Hatcher v. State

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge. Carroll Antonio Hatcher, appellant, was charged in the Circuit Court for Washington County with possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Before trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress cocaine seized from his pants pocket. Following a suppression hearing, the court denied appellant’s motion, and appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Subsequently, appellant was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with all but 84 months suspended, and three years of unsupervised probation upon release. Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the court’s denial of his motion to suppress was in error. We shall affirm. Appellant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police officers.

The officers observed the driver of the vehicle run a red light and drive at an excessive speed, and they knew the vehicle had been stolen, prior to initiating the stop. The basis for our conclusion is that the arresting police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant and conduct a search ³⁶⁶ incident to that arrest and, alternatively, that the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered. Factual Background On April 25, 2006, a suppression hearing was held pursuant to appellant’s motion to suppress cocaine seized from his person during an illegal search. At that hearing, Officer Thomas Kelley testified as follows.

On December 15, 2005, at approximately 12:41 a.m., Officer Kelley and Officer Tom Niebauer of the Hagerstown Police Department, were stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of “North Jonathan and Franklin,” when they observed a black Chevy run a red light on Franklin Street. At that time, Officer Kelley began to follow the vehicle, which was traveling at approximately 45 miles per hour in a zone with a posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour. The officers ran the vehicle registration through police dispatch and learned that the vehicle had been stolen in Leesburg, Virginia. Subsequently, the officers initiated a traffic stop by activating the police vehicle’s lights and siren.

The vehicle continued traveling approximately “a quarter of a mile to a half mile,” however, and proceeded to a ramp onto southbound Interstate 81 before it stopped “just off the ... ramp.” Once the vehicle stopped, the officers conducted a “high-risk stop” based on the fact that the vehicle was reported stolen and initially failed to comply when the officers attempted to stop it. Officer Kelley testified that the high-risk stop consisted of giving verbal commands to the driver, with weapons drawn, to turn off the vehicle, remove the keys from the ignition, and drop the keys outside of the vehicle. The officers then advised the driver to exit the vehicle. The driver complied with the officers’ request, and he was handcuffed and removed to a safe location where he was detained.

Officer Kelley stated that the front seat passenger, a female, was then commanded to exit the vehicle, was handcuffed, and removed to a safe location, where she was detained. The last occupant of the vehicle, appellant, who had ³⁶⁷ been sitting in the rear, on the driver’s side of the vehicle, was then commanded to exit the vehicle, was handcuffed, and removed to a safe location, where he was detained. Officer Kelley testified that, as each occupant was removed from the vehicle, “[d]uring each time of the handcuffing, as they were being removed to a safe location, a quick pat down was conducted for any possible weapons.” Officer Kelley testified that after confirming that the vehicle had been stolen and determining that all of the occupants were going to be placed under arrest for the vehicle theft, but prior to placing appellant in the rear of his police cruiser, he “searched” appellant. Officer Kelley’s testimony in this regard was as follows.

THE STATE: And now proceeding on with what happened that evening, did there come a time when you patted down [appellant], the rear seat passenger? OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. After the vehicle had been cleared for any possible or any additional suspects, I then went back, made contact with [appellant]. He was in a safe location.

I u’m prior to placing him in the back of my police cruiser, once again searched him. THE STATE: Let me ask you, at that point was it your intent at that point to place him in the back of the police cruiser before you patted him down? OFFICER KELLEY: Yes to get — due to the — Believe it or not at that time of night 81 was very congested, a lot of traffic. It was determined, based on the information that we had, it was confirmed that the vehicle was stolen, that all suspects were to be placed under arrest and also to bring [appellant] to a safe location out of the flow of traffic or to at least get him off the uh in a vehicle, my determination was to place him in the back of the vehicle for his safety.

THE STATE: Okay. And Officer Kelley, let me — I just want to clarify some things. Do you have your reports in front of you? OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. ³⁶⁸ THE STATE: Okay and this — -just to make sure we get a good chronology for the [c]ourt, at the time that you were going to conduct the pat down— OFFICER KELLEY: Yes.

