Hashmi v. Bennett

WOODWARD, J. This appeal arises from the death of twenty-seven year old Adrian Tyree Bennett (“Adrian”) from septic shock on April 23, 2003. A jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found that appellant, Shoaib A. Hashmi, M.D., was negligent in his care and treatment of Adrian and that his negligence caused Adrian’s death. On October 25, 2006, the court entered judgment on the verdict against appellant and in favor of appellees, Troy Bennett, as Personal Representative of Adrian’s estate and as Adrian’s father; Geraldine Bennett, as Adrian’s mother; and Keion Bennett, Tyshaun Bennett, and Adam Gross, as Adrian’s children, in the total amount of $2,295,000. Upon motion of appellant, the court applied the provisions of Maryland Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.), Section 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) and reduced the judgment to $1,795,000.

Appellant then moved to further reduce the judgment, claiming entitlement to additional reduction under the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tori—Feasors Act (“UCATA”), C.J. §§ 3-1401 et seq. Because appellees had entered into two settlement agreements with other defendants, the circuit court, on March 20, 2007, reduced the judgment by two-thirds to $598,-333.333. On appeal, appellant presents one question for our review, which we have rephrased: Did the trial court err by reducing the judgment against appellant by two-thirds, instead of four-fifths, under UCA-TA? ⁴³⁹ For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. BACKGROUND On November 16, 2005, by a First Amended Complaint and Election for Jury Trial, appellees filed a survival and wrongful death action against Stephen Holtzclaw, M.D., Roman Kos-trubiak, M.D., Emergency Physician Associates of Maryland, P.C.

(“E.P.A.”), appellant, and The Good Samaritan Hospital of Maryland, Inc. (“Good Samaritan”)- Appellees alleged that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose and appropriately treat a methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus infection that the decedent had developed before he went to the Good Samaritan emergency room on April 22, 2003. As a result of the defendants’ negligence, according to appellees, Adrian went into severe septic shock and died on April 23, 2003. Dr. Holtzclaw was dismissed without prejudice from the lawsuit on June 21, 2006. On October 10, 2006, Dr. Kos-trubiak, E.P.A., and Good Samaritan were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to settlement agreements. 1 As part of settlement, the settling defendants agreed to execute joint tortfeasor releases.

Appellees were paid $400,000 by E.P.A. and Dr. Kostrubiak, its employee physician, and $550,000 by Good Samaritan. A jury trial commenced on October 16, 2006, against appellant as the only remaining defendant. The jury found appellant negligent in his care and treatment of Adrian and that his negligence was a cause of Adrian’s death. As noted, on October 25, 2006, the court granted judgment on the verdict against appellant and in favor of appellees in the total amount of $2,295,000, and reduced the judgment to $1,795,000, pursuant to the statutory cap on non-economic damages set forth in C.J. § 11-108. ⁴⁴⁰ Thereafter, appellant moved to farther reduce the verdict, 2 claiming entitlement to additional reduction under UCATA Appellant argued that the E.P.A. release created one joint-tortfeasor share for E.P.A. and its employee, Dr. Kostrubiak.

Regarding the Good Samaritan release, appellant contended that there were three joint-tortfeasor shares, i.e., one share for each of Good Samaritan’s three employees, Dr. Hina Sahi, Nurse Kathleen Bosse, and an unidentified emergency room nurse, “Nurse A.” In combination with appellant’s share as a joint tortfeasor, appellant calculated a total of five shares, and thus argued that he was entitled to a four-fifths pro rata reduction of the verdict. Appellees agreed with appellant that the E.P.A. release created one joint-tortfeasor share for E.P.A. and its employee, Dr. Kostrubiak. Appellees, however, contended that the Good Samaritan release produced only one joint-tortfeasor share, rather than three. According to appellees, a total of three joint-tortfeasor shares were present in the instant case—one for appellant, one for E.P.A./Kostrubiak, and one for Good Samaritan, resulting in a two-thirds reduction of the jury verdict.

On March 15, 2007, a hearing was held on appellant’s post-trial motions. On March 20, 2007, the court reduced the judgment by two-thirds, instead of four-fifths. Accordingly, judgment was entered in the amount of $598,333,333 ($1,795,-000 v 3 = $598,333,333), representing the amount of appellant’s one-third joint-tortfeasor share. Appellant timely noted this appeal on April 13, 2007.

