Harvey v. Marshall

HARRELL, Judge. This case arises from attempts by Derek T. Harvey, a father who reunited with four of his children, to have a Maryland court extinguish, or, in the alternative, direct the Child Support Enforcement Administration (“CSEA”) to forgive, child support arrearages he owes that accumulated before he obtained custody of the children. In resolving this case, we are called upon to examine whether a court may eliminate completely child support arrearages in light of the statutory prohibition on the retrospective modification of child support orders. We also must determine whether the CSEA is bound to apply the familiar “best interests of the child” standard in deciding, pursuant to its statutory discretion, whether to forgive child support arrearages, and whether the agency’s refusal to exercise that discretion in the father’s favor, because of financial and administrative considerations affecting the State’s child welfare program, was “arbitrary or capricious.” I. Derek T. Harvey obtained physical custody of his three youngest children, Dereka, Robin, and Derek, Jr., when they came to live with him in Baltimore City in the fall of 1996 after their mother became unable to care properly for them.

Later that year, Harvey’s eldest daughter, Keawoni, came to live with him due to the death of her mother and the subsequent inability of her grandparents to care for her. At the same time, Harvey also opened his household to Keawoni’s half-sister, Kelly Williams. Harvey’s child support obligations arose from consent paternity decrees issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in 1986 and 1989 establishing Harvey as the biological father of ²⁵⁰ the pertinent children. 1 Prior to Harvey gaining custody of the children, Robin Laverne Marshall, the mother of Dereka, Robin, and Derek, Jr., applied for welfare assistance because she was not receiving the child support Harvey was ordered to pay. As a condition of receiving welfare assistance, Ms. Marshall was required to initiate child support proceedings and assign the children’s support rights to the State. 2 Rita Williams, the mother of Keawoni, also assigned her child support rights to the State as a condition of receiving welfare assistance.

During the period the children were in the custody of their mothers, Harvey accumulated significant child support arrearages as the result of his nonpayment of the court-ordered child support. Soon after the children joined his household, Harvey, on several occasions, informed officials at the Baltimore City Office of Child Support Enforcement (“BCOCSE”) that the children were now in his physical custody. At all times relevant to these proceedings, BCOCSE was operated by MAXIMUS, Inc. (“MAXIMUS”), a private corporation under contract with the CSEA. 3 Harvey hoped that by notifying BCOCSE of this change in custody, he might persuade BCOCSE to close his child support cases and forgive his accumulated arrearages. Harvey’s informal attempts, however, met with no success.

After one meeting with a case ²⁵¹ manager in July 2000 at the offices of BCOCSE, in which Harvey once again explained the changed circumstances with regard to his children, he allegedly was informed by the case manager “that the situation would be taken care of.” Despite this assurance, BCOCSE continued to enforce Harvey’s child support obligations, charging him for his current support, reporting his alleged arrearages to credit reporting agencies, and intercepting several of his tax refund checks. Also in July 2000, Harvey approached the Baltimore City office of the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. (“Legal Aid”) seeking assistance with regard to his attempts to reduce or eliminate his child support obligations and arrearages. In the spring of 2001, with the assistance of Legal Aid, Harvey was successful in diverting his then-ongoing child support obligation toward his arrearages. Harvey, however, continued to encounter difficulties from BCOCSE in achieving forgiveness of his arrearages.

Frustrated with BCOCSE, Harvey switched his focus to the CSEA, BCOCSE’s parent agency. In a 4 June 2001 letter, Legal Aid made a formal request to the CSEA for “forgiveness or abatement” of Harvey’s arrearages and current support obligations. The letter advised the CSEA that, as of May 2001, Harvey owed approximately $32,000 in two cases, of which all but $1600 was owed to the State. Legal Aid argued that, although the funds sought by BCOCSE would be used to reimburse the State for past welfare support of the affected children, the current and future best interests of Harvey’s children would be served by allowing Harvey to apply current and future income, including $57 subtracted from his paycheck each week, to the future support and upbringing of his children now in his custody.

In a 6 July 2001 letter, Teresa L. Kaiser, executive director of the CSEA, informed Legal Aid that the CSEA would consider exercising its statutory discretion to eliminate or reduce Harvey’s child support arrearages owed to the State. The letter, however, stated that, in order to do so, Harvey would need to provide BCOCSE with evidence confirming the length of his physical custody of the children. In response, ²⁵² Harvey provided documentation, including school records and documents relating to an investigation of Ms. Marshall for fraudulent receipt of welfare benefits, establishing that the children had lived with him since 1996. Harvey also procured and delivered to BCOCSE a court order, issued 20 November 2001 by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, granting him legal custody of the four children, and made retrospectively effective as of 1 October 1996.

The order also terminated Harvey’s ongoing child support obligations and eliminated any arrearages accruing after 1 October 1996. In a memorandum, dated 6 March 2002, to Dwayne Brown, project director of BCOCSE, Ms. Kaiser acknowledged receipt of the 20 November 2001 court order and proposed that BCOCSE take the following actions with regards to the enforcement of the arrearages owed by Harvey: 1. Collect $1.00 per year on the arrears of $5,421.26 4 ; 2. Suspend the interception of State and Federal Income Taxes and other enforcement measures except for the Maryland Lottery until: a) all the children are emancipated, b) the non-custodial parent begins to pay child support; or c) the arrears are paid completely by interceptions received through the Maryland Lottery Office; 3.

Enter a narrative into the Case Action Logs stating why enforcement in this case was suspended; and 4. Refund State and Federal taxes that were intercepted. ²⁵³ Ms. Kaiser also instructed Mr. Brown in this memorandum that he would “need to write a letter to the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. with a summary of the actions outlined above [and that he should] contact [Kaiser] to confirm these arrangements or to discuss other satisfactory arrangements.” BCOCSE, however, objected to Ms. Kaiser’s proposal, and neither the CSEA nor BCOCSE took any further action on Harvey’s requests. 5 Meeting no success in his initiatives with BCOCSE or the CSEA, Harvey filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on 17 May 2002 a Motion to Set-Aside Child Support. 6 By this time, Harvey had remarried, adding his new wife and her son to his household. In his motion, Harvey asked the court to set aside his child support arrearages under the authority of Md. Code (1974, 2004 Repl. Vol.), 7 § 5-1038(b) of the Family Law Article, 8 which he argued permits a court to modify or set aside a child support order if the court finds that such an action is “just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child.” Harvey also asked the court, in the alternative, to find that the CSEA declined improperly to forgive his arrearages under § 10-112, which grants discretion to the CSEA to settle past child support arrearages for less than the full amount.

At a merits hearing on the motion held on 25 October 2002, Rachelle Langdon, a manager for BCOCSE, testified that, in regard to the proposal by Ms. Kaiser, ²⁵⁴ ... I believe my supervisor, Mr. Drummond discussed this at one of our bi-weekly meetings, basically stating that we didn’t agree with this proposal because: (1) our computer systems are not set up to read anything like this, which means that if you have $5,000.00 on the system, we don’t really have much of a way to monitor these cases to make sure his taxes are intercepted or not you know turned into the credit agency. We have a lot of automated systems that are in place[.] Ms. Langdon also testified that BCOCSE did not want to take the action proposed by Ms. Kaiser because to do so “would potentially harm the numbers that show the local enforcement office’s collection rate.” At the hearing, Harvey testified that he supported his children and extended household on wages of $10.96 an hour as a landscaper for the City of Baltimore. Harvey claimed that the existence of unpaid child support obligations affected adversely his credit rating, prevented him from purchasing or financing a home, and undermined his ability to pay and save for his children’s education.