THE STATE: Okay you placed [appellant] in handcuffs at that point is that correct? Before patting him down? OFFICER KELLEY: He had already — Excuse me. [Appellant] had already been in handcuffs at that time, yes. And another officer had already patted him down.

THE STATE: Okay so another officer had patted him down. Was anything found at that point that you know of? OFFICER KELLEY: Not that I know of, no sir. THE STATE: So at what point was it that you sear — that you conducted any further search of [appellant]?

OFFICER KELLEY: Prior to placing him in the back of the vehicle, which each day I sign out that vehicle, I am responsible for that vehicle, any contents of that vehicle I am responsible for. So before each — At the beginning of each shift, at the end of each shift, I search the interior compartment of that vehicle, be it the passenger compartment, under the driver and passenger side seats. I search that. Anyone that is taken into custody, be it myself or another officer makes an arrest and I’m required to transport, I search that person the best I can to uphold the integrity of my search of the compartment of that vehicle---- But to uphold the integrity of the original or the initial search, anybody that is put in the vehicle is searched by myself.

THE STATE: And prior to conducting that search that we’re talking about and will describe for the [c]ourt in a second here, was it your intent to place [appellant] under arrest on the car issue, the car theft issue? OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. THE STATE: Okay. And what did you do then — Could you please explain to the [c]ourt what type of search you conducted and what you found if anything? ³⁶⁹ OFFICER KELLEY: I searched the outer area of [appellant].

I then proceeded to check his pockets. And then as I checked his right front pocket, I felt an object that was hard, a hard cylinder object that was consistent, based on initial feeling of it, with the size of an item that I believed to be possibly a or consistent to be with a crack cocaine pipe. I proceeded further, removed the item from his pocket. It was wrapped in a piece of cloth with a rubber band wrapped around it.

I removed the rubber band, the cloth and there was a glass pipe with wire mesh on one end. The contents of that wire mesh had burnt residue. And through my training, knowledge and experience, I suspected that the item was used to smoke crack cocaine and that the residue was possibly crack cocaine in the burnt — in the mesh. In addition in the same area a small plastic zip-lock baggie contained a white or beige rocklike substance.

Also through my training, knowledge and experience I initially suspected the item to be, recognized the item to be, suspected to be crack cocaine. I maintained custody of those items, continued with the search and then placed [appellant] in the back of the car. Now the search was not an extensive search. It was just the, like you could say the personal compartments of [appellant] which consisted of pockets, the belt lining and again the belt lining for any possible hidden weapons or contra-bands that may have been missed and then I rubbed down the legs and sock area.

On cross-examination, Officer Kelley testified that, although he had information that the vehicle was stolen, he had not received information prior to the stop that appellant was wanted for the theft. As the officers were in the “process of leaving” the scene, the police dispatcher advised that “Carroll Antonio Hatcher” was wanted for the theft, in Leesburg, Virginia. At that time, Officer Kelley was still trying to determine if appellant was Carroll Antonio Hatcher because he had identified himself as “Randolph T. Hatcher,” and presented a New Jersey identification card so indicating. At ³⁷⁰ some point, Officer Kelley also learned that there was a warrant for the driver of the vehicle, Dewaine Feaster.

As noted earlier, Officer Kelley testified that a “pat-down” had occurred prior to his search of appellant. On cross examination, Officer Kelley testified that he “assumed” a “pat-down” had occurred prior to his search. The pertinent testimony follows. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Officer Kelley, who was driving the vehicle in question?

OFFICER KELLEY: A black male who was later identified as Dewaine ... Feaster____ APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And the record would indicate that there were some New Jersey warrants for both Mr. Feaster and— OFFICER KELLEY: U’m — I believe there were warrants for both Mr. Feaster and— ❖ * * OFFICER KELLEY: Yes in Essex County. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: When would you have been aware of those? OFFICER KELLEY: We were advised during the booking process.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: During booking? OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: The uh — When dispatch said — I believe you said right around the time you started the traffic stop, dispatch said the vehicle was stolen. What exactly — Not that you know verbatim, but what would be— How would they — What would they have told you?

