Hikmat v. Howard County

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge. RAFAT, Inc., appellant, 1 filed a petition with the Howard County Department of Planning and Zoning (“DPZ”) to waive ⁵⁰⁶ a requirement contained in the Howard County Subdivision and Land Development Regulations (“HCSLDR”) in order to permit disturbance of a stream and buffer area located within its property. The request was denied by DPZ, and appellant appealed to the Board of Appeals (“Board”). The Board reversed, granting appellant’s waiver petition, and Howard County, (“the County”), appellee, on behalf of DPZ, filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Howard County.

The circuit court reversed, and appellant noted an appeal to this Court. The primary task facing this Court is to determine whether the Board committed any errors of law or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. We hold that it did not commit any errors of law, but that its decision granting the waiver cannot be sustained because the findings and conclusions contained in its opinion are inadequate. In addition, we are presented with the question of whether the circuit court erred in granting a motion to intervene filed by several community members, additional appellees.

We shall hold that the circuit court did not err. Factual Background Appellant owns a 6.9 acre parcel of land, zoned R-20, in Howard County. A small stream crosses the property in a north-south direction with approximately two-thirds of the property lying on one side of the stream. In February 1997, appellant sought approval from DPZ to subdivide the property into 12 lots and open space.

The proposed subdivision reflected 4 lots on the one-third portion of the property, accessed by a use-in-common driveway crossing the stream. DPZ initially approved appellant’s sketch plan, and later its preliminary plan, but by letter dated February 11, 1999, DPZ rescinded the approval. The letter explained that at the time the sketch plan was approved, DPZ regarded the disturbance needed to construct the proposed driveway as necessary because it was to be placed over an existing steel pipe, and the embankment would be part of an in-stream storm water management pond. By the time of the preliminary plan, however, the driveway was no longer located at the site of the ⁵⁰⁷ existing pipe, and the embankment no longer played a role in storm water management.

Due to the changed circumstances, DPZ requested a revised preliminary plan and further stated, “[i]f you intend to pursue the current design which includes residential Lots 10-13, you must submit a formal waiver petition for relief from Subdivision Regulations, Section 16.116(a), to allow the disturbance within the environmental buffers needed to construct the proposed use-in-common driveway designed to serve as access for those lots.” 2 On June 1, 1999, appellant filed a waiver petition, pursuant to HCSLDR section 16.104, seeking permission to grade and remove vegetative cover for the purpose of constructing the use-in-common driveway. Section 16.104(a), in pertinent part, provides: So that substantial justice may be done and the public interest secured, the Department of Planning and Zoning may grant waivers of the requirements of [the HCSLDR] in situations where the Department finds that extraordinary hardships or practical difficulties may result from strict compliance with [the HCSLDR] or determines that the purposes of this Subtitle may be served to a greater extent by an alternative proposal. Subsection (b) further requires that the developer demonstrate “the desirability” of a waiver and that the waiver must not have the effect of “nullifying the intent and purpose” of the HCSLDR. Appellant, in its waiver petition, asserted the following as justification for its request: (1) strict compliance with the regulations would result in extraordinary hardship and practical difficulties because one-third of the buildable property would be unusable, thereby prohibitively increasing the development cost per lot and preventing a “credible” builder from pursuing the project, (2) all alternatives were considered and ⁵⁰⁸ appellant chose the most feasible alternative, (3) the waiver would not be detrimental to the public interest because (a) the crossing would not be noticeable from Gwynn Park Drive, (b) the crossing would have no flooding impact on upstream properties, (c) the crossing was more than 600 feet from the downstream property, (d) erosion and sediment control measures would be provided, and (e) granting the waiver would control 100 year storms, a benefit greater than that required by the regulations, and (4) approval of the waiver would not nullify the intent of the regulations because it would minimize the impact on the stream while allowing development in accordance with zoning regulations.

By letter dated July 27, 1999, DPZ denied the waiver request, providing the following reasons for the denial: 1. Nullifies the Intent of the Regulations Effective August 19, 1999, no forest conservation easements will be allowed on residential lots less than 10 acres in size, unless the preliminary plan has signature approval by that date. Per Section 16.1205(a), (d), & (e), subdivision, site development, and grading shall leave forested stream buffers, steep slopes, and areas contiguous with those sensitive areas in an undisturbed condition and protected by inclusion as part of the forest conservation easement area. Steeply wooded slopes and stream buffers are proposed to be disturbed on this site for the purpose of providing the access which would allow creation of 4 lots.

