Heartwood 88, Inc. v. Montgomery County

HOLLANDER, Judge. This appeal requires us to construe the “Tax Sale” statute, codified in Title 14, Subtitle 8 of the Tax-Property Article (“T.P.”) of the Maryland Code (1985, 2001 Repl.Vol.). The case involves a dispute between Heartwood 88, Inc. (“Heartwood”), appellant, and Montgomery County (the “County”), ³³⁹ appellee, with regard to a tax sale of real property conducted by the County, at which it mistakenly sold 331 properties to Heartwood for which the owners were not then delinquent in payment of their real property taxes. Upon discovery of the errors, the County refunded the purchase monies to Heartwood for all of the sales, along with interest at the rate of 8%.

Nevertheless, Heartwood claimed that it was entitled to interest at the “redemption rate” of 20%, amounting to $208,648.17, because that is the rate that would have applied if the sales had been valid and the owners had redeemed their properties. Appellant also sought to recover statutory attorney’s fees of $400 for each of the 331 properties, totaling $132,400, along with other expenses. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County rejected Heartwood’s claims and ordered Heartwood to return the County’s interest payment. Heartwood poses two questions for our consideration: I. Did the circuit court err in refusing to award Heartwood interest at the 20% redemption rate plus statutory attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred?

II

Did the circuit court err in concluding that interest paid to Heartwood by Montgomery County was paid without legal authority and that the County was therefore entitled to judgment? For the reasons discussed below, we shall affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL SUMMARY 1 In May 2000, the County advertised its annual sale of parcels of real property located in the County, for which the payment of property taxes was delinquent. The County’s notice of sale stated: The tax sale is open to the public.

Prospective bidders should investigate the properties. There is no warranty, expressed or implied, that a property has a marketable title ³⁴⁰ or that it contains the area of land which it is said to contain; therefore, the purchaser assumes all risks in that regard. Purchasers will receive a certifícate of sale as required by law. In the event a tax sale is subsequently invalidated, the tax sale purchaser, upon the surrender of the Tax Sale Certificate, mil receive a refund of the amount paid at tax sale, including interest calculated at 8%.

The County will pay no expenses associated with the sale or invalidation. The list of delinquent taxpayers shown below may include taxpayers who paid their taxes since the list was submitted to the newspaper for publication, and does not necessarily mean that their taxes are still delinquent. During the advertising period, May 18th through June 8th [of 2000], properties will be removed from groups [of properties for sale] predicated on payments received from taxpayers. Therefore, the final newspaper advertisement on June 8th will list groups with fewer properties then were originally advertised. * * * Pursuant to 1999 tax sale legislation, the County must establish a high-bid premium for all properties sold in groups and/or by a sealed bid process.

This high-bid premium is 20% of the amount by which the bid exceeds 40% of the properties’ full cash value. The high-bid premium is payable at the same time the successful bidder pays the tax sale amount. The County will refund the high-bid premium, without interest, to the holder of the tax sale certificate on redemption of the property or to the plaintiff in an action to foreclose the right of redemption on delivery of a tax sale deed for the property for which the high-bid premium was paid. The high-bid premium is not refundable after the time required (under Section 14-833) for the filing of an action to foreclose the right of redemption, if there has been ³⁴¹ no redemption and if an action to foreclose the right of redemption has not been filed within that time.

(Emphasis added). Appellant participated in the tax sale, which was held on June 12, 2000. At that time, the County sold approximately 1,900 properties in twenty-four groups. The sale of the properties was organized by group to insure the sale of all properties, including those that were regarded as less desirable.

Appellant was the high bidder for twenty of the groups, consisting of 1,385 individual properties. Accordingly, on June 13, 2000, Heartwood paid the County the sum of $6,868,442.56. Of that sum, $3,934,555.09 represented the amount due for taxes, interest, and penalties. The remaining sum of $2,933,887.47 constituted a statutory, interest-free “high-bid premium.” 2 Appellant’s purchases were evidenced by a “Certificate Of Tax Sale,” which the County tendered to appellant for all 1,385 properties.