What would dispatch say? OFFICER KELLEY: Something along the lines that the vehicle was 1099, indicated wanted. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. OFFICER KELLEY: And then they would further give information indicating it was wanted out of Leesburg, Virginia for being stolen. ³⁷¹ APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Your answer is that basically the information that you and Officer Niebauer had?

OFFICER KELLEY: I’d say yeah. I mean that’s the gist of it yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. What I’m getting at is dispatch said the vehicle is reported stolen out of Virginia, Leesburg, Virginia.

It’s report — It’s a stolen vehicle out of Virginia. OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. There would be no specific information at that time indicating [appellant] to you.

It wouldn’t say anything — “We’re looking for Carroll Hatcher” at the same time. OFFICER KELLEY: At the initial time? APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Right. OFFICER KELLEY: No. Prior to the stop, no.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And is it fair to assume, based on your answer about the driver, that when you went to booking, you would have found out more information about the various people, including [appellant]? OFFICER KELLEY: If I can elaborate. As the investigation continued with the stop, the arresting of all the occupants, of course police dispatch getting information fairly quickly on the computer screen, they would then — they then gave information indicating that a u’m Carroll Hatcher was to be associated with the vehicle and was also wanted out of Leesburg, Virginia for the uh for the theft of the vehicle. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Do you know exactly when you would have got that information?

If you don’t, you don’t. OFFICER KELLEY: No I don’t know sir. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. THE COURT: Well you said dispatch would have given you that information fairly quickly? ³⁷² OFFICER KELLEY: Well if I — They are receiving the information fairly quickly.

Of course while the traffic stop is in progress, they cease all radio traffic to free up the air. So they indicate the vehicle is stolen out of Leesburg, Virginia. We are in the course of making the traffic stop, the vehicle stopping, et cetera. They free up traffic on the radio we then conduct our stop procedure.

We detain or we detain the occupants. The determination is made at that time, based on the fact that the vehicle is stolen, the occupants are under arrest. Each occupant is detained in their separate areas. And then as I think prior or up to prior to transportation, transporting back to the police department, they are indicating that [appellant] is to be wanted for the theft of the vehicle ...

THE COURT: Well do you know how long you were on the scene from the time of the stop until vacating the scene? OFFICER KELLEY: I can estimate at approximately 12:41 we initiated the, we made the stop approximately and approximately 12:43 we advised police dispatch that the occupants were under arrest. And I’d say maybe 10 to 15 minutes or so, again trying to figure out what we were going to do about towing the vehicle, inventorying the vehicle, and trying to get these, the suspects back to the building as quickly as possible, get off 81. THE COURT: Okay.

But as I understood it from [appellant’s counsels’] question, you had information that a Carroll Hatcher was wanted out of Leesburg, Virginia for theft of the vehicle for theft of the vehicle before you vacated the I-81 scene? * * # OFFICER KELLEY: We were in the process of leaving when police dispatch had advised that he was wanted. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. Is it fair to say that each person, starting with the driver, would have been, would have been told to, if I can get this right, “Put your ³⁷³ hands out the windowu”n “Hands up and walk backwards[?]”[ ] OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: At some point “Get on the ground[?]”[ ] OFFICER KELLEY: Yes.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And then they are handcuffed. OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay and then — Now if my client describes being walked back to one of the cruisers and leaning over the trunk of the cruiser to be searched, is that a fair statement? You know that he was brought back to one of the police cars, leaned over the cruiser in order to be searched?

OFFICER KELLEY: I would speculate because I did not have uh visual on [appellant] when he was completely brought back for any searching. My vision or my attention was on the vehicle until the vehicle had been cleared. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: I thought in response to one of [the State’s] questions ... I thought you said he had already been, [appellant] had already been patted down by somebody else?

Is that — Am I correct in that? OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: All right. And would that have been officer Niebauer?