In addition, priority tree save areas adjacent to the stream and its buffers would have to be disturbed to accommodate the development of the 4 lots. This Division will not accept fee-in-lieu or off-site easements as an alternative to protection of the priority wooded areas unless the applicant has demonstrated that reasonable efforts to protect that priority forest have been taken; that the plan cannot be reasonably altered to include protection of the priority forest; or that a specific alternative offsite location has been identified where forest planting would have a greater environmental benefit ⁵⁰⁹ than on this site. The applicant has failed to provide such justification. 2. Self-Created Hardship Per Section 16.116(c), the applicant has attempted to establish that the driveway crossing is essential for the creation of 4 of the 12 lots and has shown the disturbance (conceptual grading) necessary for placing a driveway across the environmental area, which wold allow development of those 4 lots across the stream.

The applicant has stated that no other reasonable alternative access points are available through the adjacent lots or elsewhere on the site to the 1.3 acre piece of land on the other side of the stream and that development of the 4 lots is not possible except by crossing the stream and grading for the crossing by a use-in-common driveway. However, there is no guarantee of lot yield in the R-20 zoned district. The applicant has failed to demonstrate that the proposal would not nullify the purpose of the Regulations, which is to protect environmental buffers and steep slopes on the site for the purpose of preserving water quality and vegetative cover on erodible soils. The applicant has not shown that reasonable use of the 6.7 acre site is dependent on realizing the density proposed (i.e., 12 lots on 6.9 acres).

Without the stream crossing, the developer can create 8 residential lots. 3. Detrimental to the Public Interest The lot and use-in-common driveway layout proposed as justification for the stream crossing is a forced design, shoe-horning minimum-sized (14,000 sf.) lots into the narrow wooded stream valley adjacent to existing residential backyards. One lot is encumbered by a drainage structure; another lot is encumbered with the paving for the use-in-common driveway to be 7 feet from the house; a third lot has questionable driveway access into the garage. The use-in-common driveway itself has no flexibility in design.

It requires wholesale removal of priority forest adjacent to the 50-foot stream buffer and construction of retaining walls to create a bench for construction. ⁵¹⁰ In order to accommodate lots in compliance with the minimum building envelopes required by Zoning, the driveway must be located as far as possible uphill and adjacent to the neighboring properties, leaving limited room for the required landscape buffer. On August 5, 1999, DPZ sent a letter to appellant requesting a revised subdivision plan. On September 14,1999, appellant submitted a revised plan which reflected a 1.9 acre lot, in lieu of four lots, and without a stream crossing. On October 14,1999, DPZ approved the plan.

Appellant noted an appeal to the Board, challenging DPZ’s denial of its waiver request and DPZ’s requirement for a new plan. In pertinent part, appellant asserted that DPZ erred by (1) referencing law not yet in effect, (2) referencing disturbance of steep slopes that do not exist, (3) referencing a distance of 8' from the use-in-common driveway to adjacent properties while the proposal was 10', and (4) other factual errors. The Board heard testimony on October 19, 1999, December 2, 1999, February 22, 2000, and June 8, 2000. Cindy Hamilton, a DPZ employee, testified that there were no steep slopes, wetlands, or flood plains within the stream or stream buffer.

She also testified that DPZ was justified in considering the entire area, not just the stream and buffer area, when making its decision. She stated that DPZ was concerned with the tightness of the “building envelope,” but acknowledged that in the absence of the stream crossing issue, the proposed lots would be allowed. Jacob Hikmat testified that the project met the requirements of Howard County’s Forest Conservation Act, see Howard County Code § 16.1205 (laying out the requirements of a forest conservation plan), and the requirements of the applicable Howard County Zoning Regulations. He also testified that the hardship was not self created, but was created by the stream and that the configuration and size of the lots bore no relevance to the impact of the stream crossing.