Each tax sale certificate provided, in pertinent part: “Upon redemption, the holder of this certificate will be refunded the sums paid on account of the bid price together with ... interest and penalty ... The interest and penalty will be computed at the rate of 8% and 12% per annum respectively from the date of the tax sale to the date of redemption, together with all other amounts specified by Section 14—813, Annotated Code of Maryland. .. .” The County concedes that it “mistakenly offered [331] properties at the tax sale even though the taxes had been paid.” According to Glenn Wyman, then Chief of the Treasury Division for the County’s Department of Finance, it was Heartwood that first discovered that the County had sold properties for which the owners were not in arrears. Over a period of months, beginning in December 2000 and continuing through ³⁴² October 2001, the County verified that, as of the time of the tax sale on June 12, 2000, the delinquent taxes and other charges had already been paid by the owners of the 381 properties inadvertently sold by the County at the tax sale. Accordingly, about ten months after the tax sale, in April 2001, the County refunded the sum of $1,276,522.42 to Heartwood, representing reimbursement for the purchase price for the 331 properties.

The County also paid Heartwood interest in the amount of $83,621.22, calculated at the rate of 8%, consistent with the County’s tax sale notice. In addition, the County refunded the high bid premium that Heartwood had paid, in the amount of $890,537.39, but without interest. 3 Heartwood was not satisfied with the interest payment at the 8% rate. It claimed that, because the sale of 331 properties was void, it was entitled to interest at the County’s redemption rate of 20%, amounting to $208,648.17, pursuant to T.P. § 14-848 and other statutory provisions. Therefore, Heartwood sought an additional $125,026.95 from the County.

Further, appellant claimed it was entitled to statutory attorneys’ fees of $400 for each of the 331 properties, totaling $132,400, plus expenses of $2475, pursuant to T.P. § 14-843. On December 6, 2001, after the County refused to pay the additional sums claimed by Heartwood, appellant instituted suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Styled as a “Complaint For Declaratory Judgment And For Judgment That Tax Sales Were Void,” appellant sued the County and Timothy Firestine, Collector of Taxes and Director of Finance for the County. 4 In its suit, appellant asked the court to ³⁴³ declare void the sales of the 331 properties; to order the County to pay interest at the redemption rate of 20%; and to require the County to pay attorneys’ fees of $400 per property, along with costs. The County filed a counterclaim and request for declaratory judgment, seeking to recover the 8% interest that it had previously paid to Heartwood.

Following a hearing in October 2002 on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court issued a written “Opinion and Order” on December 18, 2002, in which it granted judgment in favor of the County and Firestine. Noting that the parties “agree that the sale of the 331 properties in question was void at the time of the tax sale ... ”, the court ruled that Heartwood was not entitled to the requested relief of interest on the refund at the redemption rate of 20%, statutory attorneys’ fees, and expenses. The court said: “Simply put, in order for [Heartwood] to recover interest at the redemption rate, there must be a redemption of the property by the owner.” In its view, “[t]here was no redemption with regard to the 331 properties at issue ... because the sale was void from its inception,” and thus the properties were “never subject to redemption.” As “there was no sale for the court to void,” the court determined that T.P. §§ 14-848 and 14-843 had no application here. Moreover, the court determined that appellant was obligated to reimburse the County in the amount of $83,621.22, representing the 8% interest that the County had previously paid to appellant.

The court reasoned that the tax collector “did not have the authority to pay 8% interest because no statute applied to the void tax sale,” and such payment “was in violation of law.” While acknowledging “a clear representation” that the County would pay interest at 8% for an invalid sale, and noting that “the three elements of equitable estoppel would appear to be met,” the court nonetheless pointed out ³⁴⁴ that the doctrine of equitable estoppel “has limited application against municipalities.” The court concluded that “[t]he doctrine of equitable estop-pel does not prevent the County from [obtaining] reimbursement of the 8% interest paid in error.” It reasoned that, as against a municipality, the doctrine, “when applicable, must be bottomed on the need for the interpretation or clarification of an ambiguous statide or ordinance ...” (Citation omitted)(emphasis in court’s opinion). Satisfied that “there is no ambiguous statute or ordinance that is subject to interpretation,” the court rejected appellant’s argument that the County was “subject to estoppel because the County and the Tax Collector were following a long-standing administrative interpretation .... ” Rather, the court was of the view that “the common law rule of caveat emptor applies to tax sales.” We shall include additional facts in our discussion. DISCUSSION I. Pursuant to Article Xl-A of the Maryland Constitution, known as the “Home Rule Amendment,” counties that opt to adopt a home rule charter for purposes of local governance are able “to achieve a significant degree of political self-determination.” Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 504 , 801 A.2d 148 (2002); see McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 16 , 570 A.2d 834 (1990). The “Express Powers Act,” Md. Ann.Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Article 25A, is “the legislative response ... to the directive contained in § 2 of Article Xl-A” of the State Constitution, which required the General Assembly “to provide a grant of express powers for charter home rule counties.” Tyma, 369 Md. at 505 , 801 A.2d 148 .