OFFICER KELLEY: That I don’t know. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: So there were other cruisers because there were a number of police cars there, I take it. OFFICER KELLEY; Yeah and it was myself and Officer Niebauer in a two person car and I believe there were two additional HPD who responded. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: So in fact to your knowledge today someone else from HPD patted down [appellant] and ³⁷⁴ then you did the more extensive search and felt the object in his pocket?

OFFICER KELLEY: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. Some other officer patted down [appellant]. You then place him in the cruiser or do you search him first?

OFFICER KELLEY: I search him before I place him in the cruiser. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: At what point is [appellant] officially told he’s under arrest? And if you don’t remember, that’[s] fine. OFFICER KELLEY: I don’t remember.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And I think in response to the [c]ourt’s question, as you were leaving, you received info — as you were leaving the scene I assume with [appellant] in the cruiser, you got word from dispatch that he was specifically wanted out of Virginia. OFFICER KELLEY: We got information that a Carroll Antonio Hatcher was wanted out of Leesburg, Virginia for the theft of the vehicle, however, we were still trying to— APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Figure out if this was Carroll Hatcher. OFFICER KELLEY: Figure out if this was Carroll Hatch-er or not because he identified himself to be Randolph T. Hatcher and he presented a New Jersey identification card. So there was— APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: For timing purposes, it’s your best recollection you were leaving the scene when that information came in.

OFFICER KELLEY: Yes I would anticipate that, yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay now in your police report, in your report, you indicate that each suspect would be handcuffed and searched for possible weapons. But you do use the word “searched[.]”[ ] However in response to my question it’s your recollection that another officer patted ³⁷⁵ down [appellant], a pat down for weapons. Outer clothing.

Or you don’t know? I mean you don’t know what they did. OFFICER KELLEY: Me using search in that incident was a loose word. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay.

OFFICER KELLEY: It should have been better articulated as a pat down to articulate the high-risk stop. But in reference to your question about what another officer did, I can’t answer that. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: But you seem to have some understanding that somebody had processed him first. OFFICER KELLEY: I would assume that when he was cuffed, brought back to a safe location, that a pat down would have been conducted for weapons.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. OFFICER KELLEY: And again search was a loose term. I should have articulated that better. THE STATE (Redirect Examination): Officer Kelley, do you have any recollection of being advised prior to your search of [appellant] that anything had been identified, located or recovered of an illicit nature by whoever conducted the pat down?

Did anyone tell you they found something on him before you searched him? OFFICER KELLEY: No sir nobody told me that. No sir. THE STATE: Okay.

And you indicated that you had contacted the police department indicated that the occupants were placed under arrest at 12:43? OFFICER KELLEY: The arrest — The booking sheet indicates that they were informed at 12:43 is what was noted in the system. THE STATE: And was — Had you decided or had the decision [been] made to arrest [appellant] prior to your searching him? OFFICER KELLEY: Yes my decision had been made prior to searching. ³⁷⁶ Appellant also testified at the hearing.

He testified that he was seated in the rear passenger seat when the vehicle was stopped. He stated that after the driver was ordered out of the vehicle, he was ordered to exit the vehicle with his hands in the air, walk backwards towards the officers, drop to the ground on his knees, lock his legs, and interlock his hands behind his head. At that point, appellant stated that he was placed in handcuffs. As to the conduct of the search, appellant testified as follows.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Then what happened next? APPELLANT: I was standing beside the driver. Both of us had, was being searched. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Were you standing straight up?

APPELLANT: I was leaned over the [police] car. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. Did you — Did the officer, the first officer, did you feel him pat you down? How did the — What happened?

APPELLANT: Actually it wasn’t but one officer that patted me down. They searched me. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: How many officers was it? APPELLANT: There were several officers there I observed, but it was only one officer that searched me.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Now there is — There is something called a pat down where your clothing is patted down to feel things and then there is reaching into your pocket and so forth. APPELLANT: Well the way I was searched it wasn’t, it was more than just a pat down. I mean when I was being searched, hands was going in my pockets. It wasn’t like rubbing me you know.

Hands was going in my pockets, checking all my pockets. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Was anything taken out of them? ³⁷⁷ APPELLANT: Yes a crack pipe and a zip-lock baggie with a piece of crack in it. THE COURT: All right I’m confused. I thought Officer Kelley did that at a later time.

