Henry v. Leech

Pattison, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, the plaintiff below, an infant, by his father and next friend, filed his hill in Circuit Court No. 2 of Bal ⁴³⁸ timore City seeking to annul and set aside a gift made by his grandfather, John Welsh, unto his aunt, Ella Leech, one of the appellees. The bill alleges, in substance, that the said Welsh departed this life on or about the 19th day of April, 1913, at or about the age of eighty-two years leaving the said Ella Leech, a daughter, and the plaintiff, a son of a deceased daughter, as his next of kin and only heirs-at-law. “That by reason of his great age and physical infirmities, the mind and will of the said Welsh at the time of his death and for a considerable period prior thereto were so weak as to render him incapable of conducting any business with any rational comprehension of his acts.” And that on or about the 29th day of November, 1912, the defendant, Ella Leedi, by means of artifice and undue influence exercised by her over the said John Welsh when his mind and will was weakened by sickness and infirmity and old age, did induce him to assign or transfer to her the sum of thirty-three hundred and seventy-seven dollars ($3,377.00) then on deposit in The Savings Bank of Baltimore. The prayer of the bill asks that the Court assume jurisdiction of this -fund and that it be disbursed or distributed to those entitled thereto and that the defendants account for any sum or sums withdrawn from said fund and used by them; and that they be restrained and enjoined from disposing of, or in anywise interfering with, said fund or any part of it.

The defendants answered the bill denying the alleged impaired condition of the mind and will of John Welsh and also denying the exercise of any artifice or undue influence practised upon him by the said defendant, Ella Leech, inducing him to assign or transfer to her the money so deposited by him in said bank, and averring therein that said gift was made to her voluntarily of his own free will, acting with and in the possession of his full mental powers. ⁴³⁹ The Court, after hearing evidence, dismissed the bill and dissolved the preliminary injunction which haej, been granted upon the filing of the bill. It is from this order or decree of the Court dismissing the bill and dissolving the injunction that the appeal is taken. Before considering the evidence here offered we should determine whether this case falls within the doctrine of confidential relations where the burden of proof is upon the grantee to establish to the satisfaction of the Court the perfect fairness of the transaction. The rule is designed, in some degree, as a protection to the parties against the effects of overweaning confidence. 1 Story Eq.

Jur. 307. As was said in Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 353 : “Wherever a fiduciary relation exists, legal or actual, whereby trust and confidence are reposed on the one side, and influence and control are exercised on the other, Courts of Equity, independent of the ingredients of positive fraud, through public policy as a protection against overweaning confidence, will interpose to prevent a man from stripping himself of his property. Story’s Eq., secs. 303-322. “The relation requires the parties to abstain from all selfish projects. ‘The general principle is, if a confidence is reposed and that confidence is abused, Courts of Equity will grant relief.’ “In such cases it is not necessary to prove actual exercise of overweaning influence, misrepresentation, importunity or fraud aliunde the act complained of * * *. The general rule is that he who bargains in a matter of advantage with a person placing a confidence in him, is bound to show that a reasonable use bas been made of that confidence, — a rule applying equally to all persons standing in confidential relations with each other.

Story’s Eq., sec. 312.” Colegate D. Owings’ Case, 1 Bland. 392; Brooke v. Berry, 2 Gill. 99; Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188 ; Eakle v. Reynolds, 54 Md. 305 ; Williams v. Williams, 63 Md. 371 ; Whitridge ⁴⁴⁰ v. Whitridge, 76 Md. 54 ; Zimmerman v. Bitner, 79 Md. 115 ; Bauer v. Bauer, 82 Md. 241 ; Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 443 ; Brown v. Mercantile Trust Co., 87 Md. 377 ; Reck’s Executor v. Reck, 310 Md. 497 ; Thiede v. Startzman, 113 Md. 278 ; Kensett v. S. D. & Trust Co., 116 Md. 526 ; Beinbrink v. Fox, 121 Md. 102 . But it is sometimes difficult to lay down with precision what is meant by the expression “confidential relations” or “relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another.” Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 239, cited in Whitridge v. Whitridge, 76 Md. 73 . Such a relation will undoubtedly be presumed in certain cases; as for instance, in that of a guardian and ward, parent and child, attorney and client, and also in that of principal and agent, and may exist in many other situations. Brown v. Mercantile Trust Co., supra, and other cases above cited.

This Court in the case of Bauer v. Bauer, 82 Md. 242 , speaking through Judge Bbiscoe, said: “It is a well settled law that a gift of voluntary conveyance between parties standing in the confidential relation of child to parent is prima facie void, and can only be upheld upon proof that it was the free, voluntary and unbiased act of the person making it. Whitridge v. Whitridge, 76 Md. 54 . This is so because a child is presumed to be under the control of parental influence, as long as the dominion of the parent lasts and whilst- that dominion exists it lies on the parent maintaining the gift to disprove the exercise of parental influence, by proof that the child had independent advice or in some other way. “But a voluntary conveyance of property from a parent to a child rests upon a different principle and is not prima facie void. It turns, says Mr. Pomeroy in his work upon Equity Jurisprudence, upon the exercise of actual undue influence and not upon any presumption of invalidity.

A gift from parent to-child is certainly not presumed to be invalid. 2 Pomeroy Eq., sec. 1399. If, however, the confidential relation is shown by competent proof to exist, then the burden ⁴⁴¹ is imposed upon tlie grantee to show that the transaction was a righteous one.” In the ease of Highberger v. Stiffler, supra, the mother, who was advanced in years, had entrusted to her son the conduct of all her business, and it was there.held that “the natural relation of the parties was reversed by the influence of time, The parent had become a child, and the child was a guardian to the parent.’ The same dependence, over-weaning confidence and explicit acquiescence which rendered one an automaton in the hands of the other existed, ‘el ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem jus.' The wish of the agent had become the will of the principal, whatever the former suggested the latter executed. There was no consent to two minds, hut a merger of the principal’s mind into the agent’s.” In a case of a voluntary gift hv the parent to a child, like the one before us, the reversed relations of the parties must first be shown to exist before tbe rule can be applied and before the gift can be presumed to be void. In all such cases where it is shown that a confidential relation exists as a fact, — where confidence is reposed on the one side and the resulting superiority and influence on the other, — the rule .should be applied.

Zimmerman v. Bitner, 79 Md. 126 . In the case before; us tbe relation existing between tbe parent and child is not that confidential relation upon which the rule is based. Until a few days prior to the time when the gift was made the father and daughter had been separated for a number of years with practically no intercourse between them and no outward indication of the existence of any close or intimate relation that might naturally have been expected between parent and child. The evidence does not disclose a single instance where the business affairs of the father were entrusted or confided to the management of the daughter.

He had looked after and managed his own affairs. He had sold his farm and had deposited the money received therefor in bank, of which fact the daughter was entirely ignorant. There is nothing ⁴⁴² in the evidence from which we can reach the conclusion that there existed between the father and daughter a confidential relation such as is meant and contemplated by the rule above mentioned. There might have been, and probably was, a relation existing between them such as might naturally arise from near kinship and mutual affection.

But it was not such a relation as would imply dominion or control either over the property or person of the donor. Having determined that this case does not fall within the' rule, there is no presumption that the gift was void, and thus the burden of proving that the gift was not the free, voluntary and intelligent act of the donor is upon the plaintiff. A number of witnesses produced by the plaintiff testified as to acts and expressions of the donor which the plaintiff contends show a want of mental capacity in him to make a valid gift or conveyance. Such conduct of the donor showed that he was an eccentric