Montgomery County is a charter or home rule county. Therefore, it exercises the express powers granted to it by State law, Tyma, 369 Md. at 505 , 801 A.2d 148 , which means that it enjoys “full legislative power ... to pass all ordinances” that it “deem[s] expedient under the police power ...,” sub ³⁴⁵ ject to the laws of the State and the provisions of Article 25A. Tyma, 369 Md. at 506 , 801 A.2d 148 . These express powers include the right “[t]o provide for the prompt collection of all taxes due the county; and for the sale of real estate, as well as leasehold and personal property, for the payment of the same.” Code, Art. 25A, § 5(0).

However, as noted, there are limitations on a home rule county’s legislative power. Under Section 5(S) of the Express Powers Act, for example, a charter county may not enact an ordinance that conflicts with State law. Tyma, 369 Md. at 505-06 , 801 A.2d 148 . Tax sales of real property “are concerned with the payment of taxes on land....” Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 229 , 783 A.2d 206 (2001).

The laws regarding tax sales reflect a blend of State and local governmental power. The State’s Tax Sale statute authorizes the State’s political subdivisions to sell real property located in their own jurisdictions, for which property taxes are in arrears. While the General Assembly has carefully crafted legislation that governs much of the process and procedure with respect to such tax sales, see T.P. §§ 14-808 to 14-863, the local subdivisions are entitled to set the redemption rate of interest that an owner must pay after a tax sale in order to recover the property sold at the sale. That rate, often referred to as the redemption rate, is considered “a matter of local concern.” Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md. 1, 11 , 650 A.2d 705 (1994).

As Heartwood explains, the effect of a properly conducted tax sale under the State’s statutory scheme is to provide “interest-free financing” to local subdivisions for unpaid real estate taxes. Because the State’s Tax Sale statute is at the center of this appeal, we begin with a review of the statute and its salient provisions, many of which are interrelated, as well as the pertinent Maryland rules. Upon proper notice to the necessary parties, the Tax Sale statute authorizes a local tax collector to sell property at public auction if an owner’s real property taxes are in arrears. See T.P. §§ 14-808; 14-817; LaValley v. Rock Point Aero Sport Club, Inc., 104 Md.App. 123, 126 , 655 A.2d 60 , cert. ³⁴⁶ denied, 339 Md. 354 , 663 A.2d 72 (1995).

The statute also authorizes the tax collector to set the terms for conducting the tax sale. T.P. § 14-817 states: § 14-817. Sale at public auction. (a) Conduct of sale. * * * (4) The conduct of the sale shall be according to terms set by the collector, and published with a reasonable degree of specificity in the public notice of the tax sale, to ensure the orderly functioning of the public auction and the integrity of the tax sale process....

Pursuant to County law, the Director of the Department of Finance must conduct the tax sale on the second Monday in June at an hour and place specified in a published notice. That notice is sent by the Department to the owners of property for which taxes remain unpaid. Montg. Co. Code § 52-36 (1994, as amended).

Under T.P. § 14-818, the person or entity who makes a tax sale purchase must pay to the municipality, no later than the day after the tax sale, “the full amount of taxes due on the property sold” at tax sale, “together with interest and penalties on the taxes, expenses incurred in making the sale, and the high-bid premium, if any.” The remainder of the purchase price “remains on credit.” Fish Market, 337 Md. at 4 , 650 A.2d 705 . In return, “[t]he purchaser ... receives a certificate of sale, which is freely assignable.” Id. (citing T.P. § 14-820, § 14-821). The Tax Sale statute provides for a variety of events to occur after a properly conducted tax sale, some of which are in the alternative.