APPELLANT: That was the only time that I was searched. THE COURT: Only one time. APPELLANT: Right. THE COURT: And that is Officer Kelley.

APPELLANT: Yes sir. THE COURT: Okay. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: After you were searched, were you placed in a cruiser? APPELLANT: Yes I was.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. Did there come a time when you were told that you were under arrest? APPELLANT: Once I was seated in the cruiser. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And it was said you were under arrest.

APPELLANT: Right. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Did there come a time when you were told that there was a warrant for you out of Virginia? APPELLANT: No not until I got to the station. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: That’s my question.

When you were told there was a warrant for you out of Virginia? APPELLANT: While I was at the station being fingerprinted and ready for picture. On June 13, 2006, the court issued a bench ruling on appellant’s motion to suppress. In denying appellant’s motion, the court ruled as follows, in pertinent part.

The law and its application. The issue articulated by counsel at the suppression hearing was whether Officer Kelley had probable cause to arrest the [appellant] as an occupant of the vehicle. Prior to initiating the stop, Officer Kelley ³⁷⁸ had knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. It is important to remember that, quote, “The rule of probable cause is a nontechnical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction by more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion,” end quote.

Doering versus State, 313 Md. 384 at page 403[, 545 A.2d 1281 ]. As further noted by the Doering Court, “These are not technical. They are factual and practical considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” 313 Md. at page 403 [, 545 A.2d 1281 ]. With this legal predicate, it is necessary to examine the crime for which Officer Kelley may have had probable cause to make an arrest.

Section 7-105(b) of the Criminal Law Article prescribes the following conduct. “A person may not knowingly and willfully take a motor vehicle out of the owner’s lawful custody, control or use without the owner’s consent.” A violation of this subsection is a felony. Section 14-102 of the Transportation Article proscribes the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Unlike motor vehicle theft, this latter section does not require proof of the intent to steal the vehicle to sustain a conviction. As noted in Johnson v. State, 2 Md.App. 486 , [ 236 A.2d 41 (]1967[)] case, the scope of the crime of unauthorized use was delineated in Anello v. State, 201 Md. 164 at page 167[, 93 A.2d 71 ].

And the following is a quote from A[n]ello and Johnson. “In Maryland it is a misdemeanor for any person, his aiders or abettors, to take and carry away out of the custody or use of any other person any of the enumerated kinds of property, including motor vehicles, although it may appear from the evidence that the offender, his aiders and abettors, took and carried away the property for his or their present use and not with the intent of appropriating or converting the same.” The Court of Special Appeals in Johnson concluded “Thus, in order to convict for larceny of use it is not essential to prove that the accused took the property from the owner. Participation, alone, in the continued use of the vehicle by a passenger with the requisite criminal intent is ³⁷⁹ sufficient to sustain a conviction. In the case at bar, there is no question that the car was stolen and that Johnson, as a passenger therein at the time of his arrest, was participating in its use to the deprivation of the owner. There remains only to determine whether there was legally sufficient evidence of Johnson’s criminal intent or guilty knowledge.” And that’s the end of that quote from Johnson v. State.

Of course the Johnson Court was examining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction for unauthorized use. As noted previously, the instant case involves the much less stringent standard of probable cause. Using the non-technical rules enunciated in the appellate cases, the [cjourt believes that Officer Kelley had probable cause to arrest the [appellant]. Although Officer Kelley could not know the [appellant’s] intent, he reasonably knew that the [appellant], as a passenger, was participating in the use of a stolen vehicle.

The U.S. Supreme Court noted in Pringle that occupants of a motor vehicle are likely to be involved in a common enterprise. Having verified that the vehicle in this case was stolen, it was reasonable for Officer Kelley to conclude that the [appellant] was a participant in the theft and/or unauthorized use, hence the search of the right front pants pocket of the [appellant] is a permissible search incident to arrest. Assuming arguendo that probable cause did not exist for an arrest, it appears that Officer Kelley had the right to detain the [appellant] at least for a brief period of time while the investigation was developing. See generally Watkins v. State, 288 Md. [597] 596, [ 420 A.2d 270 ] a 1980 case.