All of these consequences of continued enforcement, Harvey argued, acted as a detriment to the best interests of his children and thus provided a justification for the complete elimination of his arrearages. After hearing arguments from counsel, the Circuit Court, in an order dated 8 May 2003, denied Harvey’s motion to set aside child support arrearages. Harvey appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of his motion. In its reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that, although § 5-1038(b) appeared to grant a court authority to set aside a child support order, it conflicted with and was superceded by § 12-104, which prohibited the retrospective modification of a child support order prior to the filing of a motion for modification.

Harvey v. Marshall, 158 Md.App. 355, 363 , 857 A.2d 529, 534 (2004). The court also held that the CSEA did not abuse its discretion under § 10-112 by failing to act on Harvey’s request to forgive his arrearages. Id. at 382, 857 A.2d at 545 . Harvey petitioned for a writ of certiorari in this Court, which we ²⁵⁵ granted, 384 Md. 448 , 863 A.2d 997 , in order to consider the following questions: I. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the Circuit Court had no discretion to retrospectively extinguish a child support award prior to the date of the filing of a motion for modification?

II

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the CSEA did not act in an arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable manner when it refused to exercise its discretion under § 10-112 to forgive Harvey’s child support arrearages?

II

Harvey argues that the Circuit Court erred when it found that it did not possess discretion under § 5-1038(b) to eliminate Harvey’s child support arrearages accruing prior to the filing of his motion. Sec. 5-1038, in context, states: Title 5. Children. Subtitle 10.

Paternity Proceedings. Part VI. Court Order. § 5-1038. Finality; modification.

(a) Declaration of paternity final; modifications. — (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a declaration of paternity in an order is final. (2)(i) A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside: 1. in the manner and to the extent that any order or decree of an equity court is subject to the revisory power of the court under any law, rule, or established principle of practice or procedure in equity; or 2. if a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order. ²⁵⁶ (ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, a declaration of paternity may not be modified or set aside if the individual named in the order acknowledged paternity knowing he was not the father. (b) Other orders subject to modification. — Except for a declaration of paternity, the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. The CSEA and BCOCSE counter that the discretion conferred upon a court by § 5-1038(b) conflicts with and is limited by the more specific pronouncements in § 12-104, which state, in context: Title 12.

Child Support. X X X Subtitle 1. General Provisions. X X X § 12-104.

Modification of child support award. (a) Prerequisites. — The court may modify a child support award subsequent to the filing of a motion for modification and upon a showing of a material change of circumstance. (b) Retroactivity of modification. — The court may not retroactively modify a child support award prior to the date of the filing of a motion for modification. Harvey continues by maintaining that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that, as applied to his case, the specific prohibition in § 12-104 on retrospective modification conflicts with the wide discretion contained in § 5-1038(b).

He argues that, because he seeks to eliminate completely his past arrearages, he is not requesting a “modification” of his obligations, but rather a “set aside.” Harvey’s theory relies heavily on the fact that, although § 5-1038(b) permits a court to “modify or set aside any order,” the language in § 12-104 only limits a court’s discretion to “modify” a child support award retrospectively. He posits that the absence in § 12-104 of a limitation on a court’s discretional authority to “set aside” ²⁵⁷ an order is a clear and conspicuous indication that § 12-104 does not limit a court’s authority, under § 5-1038(b), to eliminate completely his arrearages accruing before the filing of his motion. We do not agree with his interpretation. A. 1.

Harvey’s question is one of statutory interpretation and, as such, is purely a legal one. Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 66-67 , 871 A.2d 575, 577 (2005). We therefore review the matter de novo. Id.; see also Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 , 861 A.2d 78, 80-81 (2004) (stating that “[b]ecause our interpretation of ... provisions of the Maryland Code ... are appropriately classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters”). 2.

The CSEA and BCOCSE argue, as a preliminary matter, that Harvey’s claim is foreclosed by claim preclusion principles because he “previously sought relief from his responsibility to pay past due child support based on exactly the same factual circumstances that form the basis of his claims in the present proceeding; that he has had actual physical custody of his children since 1996.” 9 Respondent’s Brief at 6. The CSEA, however, ignores the fundamental purpose and nature of § 5-1038(b), which relaxes with regard to certain ²⁵⁸ orders in paternity cases the ordinary rules of finality of judgments. We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the present case because Harvey’s motion seeking to establish custody of his children did not present the same claim or cause of action as the present case. See Lizzi v. Washington Metro.

Area Transit Auth., 384 Md. 199, 206-07 , 862 A.2d 1017, 1022 (2004) (stating that res judicata “bar[s] the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been — but was not — raised in the first suit” (citations omitted)). On 29 March 2001, Harvey filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in the underlying paternity cases, setting forth the basic facts of his reunification with his children and asking for the following relief: A. That he be awarded immediate custody of the minor children ... dating back to October 1996; B. That Defendant be awarded the permanent care and custody of the children; [and] C. That Defendant be awarded such other and further relief as the nature of his cause may require. Although Harvey experienced some resistance from the Baltimore City Department of Social Services in obtaining documents relating to his claims, Ms. Marshall, the mother of three of the children and the putative plaintiff, did not oppose the relief requested. 10 As indicated supra, the Circuit Court granted Harvey custody of all four of his biological children, effective 1 October 1996. The court also ordered that Ms. Marshall be “charged generally for the support and maintenance of [the children she had with Harvey].” Finally, the court directed that Harvey’s child support obligations for his children be terminated, also effective 1 October 1996 (meaning ²⁵⁹ for child support attributable to and accruing from that date forward).

The record reveals that Harvey’s purpose in asking the court to award him custody of his children was to establish a foundation to pursue forgiveness of his arrearages from the CSEA under the statutory scheme in § 10-112. There is no indication that Harvey asked the court, at that time, to exercise its discretion under § 5-1038(b) to eliminate or modify his arrearages that accrued prior to 1 October 1996. Had Harvey sought retrospective modification (i.e., elimination) of his past child support obligations for the period before he gained custody, he theoretically would have encountered the same obstacle as he has in the present case — the limitations on retrospective modification contained in § 12-104. Confronted with only a request for a retrospective child custody determination, the Circuit Court awarded Harvey only that relief that was a direct consequence of a finding of retrospective custody, including a “credit” or “offset” of child support payments that he was to have paid during that period.

See Child Support Enforcement Admin. v. Shehan, 148 Md.App. 550, 562 , 813 A.2d 334, 342 (2002) (finding that, because, under § 12-204(Z )(2), “[t]he custodial parent shall be presumed to spend that parent’s total child support obligation directly on the child .. .,” a parent that had reunited with his family and became the custodial parent was entitled to a credit of the payments made during the period since he became a custodial parent). A motion, pursuant to § 5-1038(b), seeking elimination of arrearages accruing during a non-custodial period of time is not, for res judicata purposes, the same claim as a motion to establish custody retrospectively, and simply was not litigated in the 2001 proceeding. 3. Next, we consider whether the prohibition on retrospective modification of child support orders (for non-custodial periods of time) in § 12-104 was intended as a limitation on the broad authority conferred upon a court by § 5-1038(b), and, if so, the extent of that limitation. Our starting point is ²⁶⁰ the plain language of the two statutes.

See Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 387 Md. 1,11 , 874 A.2d 439, 445 (2005). Harvey observes correctly that, although § 5-1038(b) provides authority for a court to both “modify or set aside” any order in paternity actions (other than a declaration of paternity), § 12-104 merely limits a court’s discretion to “modify,” retrospectively, a child support order. Harvey continues, however, that, although the statutes use similar language, there is a substantive difference between a court’s authority to “set aside” a child support order and a court’s authority to “modify” retrospectively such an order. In order to grant Harvey the relief he requests, therefore, a court must be convinced that an action to eliminate retrospectively and completely child support arrearages should be classified properly as a “set aside,” governed by § 5-1038(b), rather than a “modification,” governed by § 12-104.