An understanding of these alternative scenarios is important to this case. In general, they involve three categories: the first concerns the owner’s right to redeem the property; the second involves the tax purchaser’s right to foreclose on the property; the third concerns the time period applicable to the right to foreclose. We explain. ³⁴⁷ First, under T.P. § 14-827, the property owner has the right to redeem the property sold by the tax collector “at any time until the right of redemption has been finally foreclosed....” To do so, T.P. § 14-828 requires the redeeming party to pay the tax collector the “total price paid at the tax sale for the property together with interest”; plus taxes, interest, and penalties paid by the certificate holder; and taxes, interest, and penalties that have accrued since the date of the tax sale until the date of redemption. See Fish Market, 337 Md. at 4 , 650 A.2d 705 .

T.P. § 14-828(a) states, in part: § 14-828. Required payments; interest rate on redemption; notice to holder of certificate; execution of certificate. (a) Payments to collector.—If the property is redeemed, the person redeeming shall pay the collector: (1) the total price paid at the tax sale for the property together with interest; (2) any taxes, interest, and penalties paid by any holder of the certificate of sale; (3) any taxes, interest, and penalties accruing after the date of the tax sale.... T.P. § 14-828(b) provides that the “interest rate on redemption” is “set under [T.P.] § 14-820.” The sums referred to in T.P. § 14-828 are paid by the tax collector to the tax sale purchaser in exchange for the “surrender of the certificate of sale.” See T.P. § 14-828(c).

In Fish Market, 337 Md. at 5 , 650 A.2d 705 , the Court said: “If the property is redeemed, the holder, upon surrendering the certificate, receives the redemption amount paid to the collector, excluding taxes.” In addition, T.P. § 14-843 pertains to attorney’s fees due “on redemption.” It requires the redeeming party to pay attorney’s fees of $400 for each property, plus expenses, to the certificate holder. Pursuant to T.P. §§ 14-833 through 14-844, no sooner than six months from the date of the certificate of tax sale, but no ³⁴⁸ later than two years from that date, the certificate holder may file a complaint to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption of the property. T.P. § 14-836 identifies the various parties to the proceedings. In particular, it denominates the holder of the certificate as the plaintiff and the record title holder of the property as one of the defendants.

The form of a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption is governed by T.P. § 14-835 and Md. Rule 14-502. T.P. § 14—835(a)(3) and Rule 14-502(a)(3) both provide that the party filing such a complaint must state “that the property has not been redeemed by any party in interest.” Upon the filing of a complaint to foreclose, the court issues summonses to all defendants and an order to publicize the foreclosure proceeding. See T.P. §§ 14-839, 840; Fish Market, 337 Md. at 6 , 650 A.2d 705 . Until the court issues a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption, however, the owner’s right of redemption continues.

Fish Market, 337 Md. at 6 , 650 A.2d 705 . Moreover, in the event of a controversy as to the amount required for redemption, it is the court’s responsibility to resolve that issue. Id. T.P. § 14-842 is also significant, because it concerns a challenge to the validity of a tax sale.

It provides: § 14-842. Validity of taxes and sale presumed unless attacked in answer. In any proceeding to foreclose the right of redemption, it is not necessary to plead or prove the various steps, procedure and notices for the assessment and imposition of the taxes for which the property was sold or the proceedings taken by the collector to sell the property. The validity of the procedure is conclusively presumed unless a defendant in the proceeding shall, by answer., set up as a defense the invalidity of the taxes or the invalidity of the proceedings to sell or the invalidity of the sale.

A defendant alleging any jurisdictional defect or invalidity in the taxes or in the proceeding to sell, or in the sale, must particularly specify in the answer the jurisdictional defect or invalidity and must affirmatively establish the defense. ³⁴⁹ (Emphasis added). See also Rule 14-505 (“Any issue as to the validity of the taxes, the proceedings to sell the property, or the sale, shall be raised by separate affirmative defense.”). In the event the owner fails to redeem the property by the specified date, the court issues a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption. T.P. § 14-844.