See also U.S. v. Wright, 565 F.2d 486 , a 1977 case out of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, certiorari denied 435 U.S. 974 , [ 98 S.Ct. 1621 , 56 L.Ed.2d 67 (]1978[)]. After the stop of the vehicle took place, the officer was at least entitled to obtain basic identifying information from the occupants of the car. Handcuffing alone does not necessarily transform an investigatory stop into an arrest. Trott v. State, 138 Md.App. 89 , 770 A.2d 1045 , a 2001 case.

Within approximately 10 min ³⁸⁰ utes of the stop, Officer Kelley was given information that a Carroll Antonio Hatcher was wanted in Leesburg, Virginia. Under the circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for Officer Kelley to detain the [appellant] for a brief period of time, including transporting him to the station pending resolution of the [appellant’s] identity. When the [appellant] was then identified as Carroll Hatch-er, the investigatory detention ripened to probable cause to arrest the [appellant], hence the pipe and cocaine would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to lawful search incident to the [appellant’s] arrest under such a scenario. For these reasons, the [appellant’s] motion to suppress is denied.

Parties’ Contentions We shall paraphrase the parties’ contentions. Appellant contends that the motions court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress because (1) appellant was arrested solely because of his status as a passenger in the car and without any individualized suspicion or probable cause to believe that he was committing any crime, and (2) appellant was clearly arrested, rather than simply detained for investigatory purposes; thus, Officer Kelley did not intend to conduct a Terry 1 stop and, in any event, did not “articulate any basis for having any suspicion specific to appellant to do so”; and, (3) there was no basis for reasonable articulable suspicion to justify detaining appellant, within the meaning of Terry. The State counters that (1) Officer Kelley clearly had probable cause to arrest appellant for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop — which circumstances included that appellant was a passenger in a stolen vehicle that, at 12:41 a.m., had run a red light, was speeding, and had failed to immediately stop after the officers activated their emergency lights— and to properly conduct a search incident to that arrest; (2) ³⁸¹ assuming arguendo, the police did not have probable cause to arrest appellant, the fact that police ordered him out of the vehicle at gunpoint and handcuffed him did not mean that appellant was arrested, and the actions constituted an allowable investigatory detention pursuant to Terry; and, (3) that, pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine, even if the police had neither probable cause to arrest, nor reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention, “any taint from an illegal search and seizure would have been dissipated by the subsequent discovery that [appellant] was wanted by Virginia authorities for theft of the vehicle”; thus, the evidence recovered was admissible as the fruit of a search incident to a lawful arrest. Discussion A Standard of Review When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, our scope is ordinarily limited to the record of the suppression hearing and does not include the record of the trial.

Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 274 , 909 A.2d 1048 (2006) (citing Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 477 , 893 A.2d 1119 (2006)). We consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing on the motion, in this ease, the State. State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581 , 861 A.2d 62 (2004). Ordinarily, we will give great deference to a hearing judge’s factual findings, and we will not disturb them unless they are clearly erroneous.

Id. at 581-82 , 861 A.2d 62 . When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, however, we must, under an independent de novo review standard, consider the application of the law to the facts in determining whether the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law and, accordingly, should be suppressed. Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 499 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007) (other citations omitted). “Indeed, appellate courts make their ‘own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the law and applying it to the peculiar facts of ³⁸² the particular case.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 457 , 682 A.2d 248 (1996)).

B. Motion to Suppress Before turning to the merits, we shall summarize the facts adduced at the suppression hearing that are pertinent for purposes of our analysis. At approximately 12:41 a.m., Officer Kelley and Officer Niebauer initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle based on the knowledge that it was stolen, was in violation of traffic laws, and had failed to respond promptly. Subsequently, the vehicle’s occupants were ordered out of the vehicle, possibly patted down, and physically restrained. An intent to arrest the vehicle’s occupants was formed at some point, but prior to the search of appellant.

