Hill v. Baltimore County

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. The County Code for Baltimore County establishes a statutory scheme governing the retirement of public employees. The interpretation of that scheme is the focus of this appeal. Randy L. Hill was injured in the “line of duty” and sought disability retirement through the County Employees retirement and pension system.

The administrative agencies of the county rejected his claim. He appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which affirmed the agency's decision. Hill noted a timely appeal to this Court. Five issues are raised by this appeal: —Whether the County Board of Appeals erred in making a finding that Hill was not totally disabled because the County Code exclusively reserves to the Medical Board the issue of disability. —Whether the administrative procedures utilized in this case violated due process and equal protection. —Whether Hill was entitled to disability benefits. —Whether the County Board of Appeals should have excluded certain opinion testimony about Hill’s incapacity because the opinion failed to consider reports of a particular doctor who treated Hill. —Whether the trial court erred in declining to apply a de novo standard of review in deciding Hill’s appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals.

We conclude that Hill has misinterpreted the statutory scheme. For that and other reasons set out below, we will affirm. BACKGROUND Hill sustained a “line of duty” injury to his right arm in 1985 when he fell from the back of a truck while employed at the Baltimore County Department of Recreation and ⁶⁴⁷ Parks as a maintenance worker. He tore tendons in his right arm, requiring surgical repair and rehabilitation.

After returning to work for the County, Hill complained of an inability to perform his job and sought reassignment to light or desk-type work. No desk position was available, however. Until Hill stopped work altogether, he missed most of the working days available. Eventually, Hill sought disability retirement through the County Employees retirement and pension system.

To initiate the process, Hill filed an “Employee’s Statement of Disability” with the Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement System of Baltimore County (Trustees). The Trustees, in compliance with the County Code, referred the case to the County Medical Board (Medical Board) for its determination of whether Hill was sufficiently injured to warrant retirement. The Medical Board concluded Hill was not totally disabled. Based on this information, the Trustees determined that he was not entitled to disability retirement benefits.

Hill appealed to the Board of Appeals of Baltimore County (Board of Appeals). That Board, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, affirmed the Trustees’ decision. Hill appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County which also affirmed the decision. STATUTORY SCHEME Before we examine appellant’s contentions, we need to explain the statutory scheme.

The Baltimore County Charter and Code establish a two-step administrative process to secure retirement based on disability. The first step consists of the administrative-investigative procedures. The second step consists of the administrative-appellate process before the County Board of Appeals. We will discuss each in turn. —Administrative-Investigative Procedure— Title 20 of the Baltimore County Code specifies the process to be followed to secure retirement benefits.

Section ⁶⁴⁸ 20-1 authorizes the County to establish and maintain a pension/retirement system for its employees. It authorizes the County to establish terms for admission into the system and different classifications for such admission. In accord with § 20-1, two classifications for disability benefits are established: § 20-20, Ordinary disability retirement benefit, and § 20-22, Accidental disability benefit. The distinction that exists between these two classes gives rise to appellant’s equal protection argument and will be discussed fully later.

Section 20-34 establishes the composition, term and election of the Board of Trustees. Section 20-44 provides that the Board of Trustees establish a Medical Board to “participate in the retirement system.” The Medical Board is required to arrange and “pass upon” all examinations required under the article. § 20-44. Moreover, the Medical Board is required to report to the Board of Trustees its “conclusions and recommendations” on all matters referred to it. The determination of whether an applicant is disabled is the province of the Medical Board.

Determining whether the applicant’s disability is work related is the province of the Board of Trustees. —Administrative-Appellate Process— Maryland’s Constitution, Art. XI-A, § 2 requires the General Assembly to provide a grant of express powers to counties that form a charter under the auspices of the Article. The General Assembly provided this express grant in Art. 25A, § 5 (1957, 1990 Repl.Vol.), in the Maryland Code, known as the Express Powers Act. Anne Arundel County v. Bowen, 258 Md. 713, 715 , 267 A.2d 168 (1970). Subsection 5(U) of the Act authorizes “Chartered Counties” to enact local laws allowing for the creating of a County board of appeals.