The CSEA responds that the Legislature’s use of the term “modify” in § 12-104 was intended, as a matter of both legislative intent and common sense, to include those actions covered by any definition of “set aside,” and thus the distinction sought by Harvey is irrelevant. Thus, proper analysis, as we perceive it, hinges on interpretation of the term “modify” in § 12-104, and specifically whether the use of that term encapsulates the complete elimination of a child support arrearage — the relief that Harvey requests. Although the terms “modify” and “set aside” are not defined in either of the respective subtitles that contain the relevant statutes, these terms (or similar terms) are addressed in Black’s Law Dictionary. The fifth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, 11 published contemporaneously with the enactment ²⁶¹ of § 12-104 in 1988, defines “modify” as: “To alter; to change in incidental or subordinate features; enlarge, extend; amend; limit, reduce.

Such alteration or change may be characterized, in quantitative sense, as either an increase or decrease.” Black’s Law Dictionary 905 (5th ed. 1979). Applying the appropriate senses of the word, one might conclude that the prohibition on retrospective modification of child support awards in § 12-104 would preclude the retrospective elimination of arrearages. Even if the relief Harvey requests also was defined as a “set aside,” such an action arguably would involve “modifying” a child support order because, not only would a complete elimination of arrearages be, in relatively broad terms, an “alteration” or “change” to a child support award, but, in more specific terms, it would certainly be a “limitation” or “reduction” of such an order. Harvey, however, in arguing that there is a substantive distinction between “modify” and “set aside,” points us toward the definition of “modification.” The fifth edition of Black’s 12 defines “modification” as “[a] change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or ²⁶² cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact.” (Emphasis added). 13 Black’s Law Dictionary 905 (5th ed. 1979).

Harvey asks us to compare this definition with that of “set aside,” which is defined by the fifth edition 14 of Black’s as “[t]o reverse, vacate, cancel, annul, or revoke a judgment, order, etc.” Id. at 1230. Harvey proclaims that, under these definitions, the complete elimination of child support arrearages would not be a “modification,” because it would not “leave[] the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter [of the child support order] intact,” but would instead “cancel, annul, or revoke” an obligation to pay child support. Harvey’s interpretation, if accepted, would have the result of the relief he requests skirting the limitation on retrospective modifications in § 12-104 and placing it within the broad remedial authority of § 5-1038(b). We agree with Harvey that there is a substantive distinction, at least with regard to child support and paternity matters, between a “modification” and a “set aside.” Despite this, we conclude that the relief Harvey seeks, in fact, is ²⁶³ defined more properly as an effort to “modify” his child support arrearages, rather than as an action to “set aside.” Cf.

Morton County Soc. Serv. Bd. v. Hakanson, 660 N.W.2d 599, 601 (N.D.2003) (finding that, when a child support judgment is filed in a court solely for the purposes of enforcement of that order, that court may not forgive child support arrearages because, “[i]f a court forgives past due child support obligations, it has modified a child support order”); Gilbertson v. Graff, 477 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (finding that “[fjorgiveness of unpaid child support is a retroactive modification of child support governed by [the Minnesota statute prohibiting the retroactive modification of child support orders]”); cf. Schulz v. Ystad, 155 Wis.2d 574 , 456 N.W.2d 312, 320 (1990) (finding that a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the retrospective “revision” of child support orders “eliminated the long-standing power of the Wisconsin courts to modify, reduce, or forgive accumulated support arrearages”). Harvey’s child support obligations and arrearages arose from paternity decrees, issued by a court, that included awards for child support.

In asking the court to eliminate completely his arrearages, Harvey does not do so by challenging the underlying validity of the child support awards. Harvey’s motion therefore does not seek to “set aside” or invalidate his child support obligations, but relates rather to a modification with respect to the enforcement of those remaining, valid portions of his child support obligations as they affect his current and future ability to support his family. Had the underlying child support award been invalid, there would be clear authority for a court to “set aside” the award retrospectively, even in light of the statutory language in § 12-104. See Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 395 , 788 A.2d 609, 614 (2002) (finding that a court has no discretion, under either § 12-104 or § 5-1038(b), “to ‘modify’ a child support order which is based on a vacated paternity judgment because the order itself is inextricably linked to the paternity declaration, its viability ... absolutely dependent on the viability of the paternity declaration”).

Because Harvey’s “motion to set aside” instead asks for an alteration to or limitation on only that portion of the award ²⁶⁴ that is affected by his current circumstances, it should be deemed therefore a “motion for modification.” Thus, although § 5 — 1038(b) seemingly would permit the retrospective modification, i.e. complete elimination, of Harvey’s arrearages, its broad language, as applied in the present case, conflicts clearly with the limitation on retrospective modification in § 12-104. 4. This conclusion finds support in the legislative history of § 12-104. The limitations on retrospective modification of child support awards found in § 12-104 were enacted by the General Assembly in 1988 in response to a federal stimulus to the States regarding their enforcement of child support awards. 1988 Md. Laws, Chap. 338. In her statement before the Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on 10 March 1988, Senator Ida G. Ruben (D — Montgomery County), the sponsor of the bill that ultimately became the enacted legislation, explained the underlying issues and policy concerns regarding Maryland’s child support enforcement situation: As it stands now, a person owing back-child support payments usually has to go back to court and promises to be more timely in the future.

Then the judge usually wipes out the previous debt and allows the payor to start anew with child support payments. The result is that thousands of dollars owed to children and their families are lost forever. S.B. 691 [codified ultimately as § 12-104] would end that practice by not allowing the court to retroactively modify a standing decree for child support. Children and their families would be able to get back payments they are owed.

Ann C. Helton, then-executive director of the CSEA, appeared before the Senate Committee to emphasize that the legislation was necessary to prevent courts from forgiving accumulated arrearages: As important as collection of these overdue amounts is to families and taxpayers, in many cases judges have ordered ²⁶⁵ that these arrearages be abated in return for the obligor’s promise to remain current in future support payments. Regardless of whether that promise is kept, the overdue amounts have been wiped out .... [§ 12-104] simply prevents the Court from forgiving the debt. Beyond these financial implications for any State, the federal government identified the retrospective reduction and elimination of child support awards as a significant problem warranting national attention. In 1986, Congress amended Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

(2005), to require States to conform to national standards with regard to child support payments and enforcement. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9103 , 100 Stat. 1874 , 1973 (1986). This legislation, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9) (2005), provided in part: (a) ... each State must have in effect laws requiring the use of the following procedures ... to increase the effectiveness of the program which the State administers under this part [ 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.] ...

(9) Procedures which require that any payment or installment of support under any child support order, whether ordered through the State judicial system or through the expedited processes required by paragraph (2) [concerning procedures for establishing paternity and for establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations], is (on and after the date it is due)'— (A) a judgment by operation of law, with the full force, effect, and attributes of a judgment of the State, including the ability to be enforced, (B) entitled as a judgment to full faith and credit in such State and in any other State, and (C) not subject to retroactive modification by such State or by any other State; except that such procedures may permit modification with respect to any period during which there is pending a petition for modification, but only from the date that notice ²⁶⁶ of such petition has been given, either directly or through the appropriate agent, to the obligee or (where the obligee is the petitioner) to the obligor. (emphasis added). Legislation containing the language found in 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9) originally was introduced by Senator William W. “Bill” Bradley of New Jersey on 5 May 1986 as S. 2404, and by Representative Barbara B. Kennedy of Connecticut on 7 May 1986 as H.R. 4769. These two bids, however, died in committee.

