Hicks v. Consolidation Coal Co.
Bryan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. By an order of the Circuit Court for Alleghany County, sitting in' equity, all the property, real and personal, of the Crown and Cumberland ¡Steel Company was placed in the hands of receivers. The Consolidation Coal Company filed its petition asking that it might be made a party complainant, and that it might be paid a sum alleged to be due for certain quantities of coal sold to the other company. The sale and delivery of the coal were proved at the prices claimed.
The property of the Steel Company having been sold, the auditor filed a 89 report distributing the proceeds of sales of personalty, and rejecting the claim of the Coal Company. The net balance in the hands of the receivers was audited to Hicks and Hickey on account of a mortgage which they hold on the property. On exceptions to the audit, the Court held that the Coal Company was entitled to a lien on the net amount for distribution, which had priority over the mortgage, and it referred the case to the auditor to state another account in accordance with its opinion. Appeal by Hicks and Dickey.
The question at issue depends on the local legislation applicable to Alleghany County. The Act of 1847, chapter 228, declared that if any individual, association of individuals, or body corporate engaged in mining or manufacturing within the County of Alleghany should for the space of ninety days refuse, neglect or fail to pay as they might become due the wages of persons in his or their employment whether miners, mechanics, laborers, clerks, contractors or a=gents; or should refuse, neglect or fail for the same period to pay the furnisher or furnishers of any ore, clay, coal, or other raw material generally used in manufacturing establishments, they should become liable to a receivership of their affairs, provided that the aggregate indebtedness should amount to five hundred dollars. It was made the duty of the receiver when appointed to take charge of all property of every kind belonging to the party so in default, except real estate, and to reduce it into money and to pay off the claims of the above mentioned persons pro rata; and it was further enacted that no mortgage or other lien should have priority over these claims, except mechanics’ liens. The furnishers of coal are by name and special designation declared to be entitled to this extraordinary remedy against the personal property of the individuals and corporations mentioned in the Act, and so are the furnishers of ore, clay, or other raw material generally used in manufacturing 90 establishments.
It is net said that they are to be paid out of the sales of the products, with which the raw material may have become incorporated in the process of manufacturing; but out of the sales of all the personal property of their debtor. The statute makes their claim absolute, and does not restrict or qualify it by any relation to the products resulting from manufacture. It is placed on the same footing with the wages due to clerks and laborers and other employes. They are all to be paid in the same way pro rata out of all the personal property of the delinquent debtor.
The particular product to which the labor service and material may have contributed is not once mentioned in the statute; nor is it made a requisite that there should be any product at all. The essential fact is that money should be due and unpaid for the time specified for labor and services, and for coal and the other articles described as raw material. We look in vain for any clause or provision in the statute, which would enable the manufacturer to defeat these claims by showing that he had manufactured nothing. Nor does the
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