Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liability Ltd. Partnership

DAVIS, J. Appellant Suzette Hemmings filed a wrongful death and survival action against appellees Pelham Wood Limited Liability Limited Partnership and RLA Management, L.L.P. (RLA), in her individual capacity and as Personal Representative of the Estate of her late husband, Howard W. Hemmings. The suit, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleged negligence by appellees, the owner and property manager of ³¹⁴ Pelham Wood Apartments (Pelham Wood), a 400-unit building where Mr. Hemmings was murdered. Appellee RLA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 11, 2001.

After conducting a hearing on July 30, 2001, the trial court granted the motion as to both appellees. Appellant noted this timely appeal on August 2, 2001, presenting three questions, which we combine and rephrase as follows: Did the trial judge err in granting appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment? We answer this question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the trial court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant and her late husband leased from appellees unit A-2, a second-floor apartment in Pelham Wood, which abutted a wooded area.

As with all of the apartments in the development, unit A-2 was equipped with deadbolt locks and “Charlie-bars,” which secured the sliding glass doors of'the apartment balconies. On June 13, 1998, at approximately 1:17 aim., an unidentified person entered the apartment and shot and mortally wounded appellant’s husband. He was able to call “911” for assistance and was coherent when the emergency personnel arrived. He informed them that he did not know his assailant.

While traveling to Shock Trauma, he suffered cardiac arrest, and died at 3:54 a.m. According to appellant’s complaint, the intruder forcibly entered the apartment via a sliding glass door on the second floor balcony, located at the back of the apartment building. All data collected from the scene similarly suggested that the entry was a forced entry. Indeed, the lock on the sliding door to the apartment was clearly damaged.

As of the filing of appellees’ motion for summary judgment, however, the police investigation regarding Mr. Hemmings’s murder remained ongoing; therefore, the actual events leading up to the murder are still unknown, as none of the parties was able to obtain details of the investiga ³¹⁵ tion. 1 Prior to June 13, 1998, appellees received numerous complaints from tenants regarding the safety of the premises and the security light that had been broken for an extended period of time. These complaints were corroborated by the more than thirty Baltimore County Police Department Crime Reports filed by Pelham Wood tenants attached to the complaint. 2 It is conceded, however, that during their tenancy, neither appellant nor her husband ever voiced any oral or written complaint to appellees regarding the security of their apartment. At the hearing on appellees’ motion for summary judgment, counsel for RLA argued that appellant was merely speculating that the cause of her husband’s death was a burglary-related murder. Furthermore, he continued, the reports made by tenants, most pertaining to burglaries or attempted burglaries, were “insufficient to create a duty on the part of the [appellees] to do anything and certainly [did] not [rise] to the level of demonstrating propensity for violent crime [in the apartment complex] ...

It simply indicated] a smattering of property crimes.” In response, counsel for appellant contended that it was known “with some assuredness” that the intruder entered the apartment by forcing open the rear sliding door. Moreover, “[i]n 1997 there were two ³¹⁶ breaking-and-enterings, a notice of theft at a balcony apartment, which is what Mr. Hemmings lived in, one attempted breaking-and-entering, one armed robbery.” Agreeing that appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence that would impose a duty on appellees, the trial court granted their motion. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Maryland Rule 2-501(e), the court shall enter judgment in favor of the moving party “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to decide whether there is an issue of fact sufficiently material to be tried, not to try the case or to resolve factual disputes.” Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 356 , 744 A.2d 47 (2000). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In order to determine whether the trial court should have granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment, we must determine if the trial court was legally correct. Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). LEGAL ANALYSIS Appellant posits that the trial court improperly granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment because a dispute as to material fact exists such that would preclude a determination, as a matter of law, that “the murder of Howard Hemmings was not foreseeable, or that the criminal act of the intruder was an unforeseeable, superseding cause.” Because the question of whether an act is reasonably foreseeable should be left to the determination of the fact finder, appellant asserts that the decision should be reversed. Appellees 3 ³¹⁷ counter that, as appellant’s landlord, they owed no duty to protect her or her husband from any violent crimes that occurred within apartment A-2.

