Helms v. State

¹⁸⁷ JAMES R. EYLER, Judge. Jerry A. Helms, appellant, appeals from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Garrett County, denying his “Motion for Reduction of Sentence by 1/4” under Maryland Code (2008 RepLVol.), § 11-605 of the Correctional Services Article (“CS”). In his brief, appellant, who is self-represented, contends the circuit court erred by (1) denying the motion under § 11-605 without “the benefit of an essential hearing,” and (2) not providing an explanation for the denial. 1 In the exercise of our discretion, we shall address the applicability of § 11-605, an issue not raised by appellant and not raised in circuit court. We conclude that the statute is applicable only to inmates housed in local correctional facilities, and thus, not to appellant, who is incarcerated in a State correctional facility.

We shall also address appellant’s contentions, which lack merit. The plain language of § 11-605 grants the circuit court discretion in determining whether to allow a diminution of an inmate’s sentence and does not require it to hold a hearing or provide an explanation for its ruling. For these reasons, explained below, we shall affirm the ruling of the circuit court. Factual and Procedural Background On December 11, 1997, appellant appeared before the Circuit Court for Garrett County, entering guilty and Alford pleas to charges in six different cases.

He was convicted and, according to appellant, sentenced to eighty-five years in prison. More than eleven years after his sentencing, on January 5, 2009, appellant filed a “Motion for Reduction of Sentence by 1/4,” citing Maryland Code (1957), Article 27, § 645N. That section was repealed and recodified, without substantive ¹⁸⁸ change, in Maryland Code (2008 Repl.Vol), § 11-605 of the Correctional Services Article. 2 Section 11-605 is titled “Diminution credits” and provides: If the committing court determines that an inmate’s conduct, diligence, and general attitude merit a diminution of sentence, the court may allow diminution of one-fourth of the inmate’s term of confinement. To demonstrate that he qualified for the diminution credits under the language of § 11-605, appellant also appended various definitions to his motion, including “Inmate,” “State Correctional Facility,” “Committing Court,” and “Term of Confinement.” 3 In his motion, appellant argued that he “satisfied the requirements of § 11-605” because he had (1) “an [sic] good conduct history while being confined in the State Facilities,” (2) “maintained a job while in prison and most of the jobs have been preferred jobs, which are for the best inmates with the best skills,” and (3) “been able to stay away from gangs and drugs while in prison.” Appellant requested a hearing on the motion.

On January 8, 2009, the State filed its “Answer to Motion for Reduction of Sentence by 1/4.” The State did not address appellant’s conduct as an inmate, noting that it did not have the opportunity to review appellant’s file in the Division of Correction. Instead, it argued that the language of § 11-605, particularly the word “may,” grants a circuit court discretionary authority when considering an inmate’s request for a diminution of his term of confinement. The State then described the nature of the six cases underpinning appellant’s sentence, focusing on “two cases involving physical violence ¹⁸⁹ and sexual abuse of a one-year old child” that now lives with “permanent injuries and disabilities — seizures, a deformed arm and vision impairment.” The State concluded that “[wjhether [appellant] has conformed his conduct while incarcerated and held jobs within the prison system does not in the State’s view balance the risk that [appellant] would pose to the most vulnerable individuals” if his term of confinement were reduced. By order entered January 12, 2009, the circuit court, noting that it had “read and considered” the motion and the State’s answer, denied the motion without a hearing or elaboration of reasons.

This appeal followed. Contentions As noted earlier, appellant contends the circuit court erred by (1) denying the motion under § 11-605 without “the benefit of an essential hearing,” and (2) not providing an explanation for the denial. The State counters, as it did in its answer in circuit court, that the plain language of § 11-605 grants the circuit court discretion in determining whether to allow a diminution of an inmate’s sentence. The State also argues, for the first time, that appellant had no right to relief under § 11-605 because the statute applies to inmates incarcerated in local, and not State, correctional facilities. 4 We agree with the State. ¹⁹⁰ Discussion The resolution of appellant’s claims involves statutory interpretation.

In WCI v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125 , 807 A.2d 32 (2002), the Court of Appeals stated: Repeatedly, we have emphasized that “the paramount object of statutory construction is the ascertainment and effectuation of the real intention of the Legislature.” In seeking to ascertain legislative intent, we first look to the words of the statute, viewing them “in ordinary terms, in their natural meaning, in the manner in which they are most commonly understood.” “Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent.” Nor may a court under those circumstances add or delete language so as to “reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,” or construe the statute with “ ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.” We have acknowledged that in determining a statute’s meaning, courts may consider the context in which a statute appears, including related statutes and, even when a statute is clear, its legislative history. We have cautioned, however, that this inquiry is “in the interest of completeness, to look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account.” Id. That inquiry, in other words, ... “is a confirmatory process; ¹⁹¹ it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute.” Id. at 140-43 , 807 A.2d 32 (citations omitted). 1. § 11-605 Does Not Apply to Inmates in State Correctional Facilities We conclude that § 11-605 applies to inmates incarcerated in local, and not State, correctional facilities. The General Assembly expressly distinguishes between “Local Correctional Facilities” and “State Correctional Facilities” throughout the Correctional Services Article.

A “Local correctional facility” is operated by “one or more counties” or “by a municipal corporation,” CS § l-101(j), whereas a “State Correctional Facility” is operated by the State or, more specifically, the Division of Correction. CS § 1 — 101(o)(l); CS § 9-103 (providing that a judge “shall sentence” an individual to the Division of Correction for an offense “for which a law requires the imprisonment be served at a specific State correctional facility.”) The length of an inmate’s sentence determines where the inmate is incarcerated. See CS §§ 9-104 and 9-105 (providing sentencing ranges for local and State correctional facilities, respectively). Although the language of § 11-605, considered alone, does not refer to either local or State correctional facilities, its restrictive applicability is clear by virtue of its location within the Code, corroborated by its legislative history.

See Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405 , 535 A.2d 471 (1988) (“When construing a provision that is part of a single statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be gathered from the entire statute, rather than from only one part.”) Section 11-605 appears as part of Subtitle 6 within Title 11. Title 11 is captioned, “Local Correctional Facilities.” See Tidewater/Havre de Grace v. Mayor & City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 347 , 653 A.2d 468 (1995) (stating “that the title of an act is relevant in ascertaining the legislative intent and purpose”) (citations omitted). In addition, subtitle 6, the scope of which is expressly outlined in CS § 11-601, is applicable only to local correctional facilities. CS § 11-601 provides: ¹⁹² (a) In general. — Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and Subtitle 7 of this title, this subtitle applies in all counties.

(b) Montgomery County. — This subtitle does not apply in Montgomery County. The language of § 11-605’s sister statutes in Subtitle 6 reinforces this reading, as their provisions are directed at local correctional facilities. See, e.g., § 11-602 (titled “Employment” and providing, in part, that “[w]hen an individual is convicted of a crime and sentenced to a local correctional facility, the sentencing judge may allow the individual, to the extent possible, to continue the individual’s regular employment ----”) (emphasis added); § 11-603 (titled “Confinement' when not working” and providing that, “[ujnless the court directs