Nonetheless, the amendments codified ultimately as 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9) were placed into H.R. 5300, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, which was passed by the Congress and signed into law by the President on 21 October 1986. Pub.L. No. 99-509, § 9103 , 100 Stat. 1874 , 1973 (1986). The legislative history of the two predecessor bids indicates that the main concerns addressed were deficiencies and loopholes affecting the interstate enforcement of child support awards, including the effect of retrospective modification of child support orders. See 132 Cong.

Rec. 9416-17 (1986) (statement of Sen. Bradley); 132 Cong. Rec. 9958 (1986) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).

In her statement in the House of Representatives on 7 May 1986, Rep. Kennedy stated that H.R. 4769 was aimed at States that allowed “[child support] debt to be reduced, even to the point of wiping out the entire prior obligation. ...” 132 Cong. Rec. 9958 (emphasis added). This concern with the abidty of States to eliminate completely an obligor’s arrearages was also reflected in the published “legislative history” of Public Law 99-509.

See Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News ( 100 Stat. 1874 ), 3607, 3917-18 (stating that Pub.L. No. 99-509 was intended to amend the current law in regard to those States and their courts' that have “the authority to reduce or nudify arrearages”); HHS Rules Proposed on Proscription Against Retroactive Modification of Support Arrears, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1600 , 1601 (Oct. 13, 1987) (same).

The Maryland Legislature understood clearly that significant federal funds were in jeopardy if it did not enact legislation intended to effectuate the child support mechanisms ²⁶⁷ located in, and defined by, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9). Regarding the federal legislation and its accompanying fiscal incentives, Sen. Ruben stated at the Committee hearings: The federal government has recognized [retroactive modification of child support awards] as a national problem and has passed legislation requiring states to conform to national standards in child support payments. S.B. 691 would bring the State of Maryland into conformity with federal law.

Presently, Maryland is the only state not yet in compliance with federal standards. We are in danger of losing all of our child support funding and federal [Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”)] payments if we do not come into compliance this session. So you can see that it is imperative that this legislation be passed.... 15 CSEA Executive Director Helton also recognized that S.B. 691 was designed to conform Maryland law to federal mandates: The purpose of SB 691 ... is to prohibit the court from retroactively modifying the amount of a child support order. Federal law enacted in 1986 requires all states to enact such legislation.

The intent of Congress was specifically aimed at the practice of some courts to reduce or forgive arrearages. This history indicates clearly that, in enacting § 12-104, the Maryland Legislature sought to fulfill the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9) as outlined by Congress. See Department of Fiscal Services, Fiscal Note Revised 1988, S.B. 691 (stating that the “Department of Human Resources advises that this bill conforms State practice to federal requirements”); see ²⁶⁸ also Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490 , 514 n. 11, 784 A.2d 1086 , 1099 n. 11 (2001), abrogated on other grounds, Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516 , 873 A.2d 1122 (2005) (concluding that “[i]t appears that the General Assembly imposed limitations on the modification of child support awards in order to comply with the requirement of the [AFDC]”). We therefore conclude that, in using the term “modify” in § 12-104, the General Assembly intended to reflect and appropriate the language used in 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9).

Because of the adoption of this identical language in § 12-104, we conclude that the Legislature also intended to adopt the connotation and meaning of the term “modification” as intended by Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9), which included not only a reduction or alteration, but the complete elimination, of child support arrearages. 132 Cong. Rec. 9958 (1986) (statement of Rep. Kennelly); see also Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604, 605-06 (Tenn.1991) (finding that the “legislative history of [the Tennessee statute prohibiting the retroactive modification of child support orders] reflects the [Tennessee] General Assembly’s clear understanding that as a result of legislative action to bring Tennessee law in line with the federal requirement [outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9)], the courts of this state would lose their ability to forgive past arrearages in child support cases ... ”). 5. Despite this legislative history and purpose, Harvey argues that, by defining “modify” to include the retrospective elimination of arrearages, we would be ignoring our responsibility, under principles of statutory interpretation, to search for and find a harmonious interpretation between two related statutes.

See Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65-66 , 862 A.2d 419, 429-30 (2004) (stating that “various consistent and related enactments, although made at different times and without reference to one another, nevertheless should be harmonized as much as possible” (citations omitted)). When two statutes conflict, by their plain language, however, no harmonious interpretation is possible. In this case, there is a conflict between the statutes ²⁶⁹ in that § 5-1038(b) seemingly allows a court to eliminate child support arrearages retrospectively, while, as we have concluded, § 12-104 specifically precludes that result. This conflict becomes even more apparent when we examine the logical consequences of Harvey’s interpretation of § 12-104.

State v. Glass, 386 Md. 401, 410 , 872 A.2d 729, 734 (2005) (stating that a court’s analysis “must be undertaken from a commonsensical rather than a technical ] perspective, always seeking to avoid giving the statute a strained interpretation or one that reaches an absurd result” (citations omitted)); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 388 , 835 A.2d 1221, 1227 (2003) (stating that courts must “avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense” (citations omitted)). Under Harvey’s “harmonious interpretation,” § 12-104 would not limit a court’s discretion to extinguish retrospectively 100% of a parent’s arrearages, because that action would be a “set aside,” but that same court would have no discretion to reduce that parent’s arrearages by up to 99.99%, because that would be a “modification.” Common sense and the legislative history of § 12-104 restrain us from agreeing with such a conclusion. Cf. In re Trust of Lane, 323 Md. 188, 192-93 , 592 A.2d 492, 494-95 (1991) (finding that “if a court has the power to terminate a trust it necessarily has the power to take less drastic measures and modify that same trust”).

Although we conclude that the two statutes conflict with respect to the retrospective modification of child support arrearages, we note that our interpretation of § 12-104 and § 5-1038(b) in this case harmonizes those statutes with the Court’s holding in Walter v. Gunter. In Walter , we held that, when a child support order is premised on an invalid paternity declaration, § 12-104 does not limit a court’s discretion to “set aside” that child support order. 367 Md. at 393-96 , 788 A.2d at 613-15 . Our holding today is consistent with Walter in that, by including the complete elimination of child support arrearages within the sphere of § 12-104’s prohibition on retrospective modification of child support awards, § 12-104 does not interfere with a court’s ability to “set aside” an invalid child support order, while still remaining true to the ²⁷⁰ legislative purposes espoused by both state and federal lawmakers. Pub.L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News ( 100 Stat. 1874 ) 3917-18.

B. When a court concludes that the provisions of two statutes conflict, it then must determine which statute controls the facts before it. We turn now to the principles of statutory interpretation concerning conflicting statutes. We often have stated that “[wjhere there is a specific enactment and a general enactment which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.” Dep’t of Natural Res. v. France, 277 Md. 432, 461-62 , 357 A.2d 78, 94-95 (1976) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Smack v. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 306 , 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003) (stating that when, in the context of statutes within the same statutory scheme, “two statutes conflict and one is general and the other specific, ‘the statutes may be harmonized by viewing the more specific statute as an exception to the more general one’ ” (citations omitted)). In the present case, we conclude that the prohibition on retrospective modification in § 12-104 limits a court’s broad discretion, under § 5-1038(b), to “modify or set aside” any order that is in the best interests of the child.