Then, upon payment of any amounts that are due, the tax collector issues a deed to the tax purchaser. In this way, the tax purchaser acquires fee simple title to the property. See Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 139 , 702 A.2d 753 (1997); LaValley, 104 Md.App. at 127 , 655 A.2d 60 (stating that “the purchaser acquires absolute title to the property.”). As the Court said in Lippert, 366 Md. at 230 , 783 A.2d 206 : When there is “a valid tax sale and proper foreclosure of the equities of redemption,” the prior title is terminated and a new title is created and “granted by the sovereign.” The certificate holder must file a proceeding to foreclose the right of redemption within two years from the date of the tax certificate.

If the tax purchaser fails to do so, the sums paid by the tax sale purchaser for the tax certificate, including the high-bid premium, are forfeited. See T.P. § 14-817(b)(2)(vi); T.P. § 14-833(d); Gordon Family Partnership, 348 Md. at 137 , 702 A.2d 753 . As we have seen, the tax sale purchaser is entitled to a certificate of tax sale. The content of the certificate of tax sale is prescribed by T.P. § 14-820(a).

It states, in part: “The collector shall deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale ... which ... shall set forth: ... (6) a statement that the rate of redemption is 6% a year, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.... ” T.P. § 820(a) (Emphasis added). T.P. § 14-820(c) is also pertinent. It states: § 14-820.

Certificate of sale—In general. (c) Form of certificate.—The certificate of sale shall be in substantially the following form: ... “On redemption the holder of the certificate will be refunded the sums paid on account of the purchase price together with interest at the ³⁵⁰ rate of 6% a year from the date of payment to the date of redemption (except as stated in subsection (b) of § 14-820 of the Tax Property Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland), together with all other amounts specified by Chapter 761 of the Acts of 1943, and acts that amend that chapter.... ” (Emphasis added). Both T.P. § 14-820(a) and T.P. § 14-820(c) provide for interest to the tax purchaser at the rate of 6%, except as otherwise provided pursuant to T.P. § 14-820(b). T.P. § 14-820(b) provides: “The rate of redemption is 6% a year except: ...

(15) in Montgomery County the rate is 6% a year or as fixed by a law of the County Council.” (Emphasis added). Thus, T.P. § 14-820(b)(15) authorizes the Montgomery County Council to set the County’s rate of interest payable on redemption. The Montgomery County Council issued Resolution No. 9-1591 in December 1981, in which it declared, in part: [T]he County Council ... believes that the tax sale of real property for overdue and unpaid ordinary taxes ... provides necessary government revenues; and the purchaser at tax sale is performing a service to the public. Therefore, the purchase of property at tax sale should be encouraged by providing that the rate of redemption shall be the sum of the interest rate as provided in Section 48, Article 81, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1980 Replacement Volume, as amended, on late payment of delinquent taxes, and the penalty rate on late payment of delinquent taxes as fixed by resolution of the County Council.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the County Council for Montgomery County, that commencing with the tax sale of real property in June 1982 for ordinary taxes overdue, in arrears and unpaid, in accordance with the provisions of Section 76 through 123, Article 81, Annotated Code of Maryland, the rate of redemption shall be the sum of the interest rate on late payment of taxes as provided in Section 48, Article 81, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1980 ³⁵¹ Replacement Volume, as amended, and the penalty rate on late payment of delinquent taxes as fixed by resolution of the County Council. (Emphasis added). The County’s interest rate on delinquent property taxes is set at 8%, and its penalty rate is 12%. Therefore, the parties agree that the County’s redemption rate (the combined rate of interest and penalties) is set at 20%. 5 The Court of Appeals has recognized the policy reasons that undergird the rather high redemption rates that local governments typically establish in connection with properties sold at tax sales. 6 In Fish Market, 337 Md. at 5 , 650 A.2d 705 , it said: Local subdivisions often set the [redemption] rate higher than rates given on ordinary investments.

For example, Baltimore City has set the redemption interest rate at 24% per year.... This high rate of return encourages potential tax sale purchasers to invest in the property despite the fact that the property is subject to a right of redemption. T.P. § 14-848 is central to this case. It provides: ³⁵² § 14-848.

