Hill v. Motor Vehicle Administration

ADKINS, J. Petitioner James E. Hill, the holder of a commercial driver’s license (“CDL”), was detained by an officer of the Charles County Sheriffs Department on suspicion of drunk driving. During the traffic stop, Hill was advised of his right to refuse to take an alcohol concentration test (commonly called a “breathalyzer” test), and of the sanctions that would be imposed against him if he either failed or refused to take the test. These advisements came via the recitation of a standard form prepared by Respondent, the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”). Hill refused the test, and was subjected to an administrative hearing, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, in order to determine the sanctions that would be imposed against him.

During the hearing, Hill argued that he had been improperly advised of his rights as required by both due process and the relevant provisions of the Transportation Article. The ALJ found that Hill had been properly advised of his rights, and imposed on Hill a 120-day suspension of all driving privileges, modified to allow him to participate in an Ignition Interlock System Program (“Interlock Program”). His CDL was also disqualified for one year. Hill sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision in the Circuit Court for Charles County, which affirmed the ruling below.

We granted certiorari to consider the following question: 1 ²³⁶ Whether the Petitioner was not “fully advised” of the administrative sanctions for refusing a breath test and was misled, where Petitioner was advised that he would be eligible for “a modification of the suspension of issuance of a restrictive license” if petitioner participated in the ignition interlock program but was not informed that a one-year CDL disqualification could not be modified? We shall hold that Hill was properly advised of his rights, as required by both due process and the statute at issue, and we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On the evening of May 30, 2008, Petitioner James E. Hill was stopped by Charles County Sheriffs Deputy Robert Herbert while Hill was driving his pickup truck through the town of Pomfret. Hill, the owner of an excavating and land development company, was coming from a job site.

Hill was the holder of a Class A CDL, which allowed him to operate both commercial and passenger vehicles (though the truck driven by Hill at the time of the stop was not a commercial vehicle). Herbert noted that Hill had been weaving in and out of his traffic lane while driving, at one point crossing the center line. According to Herbert, Hill had the odor of alcohol on his breath, slurred his speech, and appeared “unsteady on his feet.” Hill would later testify that he had consumed several servings of beer approximately two hours prior to Herbert’s stop. After administering field sobriety tests, Herbert took Hill into custody on suspicion of driving while intoxicated.

Herbert advised Hill of his rights under Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article by reading the entirety of MVA form DR-15 to Hill at the scene. Form DR-15 was designed by the MVA to explain to persons detained under Section 16-205.1 that they have the right to refuse an alcohol concentration test, as well as to explain the potential sanctions that could arise from either taking and “faffing” the test (i.e., ²³⁷ showing a systemic alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater) or refusing to take the test at all. In pertinent part, the form read as follows: You have been stopped or detained and reasonable grounds exist to believe that you have been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle under circumstances requiring that you be asked to submit to a test under § 16-205.1 of the Maryland Vehicle Law. In this situation, the law deems that you have consented to take a test to measure the alcohol concentration ... in your system.

You may refuse to submit to the test(s), unless you were in a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of or life-threatening injury to another person. Suspension of Your Maryland Driver’s License or Driving Privilege: If you refuse to submit to the test, or submit to the test and the result indicates an alcohol concentration of 0.08 [percent] at the time of testing, your Maryland driver’s license will be confiscated, you will be issued an Order of Suspension and, if eligible, a temporary license valid for 45 days. The following periods of suspension shall be imposed against your license or privilege to drive in Maryland: If your test result is ... at least 0.08 but less than 0.15: The suspension will be 45 days for a first offense and 90 days for a second or subsequent offense. If your test result is ... 0.15 or more: The suspension will be 90 days for a first offense and 180 days for a second or subsequent offense.

If you refuse to submit to a test: The suspension will be 120 days for a first offense and one year for a second or subsequent offense.... If you hold a commercial driver’s license (CDL) at the time you refuse to submit to a test, your CDL or privilege will be disqualified for 1 year. Modification of the Suspension or Issuance of a Restrictive License: ²³⁸ If your test result is an alcohol concentration of [at least] 0.08 but less than 0.15: The suspension may be modified or a restrictive license issued at a hearing in certain circumstances. If you refuse a test, or take a test with a result of 0.15 or more: You will be ineligible for modification of the suspension or issuance of a restrictive license, unless you participate in the [Interlock] Program under § 16-404.1 of the Maryland Vehicle Law.

This program requires the vehicle(s) you drive to be equipped with a device that prevents you from operating it if you have alcohol in your blood. At a hearing, if you request one, an administrative judge may modify a suspension by permitting you to participate in the [Interlock] Program for one year, but is not required to do so. Instead of requesting a hearing, you may elect to participate in the [Interlock] Program for one year, instead of the period of suspension, if the following conditions are met: 1) your driver’s license is not currently suspended, revoked, canceled, or refused; 2) you were not charged with a moving violation arising out of the same circumstances as the Order of Suspension that involved the death of, or serious physical injury to, another person; and 3) within thirty (30) days of the date of the Order of Suspension you [elect in writing to participate in the Interlock Program and surrender a valid license]____ (Emphasis altered and added.) Hill refused to submit to the alcohol concentration test. After hearing the refusal, Herbert transported Hill to the Charles County Jail, where Hill again refused to take the test.

Ultimately, Hill requested an administrative hearing, which was held before an ALJ on August 29, 2008, and October 29, 2008. At the hearing, Hill argued that he was misled by the DR-15 form, because the form did not properly advise him that his CDL would be disqualified for one year regardless of whether he participated in the Interlock Program. The ALJ found that Herbert had reasonable grounds to stop Hill and to ask Hill to submit to an alcohol test. The ALJ further found ²³⁹ that Herbert had read the DR-15 form to Hill, and that Hill refused to submit to the test after being properly advised of his rights.

