Haynie v. National Gypsum Corp.

⁵³⁰ ALPERT, Judge. “Catch 22” 1 may have carved a niche in the annals of contemporary American literature, but it shall not have a counterpart in contemporary Maryland civil litigation. Samuel B. Haynie had his “Catch 22.” Having filed a claim for Worker’s Compensation, he decided to file a common law tort action against his employer, but was told by the courts that he could not pursue that action because of his Worker’s Compensation claim. When he attempted to pursue his Worker’s Compensation claim thereafter, he was told that he could not proceed with that claim because of the common law tort action. For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse the order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissing the appellant’s Worker’s Compensation claim.

In March, 1978, appellant, Samuel B. Haynie was injured as a result of his employment at appellee’s, National Gypsum Company, subsidiary, Gold Bond Building Products, also an appellee in the case sub judice. Appellant’s injury arose out of an incident wherein he observed a fellow employee being accidentally electrocuted and attempted to save the employee. As a result of his efforts, however, appellant himself was severely injured. In April, 1978, appellant retained an attorney and filed a claim with the Maryland Worker’s Compensation Commission.

The claim was uncontested and appellant was awarded temporary total disability benefits. Appellant received these benefits and in January, 1980, his award was continued. In February, 1980, however, appellees contested the ⁵³¹ Commission’s finding on the nature and extent of appellant’s injury by appealing to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Prior to being heard on appeal, appellant retained new counsel and was advised of a possible common law tort remedy against appellees under Section 44 of Art. 101 of the Maryland Code, which provides: If injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child, children or dependents of the employee shall have the privilege either to take under this article or have cause of action against such employer, as if this article had not been passed.

Md.Ann.Code art. 101 § 44 (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.). In July, 1980, his new counsel filed a common law tort action against appellees in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and requested that the appeal of the worker’s compensation claim be stayed pending resolution of the tort action. On January 27, 1981, appellant’s counsel requested that appellees discontinue appellant’s benefits under the appealed worker’s compensation claim. Appellees unsuccessfully demurred to appellant’s tort suit and thrice moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they were immune from any common law liability.

Appellant, in an attempt to resolve the issue, filed for declaratory relief seeking a legal determination of whether he had the common law right to sue his employer. Appellees, in response to appellant’s petition for a declaratory judgment, dismissed their appeal of the worker’s compensation claim and requested that the Worker’s Compensation Commission conduct a further hearing on the nature and extent of appellant’s injury. Appellant promptly requested that the Commission’s consideration of this request be placed on a stet docket pending resolution of the tort and declaratory judgment suits. The Commission initially granted appellant’s request but later reversed itself. ⁵³² It then ordered appellant to show cause why his worker’s compensation claim should not be dismissed in light of the other pending suits.

After a September 28, 1982 hearing on the matter, the Commission involuntarily dismissed appellant’s claim because he “elected to proceed with civil action against [his] Employer under [Art. 101] section 44.” Appellant promptly appealed the dismissal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Prior to the hearing on appeal, Judge Grady of the Baltimore City Circuit Court ruled on appellant’s declaratory action and held that appellant had made a binding election to pursue his remedies under the Maryland Worker’s Compensation Act. On the appeal of the dismissal of the worker’s compensation claim before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the trial judge refused to consider Judge Grady’s ruling and affirmed the dismissal. 2 The trial judge’s dismissal of the compensation claim and Judge Grady’s dismissal of the tort claim were separately appealed to this Court. In an unreported opinion, Haynie v. Gold Bond Building Products (No. 324, September Term, 1984, filed November 27, 1984) (“Haynie I ”), we affirmed Judge Grady’s dismissal of the tort action. 3 The case sub judice addresses the propriety of the trial judge’s dismissal of appellant’s worker’s compensation claim.

Appellant, by virtue of our decision in Haynie I and the trial judge’s decision on the worker’s compensation claim, stands before this Court stripped of any right to bring any claim. In other words, we held that the filing of the worker’s compensation claim barred the filing of the tort claim and the trial judge has decided that the filing of the ⁵³³ tort claim barred maintenance of the worker’s compensation claim. The inconsistency is obvious. Our