Heinlein v. Stefan

MOYLAN, Judge. When granting a divorce, a judge may unilaterally retain jurisdiction over yet unresolved marital property issues for an additional period of 90 days if in the divorce decree itself that reservation of jurisdiction is expressly made. For that reservation of jurisdiction to extend beyond 90 days, however, it is required that both parties to the divorce consent to such a further extension. The precise issue before us, assuming otherwise valid consent by the parties, is that of what, if any, time constraints there are on the act of giving formal consent.

As an incident of resolving that question, we will revisit the never-ending riddle of what, if any, significancé to give to words, phrases, or sentences that may appear in appellate opinions. The immediate concern of this appeal is with the authority of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to distribute marital property following the absolute divorce of the appellant, Joseph George Heinlein, and the appellee, Robin Stefan. The sole issue is whether, after the lapse of 90 days, the court lost jurisdiction to engage in the distribution of marital property. The Formal Proceedings On July 11, 1995, the appellee filed a Complaint for a Limited Divorce, later amended to constitute a Complaint for an Absolute Divorce, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore Coun ³⁵⁹ ty.

The appellee sought custody of the parties’ minor child, child support, a monetary award, and the division of marital property. The appellant filed a Counter Complaint for Absolute Divorce on October 17, 1996. The trial on the merits took place on September 23, 1998, before Judge Barbara Kerr Howe. The issues of custody, visitation, and child support were resolved.

The marital property question remained unsettled. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Howe reserved jurisdiction and then cautiously advised: It is my understanding that the marital property issues which have arisen from the union of Miss Stefan and Mr. Heinlein are reserved for future determination by the Court. We would hope to have these matters scheduled within the next 90 days, but absent that, due to scheduling purposes, / have asked that counsel obtain the signatures of each party to this case so that we don’t violate the Family Law Article and the rules which would require and demand of me that I determine those issues within 90 days indicating, again, we hope to get them in within 90 days and fully and finally litigated and resolved, and I now have that agreement to extend the time by consent beyond the 90 days from the date of divorce absolute and for reservation of my authority to make such a, determination. (Emphasis supplied).

Pursuant to the advice and request of Judge Howe, on September 23, 1998, the following “Consent to Reservation of Jurisdiction for Purpose of Determining Marital Property” (“Consent Agreement”) was signed by both parties: The parties hereto ... pursuant to Family Law Article, § 8-203(a), hereby consent to an extension time in which this Court shall determine the marital and non-ma,rital property of the parties in conjunction with their action for absolute divorce, as well as any monetary award beyond ninety (90) days from the date of any absolute divorce between the parties and farther consent to a reservation of the Court’s authority to make such a determination. ³⁶⁰ (Emphasis supplied). On April 27, 1999, the written “Judgment of Absolute Divorce” was signed by the court and docketed. After the entry of that written divorce decree, the parties engaged in battle over whether the court still had jurisdiction to decide issues of marital property distribution. The appellee contended that, by virtue of the September 23, 1998, Consent Agreement, the parties had agreed to extend Judge Howe’s authority to resolve marital property issues beyond ninety days from the date of any divorce decree.

The appellant, on the other hand, contended that the Consent Agreement only had effect for ninety days from the date of the September 23, 1998, hearing and that a new and superseding “Consent Agreement” would have to have been signed by the parties following the April 29, 1999, written Judgment of Absolute Divorce and that no such new and superseding “Consent Agreement” had been signed. On October 5, 1999, the appellee filed a “Motion to Reserve Jurisdiction of Court.” The appellant responded by filing an “Answer to Motion to Reserve Jurisdiction of Court.” On October 18, 1999, Judge Howe granted the appellee’s Motion to Reserve Jurisdiction. The appellant responded with a Motion to Dismiss which was denied. This appeal followed.

The Timeliness of Consent The time period involved was more than 90 days after either September 23, 1998, or April 27, 1999. The consent of the parties was, therefore, an indispensable prerequisite to Judge Howe’s extended jurisdiction over the marital property issues. The issue before us concerns the third requirement of § 8-203(a)(3) of the Family Law Article that “the parties consent to this extension.” The precise language of the Consent Agreement signed by both parties on September 23, 1998, provides: The parties ... consent to an extension time ... beyond ninety (90) days from the date of any absolute divorce between the parties.... ³⁶¹ (Emphasis supplied). By that Consent Agreement the parties manifested their intent to give the court jurisdiction to decide marital property issues beyond the 90-day period following the entry of the judgment of an absolute divorce.

The appellant’s only challenge to the consent is with respect to its timeliness. Although the resolution of the dispute will not be ultimately dispositive, there is a contextual dispute between the appellant and the appellee as to the precise date when the divorce became final and consequently when the initial 90-day period began to run. The appellee argues for September 23, 1998, when Judge Howe announced from the bench that she was granting the divorce. The appellant argues for April 27, 1999, the day the written Judgment of Absolute Divorce was signed by Judge Howe and docketed. “The old, old question of when is a judgment a judgment” Cedar Creek Oil and Gas Co. v. Fidelity Gas Co., 238 F.2d 298 (9th Cir.1956), referred to “the old, old question of when is a judgment a judgment.” The analytic framework for examining such a question in Maryland was established by Judge Raker in Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699 , 646 A.2d 365 (1994).