Moreover, they posit, appellant failed to present any evidence that appellees had any actual or constructive knowledge regarding any violent crimes in the apartment complex that would give rise to any such duty under Maryland law. Finally, they contend that, assuming, arguendo, appellees owed and breached some duty to appellant and her husband, his death was proximately caused by an intervening and superseding violent criminal act. “The basic elements necessary for a cause of action in negligence ‘are a duty or obligation which the defendant is under to protect plaintiff from injury, a failure to discharge that duty, and actual loss or injury to the plaintiff proximately resulting from that failure.’ ” Scott v. Watson, 4 , 278 Md. 160, 165 , 359 A.2d 548 (1976)(quoting Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md. 663, 669 , 267 A.2d 114 (1970)). A landlord is obligated to use reasonable and ordinary care to keep common areas safe. Id.

Because a landlord is not an insurer of the safety of its tenants, he or she is not ordinarily liable to a tenant or guest of a tenant for injuries from a hazardous condition in the leased premises that comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession. Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687 , 161 A. 172 (1932). This rule also applies to criminal acts of third parties; “there is no special duty imposed upon the landlord to protect his [or her] tenants against crimes perpetrated by third parties on the landlord’s premises.” Scott, 278 Md. at 166 , 359 ³¹⁸ A.2d 548. However, when it can be illustrated that the landlord had knowledge of increased criminal activity on the premises, a duty is imposed on the landlord to undertake reasonable measures to keep the premises secure.

Id. at 165, 359 A.2d 548 . 5 It is noteworthy that the rules stated above pertain to claims of negligence arising from injuries occurring in the common areas of leased premises: “Where a landlord leases separate portions of his [or her] property to different tenants and reserves under his [or her] control the passageways and stairways, and other parts of the property for the common use of all tenants[,] he [or she] must then exercise ordinary care and diligence to maintain the retained portions in a reasonably safe condition.” Our recognition of landlord liability in common areas is generally premised on the control a landlord maintains over the common areas. Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 351 Md. 544, 554 , 719 A.2d 119 (1998)(quoting Langley Park Apts. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 407 , 199 A.2d 620 (1964))(emphasis added). The duties imposed upon a landlord with regard to those areas ³¹⁹ under the tenant’s control, however, are governed by general common law principles and, therefore, “when the owner has parted with his [or her] control, the tenant has the burden of the proper keeping of the premises, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary; and for any nuisance created by the tenant the landlord is not responsible.” Id. at 555, 719 A.2d 119 (quoting Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 689 , 161 A. 172 (1932)).

It has been noted that the law governing situations involving injury to tenants occurring inside the leased premises is “less settled” in Maryland. Id. at 556, 719 A.2d 119 . Indeed, a “common thread” running through most cases in which the landlords were found to have been liable, is the ability of the landlord to exercise, to some extent, control over the condition at issue and to attempt to prevent injuries by taking proactive measures. Id. at 557, 719 A.2d 119 (citing Scott, 278 Md. at 165-66 , 359 A.2d 548 ) (holding a landlord liable for “injuries sustained by tenants as a result of criminal acts committed by others in the common areas within the landlord’s control”); Macke Laundry Service Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 431 , 298 A.2d 27 (1972)(noting that “[the Court of Appeals] decisions have consistently held a landlord liable for ... failure to remedy defects ... over which he [or she] retains control ”); Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 454, 457 , 177 A.2d 263 (1962)(holding that a landlord has a duty with regard to areas “under his [or her] control”).

Because the allegedly negligent behavior occurred within the leased premises, we must proceed with the analysis applicable thereto, rather than the common law of Maryland which, as stated above, has typically pertained to injuries occurring in the common areas of a multi-dwelling complex. Faced with a dearth of Maryland law relevant to the case at hand, we look to other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. 6 ³²⁰ In Fields v. Moore, 953 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.App.1997), appellants—tenant and her children—rented a house from appellee landlord. Appellee’s son, who rented the property adjacent to appellants, sexually assaulted appellant and, consequently, appellant brought suit against appellee, alleging that, as landlord, appellee owed appellant a duty to secure the rental premises against criminal acts of third parties. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee landlord, finding that she had no duty to protect appellants.

Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court held: Whatever duty a lessor may have to protect persons injured on the leased premises against the criminal acts of third parties, that duty does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm. Accordingly, the [lessor is] entitled to summary judgment if [he or she] established as a matter of law that violent criminal acts ... were not foreseeable. Id. at 524 . The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, has been reluctant to delineate a bright-line rule that would extend a landlord’s duty to protect tenants from incidents which occur within the boundaries of