Hayes v. State

WRIGHT, J. This appeal arises from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County’s dismissal of a negligence complaint filed by James McKinley Hayes (“Hayes”). Hayes was accused by his ex-wife of abusing their minor daughter, and the Department of Social Services (“DSS”) found that he was an “indicated child abuser.” Hayes appealed this finding to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who overturned it. Hayes then brought a negligence action against DSS based on its failure to conduct the “thorough investigation” required by Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-706(a) of the Family Law Article (“FL”).

The circuit court held that this statute does not create a legally cognizable duty to the target of the investigation and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Questions Presented The appellant, on appeal, presents several issues, which we have consolidated and rephrased for clarity: 1 ⁷⁴⁶ 1. Whether the lower court erred in determining that the State’s duty to investigate allegations of child abuse is a duty that is owed to children and not to the target of abuse investigation. 2. Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the appellant’s amended complaint -without giving preclusive effect to the judgment in a domestic relations case between Hayes and his former spouse.

The Court of Appeals has recognized a limited statutory duty on the part of DSS to investigate reports of child abuse. However, that duty runs to the children who are the subject of the reports and not to their parents. See Horridge v. St. Mary’s County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 382 Md. 170 , 854 A.2d 1232 (2004).

Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that DSS did not owe a comparable legal duty to Hayes and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We note, however, that Hayes does not allege intentional or malicious conduct on the part of any DSS employee, nor is this a case where DSS failed to conduct any investigation whatsoever. Facts and Procedural History Hayes and Sherry Hayes (“Sherry”) were married on September 15, 2004, and Ciara was born to the couple on May 16, 1995. At the time of Ciara’s birth, Hayes was aware that he was probably not her biological father, and subsequent DNA testing confirmed that he, in fact, is not.

Nevertheless, the parties agreed that they would raise Ciara as if she were Hayes’s daughter. The record does not indicate that Ciara’s biological father has ever been involved in her life. Mr. and ⁷⁴⁷ Mrs. Hayes separated on March 24, 1997, with Sherry taking custody of Ciara and Hayes receiving visitation. On May 20, 2002, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted the couple an absolute divorce.

The parties entered into a consent agreement that granted sole legal and physical custody of Ciara to Sherry and gave Hayes daytime visitation on Saturday and on Thursday after school. The court reserved on the issue of overnight visitation pending an evaluation by the child psychologist. On April 25, 2003, the circuit court granted Hayes overnight visitation every other weekend. The court acknowledged the constitutional presumption that a child’s best interest is best served by remaining in the custody of the biological parent.

The court, nevertheless, held that the presumption was overcome because Sherry had exhibited a pattern of denying Hayes visitation and undermining Ciara’s relationship with him — the only father she had ever known. In fact, Sherry had been held in contempt for failure to abide by the court’s visitation orders. On May 22, 2004, while Ciara was visiting with Hayes, he took her to a Giant Food store in Largo, Maryland. They went to a self-checkout line and Ciara asked the Giant employee supervising the area for assistance in ringing up some cookies.

The next day, Sunday, Ciara and Hayes attended a church graduation ceremony and afterwards, at 6:00 p.m., Hayes returned Ciara to Sherry. According to Sherry, Ciara complained that the middle finger of her right hand hurt and that Hayes had bent her finger back while they were checking out at Giant. Sherry took Ciara to Kaiser Permanente, where she was diagnosed with a finger sprain and treated with ice and a finger splint. As a result of this incident, Sherry filed a motion for an emergency hearing on May 28, 2004.

She also contacted the circuit court on June 1, 2004, asking the court to stay Hayes’s next visit, scheduled for June 4, 2004. The court declined to do so, choosing instead to address the issue at a previously-scheduled review hearing on June 7, 2004. Six hours after the ⁷⁴⁸ emergency hearing, Sherry initiated criminal charges against Hayes. At the review hearing on June 7, 2004, the circuit court heard testimony from Ciara and Sherry about the alleged finger-bending incident.