She there pointed out that granting a judgment is a two-step process: [T]wo acts must occur for an action by a court to be deemed the granting of a judgment: the court must render a final order and the order must be entered on the docket by the clerk. These two required acts — rendition of a judgment by the court and entry of the judgment by the clerk — are discrete occurrences. Rendition of judgment is the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of the law on the matters at issue. In other words, rendition is the court’s pronouncement, by spoken word or in open court by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.

The second act required under Maryland law — the clerk’s entry of the judgment on the docket — is the purely ministerial act ³⁶² by means of which permanent evidence of the judicial act of rendering the judgment is made a record of the court. A judgment is therefore not granted until it is both properly rendered and entered. 335 Md. at 710 , 646 A.2d 365 (internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied). The Rendering of the Judgment Typically, the dispute over whether an arguable judgment was actually a judgment is one of whether the judge’s words at the conclusion of a hearing were intended to be and qualified as a valid “rendering” of a judgment. Judge Raker observed in that regard, 335 Md. at 710-11 , 646 A.2d 365 : The determination of whether a court has rendered judgment turns on whether the court indicated clearly that it had fully adjudicated the issue submitted and had reached a final decision on the matter at that time.

In other words, the trial court’s ruling must be “an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy.” There are, however, no formal requirements regarding the rendition of a judgment. As one court has. observed, “[tjhere are no hard and fast rules for determining what is a judgment.” Rather, whether a judgment has been rendered in a particular case is an inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis and which focuses upon the actions and statements of the court. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied). In this case we are fully persuaded that Judge Howe intended to “render” a judgment of divorce on September 23, 1998.

Although the marital property issues had yet to be resolved at a future time and although “the consent agreement ... as to custody” had to be incorporated into the written judgment of divorce, the September 23 pronouncement from the bench bore every indication of intended finality. I therefore grant to Robin Stefan, Plaintiff, from the Defendant, Joseph George Heinlein a Judgment of Divorce Absolute and I request that Miss Gray prepare that Judg ³⁶³ ment of Divorce Absolute incorporating into it the consent agreement reached between the parties today as to custody, visitation and other matters recited on the record. Any open costs will be divided, equally between the parties so that that judgment may enter. I intend for it to be and order that it be a judgment that mil enter upon the record, understanding and knowing full well that it is only a partial judgment in this case, but that it be entered as a final judgment.

(Emphasis supplied). The fact that a written Order of Absolute Divorce was subsequently signed on April 27, 1999, does not negate Judge Howe’s intention on September 23, 1998, to render a final judgment of divorce. In that regard, Davis v. Davis was clear: Although the court signed a formal written order on June 11, 1990 which stated that judgment of absolute divorce “is hereby granted,” the subsequent issuance of a formal written order does not preclude a finding that judgment was actually orally rendered on an earlier date. 335 Md. at 713 , 646 A.2d 365 (emphasis supplied). A persuasive indication that Judge Howe intended her words of September 23, 1998, to be a final judgment of divorce was her statement with respect to the marital property issue yet to be resolved.

When jurisdiction over such issues is reserved by the court, it normally has a statutorily mandated period of 90 days from the granting of the absolute divorce within which to act. Judge Howe clearly was measuring 90 days from September 23, 1998, and she explicitly referred to that period as “the 90 days from the date of divorce absolute.” We would hope to have these matters scheduled within the next 90 days, ... I now have that agreement to extend the time by consent beyond the 90 days from the date of divorce absolute. ... (Emphasis supplied).

In Davis v. Davis, Judge Raker held that just such a reservation of jurisdiction over the marital property issue was ³⁶⁴ conclusive evidence of the trial judge’s intention to render an absolute judgment of divorce from the bench. [T]he trial judge further stated that “The Court reserves ... the authority under the statute to make a marital award” for a period of ninety days. The court’s express reservation of a ruling upon marital property issues for a ninety-day period pursuant to § 8-203(a) factors significantly in our conclusion that the court did in fact intend to render an unqualified, final judgment of divorce on February 28. ... If the court did not intend to render the judgment of divorce on February 28, there would have been no reason for the court, at that time, to reserve the power to make a marital property distribution. We find that the reservation of the power to rule on the marital property issues is strong evidence that the court intended to grant Mr. Davis an absolute divorce on February 28. 335 Md. at 712 , 646 A.2d 365 (emphasis supplied).

The Docketing of the Judgment Notwithstanding what to us seems to have been the unequivocal intention of Judge Howe to render a final judgment of divorce on September 23, 1998, we nonetheless agree with the appellant that the divorce did not become final until April 27, 1999. That is because the indispensable second step for the finalization of the earlier ruling was never accomplished. The clerk’s docket entry for September 23, 1998, reads simply: Hon. Barbara Kerr Howe.

Hearing had. Case, as to custody only, settled on the record. Order to be filed. Testimony taken.

Open court costs to be divided between the parties. Although we believe it to have been clearly intended, a final judgment of divorce was never docketed. Under the unmistakable mandate of Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. at 710 , 646 A.2d 365 , that was a fatal flaw in terms of finality.