Judgment declaring sale void. If the judgment of the court declares the sale void and sets it aside, the collector shall repay the holder of the certificate of sale the amount paid to the collector on account of the purchase price of the property sold, with interest at the rate provided in the certificate of tax sale, together with all taxes that accrue after the date of sale, which were paid by the holder of the certificate of sale or the predecessor of the holder of the certificate of sale, and all expenses properly incurred in accordance with this subtitle.... (Emphasis added). According to appellant, T.P. § 14-848 is the only provision in the Tax Sale statute that pertains to the circumstances of this case, involving the erroneous sale by the tax collector of properties for which no taxes were in arrears.

In this situation, says appellant, T.P. § 14-848 requires the County to pay “interest at the rate provided in the certificate of tax sale,” plus “expenses properly incurred in accordance with this subtitle____” Although the County stated in its notice of sale that it would pay interest of 8% in the event of an invalid sale, appellant asserts that, in setting that amount, the County “simply misconstrued” T.P. § 14-848. In essence, Heartwood claims that the term “interest rate” really means the “redemption rate”—the sum of the interest and penalty rates of 8% and 12%, respectively. As noted, T.P. § 14-848 provides for payment of interest to the tax purchaser at the rate provided in the certificate of sale, as well as payment of “all expenses properly incurred in accordance with this subtitle.” T.P. § 14-843 governs those expenses. It provides, in part: § 14-843.

Plaintiff or holder of certificate of sale reimbursed for expenses incurred. (a) In general.—Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, on redemption, the plaintiff or the holder of a certificate of sale is entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in any action or in preparation for any action to foreclose the right of redemption. In addition, the plaintiff ³⁵³ or holder of a certificate of sale, on redemption, is entitled to be reimbursed for fees paid for recording the certificate of sale, for attorney’s fees in the sum of $4-00 for each certificate of sale, for expenses incurred in the publication and service of process by publication, for reasonable fees for a necessary title search, and for taxes, together with interest and penalties on the taxes, arising after the date of sale that have been paid by the plaintiff.. . . The plaintiff or holder of a certificate of sale is not entitled to be reimbursed for any other expenses.

(Emphasis added). T.P. § 14-832 is also noteworthy. It provides that T.P. §§ 14-832.1 through 14-854 “shall be liberally construed as remedial legislation to encourage the foreclosure of rights of redemption by suits in the circuit courts.... ” Further, T.P. § 14-834 is relevant. Titled “Jurisdiction of court,” it states, in part: The circuit court, on the filing of a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption, has jurisdiction to give complete relief under this subtitle, in accordance with the general jurisdiction and practice of the court, and with all laws and rules of court that relate to the circuit courts for the county in which the property is located, except as otherwise provided in this subtitle....

T.P. § 14-851 concerns the repeal of inconsistent acts and states, in part: Any act, whether public general or public local, inconsistent with the provisions of Parts I through III of this subtitle, is repealed to the extent of the inconsistency; but all laws repealed by this subtitle shall nevertheless remain in force in respect to any tax sale made or instituted before December 31, 1943. Any tax sales made or instituted after December 31, 1943, shall be made only in accordance with the provisions of Parts I through III of this subtitle....

II

Both sides have presented cogent, multifaceted arguments in support of their diametrically opposing positions. ³⁵⁴ Heartwood claims that T.P. § 14-848 governs the resolution of this case, because it pertains to a tax sale that is void, and these sales were void since the owners had paid their delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale. The underlying premise of Heartwood’s position is its view that the “purpose of [T.P.] § 14-848 is to place the tax sale purchaser in the same position [it] would have been in had the sale [of the 331 properties] been properly conducted.” Therefore, Heartwood contends that the properties in issue were subject to a redemption rate of 20%, and the court erred in failing to award Heartwood interest at the redemption rate of 20%. In addition, Heartwood contends that it was entitled by statute to recover attorneys’ fees of $400 for each of the 331 properties in issue, because statutory attorney’s fees are an “expense” under T.P. § 14-843 and, under T.P. § 14-848, the County is liable for “all expenses properly incurred in accordance with this subtitle.... ” Appellant observes that, “if the payment of the taxes on these properties had not been discovered until after actions to foreclose the right of redemption had been brought and served on the property owners, those property owners would have sought, and been entitled to the entry of, orders declaring the sales void.” In that circumstance, says appellant, the sales would have been voided and then they would have fit squarely within T.P. § 14-848. In its view, this case is conceptually indistinguishable from the hypothetical outlined above.