Hayes testified on his own behalf and also presented the testimony of a Mr. Gilmore, who observed Ciara at the church event and did not see any injury. There was also testimony from the Giant employee, who did not know any of the parties, stating that she observed Hayes and Ciara checking out and did not see the alleged finger-bending incident, Ciara was not crying, and the interaction between Hayes and Ciara was normal and pleasant. The court made a factual finding that “there was no incident and there was no injury to Ciara.” Sherry appealed to this Court, pro se, arguing that this finding was clearly erroneous and challenging the circuit court’s decision to continue visitation even though DSS’s investigation and the criminal case were not yet concluded. In an unpublished opinion issued July 13, 2005, Sherry F. Hayes v. James M. Hayes, No. 1051, Sept. Term, 2004, 163 Md.App. 710 , we held that the circuit court’s findings were supported by the record and that, “[b]ased upon the court’s decision relating to the finger sprain, the Protective Services investigation was moot.” Id., slip op. at 7.

As a result, we affirmed the circuit court’s decision. Our opinion included a section that addressed Sherry’s “unwarranted” attacks on the circuit court judge, accusing the judge of bias. Id., slip op. at 8. We noted: “The record supports the court’s conclusion that appellant herein has continued her effort to destroy any meaningful relationship between her daughter and her former husband since the divorce in 2002 ... [and that this] is adversely affecting the child.” Id.

Sherry’s behavior had continued after she filed her appeal — she was held in contempt on December 21, 2004, for failing to facilitate visitation. Meanwhile, in July 2004, the State’s Attorney’s Office for Prince George’s County told Hayes that it planned to pursue the assault charge because DSS was planning to classify ⁷⁴⁹ Hayes as an “Indicated Child Abuser.” DSS sent Hayes a letter dated August 30, 2004, informing him that it had made a finding of indicated child abuse against him. Hayes was tried in district court on October 26, 2004, and he was found not guilty. As was his right, he appealed DSS’s finding of indicated child abuse. 2 On May 16, 2005, after a contested hearing, the ALJ ruled that: Sherry and Ciara had “likely fabricated” the incident; a finding of indicated child abuse was not supported by the record, nor was a finding of unsubstantiated child abuse supported; and, the finding of indicated child abuse must be vacated and replaced with a finding of “child abuse ruled out.” Neither party appealed the ALJ’s decision.

On May 22, 2007, Hayes filed a ten-count negligence complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the State of Maryland. The State filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, because DSS did not owe a legally cognizable duty to Hayes to conduct its investigation in a particular manner. In the motion, the State noted that the statute requiring DSS to conduct a “thorough investigation” left DSS the discretion to conduct the investigation as it saw fit. In addition, the statute creates a duty to the public, generally, not accused perpetrators of child abuse, specifically.

The motion also argued that, even if Hayes was owed a duty, the chain of causation necessary to hold the State liable was broken by Sherry’s deliberate actions. Finally, the Assistant State’s Attorney and District Court Commissioner enjoy absolute immunity; therefore, the State could not be held liable for their actions. On August 27, 2007, Hayes filed an amended complaint naming Alice Gregory, a social worker at DSS; Deneen Gas-kin, a supervisory social worker at DSS; David Stewart, Child Protective Services; Carol Ann Smith, Attorney General’s ⁷⁵⁰ Office; Raymond Garvey, Maryland State Treasurer; Phil Newsom, DSS; Shannon Crawford, District Court Commissioner; and Lisa Hall, Assistant Attorney General, as defendants. Count I alleged that Gregory and Gaskin were negligent because they did not contact the witnesses Hayes named, obtain Ciara’s medical records, or “recognize the collateral estoppel/issue preclusive effect of the prior judicial decision” of the circuit court that the incident never occurred.

