Helinsky v. C & P Telephone Co.

ALPERT, Judge. Statutory construction and the attendant linguistical gymnastics that pertain to the timeliness of a claim of occupational disease under Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”) are the tasks presented to us by Mary P. Helinski, appellant, (“Ms. Helinski”) and Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, appellee, (“C & P”) who were, respectively, employee and employer. Ms. Helinski, whose claim for workers’ compensation was denied by the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”), sought relief from the Circuit ⁴⁶⁴ Court for Anne Arandel County. No recourse was found there, however, as the circuit court dismissed her claim on C & P’s motion for summary judgment.

Continuing her quest for redress, Ms. Helinski now comes before us and presents two issues for our consideration. I. Whether the lower court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Strike the Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment where the latter was not filed with a supporting affidavit, and where the affidavit filed during the hearing on the motion was not upon personal knowledge as required by Md.Rule 2-501(c)[.] II. Whether the facts and circumstances surrounding the onset of Mrs. Helinski’s disease and the date that Mrs. Helinski actually knew that the disablement was caused by her employment, demonstrate a material doubt about whether she filed her claim in time which requires resolution by a trial rather than by summary judgment[.] At oral argument, the parties asked that we address the substantive matter, issue II, ■ to the exclusion of issue I. Accordingly, we turn our attention to issue II. C&P 1 employed Ms. Helinski as a service representative beginning in 1972.

For our purposes, nothing significant occurred in the employment relationship until February 15, 1989. On that day, Ms. Helinski met with Dr. Paul Berson, an ophthalmologist, who, in response to Ms. Helinski’s statements and his examination, diagnosed her with “contact allergic dermatitis” of the eyelid. Dr. Berson was unable to pinpoint the cause of Ms. Helinski’s dermatitis. Ms. Helinski informed her superiors of her dermatitis, and was directed to fill out health insurance and office forms.

Ms. Helinski took Dr. Berson’s bill and a prescription receipt to C & P’s medical department on March 28, 1989. Dr. Brown, a physician employed by C & P, examined Ms. Helinski and suggested to her that, although he was not sure what was causing the dermatitis, formaldehyde might be a culprit. In ⁴⁶⁵ response to Dr. Brown’s question as to whether there were new materials in Ms. Helinski’s workplace, she replied that her Annapolis office contained new furniture and carpeting. Dr. Brown, according to Ms. Helinski, stated that C&P would further investigate the cause of her dermatitis.

C&P returned to Ms. Helinski, sometime in May 1989, Dr. Berson’s bill and the prescription receipt. Ms. Helinski’s supervisor notified her that C&P would not reimburse her because C&P did not find her dermatitis to be work related. In April of 1989, Ms. Helinski’s supervisor advised her that according to the office furniture supplier formaldehyde was not used in the furniture’s manufacturing process. Ms. Helinski’s supervisor did note, however, that the carbonless paper manufacturers stated that although the papers did not contain harmful materials, they may have a “pungent odor” when first used.

Ms. Helinski submitted to C & P’s multiphasic health screen on July 20,1989. On that day she did not exhibit symptoms of her earlier eye irritation. The dermatitis, which had subsided by late May of 1989, had not caused Ms. Helinski to miss any time from work, nor had it prevented her from performing job related tasks. Ms. Helinski departed for maternity leave in October 1989 and returned in September 1990.

Upon her return to active employment, she attended a six-week training session held at C & P’s Calverton office. When she returned to C & P’s Annapolis office, in late October, her symptoms reappeared. In December of 1990, Dr. Fratto, a C & P physician, evaluated Ms. Helinski’s complaints, and directed that her work station be changed. He suggested that her dermatitis might be related to her use of personal care products.

Her condition improved in December of 1990 and January of 1991, during which time she was stationed in C & P’s Baltimore office. The dermatitis and other maladies finally took their toll upon Ms. Helinski on April 25, 1991, when she missed her first time from work due to the symptoms. Until that day, she had not missed any work time because of the dermatitis. ⁴⁶⁶ On January 30, 1992, Dr. Grace Ziem diagnosed Ms. Helinski as having an occupational disease. Later that year, on July 1,1992, Ms. Helinski filed a workers’ compensation claim, citing an occupational disease.