At 12:43, the officers announced to the police dispatcher the arrest of appellant and the other occupants. Thereafter, and prior to putting appellant in the back of the police cruiser, appellant was searched. According to the court’s finding, the stop, at the scene, lasted approximately 10 minutes. As they were leaving the scene, the officers learned of the existence of an outstanding warrant for Carroll Antonio Hatcher, who was wanted out of Leesburg, Virginia for the theft of the vehicle.

At that time, the officers were attempting to verify that appellant was Carroll Antonio Hatch-er. For the reasons that follow, we shall conclude that appellant was lawfully arrested based on probable cause and, subsequently, searched incident thereto. Even if we did not so conclude, and instead assumed hypothetically that the arrest and search were unlawful, we would conclude that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to support a Terry stop, and that the drugs would have been inevitably discovered. 1. Fourth Amendment; Probable Cause and Search Incident to Arrest The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth ³⁸³ Amendment, protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Warrantless searches and seizures are considered “per se unreasonable,” In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 490 , 701 A.2d 691 (1997), but, if such a search or seizure “falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions, it will be upheld.” Id.; see Gamble v. State, 318 Md. 120, 123 , 567 A.2d 95 (1989). A search incident to a lawful arrest, based upon probable cause, see State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 147 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002), “is one of the well delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 583 , 861 A.2d 62 (2004) (other citations omitted). Furthermore, pursuant to Maryland Code (2001), § 2-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article, a police officer “without a warrant may arrest a person if the police officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed or attempted and the person has committed or attempted to commit the felony whether or not in the presence or within the view of the police officer.” In Collins v. State, 322 Md. 675 , 589 A.2d 479 (1991), the Court of Appeals explained probable cause as follows.

Probable cause, we have frequently stated, is a nontechnical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 403 , 545 A.2d 1281 (1988); Edwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131, 136 , 220 A.2d 547 (1966). A finding of probable cause requires less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion. Woods [v. State, 315 Md. 591, 611 , 556 A.2d 236 (1989)]; Sterling v. State, 248 Md. 240, 245 , 235 A.2d 711 (1967); Edwardsen, supra, 243 Md. at 136 , 220 A.2d 547 .

Our determination of whether probable cause exists requires a nontechnical, common sense evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in a given situation in light of the facts found to be credible by the trial judge. State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 379, 568 A.2d 48 (1990); Doering, supra, 313 Md. at 403-04 , 545 A.2d 1281 . Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances taken as a whole would lead a reasonably cautious person to ³⁸⁴ believe that a felony had been or is being committed by the person arrested. Woods, supra, 315 Md. at 611 , 556 A.2d 236 ; Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 521 , 413 A.2d 1340 (1980); Duffy v. State, 243 Md. 425 , 221 A.2d 653 (1966).

Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest the police must point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion. Lemmon, supra, 318 Md. at 380, 568 A.2d 48 . Id. at 680, 589 A.2d 479 (parallel citations omitted). The above-quoted principles remind us to remember “precisely what it is that we are measuring,” Burns v. State, 149 Md.App. 526, 539 , 817 A.2d 885 (2003), when analyzing the adequacy of the basis for a probable cause determination.

Id. As we stated in Bums, on this threshold issue of probable cause, a lot less need be shown [than need be shown to support a guilty verdict]. We are, after all, not measuring the level of certitude that must exist for a defendant to be deprived of freedom. We are only measuring the reasonableness of a non-lawyer police officer’s on-the-street reaction to a rapidly unfolding confrontation.

We must never forget the critical difference between these two very different measurements. Id. at 540 , 817 A.2d 885 . Once a person has been lawfully arrested based on probable cause, the police may conduct a search incident to that arrest. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court explained the justification for such a search.

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. ³⁸⁵ And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.

There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 . Appellant argues that the fact that he “was a back-seat passenger in a car that had been reported stolen could not, alone, confer probable cause to believe that [he], rather than the driver, had committed or was committing a crime,” that crime being, as indicated by the motions court, either motor