Hicks v. Hatem

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires us once again to construe the “household exclusion” clause in an automobile liability insurance policy. The policy in question was issued by The National Guild Insurance Company (Company) to Mr. Charles A. Swanson (the insured), and contained the following familiar exceptions to its coverage: “* * * This policy does not apply: * * * (b) to bodily injury to (1) the spouse or any parent, son, or daughter of the insured or (2) the named insured, or (3) any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.” (Emphasis Supplied). Thomas J. Hatem, appellee, as the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland and the appointed receiver of the Company, and Mrs. Georgia I. Bishop, appellant, submitted by way of a request for a declaratory judgment (Code, 1971 Repl.

Vol., Art. 31A) the question of whether Mrs. Bishop was eligible for coverage under the policy to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (DuFour, J.) upon the following stipulated statement of facts: “Charles A. Swanson, RD #5, Elkton, Maryland was insured under National Guild Insurance Company policy No. ACM 29751 an automobile ²⁶² liability policy. On July 5, 1965, while the policy was in effect, Swanson was driving a 1950 Willys station wagon, the insured vehicle. With him as a passenger was one Georgia I. Bishop. The auto driven by Swanson went out of control and struck a bridge abutment.

Mrs. Bishop suffered injuries to her right hip and right knee for which she has filed a liquidation claim in the amount of $30,000. “Georgia Bishop and Charles Swanson had been occupying the same household on Dogwood Road, RD #5, Elkton, Maryland, uninterruptedly for a number of years prior to the accident. They were not married to each other. About nine years before the accident Mrs. Bishop’s nephew began living in the same household. Mrs. Bishop was regularly employed.

Mr. Swanson was intermittently employed. All three ate together. Mrs. Bishop and Mr. Swanson lived as man and wife.” The lower court, in arriving at the conclusion that the “household exclusion” clause barred a recovery under the policy by the appellant, stated: “* * * this court finds that irrespective of the absence of consanguinal ties, Georgia Bishop was indeed a member of the family of the insured residing in his household. Their living together ostensibly as man and wife under one head for a period of time exceeding nine years was conducive to cozy and collusive claims; the very object and purpose of the exclusionary provision. “This court finds that the phrase of the policy here involved is not ambiguous in the sense that its general meaning is uncertain or that it can be construed in alternate ways.

That a term cannot be precisely defined so as to make clear its application in .all varying factual situations ²⁶³ does not mean that it is ambiguous. Allstate v. Humphrey, 246 Md. 492, 496 . Absent such a finding, the provisions cannot be construed most strongly against the insurer. Maryland has not adopted the rule followed in many jurisdictions that an insurance policy is to be most strongly construed against the insurer.

Allstate v. Humphrey, supra, page 497.” The issue presented on appeal is the interpretation to be given to the word “family” as used in the “household exclusion” clause, and, more specifically, whether or not Mrs. Bishop should be considered a “member of the family” of the insured. The appellant suggests that the word “family” connotes a blood relationship, and perhaps a marital relationship, existing among individuals, while the appellee would define the term as “a sociological entity consisting of persons habitually residing under one roof, forming one domestic circle and having a permanent domestic character.” For the purposes of this case, we are not inclined to adopt either definition verbatim. However, for the reasons to be stated we hold that Mrs. Bishop was not a “member of the family” of the insured. We initiate the discussion of the question presented with the observation that this Court has long recognized that the word “family” has a variety of meanings, depending on the manner in which it is employed.

See Krug v. Mills, 159 Md. 670, 673 , 152 A. 493 (1930); and Pearre v. Smith, 110 Md. 531, 534 , 73 A. 141 (1909). Additionally, Judge McWilliams, speaking for the Court in The Peninsula Insurance Company v. Knight, 254 Md. 461 , 255 A. 2d 55 (1969), stated as a general rule for the construction of contracts: “In the construction of contracts, even more than in the construction of statutes, words which are used in common, daily, now-technical speech should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have ²⁶⁴ for laymen in such daily usage rather than a restrictive meaning which they may have acquired in legal usage. * * *” 254 Md. at 472-473 . The