Heying v. United Railways & Electric Co.

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Caroline Heying brought this suit against the United Railways Company of Baltimore City to recover damages for serious bodily injury which she suffered while driving her milk wagon on one of the streets of Baltimore City. The facts as they appear in the record are that between 5.30 and 6 o’clock on the morning of December 13th, 1902, the plaintiff was driving up Columbia ave. to Cross street, up Cross street to Sharp street; that as she came to the corner of Sharp and Cross streets she looked up both sides, but she didn’t see the car coming, and she hurried up as quick as she could, and the car struck the rear end of the wagon; that when she ²⁸² looked the second, time the car was a good ways from her, she couldn’t tell how far, but it was closer to Hamburg street than to Cross street; that she hurried over as quickly as she could; she tried her best, but she couldn’t get over; the wagon was smashed completely to pieces and she was knocked senseless.” On cross-examination the plaintiff testified that when she arrived at the corner of Sharp and Cross streess she looked in both directions, up and down Sharp street, on which the cars ran. And seeing no car she proceeded to cross the track.

But she testified that before crossing she looked again, and in spite of the fact that she saw the car coming she hurried and tried to get across before the car could get to the crossing. In our opinion this is a clear case of contributory negligence. It is apparent from all the evidence that the car must have been a very short distance from the corner when the plaintiff with a reckless disregard of her safety, or perhaps more likely a want of appreciation of her danger, drove directly on the track in front of the car. Nor is there any evidence to show that after the motorman saw her in a place of danger, or could have so seen her by the exercise of any, even the greatest degree of care, could have stopped the car in time to avoid the collision.

As has often been said, the defense of contributory negligence admits some degree of negligence on the part of the defendant. But in this case the defendant does not appear to have been at fault, and the Court so instructed the jury by granting defendant’s first prayer,