Joseph Rutter, Director of DPZ, testified that a reasonable use of the property existed, without crossing the ⁵¹¹ stream, because an 8 lot subdivision was viable. Testimony-revealed that the forest conservation changes, referred to in DPZ’s July 27, 1999 letter, were contained in Council Bill 13-1999, effective August 19, 1999, and prohibited forest conservation easements on residential lots less than ten acres in area. Mr. Rutter explained that the reference was placed in the denial letter as a “heads-up” warning which could affect the preliminary plan approval. On July 21, 2000, the Board issued its Decision and Order.

The Board described the case as a de novo appeal conducted in accordance with Section 2.210(a) of the Board’s Rules of Procedure, contained within Title 2 of the County Code. Citing section 2.210(a)(4)(ii), the Board acknowledged that “[t]he burden of proof in this appeal is on the Appellants to show that the action taken by DPZ in denying ... [the waiver petition] was clearly erroneous, and/or arbitrary and capricious, and/or contrary to law.” After acknowledging that the initial burden was on appellant, the Board observed that DPZ was obligated to apply the criteria contained in HCSLDR section 16.104(a), and the burden of demonstrating the desirability of a waiver was on appellant. Ultimately, the Board concluded that DPZ’s denial was arbitrary and capricious, pointing to the following reasons by DPZ: (1) citing a law that is not yet in effect as a basis for denying the waiver request; (2) inappropriately captioning the second basis for denying the waiver request as a “self-created hardship” is not accurate when evidence was presented by the Appellant that the hardship was created by the stream and not by the creation of lots; (3) the letter denying the waiver request states that the waiver is detrimental to public interest, however, the basis given for the waiver being detrimental to the public interest is the proposed lot sizes and configurations. The lot configurations do not have anything to do with the environmental impact regarding the stream crossing and the evidence showed that the proposed lots will meet the required subdivision regulations.

DPZ’s denial letter fails to address the public interest which is the protection of the stream and stream buffer ⁵¹² and does not address the environmental impact of the area to be crossed as a basis for its denial of the waiver request. Based on its conclusion that DPZ’s denial of appellant’s waiver petition was arbitrary and capricious, the Board granted appellant’s waiver petition. On August 18, 2000, appellee, on behalf of DPZ, filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Howard County. On September 28, 2000, Ronald Dempsey, Jennifer Bean-Dempsey, Jeffrey Quillen, Richard Been, and Ann von Lossberg, members of the Gwynn Acres community, filed a motion to intervene in the circuit court proceedings. 3 On April 13, 2001, the court granted their motion.

On November 1, 2001, the court held a hearing to review the Board’s decision, and on January 22, 2002, issued its own decision. The court reversed the Board’s decision and remanded the case to the Board to either affirm DPZ’s decision or remand the matter to DPZ for DPZ to correct its decision. The court stated that, according to the applicable judicial standard of review, it was required to determine whether the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. The court held that (1) the Board exceeded its authority under section 2.210(c) by granting the waiver petition based on errors in wording or captioning in the denial letter, explaining that because “the question before the agency was fairly debatable, the matter should have been remanded to DPZ to correct its denial letter” (footnote omitted), (2) the Board impermissibly substituted its judgment of the appropriate “public interest” criteria under HCSLDR section 16.104* for the judgment exercised by DPZ, (3) while the Board correctly stated that the burden of proof was on appellant, it ignored that burden and did not address the waiver criteria contained in section 16.116, and (4) the decision of DPZ was supported by substantial evidence, and thus, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

With respect to the last point, the court also ⁵¹³ stated that the court could not substitute its judgment “for that of the administrative agency, i.e., DPZ.” 4 Contentions of the Parties Appellant contends that the circuit court and this Court are required to review the decision of the Board and not the decision of DPZ. Appellant further contends that the Board’s standard in reviewing DPZ’s decision was, if not a pure de novo standard, something less deferential than the judicial standard of review that we are bound to apply. According to appellant, the Board applied the correct standard, and was free to consider the evidence before it and apply the facts to the law as it deemed appropriate in fashioning an appropriate remedy. In addition, appellant contends that there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision.

Finally, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to intervene. Appellee contends that DPZ is the agency responsible for enforcing the laws governing the subdivision of land and that the Board must apply a deferential standard of review when reviewing DPZ’s decisions. According to appellee, the Board erred as a matter of law in basing its decision on nonsubstantive errors in DPZ’s denial letter, in establishing its own standard of “public interest,” and in ignoring that the burden of proof was on appellant. Alternatively, appellee contends that the Board’s reasons for reversal were not supported by evidence in the record.