Count II alleged that Gregory and Gaskin were negligent in failing to re-evaluate the evidence and change the finding from “indicated” to “ruled-out” child abuse prior to the ALJ’s decision. Counts III-VI and Count XI contended that Stewart, Smith, Burke, Garvey, and Newsom, as well as additional unnamed agents of DSS, failed to properly expunge records relating to the finding of indicated child abuse against Hayes, in violation of the ALJ’s order. Hayes alleged that these actions were negligent and violated his right to privacy and due process. Counts VTI-IX contended that the District Court Commissioner negligently failed to ensure that probable cause existed before she issued a warrant for Hayes’s arrest.

Finally, Count X contended that the Assistant State’s Attorney negligently failed to investigate before proceeding to trial on the assault charge. Listed among the injuries caused by the defendants’ negligence was “invasion of privacy under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.” The State filed a second motion to dismiss and the circuit court held a hearing on the motion on November 2, 2007. The motion was granted on November 27, 2007, with the circuit court finding that “the Amended Complaint failed to sufficiently allege facts: 1) establishing a duty owed to Plaintiff upon which tort liability can be based, the breach of which proximately caused injury; 2) supporting a cause of action for invasion of privacy; 3) supporting a cause of action for violation of due process; 4) abrogating the Commissioner’s judicial immunity or the Assistant State’s Attorney’s qualified immunity.” Hayes filed a timely appeal to this Court. ⁷⁵¹ Discussion At the outset, we note that Hayes is suing the State of Maryland pursuant to the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). See Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl.

Vol.), State Government Article (“SG”), § 12-104(a) & § 12-110. As we explained in Pulliam v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 181 Md.App. 144 , 955 A.2d 843 (2008), “[historically, the State of Maryland enjoyed immunity from tort liability for the acts of its employees but, by the enactment of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-101 et seq., the State, through a limited waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity, provides a remedy for citizens injured by the negligent acts or omissions of state personnel acting within the scope of their public duties.” Id. at 154 n. 2, 955 A.2d 843 (emphasis added). The State is not liable when the acts of its employees are malicious or grossly negligent — but no one is contending that such is the case here. See CJP § 5-522(a)(4)(h).

Although Hayes’s initial complaint contained multiple defendants and counts, he has abandoned many of those claims on appeal. In his brief to this Court, he discusses the allegations found in Counts III-XI of his complaint and concedes that “[t]hese allegations are not material to this appeal and are not being pursued in this appeal.” As a result, we need only address Counts I and II, which contend that Gregory and Gaskin negligently failed to conduct a “thorough investigation” of the allegation against Hayes. “In the context of a negligence action, we have previously held that a sufficient pleading must ‘allege, with certainty and definiteness, facts and circumstances sufficient to set forth (a) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (b) a breach of that duty and (c) injury proximately resulting from that breach.’ ” Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 28 , 690 A.2d 1000 (1997) (quoting Read Drug and Chem. Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 412 , 243 A.2d 548 (1968)) (emphasis added by Jenkins). “Whether there is adequate proof of the required elements to succeed in a negligence action is generally a question of fact to be ⁷⁵² determined by the fact-finder, while the existence of a legal duty is a question of law to be decided by the court.” Pulliam, supra, 181 Md.App. at 154 , 955 A.2d 843 .

The circuit court in this case granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that “the Amended Complaint failed to sufficiently allege facts ... establishing a duty owed to Plaintiff upon which tort liability can be based.” The court did express sympathy toward Hayes, however, because he “suffered a dreadful experience in the wake of his former spouse’s allegations.” “We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. We examine the complaint and determine whether it states a legally sufficient cause of action[, and] [dismissal is proper only if the complaint would fail to provide the plaintiff with a judicial remedy.” Id. at 153 , 955 A.2d 843 . At this stage in the proceedings, we must assume the truth of all well-pleaded, relevant, and material facts in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Allied Inv.

Corp. v. Jasen, 354 Md. 547, 555 , 731 A.2d 957 (1999). In a negligence action, duty can be established by either common law or statute. See