Sec. 5-1038(b) allows a court in a paternity action to “modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child.” This broad authority, viewed in isolation, would appear to allow the retrospective modification of a child support order in a paternity action. That action, however, expressly is prohibited by the more specific and particular provisions of § 12-104. We therefore give effect to the specific limitations of § 12-104 as a ²⁷¹ curb on the broad discretion conferred on the courts by § 5-1038(b). Smack, 378 Md. at 306 , 835 A.2d at 1179 .

We are convinced of the controlling applicability of § 12-104 also as a result of the relative dates of enactment of the two statutes. At the time that § 12-104 was enacted in 1988, § 5-1038(b) long had been part of the Maryland legal landscape. See 1963 Md. Laws, Chap. 722 (enacting the standard found in § 5-1038(b)). “In attempting to harmonize [two statutes that address the same subject], we presume that, when the Legislature enacted the later of the two statutes, it was aware of the one earlier enacted.” Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning and Plumbing, Inc. v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336, 352 , 783 A.2d 691, 700 (2001) (citations omitted). The legislative history reveals that § 12-104 was enacted as a result of financial incentives, contained in federal law, to ensure that child support orders were “not subject to retroactive modification” by any State.

See supra, Section II. A. 4. This purpose of § 12-104 corroborates the presumption that the Legislature was aware of the broad discretion in § 5-1038(b) because, had such discretion not existed, a statute limiting discretion would have been wholly unnecessary. In light of the legislative history of § 12-104, we not only presume, but find conclusive, the Legislature’s awareness of the previously enacted § 5-1038(b) when it enacted § 12-104.

The legislative history reveals that, during the formal legislative process, the Legislature was informed that the proposed S.B. 691 was designed to limit the discretion delegated to courts to reduce or eliminate child support arrearages, to the detriment of obligee custodial parents, this State, and other states whose child support orders were not given full faith and credit. See Testimony of Senator Ida G. Ruben before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, S.B. 691, 10 March 1988 (stating that “S.B. 691 would end that practice by not allowing the court to retroactively modify a standing decree for child support”). The discretion alluded to, of course, is ²⁷² none other than the discretion conferred upon the courts by § 5 — 1038(b). 16 By examining this legislative history, we arrive at the conclusion that § 12-104 was designed to circumscribe the broad authority delegated to the courts by § 5-1038(b). Thus, the limitation on retrospective modification contained in § 12-104 precluded the Circuit Court from granting Harvey’s request to eliminate completely the child support arrearages he owed. ²⁷³ III.

Harvey also contends that the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that the CSEA’s decision not to exercise its discretion under § 10-112 in his favor was not subject to judicial review and that alternatively, if it were, the CSEA’s refusal to exercise that discretion to grant his request was not “arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.” We begin by determining whether a decision not to exercise statutory discretion under these circumstances may be subject to judicial review, and, if so, what standard of review should apply. A. Our analysis begins with the basic premise that, in order for an administrative agency’s action properly to be before this Court (or any court) for judicial review, there generally must be a legislative grant of the right to seek judicial review. See South Easton Neighborhood Ass’n v. Easton, 387 Md. 468 , 476 n. 3, 876 A.2d 58 , 62 n. 3 (2005) (observing that the Circuit Court did not possess jurisdiction to exercise appellate review of the Easton Town Council’s decision to enact an ordinance closing a street so that public property could be conveyed to a local, non-profit hospital); Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500 , 331 A.2d 55, 64 (1975) (stating that the “right to an appeal is not a right required by due process of law, nor is it an inherent or inalienable right” and that “[a]n appellate right is entirely statutory in origin and no person or agency may prosecute such an appeal unless the right is conferred by statute”).

As Harvey concedes, there was no statutory right of judicial review for CSEA actions under § 10-112 at the time the relevant legal proceedings were initiated in the present case. At the time of the CSEA’s consideration of Harvey’s request, § 10-222 of the State Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), ²⁷⁴ Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), §§ 10-201 et seq. of the State Government Article, did not apply to this situation. Sec. 10-222 of the APA provides, with certain exceptions, that “a party who is aggrieved by the final decision [of an administrative agency] in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section.” This section does not apply to a decision by the CSEA not to exercise its discretion to forgive Harvey’s arrearages, however, because such a decision is not a “contested case” under the APA.

The APA defines a “contested case” as a proceeding before an agency to determine: (i) a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person that is required by statute or constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing; or (ii) the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or amendment of a license that is required by statute or constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing. Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-202(d)(l) of the State Government Article. Because § 10-112 did not provide the opportunity or procedure for a hearing before the CSEA, an individual affected by a decision (whether affirmatively made or presumed a denial through non-action) under § 10-112 was not entitled to judicial review under the APA. 17 See State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 395-96 , 380 ²⁷⁵ A.2d 28, 35 (1977) (finding that the definition of “contested case” in the APA contemplates only those proceedings in which a party is entitled to a hearing in front of the administrative agency); Maryland Pharmacists Ass’n v. Attorney General, 115 Md.App. 650, 658 , 694 A.2d 492, 496 (1997) (same).

Furthermore, as a result of the “entirely discretionary” nature of § 10-112 as it exists here, a decision under that statute does not fall under the “contested case” provision because it does not implicate “a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person that is required by statute or constitution.” Clark, 281 Md. at 395-96 , 380 A.2d at 35 ; see infra note 18 (noting Harvey’s lack of a clear right to have his arrearages reduced or forgiven and the lack of a clear statutory duty or obligation on the part of the CSEA to render a decision in Harvey’s favor). B. In those circumstances where there is no statutory provision for judicial review, however, this Court “has consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they possess to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.” Gould, 273 Md. at 500-01 , 331 A.2d at 65 (citations omitted); see also Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379 , 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945) (finding that “[cjourts have the inherent power, through the writ of mandamus, by injunction, or otherwise, to correct abuses of discretion and arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable acts; but in exercising that power care must be taken not to interfere with the legislative prerogative or with the exercise of sound administrative discretion, where discretion is clearly conferred” (citations omitted)); Hurl v. Bd. of Educ., 107 Md.App. 286, 304-05 , 667 A.2d 970, 979 (1995) (finding a determination of whether the APA conferred judicial review on a particular administrative decision irrelevant in light of the courts’ inherent power to review “illegal, unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious administrative action ...”). ²⁷⁶ Despite this inherent power of limited judicial review, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Harvey’s “complaint [did] not qualify for [such] relief because it is about a failure or refusal to take administrative action.” 18 Harvey, 158 Md.App. at 380 , 857 A.2d at 544 (emphasis in original). We disagree, and conclude that a court’s inherent power of judicial review, under appropriate circumstances, may reach an administrative agency’s inaction as well as its action. See, e.g., Spencer v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 527 , 846 A.2d 341, 348 (2004) (reviewing, under an “arbitrary or capricious” ²⁷⁷ standard, an administrative agency’s decision not to exercise its discretionary power to delegate a case to the Office of Administrative Hearings); cf. Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Downey Communications, Inc., 110 Md.App. 493, 536-37 , 678 A.2d 55, 76-77 (1996) (finding that, “if [an] agency fails to act within an appropriate time, the party adversely affected may be entitled to pursue an action for mandamus” (citations omitted)).