The ALJ modified Hill’s automatic 120-day suspension with respect to his non-commercial driver’s rights to allow Hill to participate in the Interlock Program, and also imposed the mandatory one year CDL disqualification. Hill sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision in the Circuit Court for Charles County, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision. In reviewing the administrative decision, the Circuit Court found that the ALJ’s factual rulings were supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ’s conclusions of law were “legally sound.” We granted certiorari to consider Hill’s claims. See Hill v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 410 Md. 165 , 978 A.2d 245 (2009) (granting certiorari).

DISCUSSION Judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision “is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determining] if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571 , 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “We review an administrative agency’s decision under the same statutory standards as the Circuit Court.” Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst., 363 Md. 481, 495 , 769 A.2d 912, 921 (2001). Hill’s challenges relate entirely to issues of law— namely, whether the DR-15 form as written fails to comport with the requirements of due process or the requirements of the Transportation Article. He does not challenge either the ALJ’s findings of fact or the Circuit Court’s review of those facts.

Because there are “no disputes of fact in the case at bar, our review is limited to determining ... if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jaigobin, 413 Md. 191, 196 , 991 A.2d 1251, 1254 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). ²⁴⁰ The Statutory Framework Before we consider the substance of Hill’s claims, it is worthwhile to set forth clearly the sanctions under the Transportation Article applicable to a driver who either refuses to take or fails an alcohol concentration test. See Md.Code (1977, 2009 RepLVol.) § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article (“T.A.”). For a duly licensed, first-time offender such as Hill, the sanctions are as follows: • A driver who fails the test, and shows an alcohol concentration between 0.08 and 0.15 percent, will have driving privileges suspended for 45 days following an administrative hearing. See T.A. § 16-205.1(f)(8)(v)(l)(A).

This suspension may be modified in several ways at the hearing given a showing that certain hardships would result from the complete suspension of driving privileges. T.A. § 16-205.1(n)(l). A restrictive license may also be issued by the hearing administrator that prohibits driving unless the driver is a participant in the Interlock Program. T.A. § 16-205.1(n)(2). • A driver who fails the test, and shows an alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or higher, will have driving privileges suspended for 90 days following an administrative hearing.

See T.A. § 16-205.1(f)(8)(v)(2)(A). This suspension cannot be modified for hardship reasons, but the hearing administrator may issue a restrictive license that prohibits driving unless the driver is a participant in the Interlock Program for one year. T.A. § 16-205.1(n)(4)(ii). Under certain conditions, such a modification will be automatic for a driver who agrees, in lieu of a hearing, to enroll in the Interlock Program for one year.

T.A. § 16-205.1(b)(3)(vii). • A driver who refuses to take the test will have driving privileges suspended for 120 days. See T.A. § 16-205.1(f)(8)(v)(3)(A). This suspension cannot be modified for hardship reasons, but the hearing administrator may issue a restrictive license that prohibits driving unless the driver is a participant in the Interlock Program for one ²⁴¹ year. T.A. § 16-205.1(n)(4)(ii).

Under certain conditions, such a modification will be automatic for a driver who agrees, in lieu of a hearing, to enroll in the Interlock Program for one year. T.A. § 16-205.1(b)(3)(vii). • A driver who refuses to take the test or fails the test (regardless of the alcohol concentration shown in the driver’s system) also incurs a one-year disqualification of a CDL. See T.A. § 16—205.1(f)(8)(ii)(l). This sanction applies whether or not the traffic stop occurred while the driver was in a commercial vehicle.

Id. This disqualification is “not subject to any modifications, nor may a restricted [CDL] be issued in lieu of a disqualification.” T.A. § 16-205.1(f)(8)(vii). There were thus three potentialities that could have applied in Hill’s situation. First, had he “passed” the test (showing an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08 percent), none of these sanctions would have applied.

Second, had he failed the test, by any measure, he would have been subject to a suspension, with the possibility of receiving a restricted license through enrollment in the Interlock Program; the length of suspension and the possibility of further modifications would depend on the precise concentration of alcohol in his system. Third, had he refused to take the test, he would have been subject to a still longer suspension than would have been imposed in the event of any failure, but he still would have left open the possibility of receiving a restricted license through enrollment in the Interlock Program. Under any scenario where Hill failed or refused to take the test, however, he would have also been subject to a one-year disqualification of his CDL. This disqualification is in addition to any suspension of non-commercial driving privileges.

The Transportation Article states that this disqualification is mandatory and cannot be modified. See T.A. §§ 16-205.l(f)(8)(ii)(l), (f)(8)(vii). This is the penalty that Hill actually received upon refusing to take the alcohol concentration test, in addition to a 120-day suspension modified to allow participation in the Interlock Program. ²⁴² At oral argument, Hill’s counsel was asked how Hill had actually been harmed by the DR-15 form (assuming it was deficient) in light of the fact that the disqualification was mandatory. Hill’s counsel responded that Hill could have avoided the disqualification by passing the alcohol concentration test, thus avoiding the aforementioned sanctions altogether.

We therefore operate from the presumption that Hill is arguing, though he does not explicitly say so in his brief, that had he been advised of the mandatory nature of the CDL disqualification, he would have agreed to the alcohol concentration test in the hopes that his result would have been less than 0.08 percent. Hill’s Challenges to the DR-15 Form Hill contends that the DR-15 form was sufficiently misleading to impinge upon both his due process rights and his statutory rights under the Transportation Article. It is true that both due process and