Finally, appellee contends that the issues relating to self-created hardship and the public interest standard were not preserved because they were not raised by appellant in its petition to appeal DPZ’s denial to the Board. ⁵¹⁴ Issues Presented As rephrased by us, the issues that we must decide are: 1) whether the Board applied the correct standard of review; 2) whether the Board’s decision was supported by legally sufficient evidence and/or set forth sufficient findings to support its conclusions; and 3) whether the circuit court erred in granting the motion to intervene. Right to Judicial Review On appeal to this Court, appellant raises no issue with respect to appellee’s right to seek judicial review of DPZ’s decision. 5 Nevertheless, because it is a jurisdictional question, we shall comment on it briefly. 6 Appellee’s petition for judicial review stated that Howard County, through its Department of Planning- and Zoning, was seeking review of the Board’s decision. This statement is ambiguous with respect to whether the petitioner was DPZ or the County. Moreover, a review of the motion papers filed in circuit court and the circuit court’s order denying the motion adds to the uncertainty because the conclusion that the County had standing relied on a hybrid analysis of the County’s and DPZ’s functions and rights.

Nevertheless, we read the pleadings as indicating that Howard County, representing the interests of DPZ, was the petitioning party. We will review relevant statutes and case law to determine whether the ⁵¹⁵ circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction when the County sought judicial review of its Board’s decision. As a starting point, we recognize that it is well established in this State that the right of appeal is wholly statutory. Howard County v. JJM, 301 Md. 256, 261 , 482 A.2d 908 (1984) (citing Maryland Bd. v. Armacost, 286 Md. 353, 354-55 , 407 A.2d 1148 (1979); Criminal Inj.

Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500 , 331 A.2d 55 (1975); Urbana Civic v. Urbana Mobile, 260 Md. 458, 461 , 272 A.2d 628 (1971)). Section 5(X) of Article 25A of Maryland’s Code authorizes Howard County, as a charter county, to enact local laws “relating to zoning and planning including the power to provide for the right of appeal of any matter arising under such planning and zoning laws to the circuit court....” Md.Code (2001 Repl.Vol.), art. 25A, § 5(X). Article 25A, section 5(U) provides for an appeal to a board of appeals by any “interested person” and for an appeal from the board to circuit court by a party before the board and “aggrieved” by it.

The section also provides that a party in the circuit court proceedings may appeal to this Court. Pursuant to this express grant of power by the General Assembly, Howard County has adopted various charter and code provisions that define the right of appeal from a decision by the Board to the circuit court. Howard County Charter section 501(d) provides for a right of appeal from the Board to the circuit court by any “person, officer, department, board or bureau of the County ... aggrieved” by the decision. Howard County Code section 2.211(e), governing the Board’s rules of procedure, also provides for a right of appeal from decisions of the Board using the same language as the charter.

Howard County Zoning Regulations section 130(D), discussing court review, provides for an appeal from the Board to circuit court, and from circuit court to this Court. The appeal from the Board may be by “[a]ny person, persons, taxpayer, officer, department, board or office of the County ... aggrieved” by the decision of the Board. Section 130(A)(2), discussing the Board’s powers generally, provides for an ap ⁵¹⁶ peal to the Board by “any person aggrieved, or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the County affected by any decisions of the Department of Planning and Zoning.” We note that the latter provision does not seem to apply to an appeal by or on behalf of DPZ itself, but in addition, it is far from certain that the zoning provisions apply to the case before us because it involves a planning/subdivision issue. Howard County Code section 16.105, which discusses the right of appeal in matters involving the subdivision and land development regulations, permits appeals to the Board by “[a] person specially aggrieved by an order of the Department of Planning and Zoning,” and then permits appeals to the circuit court “[i]f the appellant continues to be aggrieved by the decision of the Board.... ” In summary, while all of the above provisions may not be totally consistent, there appears to be a broad list of entities that can seek judicial review, subject of course to the requirement that the entity be “aggrieved” in order to obtain judicial review.