DISCUSSION Appellant argues that the language used in the Good Samaritan release “establishes that Good Samaritan Hospital accounts for three joint-tortfeasor shares, one for each of its ⁴⁴¹ three allegedly negligent employees, Dr. Sahi, Nurse Bosse, and Nurse A.” Appellant maintains that “[t]he Good Samaritan Release, read as a whole, shows that the parties intended to release not only the corporate entity[, Good Samaritan], but the individual employee actors whose care was at issue.” According to appellant, each negligent employee, along with Good Samaritan, constitutes a joint tortfeasor. Thus appellant contends that the trial court should have reduced the verdict by dividing it by five shares, rather than three shares. Appellees argue that appellant is “not entitled to multiple-share reductions of the verdict for Good Samaritan agents unnamed in the [Good Samaritan settlement] Release.” The basis of appellees’ argument is that appellant is not entitled to additional share reductions of the verdict because appellant “waived the defense of release, and failed to establish multiple Good Samaritan joint-tortfeasor shares by any of the mechanisms available to him under Maryland law.” At common law, Maryland courts refused to recognize a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., 359 Md. 671, 683 , 756 A.2d 526 (2000). “[A] release by the injured party of one of several joint tortfeasors released all.” Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619 , 133 A.2d 428 (1957).

In 1941, Maryland enacted UCATA to establish “ ‘a statutory right of contribution’ ” among joint tortfeasors, Parler & Wobber, 359 Md. at 685 , 756 A.2d 526 (quoting Central GMC, Inc. v. Helms, 303 Md. 266, 276 , 492 A.2d 1313 (1985)), thereby “enabling an individual to settle with one joint tortfeasor and still have recourse against the remaining tortfeasors.” Anne Arundel Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Condon, 102 Md.App. 408, 415 , 649 A.2d 1189 (1994); see also Jacobs v. Flynn, 131 Md.App. 342, 369 , 749 A.2d 174 (2000) (noting that UCATA was enacted “to encourage settlements by allowing a plaintiff to maintain his claim against a non-settling joint tort-feasor when he settles with another joint tort-feasor and signs a release”). When an injured person settles with a joint tortfeasor, UCATA prescribes the effect of a settlement release on the ⁴⁴² injured person’s claims against other joint tortfeasors. UCA-TA § 3-1404 provides that a joint tortfeasor release reduces the injured person’s claim against all non-settling joint tortfea-sors.

See Jones v. Hurst, 54 Md.App. 607, 608 , 459 A.2d 219 (1983) (“Under the [UCATA], certain consequences ensue when an injured person releases one of several joint tort-feasors. One of those consequences may be a reduction in any judgment the injured party recovers against remaining tort-feasor(s).”). Specifically, § 3-1404 states: A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but it reduces the claim against the other joint tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid. “Ascertaining the number of joint tort-feasors, therefore, is critical in determining the amount by which the jury award must be reduced before judgment is entered.” Jacobs, 131 Md.App. at 370 , 749 A.2d 174 . I. The Number of Joint Tortfeasors In the instant case, the issue before this Court is the effect of the releases given by appellees to E.P.A./Kostrubiak and to Good Samaritan on the judgment entered against appellant.

See Martinez v. Lopez, 300 Md. 91, 96 , 476 A.2d 197 (1984). That effect, namely a reduction of the verdict against appellant, is determined by the number of released parties that are, in fact, joint tortfeasors. See Collier v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 86 Md.App. 38, 56 , 585 A.2d 256 (“[Ojnly releases given to joint tortfeasors will give rise to rights of reduction and contribution.” (Emphasis added)), cert. denied, 323 Md. 33 , 591 A.2d 249 (1991). Jones, 54 Md.App. at 608 , 459 A.2d 219 (stating that UCATA § 3-1404, formerly § 19, “do[es] not come into play unless the person released was a joint tort- ⁴⁴³ feasor”).

Appellant, as the party moving for a reduction of the verdict in accordance with UCATA § 3-1404, bears the burden of proving the joint tortfeasor status of the settling parties. See, e.g., Swigert, 213 Md. at 619 , 133 A.2d 428 (“[Ujnder Maryland law ..., in order for [a non-settling defendant] to be certain that he will obtain these reductions, it is necessary that negligence on the part of [a settling defendant] contributing to the injuries must be shown in one manner or another.”). UCATA defines “[j]oint tort-feasors” as “two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.” UCATA § 3-1401(c). “The fact ... that a party has been sued or threatened with suit is not enough to establish joint tort-feasor status.” Jacobs, 131 Md.App. at 374 , 749 A.2d 174 . Nor is one “considered a joint tort-feasor ... merely because he or she enters a settlement and pays money.” Id.

UCATA “does not specify the test of liability. Clearly, something short of an actual judgment will suffice.... ” Swigert, 213 Md. at 619 , 133 A.2d 428 . In discussing the determination of joint tortfeasor status in Collier , we explained: Where a plaintiff has, at some time, claimed that two or more persons have contributed to his injury by their respective tortious conduct, two questions may arise: (1) whether the conduct of those persons falls within the scope of the definition and (2) how that determination is to be made. Where no settlements have occurred, the liability of all such persons is ordinarily determined by the trier of fact, and so both questions are answered by the verdicts.