The subsection also provides for the Board’s composition, rules of procedure, and “decision by the board on petition by any interested person and after notice and opportunity for hearing and on the basis of the record before the board____” As the Court of Appeals ⁶⁴⁹ recognized in Hope v. Baltimore County, 288 Md. 656, 657-59 , 421 A.2d 576 (1980), this enactment, along with provisions in the Baltimore County Charter, effectively changed the way administrative appeals occur in Baltimore County. In accord with these constitutional and statutory provisions, Baltimore County established its Board of Appeals. After enumerating several specific areas of appeal not applicable here, § 602(d) of the County Charter expressly provides that the Board of Appeals must “hear and decide appeals from all other administrative and adjudicatory orders____” Importantly, § 603, the practice and procedure section, mandates that the decisions of the Board of Appeals can be made only after “notice and opportunity for a de novo hearing.” Finally, § 604 provides a right of appeal to the Baltimore County Circuit Court for any party “aggrieved” by the Board of Appeals decision. Thus, the normal course of procedure in an application for disability retirement benefits requires the Medical Board to first determine whether the applicant is disabled.

The Board of Trustees then determines whether the disability is work related. If the decision of either Board is adverse to the applicant, he or she may receive a de novo hearing before the Board of Appeals. If that decision is adverse, the applicant may appeal to the circuit court. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Appellant challenges the administrative procedure leading to the adverse decision on his claim for disability retirement and the constitutionality of the statutory scheme.

First, appellant alleges that the Board of Appeals must limit its function to determining the nature of Hill’s disability, i.e., whether it was ordinary or accidental. He argues that the Board of Appeals erred in determining the existence or extent of his disability. Second, appellant argues that, although he was afforded a hearing before the Board of Appeals, he was given neither notice of a hearing nor an ⁶⁵⁰ opportunity to be heard before the Medical Board or the Board of Trustees. This, he contends, was a denial of due process of law.

Third, appellant argues that failure to require a medical examination for accidental disability retirement benefits violates equal protection when such an examination is required for ordinary disability retirement benefits. —Statutory Misinterpretation— Appellant contends that the Board of Appeals usurped a function of the Medical Board when it decided the issue of disability instead of limiting itself to the nature, ordinary or accidental, of appellant’s disability. Appellant relies on Board of Trustees of the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of the City of Baltimore v. Ches, 294 Md. 668 , 452 A.2d 422 (1982). In Ches , the Court of Appeals reiterated the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals in Board of Trustees of the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of the City of Baltimore v. Ches, 50 Md.App. 200, 207 , 436 A.2d 1131 (1981), that “[t]he determination of whether appellee was disabled is a function within the province of the medical board, not the Board of Trustees. Here, the Board invaded the bailiwick of the medical board, which proved to be its Achilles’ heel.” The Court of Appeals agreed that the two boards served separate functions: 1 “This Court has repeatedly stated that in cases arising under then Baltimore City Code, Art. 22, § 34(e), it is the ⁶⁵¹ function of the Medical Board to determine that an applicant is physically disabled, that his disability is likely to be permanent, and that he ought to be retired.

After those decisions have been made by the Medical Board, the only issue to be determined by the Board of Trustees is whether the applicant’s disability was the natural and proximate result of ‘an injury arising out of and in the course of the actual performance of duty, without willful negligence on his part,’ ” Ches, 294 Md. at 677 , 452 A.2d 422 (citations omitted). On the basis of this language, appellant contends that the Board of Appeals cannot reverse the decision of the Medical Board. Appellant’s reliance on Ches is misplaced. As stated e arlier, the statutory scheme provides a two-step process.

Ches refers only to the first half of the process, the investigative, code-created proceedings. Cf. Ches, 294 Md. at 678-80 , 452 A.2d 422 . In the first half of the process, the administrative bodies, here, the Board of Trustees and the Medical Board, have distinct, reserved statutory roles relative to each other.

Ches, 294 Md. at 677-78 , 452 A.2d 422 . The Medical Board determines the applicant’s disability, if any, while the Board of Trustees determines whether the applicant’s disability was causally related to a work accident. Baltimore County Code § 20-22. Ches applies solely to the first half of the process and has no relationship to the function of the Board of Appeals.

