2d 548 (1968); Triesch ²¹² man v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111 , 166 A.2d 892 (1961); Berkley v. Wilson, 87 Md. 219 , 39 A. 502 (1898).

This is a valid doctrine, but we think it was misapplied in this case. The cases in which that principle has been applied have, to the best of our knowledge, involved situations in which the plaintiff has (1) recovered a judgment against one of several tortfeasors who, allegedly, caused or contributed to a single, particular harm, and,(2) has received satisfaction of that judgment. In that setting, the Court of Appeals has precluded the plaintiff from subsequently pursuing the other tortfeasors because he has already been made whole for his injury. See Grantham v. Prince George’s County, supra, 251 Md. 28 , 246 A.2d 548 ; Bell v. Allstate Insur.

Co., 265 Md. 727 , 291 A.2d 478 (1972). The necessary underpinning to this notion, of course, is the fact that, with the judgment, there has been a formal and legally creditable adjudication of the full amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff, even if the judgment has been entered by consent ( Bell, supra) or the satisfaction is based on less than full payment of the judgment. Where the plaintiff settles with one of several joint or concurrent tortfeasors prior to