We refuse to draw a substantive distinction, for the purpose of our examination of whether the present case meets the threshold for the exercise of a court’s inherent power of judicial review, between agency action and agency inaction. When an agency, in the face of a formal invocation of its discretion by an affected person coming within the class of persons contemplated by the statute, fails to act on a matter committed to its discretion by that statute, there is as much aggrievement and potential for abuse or prejudice as when an agency affirmatively announces an adverse decision. The inherent power of judicial review of administrative decisions, however, is extremely limited. 19 Numerous ²⁸⁰ cases expressly caution about the danger of exercising our inherent power of judicial review in the absence of statutory authority. See Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 222-28, 334 A.2d 514, 522-26 (1975) (emphasizing that judicial review of administrative agency decisions under this inherent power “requires restrained and disciplined judicial judgment so as to not interfere with the agency’s factual conclusions ...” (citations and emphasis omitted)); Heaps, 185 Md. at 379 , 45 A.2d at 76 (stating that “the courts are ... without authority to interfere with any exercise of the legislative prerogative within constitutional limits, or with the lawful exercise of administrative authority or discretion”); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-81 , 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945) (same).

Consistent with these limitations, our inherent power essentially traces its origins to our duty to ensure that neither the Legislature nor the Executive branch of State government deprives the Judiciary of the ability to correct decisions premised on unreasonable findings of fact or flawed conclusions of law. See, e.g., Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 273 Md. 245, 256 , 329 A.2d 18, 25 (1974) (applying the “substantial evidence” test to administrative decisions, which “essentially is limited ‘to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached’ ” (citations omitted)); Heaps, 185 Md. at 382-83 , 45 A.2d at 77-78 (finding that judicial review of an administrative agency decision was proper where the agency relied on an erroneous interpretation of relevant law). In this case, Harvey invokes the inherent power of this Court by asking us to review, as a matter of law and statutory interpretation, the standards that the CSEA is obligated to apply in exercising its discretion under § 10-112.

IV

Harvey characterizes the CSEA’s refusal to exercise its discretion to eliminate his child support arrearages as “arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable” because the agency failed, as a matter of law, to consider the “best interests of the child” in determining whether forgiveness of Harvey’s child support arrearages was within the “best interest of this State.” For reasons to be explained, we conclude ²⁸¹ that the CSEA is not bound to consider with the same primacy, if at all, the “best interests of the child,” as that standard applies to most decisions relating to children, when exercising its discretion under § 10-112. A. Sec. 10-106 established the CSEA in 1976 as the agency within the Department of Human Resources charged with coordinating a statewide program covering all aspects of child support enforcement. § 10-108(a); 1976 Md. Laws, Chap. 778. The duties of the CSEA include locating absent parents, determining their ability to pay child support, and enforcing those obligations (including child support judgments from other states). 20 § 10-108(a). The CSEA accomplishes enforcement through traditional mechanisms, such as legal enforcement proceedings, as well as such unconventional methods as the interception of lottery prizes and tax refunds, and inaugurating the suspension of driving privileges by the Motor Vehicle Administration. § 10-113; § 10-113.1; § 10-119.

The CSEA also is charged with the duty to “accept assignment of right, title, or interest in child support made under Article 88A, § 50(b)(2) of the Code [and to] prosecute and ²⁸² maintain any legal or equitable action available to establish each absent parent’s obligation to pay child support.” §§ 10-108(5) — (6). Under Md. Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Art. 88A, § 50(b)(2), an otherwise eligible individual becomes available for temporary cash assistance benefits only if he or she “assigns to the State all right, title, and interest in support from any other person that the applicant or recipient has on behalf of any intended or potential recipient for whom the applicant or recipient is applying for or receiving assistance, including any right accrued when the assignment is executed.” When individuals owing child support to the State under such an assignment accumulate unpaid arrearages, the CSEA is granted statutory authority to settle with a child support obligor for an amount less than the full arrearages. 21 Sec. 10-112, which was enacted in 1976 as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme regarding child support enforcement, 1976 Md. Laws, Chap. 778, 22 states: ²⁸³ (a) Authority of Administration. — If the Administration considers it to be in the best interest of this State, in a case in which an assignment has been made under Article 88A, § 50(b)(2) of the Code, the Administration may accept in full settlement of an arrearage in child support payments an amount that is less than the total arrearage. (b) Authority of court. — On request of the Administration, a court may approve by order an amount that is less than the total arrearage as full settlement of the arrearage.

Harvey argues that, notwithstanding the use of a “best interest of this State” standard in § 10-112 for settlement of arrearages, the CSEA nonetheless is bound by the traditional “best interests of the child” standard when exercising its discretion in deciding whether to forgive arrearages. Harvey guides us toward the language of § 10-118: Subject to any federal law or program, the Administration and local support enforcement offices shall promote and serve the best interests of the child in carrying out their child support responsibilities under this subtitle. He claims that § 10-118 represents a clear statement of legislative purpose to which the CSEA must conform when “carrying out ... child support responsibilities,” which he interprets to include the settlement of arrearages pursuant to § 10-112. B. Preliminarily, we must address whether the act of settling or forgiving arrearages, in the context of § 10-112, is a “child support responsibility].” With regard to this point, the Court of Special Appeals held: In further considering Harvey’s argument, we are mindful that FL section 10-112 only applies when one parent has assigned his or her rights to recover child support payments from the other parent as a condition of receiving welfare ²⁸⁴ payments under Md. Code (1957, 2008 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 88A § 50(b)(2). Thus, the Administration and local support enforcement offices are collecting money that will be returned to the state coffers. They are not collecting support from one parent that will go to the other parent to benefit a child. For this reason, we conclude that, in exercising its discretion under section 10-112, the Administration and local support enforcement offices are not “carrying out a child support responsibility] under [the] subtitle,” as described in FL section 10-118.

Rather, section 10-112 simply gives the Administration the authority to settle a claim to payment that it has acquired by assignment from a parent. Harvey, 158 Md.App. at 376-77 , 857 A.2d at 542 (emphasis omitted). We disagree with the intermediate appellate court on this point. Although this novel conclusion superficially appears to be supported by sound reasoning, the implications of that court’s holding are inconsistent with the statutory scheme for child support enforcement.

The Court of Special Appeals apparently overlooked the effect of its holding on the enforcement authority of the CSEA. If Harvey’s arrearages are classified as merely a debt owed to the State, that debt would be subject only to the traditional means of enforcing judgments, rather than the more persuasive and creative enforcement mechanisms created specially for child support arrearages. 23 For example, while the ability to garnish wages as the result of an ordinary judgment is limited to 25 percent of disposable wages, a garnishment or earnings withholding or ²⁸⁵ der as the result of a child support award may be up to 65 percent of disposable wages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2005) (setting restrictions on ordinary garnishment of wages and garnishment as the result of a child or spousal support order); § 10-120 et seq.; Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. VoL), § 15-601.1 of the Commercial Law Article. 24 Removing State-owed child support collection from the scope of a “child support responsibility]” would also raise serious questions about the applicability of § 12-104 to child support orders.

If State-owed child support is not entitled to its special status, but is mere debt, a court no longer would be limited by § 12-104 and would be able to modify (and eliminate) retrospectively that debt, because § 12-104, by its language, only applies to child support orders and not mere debt. State-owed child support instead would be subject to the broad discretion set forth in § 5-1038(b). This, of course, is contrary to our interpretation of § 12-104 and, as Harvey argues, is unsupported by relevant case law. See Petitioner’s Brief at 19 (stating that the “Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion provides no explanation of how Maryland law provides for the mutation from child support to mere state debt, and the case-law ... supports the opposite conclusion”).

C. Harvey argues that, because the CSEA is performing a “child support responsibilit[y]” under § 10-112, it thus is ²⁸⁶ bound by the “best interests of the child” standard found in § 10-118 in making decisions on the forgiveness of arrearages. We disagree. Our starting point in the analysis of this contention is the plain language of the statutes. Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 387 Md. at 11, 874 A.2d at 445 .