That pertains as well in those cases where one or more settlements have occurred but the liability of the settling defendants, but for the settlements, is nonetheless submitted to and determined by the trier of fact. The problems arise, most frequently, where the actual liability of the settling defendant is not determined by the trier of fact. Resort then is made, at least initially, ⁴⁴⁴ to the language of the release. In some instances, the settling parties specify in the release that the releasee is to be regarded as a joint tortfeasor, even though he may disclaim liability.

In that event, the releasee’s status as a joint tortfeasor is contractually determined. Conversely, the settling parties may specify in the release that the releasee shall not be regarded as a joint tortfeasor unless adjudicated as such, in which event the releasee will be regarded as a mere volunteer [3] absent a judicial determination of his liability. Collier, 86 Md.App. at 57 , 585 A.2d 256 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus joint tortfeasor status may be established by (1) a judicial determination that a settling party is a joint tortfeasor, or (2) an admission or concession of joint tortfeasor status. 4 See Jacobs, 131 Md.App. at 374-75 , 749 A.2d 174 (“Tort-feasor status, in the absence of adjudication, generally ⁴⁴⁵ rests on admission by the purported tort-feasor of such status.

Thus, a party will be considered a joint tort-feasor when it admits joint tort-feasor status in a settlement agreement, or if a default judgment has been entered against a party.” (Citations omitted)). An example of the first category can be found in Swigert . There, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should not have granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Welk, a third party defendant, where, although the plaintiff executed a release of Welk pre-trial, Welk’s status as a joint tortfeasor was denied in the release. 5 Swigert, 213 Md. at 615, 618, 622 , 133 A.2d 428 . To prevent “a somewhat incongruous procedural situation to have a party to a case completely dismissed and leave the question of his negligence yet to be determined,” the Court decided that Welk was to remain in the case as a third party defendant, and the question of Welk’s tortfeasor status was to be answered by judicial determination.

Id. at 621-22 , 133 A.2d 428 . Jones presented the alternative to judicial determination of joint tortfeasor status. 54 Md.App. at 608-09 , 459 A.2d 219 . Jones arose out of an automobile accident between Jones, the appellant, and Zachary Hurst, who operated the vehicle that struck Jones. Id. at 609 , 459 A.2d 219 .

Jones sued Zachary Hurst and Henry Hurst, the owner of the vehicle, and General Motors Corporation (“G.M.”), the manufacturer of the Hurst vehicle. Id. Jones settled with G.M. and executed a “Joint Tortfeasor Release” with G.M. Id. at 609 , 459 A.2d 219 . Following trial, a verdict of $18,000 was rendered against Zachary Hurst and in favor of Jones. 6 Id. at 610 , 459 A.2d ⁴⁴⁶ 219.

Upon Zachary Hurst’s motion, pursuant to the G.M. release and UCATA § 3-1404 (formerly § 19), the trial judge reduced the judgment against Zachary Hurst by one-half, to $9,000. Id. On appeal, we rejected Jones’ argument that the verdict should not have been reduced because G.M.’s liability had never been judicially determined. Id. at 611, 459 A.2d 219 .

Although noting that the release also contained an express denial of G.M.’s liability, we concluded that the language in the release conceding G.M.’s joint tortfeasor status was sufficient to satisfy UCATA’s requirement of establishing a party’s joint tortfeasor status. Id. The release stated: “for the purpose of determining the amount of any judgments that may be recovered by me against any person, firm or corporation, except General Motors ... the said General Motors Corporation shall be considered as joint tort-feasors [sic] to the same extent and effect as if judgments had been rendered against them [sic] as joint tort-feasors.” Id. (alterations in original).

In the case sub judice, appellant concedes that he never sought a judicial determination of joint tortfeasor status of Good Samaritan’s three employees. Instead, appellant urges that he “sought a reduction based upon the language of the releases.” In determining joint tortfeasor status, “problems arise, most frequently, where the actual liability of the settling defendant is not determined by the trier of fact” and the court resorts “at least initially, to the language of the release.” Collier, 86 Md.App. at 57 , 585 A.2d 256 (emphasis in original).

II

The Good Samaritan Release When “the settling parties specify in the release that the releasee is to be regarded as a joint tortfeasor,” then “the releasee’s status as a joint tortfeasor is contractually determined.” Collier, 86 Md.App. at 57 , 585 A.2d 256 . “Maryland follows the objective law of contract interpretation and construction.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 496 , 872 A.2d 969 (2005). ⁴⁴⁷ “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed. In these circumstances, the true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. Consequently, the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away [sic] to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean____As a result, when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous, and in the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to show the intention of the parties or to vary, alter, or contradict the terms of that contract.” Id. at 496-97 , 872 A.2d 969 (alteration in original) (quoting Gen.

Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261 , 492 A.2d 1306 (1985)). In the case sub judice, the Good Samaritan Release states in relevant part: RECITALS A. Plaintiffs filed a Statement of Claim in the Health Claims Arbitration Office of Maryland, HCA No.2005-418 naming, among other parties,