In T & R Joint Venture v. OPZ, 47 Md.App. 395 , 424 A.2d 384 (1980), we recognized that “[t]he condition of ‘aggrievement,’ of being ‘aggrieved,’ is a common prerequisite in the laws relating to administrative appeals, and particularly in zoning cases.” Id. at 401 , 424 A.2d 384 . Citing the test first set forth in Bryniarski v. Montgomery County, 247 Md. 137, 144 , 230 A.2d 289 (1967) (providing guidelines as to who is or is not “aggrieved”), we noted that: Generally speaking, the decisions indicate that a person aggrieved by the decision of a board of zoning appeals is one whose personal or property rights are adversely affected by the decision of the board. The decision must not only affect a matter in which the protestant has a specific interest or property right but his interest therein must be such that he is personally and specially affected in a way different from that suffered by the public generally. The circumstances under which this occurs have been determined by the courts on a case by case basis, and the decision in each case rests upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case under review. ⁵¹⁷ Id.

(quoting Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 144 , 230 A.2d 289 ) (citation omitted). Using the Bryniarski test, we determined that “a public official, agency, or entity is not legally ‘aggrieved’ by virtue of alternative personal or property rights merely because it has public duties and responsibilities of one sort or another, or because it represents the citizens of the subdivision.” Id. at 402, 424 A.2d 384 . In T & R, Anne Arundel County, in conjunction with its Office of Planning and Zoning (“OPZ”), argued that it was aggrieved because if the land were rezoned, OPZ would be required to make major revisions to its master plans. Id. at 403 , 424 A.2d 384 .

This Court rejected that argument, holding that “[t]hat is clearly not the type of special interest, or personal property right, required under the cases.” Id. (“Many people — public officials and private individuals — are put to extra work, or inconvenience, or even expense by zoning decisions; but that does not necessarily make them ‘aggrieved’ in the legal and statutory sense.”). More recently, in M-NCPPC v. Smith, 333 Md. 3 , 633 A.2d 855 (1993), the Court of Appeals recognized that “[a]n agency may maintain an appeal in those cases involving the agency’s role in protecting the public interest,” but held that the agency in question was not aggrieved by the Board’s decision rejecting its recommendations and could, therefore, not maintain an appeal. Id. at 13-14 , 633 A.2d 855 .

In Smith , property owners applied for a building permit, and pursuant to Prince George’s County zoning ordinances, commissioners from the Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission (“Commission”) reviewed the application and recommended denial of the permit. Id. at 5 , 633 A.2d 855 . The owners appealed to the Board of Appeals, which reversed the denial of the permit. Id. at 6, 633 A.2d 855 .

When both the Commission and the County appealed the Board’s decision, the owners moved to dismiss for lack of standing, and the motion was granted as to the Commission. Id. On appeal from that decision by the trial court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s granting of the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the Commission could not establish that it was aggrieved by ⁵¹⁸ the Board’s reversal of its recommendation. Id. at 11-19, 633 A.2d 855 .

The Court explained that “[t]he Commission will not suffer any property loss, or be compelled to act based on the board’s decision. The only possible injury is the arguable indignity of having a recommendation rejected.” Id. at 12, 633 A.2d 855 . In the case before us, it is very arguable that the County, acting on behalf of DPZ, does not fit the definition of “aggrieved” as discussed in T & R and Smith . As previously indicated, Article 25A, section 5(U) requires that an entity be a party to the proceeding before the board and be aggrieved by the board’s decision in order to be able to appeal the board’s decision to circuit court.

In addition to the question of aggrievement, which we will revisit before concluding our discussion, there is the question of party status. Under the applicable provisions, there is no right of appeal unless one is a party. See Md.Code art. 25A, § 5(u); Montgomery County v. One Park North Associates, 275 Md. 193, 201-02 , 338 A.2d 892 (1975). The County is asserting DPZ’s position, however, and DPZ was a party before the Board.

Because Howard County is a body corporate pursuant to its charter, and for that reason may have had to file the petition for judicial review in its name, we hold that the “party” requirement is satisfied. Aside from the provisions addressing the right to appeal to and from a Board’s decision, there is another possible basis for finding that the County had the right to seek judicial review. This stems from a statutory provision that grants the County general power to enact and enforce local legislation. Md.Code (2001 Repl.Vol.), art. 25A, § 5(A).