Sec. 10-112 clearly states that the CSEA may settle a child support arrearage if “the Administration considers it to be in the best interest of this State.” There is no mention of the familiar “best interests of the child” standard. We must assume this omission was not by accident. Had the Legislature wished to mandate consideration of the “best interests of the child” as part of the CSEA’s calculus in exercising its discretion to forgive arrearages, it could have done so easily. See Mohan, 386 Md. at 80-81 , 871 A.2d at 585 (finding the absence of a limitation on the definition of “probationary status” in the Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights indicative of the Legislature’s desire not to limit that term in the manner suggested).

When the Legislature intends that other factors be considered in addition to the best interests of the State, it explicitly and expressly has included those factors in the statutory language. See, e.g., Md. Code (1982, 1996 Repl. Vol.), § 16-202(c) of the Environment Article (stating that the Board of Public Works, in determining whether to issue a license to dredge or fill State wetlands, “shall decide if issuance of the license is in the best interest of the State, taking into account the varying ecological, economic, developmental, recreational, and aesthetic values each application presents”); Md. Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol), Art. 83B, § 5-611.1 (stating that when the Board of Public Works approves a division of recovered archaeological historic property that has been conveyed to a permittee, the arbiter of such a division must act “in the best interest of the State ... giving due consideration to the fair treatment of the permittee”). 25 We believe that, by ²⁸⁷ failing to include a consideration of the “best interests of the child” standard in § 10-112, the Legislature intended that the CSEA not be focused solely on such a standard in exercising its discretion to forgive State-owed child support arrearages. 26 ²⁸⁹ Harvey, in a purported effort to “harmonize” the two statutes, argues that the Legislature intended to supplement the “best interest of this State” standard when it enacted § 10- ²⁹⁰ 118.

Harvey argues that the “best interests of the child” standard in § 10-118 was intended to shape and define the “best interest of this State” standard in § 10-112. We do not agree. He reminds us that, in interpreting two provisions of a statutory scheme, we should be mindful that, when a statute “is a part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intention is not determined from that statute alone, rather it is to be discerned by considering it in light of the statutory scheme,” and when “in that scheme, two statutes, enacted at different times and not referring to each other ... address the same subject, they must be read together ... ie., interpreted with reference to one another, ... and harmonized.... ” Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Ins.

Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993). Harvey suggests that a harmonious reading here results in the standard in § 10-112 being eclipsed, and, in essence, replaced, by § 10-118’s application of the paramount standard of the “best interests of the child.” We reject such an interpretation. We conclude instead that the language of § 10-112 indicates that the Legislature intended a different standard, other than the “best interests of the child” standard, to govern the settlement of arrearages. Even though it may be a “child support responsibility],” the Legislature made a conscious election that the forgiveness of arrearages was an action, separate and distinct from other “child support responsibilities,” that, because of its unique purpose, warranted a different standard.

Although the “best interests of the child” standard is generally the standard that applies in paternity or other family law matters relating to child support, there are some situations in which the Legislature has mandated, and the courts apply, a different standard or have limited, or in some way precluded, the application of the “best interests of the child” standard. 27 See Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 425 , ²⁹¹ 754 A.2d 389, 404 (2000) (finding that an “examination of section 5-1038 and its legislative history makes clear that the ‘best interests of the child’ standard generally has no place in a proceeding to reconsider a paternity declaration ... (nor does it have any] place in the fact-driven original paternity action”); Reese v. Huebschman, 50 Md.App. 709, 710-11 , 440 A.2d 1109, 1111-12 (1982) (finding that, in modifying an order for child support, a court must find a “change in the parties’ circumstances” before it may consider the “best interests of the child”). In this case, the Legislature’s use of the “best interest of this State” standard, rather than the “best interests of the child” standard, is consistent with the notion that, because the obligation to pay child support was scrutinized at the time of imposition under the “best interests of the child” standard, any subsequent attempt to eliminate those arrearages through the exercise of an agency’s discretion may be subject to a different standard that may at times be incongruent with the “best interests of the child,” particularly when the State, in lieu of the delinquent, responsible parent’s payment of support, has advanced public funds to support the child. Indeed, there is a remarkable distinction between the judicial determination of child support, which certainly implicates the best interests of a child, and the forgiveness of arrearages that accrued through no fault of the child and are often due to a noncustodial parent’s financial problems or irresponsibility. 28 ²⁹² Although child support owed to the State is still child support (rather than mere debt owed to the State), we conclude that the “best interest of this State” standard also is consistent with the fact that § 10-112 covers only child support owed to the State and thus situations in which the child, through welfare assistance, has received all of the child support to which he or she was due.

Furthermore, had Harvey wished to object to or contest the amount of child support he was to pay to Ms. Marshall or Ms. Williams, he could have raised that issue at the time the order was originally established or at any point along the continuum until he did act. We also keep in mind that “a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.” Glass, 386 Md. at 410 , 872 A.2d at 734 . Accepting Harvey’s interpretation would do just that, render meaningless the inclusion of “best interest of this State” in § 10-112. We decline to do that.

Instead, we find that § 10-118 and § 10-112 are better harmonized by giving full effect to § 10-112 as introducing a different, specific standard other than the broad direction of § 10-118. Harvey remonstrates, however, that, by enacting § 10-118, the Legislature intended the same standard to govern “all agency child support responsibilities conducted pursuant to the entire statutory and regulatory framework governing child support, including those that were already specified in FL § 10-112.” Petitioner’s Brief at 27-28. 29 Be ²⁹³ cause § 10-118 was enacted after § 10-112, Harvey argues, “the mandate in FL § 10-118 that CSEA and local child support offices must ‘promote and serve the best interests of the child in carrying out their child support responsibilities under this subtitle’ clearly applies to the earlier enacted provision under the same subtitle, FL § 10-112.” Id. at 27; 1992 Md. Laws, Chap. 561 (enactment of § 10-118). A later enacted statute, however, does not always trump an earlier-enacted statute that covers the same topic. When § 10-112 was originally enacted, it was well established that the “best interests of the child” standard governed most issues relating to children.

See, e.g., Orndoff v. Orndoff, 252 Md. 519, 522 , 250 A.2d 627, 628 (1969) (stating that the “best interest of a child is the determinative factor in custody cases”); but see McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 374-75 , 869 A.2d 751, 783 (2005) (holding that, “in private actions in which private ²⁹⁴ third parties are attempting to gain custody of children of natural parents over the objection of the natural parents, it is necessary first to prove that the parent is unfit or that there are extraordinary circumstances posing serious detriment to the child, before the court may apply a “best interest” standard”). We therefore may infer that the insertion of the “best interest of this State” standard into § 10-112 indicated that the Legislature intended the discretionary forgiveness of child support arrearages owed to the State not to be subject to the usual primacy of the “best interests of the child” standard. 30 The legislative history of § 10-118 reveals that § 10-118 was intended to “merely codif[y] what should be the current practice of the Child Support Enforcement Administration and local support enforcement offices.” See Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill Analysis 1992, H.B. 769 (codified ultimately as § 10-118) (emphasis added). When a statute “merely codifies” an already applicable standard, we afford it less weight in determining whether that statute trumps a previously enacted statute that diverges from the existing standard. 31 ²⁹⁵ V. A. Harvey continues that, even if the CSEA was not required to apply the “best interests of the child” standard, Maryland courts have the inherent power to review the discretionary decision of the CSEA not to forgive Harvey’s arrearages. See Gould, 273 Md. at 510-11 , 331 A.2d at 70 (affirming the inherent power of Maryland courts to review the discretionary actions of administrative agencies); see also Gonzales v. Ghingher, 218 Md. 132, 136-37 , 145 A.2d 769 , 772 (1958) (finding the reasoning of the Mayor and Treasurer of Baltimore City regarding the exercise of purely discretionary power to grant or deny an amusement license “arbitrary and unreasonable in a legal sense”).