The second half of the process deals with the administrative-appellate procedure, and due process requirements under the Charter; these halves are distinct. Sections 602 and 603 of the Charter provide for a de novo hearing and the ability to “decide” all the issues before the Board of Appeals. The Charter does not limit how the Board of Appeals may decide the issues. Thus, the Board of Appeals may fully decide the case and even reverse without remand.

When confronted with two proposed interpretations — one rendering legislation valid and the other invalid — courts generally attempt to read the enactment in a manner to ⁶⁵² render it valid. City of College Park v. Cotter, 309 Md. 573, 589 , 525 A.2d 1059 (1987). To interpret the provisions of the Code and Charter to mean that the Board of Appeals could not decide all the issues would render these provisions violative of due process. The Board of Appeals is the first administrative level at which appellant receives full notice and an opportunity to be heard.

If the Board of Appeals was required to remand as appellant asserts Ches and the Code require, the Medical Board and the Board of Trustees would be the ultimate or dispositive decision maker. Because an applicant does not have the opportunity to participate at these levels, due process would be violated. We conclude that the Board of Appeals may decide all the issues before it and that Ches does not require a remand to the Medical Board. 2 We next examine appellant's due process argument to ensure the administrative process utilized here comported with constitutional requirements. —Due Process— The Medical Board determined that there was insufficient medical evidence to conclude appellant was totally disabled. Based on this, the Board of Trustees denied appellant’s request for accidental disability retirement.

Ap ⁶⁵³ pellant divides his due process argument into two parts: (1) that he was denied due process because the Medical Board and Board of Trustees made the ultimate determination, therefore, he was entitled to notice and a hearing at those levels; and (2) that he was denied due process simply because he had no input into the process at each stage. Because we have already held that the Board of Appeals makes the ultimate decision on a case appealed to them, we need only deal with the second part of appellant’s argument. We agree with appellant that he is entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard at some stage in the administrative process. As we noted in Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Friendship Heights, 57 Md.App. 69, 82 , 468 A.2d 1353 (1984), the general rule is: “Where an administrative body is resolving disputed questions of adjudicative facts concerning particular parties, it is engaged in a quasi-judicial function which requires a hearing.” We part company with appellant, however, on when and how often such a hearing is required in order to comport with the requirements of due process.

Admittedly, appellant had no notice or hearing before the Medical Board or Board of Trustees. 3 He cites no specific case law, however, to support his contention that due process requires notice and a hearing at these initial stages or at all stages where the final administrative determination is made at a de novo hearing. In Quesenberry v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 311 Md. 417, 419 , 535 A.2d 481 (1988), suit was brought to obtain accidental disability under a retirement plan. The Court of Appeals concluded that the admin ⁶⁵⁴ istrative process had not been completed because no decision regarding the claim had been made and that additional review was required. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals stated: “We do not suggest that each official considering the claim or appeal must afford Appellant a hearing.

We note, however, that when an agency performs an adjudicative function involving property rights of this nature, the right to a hearing at some stage of the process may be required to accommodate the constitutional requirement of due process.” Quesenberry, 311 Md. at 425 , 535 A.2d 481 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court was more explicit in its statement of the rule. In concluding that proceedings before the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor met the requirements of due process, the Supreme Court stated: “The demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective.” Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 , 61 S.Ct. 524, 536 , 85 L.Ed. 624 (1941). Academicians have reached a similar conclusion.

In his administrative law treatise chapter on trial-type hearings, Professor Davis states, as the “main principle,” that an individual “whose interest is protected by due process is entitled to opportunity for a trial-type hearing on disputed adjudicative facts____” Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise § 12:1, at 406 (2d ed. 1979). Professor Davis enumerates several exceptions to this rule. One applicable here is that no trial-type hearing is necessary when a de novo administrative or judicial review is available. Davis, supra at 406; see Cooper, 1 State Administrative Law, at 139 (1965). ⁶⁵⁵ We hold that an individual is provided due process of law even if he or she is not given notice of or a hearing at the initial administrative levels when he or