In addition to section 5(A)’s broad grant of powers, Howard County’s charter section 904 provides that “the County shall have all powers necessary and convenient for the conduct of its affairs.... ” Section 904 has previously been relied on by the Court of Appeals as a catchall provision granting the County the authority to appeal a decision by the Board on behalf of its Office of Planning and Zoning in order to defend its subdivision regulations against ⁵¹⁹ charges of unconstitutionality. See Howard County v. JJM, 301 Md. 256, 261-63 , 482 A.2d 908 . JJM is distinguishable from the case at hand, however, because there the County did not seek judicial review of the Board’s decision in circuit court but only sought to appeal the circuit court’s decision that one of the county’s code provisions was unconstitutional. Id. at 259-61 , 482 A.2d 908 .

In the present case, we are asked to determine whether the County had the right, on behalf of DPZ, to seek judicial review of the Board’s decision in circuit court, not on the issue of the constitutionality of the code provisions, but on the basis of whether the Board erred in reversing DPZ’s denial of the waiver. Before concluding this discussion, we recognize another line of cases exemplified by Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379 , 45 A.2d 73 (1945), and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486 , 331 A.2d 55 (1975). Those cases stand for the proposition that, in the absence of a statutory right of appeal, judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision may be appropriate. Such review may be by application for mandamus, certiorari, or otherwise, but a petition for judicial review may be treated as such if it alleges arbitrary, capricious, illegal, or unreasonable action by the agency.

Gould, 273 Md. at 513 , 331 A.2d 55 ; see also City of Seat Pleasant v. Jones, 364 Md. 663 , 774 A.2d 1167 (2001). This doctrine is based on the fact that courts have inherent power to review and correct actions by an administrative agency that are ai’bitrary, capricious, illegal, or unreasonable. Gould, 273 Md. at 501 , 331 A.2d 55 . In the case before us, there is a statutory right to appeal.

The question is one of standing. Under the Gould line of cases, a party seeking judicial review presumably still needs standing to do so successfully. Standing is not limited, however, to situations where there is an impairment of personal or property rights, at least not in the traditional sense. Id. at 508 , 331 A.2d 55 . ⁵²⁰ The State Administrative Procedure Act, while not applicable here, requires that an entity seeking judicial review be both a party and “aggrieved.” See Md.Code (2001 Repl.Vol.), State Gov’t § 10-222(a)(l).

The facts necessary to satisfy the aggrieved requirement, when the petitioner is a governmental entity, appear to be that it have an interest in interpreting, administering, and enforcing the laws in question in a given case. See Maryland Real Estate Commission v. Johnson, 320 Md. 91 , 576 A.2d 760 (1990) (the State Real Estate Commission had standing to appeal from a circuit court decision and was aggrieved because a fund it managed would be required to disburse funds to claimants, it had the power to investigate claims, and to punish violators.) This approach has been followed with respect to local and not State agencies. See Calvert County Planning Commission v. Howlin Realty Management, Inc., 364 Md. 301 , 772 A.2d 1209 (2001); Board of Liquor v. Hollywood, 344 Md. 2 , 684 A.2d 837 (1996); and Carroll County v. Lennon, 119 Md.App. 49 , 703 A.2d 1338 (1998). We conclude that when an agency’s action is alleged to be arbitrary, capricious or illegal, the requirement of standing or “aggrieved” is a low threshold.

See Board of License Commissioners v. Corridor Wine, Inc., 361 Md. 403, 411 , 761 A.2d 916 (2000) (In the absence of a statutory provision for judicial review of a final decision by an administrative agency, certiorari or mandamus “is normally available for ordinary ‘substantial evidence’ judicial review of the adjudicatory administrative decisions”). But see State v. Board of Education, 346 Md. 633, 644 , 697 A.2d 1334 (1997) (noting that the legislature could preclude judicial review of a dispute between the State and a State agency). We also conclude that the current view is that a governmental entity, including a local entity, with an interest in administering the laws in question is aggrieved. Howlin Realty, supra, is not exactly on point because the question was whether the county planning commission could be a party in circuit court after the property owner petitioned ⁵²¹ for judicial review.

Nevertheless, the Court held that the planning commission had standing to be a party because it had substantial control over the subdivision of