Hill v. Reifsnider

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case the appellant seeks to restrain the execution of a judgment on the ground of fraud, and also prays for a discovery on oath as to the dealings between Fritchey & Thomas and himself prior to and up to the rendition of the judgment. There seemed to be no difficulty whatever as to the right of the complainant to the relief prayed, provided the proof was sufficient to sustain the allegations in the bill. But fraud is never presumed, and to justify a Court of equity in setting aside, ar in any manner interfering with a judgment on this ground, the fraud must be clearly and conclusively established.

The burden of tbe proof is upon ⁵⁶² the complainant to prove his' case as it is alleged by the hill, and circumstances of mere suspicion will not warrant the conclusion of fraud. In this case the proof on the part of the complainant rests mainly on his own testimony, and this is flatly contradicted in every essential particular by that of the respondents. • The undisputed facts show there had been moneyed transactions between the complainant and Eritchey & * Thomas, extending over a period of several years, and amounting in the aggregate to over twenty thousand dollars, and that uj>on an adjustment of accounts between them, the complainant executed a promissory note in their favor for eight thousand dollars. On the same day Reifsnider, according to the testimony of the respondents, at the request of Eritchey & Thomas, and for their accommodation, agreed to loan to them eight thousand dollars, provided the complainant would execute a note to him, Reifsnider, for that amount, with power of attorney to confess a judgment thereon with a stay of thirty days. In pursuance of this agreement the note of the complainant to Fritchey & Thomas was surrendered, and a note to Reifsnider substituted in its place, and it is the execution of the judgment confessed on this note that the complainant now seeks to restrain.

We find no proof in this record to satisfy our minds that either the notes or judgment was obtained by fraud. On the contrary, the weight of testimony shows that the complainant was largely indebted to Fritchey & Thomas, the precise amount of-which we shall have occasion hereafter to consider, and however suspicious some of the circumstances surrounding the transaction may appear, yet they are not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the intervention of Reifsnider was a fraudulent device on the part of the respondents for the purpose of covering up and concealing the illegal and usurious charges of Fritchey & Thomas. So far, then, as Reifsnider is concerned, he must be regarded as the bona ⁵⁶³ fide holder of the judgment, which he subsequently assigned to Fritchey & Thomas. The complainant having failed to make out a case to justify this Court in setting aside the judgment on the ground that it was obtained by fraud, the question is what relief, if any. is he entitled to?

And here we are met by the well settled law of this State, that a Court of equity will not restrain the execution of a judgment unless it shall appear that the complainant had a valid defence of which he could not have availed himself at law, or of which he might have availed himself, but was prevented by