The Commission conducted a hearing on August 3, 1993, at which Ms. Helinski testified. The next day, the Commission rendered its decision. Hearing was held in the above claim at Baltimore, Maryland on August 3,1993, on the following issue[s]: 1. Did the employee sustain an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment? 2.

Limitations. The Commission finds, based on the evidence presented, that the claimant did not sustain an occupational disease of multiple chemical sensitivity arising out of and in the course of employment as alleged to have occurred on February 28, 1992. [2] In addition to the evidence presented, the claim would have been time barred by limitations even if the claimant had sustained an occupational disease. Therefore, the Commission will disallow the claim filed herein____ The Circuit Court entered summary judgment against Ms. Helinski because C & P’s “exhibits show[ed] that [Ms. Helinski] ha[d] reason to believe she had an occupational disease as of the date she filed her On-Duty Injury Report.... [Ms. ⁴⁶⁷ Helinski’s] July 1, 1992 claim has, therefore, been filed too late....” Timeliness of Filing of the Claim Maryland Rule 2-501(e) governs the entry of judgment on a motion for summary judgment. In relevant part, the Rule states: The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Md.Rule 2-501(e) (1996). We review on appeal whether the lower court was legally correct. Pope v. Board of School Comm’rs, 106 Md.App. 578, 590 , 665 A.2d 713 (1995). Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy recited the tenets of statutory construction in Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993).

As he stated for the Court of Appeals: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the true intention of the legislature. In searching for legislative intention, a court looks for the general purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute. We first look to the plain meaning of the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, a court may not add or delete words to make a statute reflect an intent not evidenced in that language to avoid a harsh result.

A clearly worded statute must be construed without ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application. The language must be examined in the context in which it was adopted. All parts of a statute are to be read together to determine intent, and reconciled and harmonized to the extent possible. If reasonably possible, a statute should be read so that no part of it is rendered nugatory or superfluous.

Where a statute may be susceptible of more than one meaning, the court may consider the consequences of each meaning and adopt that construction which avoids a result that is unreasonable, ⁴⁶⁸ illogical or inconsistent with common sense. It often is necessary to look at the development of a statute to discern legislative intent that may not be as clear upon initial examination of the current language of the statute. Id. at 490-91 , 632 A.2d 753 (citations omitted). With these guidelines in mind, we turn to the statutory sections at issue and the interpretation thereof.

The Act is now codified in Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article. Desirous of not leaving us without guidance as to its intent, the Legislature included a section pertaining to the Act’s construction. (a) In general.—This title shall be construed to carry out its general purpose. (b) Rule for strict construction inapplicable.—The rule that a statute in derogation of the common law is to be strictly construed does not apply to this title. § 9-102 of the Labor and Employment Article (Repl.Vol.1991) (“L.E.”).

Maryland courts have followed these dictates. See R & T Constr. Co. v. Judge, 323 Md. 514, 529 , 594 A.2d 99 (1991) (applying former Article 101, § 63, of the Maryland Annotated Code, which was the precursor of § 9-102). The gist of C & P’s argument is that the statute of limitations has run its course on Ms. Helinski’s suit because she knew that she had an occupational disease as early as March of 1989, or at the latest, in December of 1989.

C&P further contends that “[tjhere is no dispute that [Ms. Helinski] was disabled throughout 1989 and thereafter. By [her] own testimony and the documents submitted with the Motion for Summary Judgment, [Ms. Helinski] has set forth specific intolerance to performing within her work environment.” The Act generally grants to an employee or her dependents two years within which to file a claim for disablement or death. (a) Filing claim.—If a covered employee suffers a disablement or death as a result of an occupational disease, the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee shall file a claim with the Commission within 2 years, or ⁴⁶⁹ in the case of pulmonary dust disease within 3 years, after the date: (1) of disablement or death; or (2) when the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee first had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused by the employment. (b) Failure to file claim.—Unless waived under subsection (c) of this section, failure to file a claim in accordance with subsection (a) of this section bars a claim under this title.

(c) Waiver.—The defense of failure to file a claim in accordance with subsection (a) of this section is waived if the employer or its insurer: (1) fails to raise the defense of the failure to file the claim at a hearing on the claim before the Commission makes any award or decision; (2) pays compensation for the disability or death arising from the occupational disease; or (3) by its affirmative conduct leads the covered employee or other claimant to reasonably believe that the requirement of filing a claim has been waived. § 9-711 L.E. (emphasis added). We glean from this section that Ms. Helinski