When an agency engages in proper fact-finding and applies the appropriate law, our inquiry is limited solely to whether, given the relevant standard and facts, the administrative agency’s decision was “arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.” Gould, 273 Md. at 500-01 , 331 A.2d at 65 . In order to determine properly whether the CSEA’s refusal to exercise its discretion under § 10-112 was “arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable,” we must first determine the boundaries of such a standard. When an administrative action is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the APA grants a reviewing court the power to “reverse or modify the decision ²⁹⁶ [of an administrative agency] if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision ... is arbitrary or capricious.” Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222(h)(3)(vi) of the State Government Article.

Although we are cognizant that the particular situation presented in this case under § 10-112 was not a “contested case” at the time it was considered by the agency and therefore the APA does not apply, Maryland cases suggest that “an administrative proceeding, even if not subject to judicial review under the APA, would be subject to judicial review, of essentially the same scope, in an action for mandamus, certiorari, injunction or declaratory judgment [under the framework of Heaps, Gould, and their progeny].” Med. Waste Assocs. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, 327 Md. 596, 610 , 612 A.2d 241, 248 (1992); see also Dickinson-Tidewater, 273 Md. at 255-56 , 329 A.2d at 25 (finding that the substantial evidence test, which the courts use when acting pursuant to the inherent ability to review administrative decisions, “is similar to the tests laid down by [the APA]”); Hurl, 107 Md.App. at 305 , 667 A.2d at 979 (finding that “the standards of judicial review of agency decisions are essentially the same whether proceeding under the APA or pursuant to our inherent power to review administrative actions”). Because the standard of review under our inherent power of judicial review of discretionary administrative action is similar, if not identical, to the “arbitrary or capricious” standard enunciated in the APA, we therefore conclude that “it is appropriate for this Court to examine and rely upon cases decided under the APA for guidance regarding the appropriate standard of review of [an agency’s] decision.” Hurl, 107 Md.App. at 305 , 667 A.2d at 979 . In Spencer v. Board of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 529-30 , 846 A.2d 341, 349 (2004), we examined the analogous standard to be applied in the context of review under the APA, ... when an agency acts neither as a finder of fact nor as an interpreter of law but rather in a “discretionary” capacity....

Logically, the courts owe a higher level of deference to functions specifically committed to the agency’s discretion ²⁹⁷ than they do to an agency’s legal conclusions or factual findings. Therefore, the discretionary functions of the agency must be reviewed under a standard more deferential than either the de novo review afforded an agency’s legal conclusions or the substantial evidence review afforded an agency’s factual findings. In this regard, the standard set forth in § 10 — 222(h)(3)(vi) [of the APA], review of “arbitrary or capricious” agency actions, provides guidance for the courts as they seek to apply the correct standard of review to discretionary functions of the agency. (citations omitted).

A review of Maryland case law demonstrates that this “arbitrary or capricious” standard is, perhaps intentionally, less than well-defined with respect to judicial review of discretionary actions. 32 In his Maryland Administrative Law treatise, Professor Arnold Rochvarg examines, in the context of the APA, the “arbitrary or capricious” standard, concluding that it ... is best understood as a reasonableness standard. If the agency has acted unreasonably or without a rational basis, it has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.... [Unlike a court’s “substantial evidence” review of an agency’s factual determinations, u]nder arbitrary or capricious review, the court’s reasonableness review goes beyond factual findings and goes beyond a review of the agency record. Under arbitrary or capricious reasonableness review, the court will consider any argument that the agency acted unreasonably regardless of whether it appears within the agency record. * * * It is impossible to catalogue every circumstance when an agency acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Attorneys and judges should merely understand that the standard requires rational conduct by the agency in all respects.

Each case must be evaluated on an individual basis. ²⁹⁸ Arnold Rochvarg, Maryland Administrative Law, § 4.38 at 128 (2001, 2004 Supp.). We also find, as Professor Rochvarg observes, id., some guidance in the definitions found in Black’s Law Dictionary. Black’s defines “arbitrary” as including those judicial decisions “founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact.” Black’s Law Dictionary 112 (8th ed. 2004). Black’s defines “capricious” as including those decisions “characterized by or guided by unpredictable or impulsive behavior, ... contrary to the evidence or established rules of law.” 33 Id. at 224.

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, as another example, defines “arbitrary” as 1: depending on individual discretion (as of a judge) and not fixed by law ... 2 a: not restrained or limited in the exercise of power: ruling by absolute authority ... b: marked by or resulting from the unrestrained and often ²⁹⁹ tyrannical exercise of power ... 3 a: based on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of something . .. b: existing or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a capricious and unreasonable act of will.... Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 59 (10th ed. 1999). Webster’s defines “capricious” as “governed or characterized by caprice,” which in turn is defined as “1 a: a sudden, impulsive, and seemingly unmotivated notion or action b: a sudden usufally] unpredictable condition, change, or series of changes ... 2: a disposition to do things impulsively----” Id. at 169. These definitions echo Professor Rochvarg’s explication that, so long as the actions of administrative agencies are reasonable or rationally motivated, those decisions should not be struck down as “arbitrary or capricious.” “Arbitrary or capricious” decision-making, rather, occurs when decisions are made impulsively, at random, or according to individual preference rather than motivated by a relevant or applicable set of norms.

Indeed, this conclusion is confirmed by the Maryland courts’ application of the “arbitrary or capricious” standard to several differing circumstances involving allegations that an administrative agency’s decision was “arbitrary or capricious.” New Maryland cases have developed a detailed general definition of “arbitrary or capricious,” relying instead on a case-by-case development or an application of the standard solely to the case at hand. See Rochvarg, supra, at § 4.38 at 128 (finding that, because of the relative ambiguity of the “arbitrary or capricious” standard, “[e]ach case must be evaluated on an individual basis”); Maryland State Bd. of Social Work Exam’rs v. Chertkov, 121 Md.App. 574, 585-86 , 710 A.2d 391, 396 (1998). Most cases, however, recognize as a threshold matter the extremely deferential nature of the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. In reviewing a claim that an administrative sanction was so disproportionate to the misconduct involved as to ³⁰⁰ be “arbitrary or capricious,” the Court in Maryland Transportation Authority v. King stated: As long as an administrative sanction or decision does not exceed the agency’s authority, is not unlawful, and is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence, there can be no judicial reversal or modification of the decision based on disproportionality or abuse of discretion unless, under the facts of a particular case, the disproportionality or abuse of discretion was so extreme and egregious that the reviewing court can properly deem the decision to be “arbitrary or capricious. ” 369 Md. 274, 291 , 799 A.2d 1246, 1255-56 (2002) (emphasis added).

Other cases have adopted this “extreme and egregious” synonym for “arbitrary or capricious.” See, e.g., Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 170-71 , 848 A.2d 642, 650 (2004) (referencing the “extreme and egregious” standard in finding that, as a matter of law, “a delay in the issuance of [an administrative agency’s order] is a relevant factor in determining whether the agency properly exercised its statutory discretion, judicially reviewed under the extremely deferential arbitrary or capricious standard”); but see Rochvarg, supra, at 24 (2004 Supp.) (commenting that an “extreme and egregious” definition of “arbitrary or capricious” is “much too deferential” and that “[e]ourts would be abdicating their responsibility if they were only willing to reverse an agency under the arbitrary or capricious standard for extreme and egregious conduct”). In Maryland Aviation