It matters not, insists Heartwood, that the errors were discovered prior to the filing of an action to foreclose, so that the sales were deemed void without the necessity of legal action by the owners or the parties. According to Heartwood, because the County refused to recognize its statutory responsibility under T.P. § 14-848, Heartwood had the right to initiate legal action to obtain a judicial determination that the sales were void. Appellant maintains that its position is consistent with the view expressed by the County Council that the tax sale purchaser performs “a service to the public” and such activities “should be encouraged.” To that end, appellant observes that T.P. ³⁵⁵ § 14-832 expressly requires liberal construction of the statute, and T.P. § 14-834 confers “broad jurisdiction” on the circuit court in these kinds of matters. Therefore, Heartwood claims that, merely because the taxes on the 331 properties had “already been paid” at the time of the tax sale, and they were “void from their inception,” this does not mean that “there was no sale for the court to void.” Appellant asserts: To the contrary, if the payment of the taxes on these properties had not been discovered until after actions to foreclose the right of redemption had been brought and served on the property owners, those property owners would have sought, and been entitled to the entry of, orders declaring the sales void.

Appellant reasons that “there are many ... examples of sales which, in retrospect, are void from their inception, to which § 14-848 nevertheless applies.” To illustrate, appellant points to sales for which the legal description in the notice of sale is erroneous, sales of properties that were omitted from the notice of sale, and sales of properties in which the owners go into bankruptcy. Appellant states: “Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an example of a void sale which is not, in retrospect, void from its inception.” Thus, appellant argues: The fact that, in retrospect, these sales were void from their inception, cannot curtail the ability of Heartwood to institute an action to foreclose the rights of redemption in the properties. Heartwood still holds possession of the certificates of sale and was entitled, as it did in this proceeding, to institute actions to foreclose since it had not received all amounts it claims are due under the terms of the certificates and § 14-848. Further, appellant contends that the limiting terms of the County’s tax sale notice are without effect, because the County cannot contravene the provisions of T.P. § 14-848.

Insisting that T.P. § 14-848 applies here, and authorizes payment of the redemption rate of 20%, appellant asserts: Surely, the General Assembly did not intend that the County could sell property on which no taxes were due, then ³⁵⁶ unilaterally declare the sale void, as the County seeks to do here, and thereby cut off the certificate holder’s right to institute an action to foreclose the right of redemption so as to obtain the return of the amount deposited (with interest). To accept the circuit court’s ruling would produce this result, however. The logical extension of the Court’s conclusion that § 14-848 does not apply is that the County, in spite of its concession, was not required to refund the deposit amount either. Such an absurd result cannot be countenanced....

The County vigorously disagrees with appellant. It presents an argument that is sequential in nature. While conceding that it “mistakenly offered” the 331 properties at the tax sale, because the owners had already paid their overdue taxes, the County nevertheless claims that T.P. § 14-848 was never triggered. It reasons that, because the owners of the 331 properties had paid their delinquent taxes prior to the tax sale, they never had to redeem their properties.

As there was no basis for the owners to redeem their properties, the County argues that Heartwood had no basis to file an action to foreclose the right of redemption. In the absence of a foreclosure action, says the County, the court had no basis to declare the tax sales void. And, absent such a judicial determination, the County contends that the remedies in T.P. § 14-848 “never became available to Heartwood.” The County asserts: “To read the statute to encompass a sale that should not have occurred because the taxes were paid, defies common sense. Heartwood’s construction of the statute fails to comply with Maryland’s statutory construction principles.” In its view, “Heartwood knew the risks associated with purchases of property at tax sale and cannot realistically argue that the Legislature intended a profit in these unusual circumstances.” According to the County, there are only “two situations in which a purchaser of property at a tax sale receives expenses and interest on the purchase price as a remedy-when an owner redeems the property, and when a court declares a sale ³⁵⁷ void in the course of a suit to foreclose redemption.” In its view, “[n]either situation existed in the present case.” The County states: The General Assembly has accounted for the possibility that an owner may redeem the property at any time before a purchaser obtains a court order and a deed that forecloses the right of redemption.

