Hewitt v. State

Prescott, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant Hewitt was tried on April 24, 1964, by Judge Lindsay, sitting without a jury, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. He was tried upon a criminal information containing 5 counts; the first charged him with having, on April 2, 1964, broken and entered the outhouse of one Joel Brown with intent to commit a felony therein, to wit, feloniously to steal goods and chattels (this, of course, meant that the goods intended to have been stolen had to be of the value of $100 or ¹¹³ more, Code [1957], Article 27, § 340); the second charged him with having broken said outhouse with intent to steal goods of another of the value of $25 or more; the third charged him with having broken and entered the same outhouse, at the same time, with intent to steal goods and chattels under the value of $100 “in violation of Article 27, Section 342” of the Code; the fourth charged him with “on the same day” having stolen $24 of the moneys and properties of Kermit Mowery; and the fifth charged him with receiving stolen goods to the value of $24 of the goods and chattels of the property of Kermit Mowery. 1 Judge Eindsay found appellant “guilty” under the third and fourth counts, without making a specific finding with reference to the remaining counts. This, under Maryland law, was a finding, by implication, of not guilty under the remaining counts.

Hewitt filed a motion for a new trial, which, after Judge Lindsay’s demise, was heard and granted by Judge Raine. Upon the new trial, Judge Jenifer, sitting without a jury, found Hewitt guilty under the first count and “not guilty” under each of the other counts. No question of double jeopardy was raised in the trial below by plea, motion or otherwise. Upon this appeal, counsel, who did not represent appellant below, attempts to raise three questions: (1) double jeopardy; (2) conviction “in violation of due process”; and (3) objects belonging to appellant were seized and improperly admitted into evidence as his arrest was illegal.

I and II We shall consider these questions together. Although Number II is couched in such general language that it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what the contention is and how to answer it, it seems to be a claim that the docket entries, and they alone, show the appellant was acquitted in his first trial on the first count of the information (therefore a defense of double jeopardy would have been successful though not made) ; hence, appellant was denied due process of law. We have repeatedly held and attempted to make clear that Maryland Rule 885 has useful and sound objectives. One of its ¹¹⁴ purposes is to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thereby saving time and expense and accelerating the termination of litigation.

Since no questions concerning