The Legislature also has provided a remedy for those instances in which a purchaser seeks to foreclose the right of redemption, but the court declares the tax sale to be void. In [only] these two situations, the purchaser at the tax sale enjoys remedies beyond the return of the purchase price. Moreover, the County maintains that “the tax collector has no power to sell the property unless the taxes remain unpaid.” Because the taxes were paid prior to the sale, the County claims that all 331 sales were “null and void.” In this regard, the County argues that it has the independent authority to invalidate and declare “void” the 331 sales, without paying the sums that might otherwise be required under T.P. § 14-848. Appellee adds that “the court reasonably may infer that the absence of a clear remedy reflects consideration and rejection of a remedy for the situation that occurred in this case.” The County states: “Absent a clear statutory provision that provides a remedy, common law remains in effect,” including the doctrine of caveat emptor.

In the County’s view, “[u]nder applicable common law principles, the County had to return only the purchase price and the high-bid premium to Heartwood.” Further, the County argues that “[t]he payment of interest derives solely from statute, so the circuit court correctly ordered Heartwood to return the interest to the County based on the absence of a statutory remedy for the circumstances of this case.” Appellee also contends that the plain language of the statute does not provide for reimbursement of legal fees or expenses, except in the case of redemption by the owner or by judicial order in an action to foreclose the right of redemption. As ³⁵⁸ neither event materialized, the County claims that appellant cannot recover legal fees or expenses. III. “[A] tax sale of property on which taxes have been paid is invalid.” Bugg v. State Roads Com., 250 Md. 459, 461 , 243 A.2d 511 (1968); see Jannenga v. Johnson, 243 Md. 1, 8 , 220 A.2d 89 (1966); Mullen v. Brydon, 117 Md. 554, 559 , 83 A. 1025 (1912). Because the delinquent taxes for the 331 properties in issue had actually been paid by the time of the tax sale, the parties agree that the sales of the 331 properties were invalid and void at the time of the sale.

Heartwood apparently recognizes that, as a predicate to obtaining the remedies contemplated by T.P. § 14-848, it must secure a judicial determination that the tax sales were void. Appellant insists, however, that, even though the 331 sales were void at their inception, it was entitled to obtain a judicial declaration pronouncing the sales as void. Then, according to Heartwood, it could invoke T.P. § 14-848 and require the County to pay the remedies prescribed by that provision. To be sure, appellant did not receive the monies it anticipated from the tax sale.

Given the County’s error in regard to the sale of the 331 properties, the question remains whether the County was legally obligated to pay Heartwood the redemption rate of 20%, plus statutory legal fees and expenses, to make appellant whole. The principles of statutory construction frame our analysis. It is well settled that the interpretation of a statute is a judicial function, Muhl v. Magan, 313 Md. 462, 481-82 , 545 A.2d 1321 (1988), and requires us to determine and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. v. Simpson, 372 Md. 434, 456 , 813 A.2d 260 (2002); Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exchange, Inc., 369 Md. 304, 316 , 799 A.2d 1264 (2002); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000); see also State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998); Board of License Comm’rs v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122 , 729 A.2d 407 ³⁵⁹ (1999).

We are guided in this endeavor by the statutory text. Huffman v. State, 356 Md. 622, 627-28 , 741 A.2d 1088 (1999); Gordon Family Partnership, 348 Md. at 137 , 702 A.2d 753 ; State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339 (1996). We give the words of a statute their ordinary and usual meaning. Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning and Plumbing, Inc. v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336, 350 , 783 A.2d 691 (2001); Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998).

If the statute is not ambiguous, we generally will not look beyond its language to determine legislative intent. Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987); Maisel v. Montgomery County, 94 Md.App. 31, 37 , 614 A.2d 1333 (1992). When a term or provision is ambiguous, however, we consider the language “in light of the ... objectives and purpose of the enactment.” Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986).

In this regard, “we may ... consider the particular problem or problems the legislature was addressing, and