Hill v. State

⁶⁷⁶ ADKINS, J. The Petitioners in this case—Steven Hill, Terri Alston, and Charles Yates 1 —were sentenced to terms of imprisonment with a deferred, or “springing,” start date. Under these sentences, their jail terms were scheduled to begin three to five years after the sentencing date. The sentencing judge informed Petitioners that if they stayed out of further legal trouble during that time, they could return to court before the start date and have their sentences vacated. Petitioners, however, did not return to court, and later failed to report on the respective start dates, and each was charged and pled guilty to second degree escape.

After the escape convictions, this Court decided Montgomery v. State, 405 Md. 67 , 950 A.2d 77 (2008), and invalidated a “springing sentence” similar to the underlying sentences here. After that decision, Petitioners attempted to vacate their escape convictions, arguing that they could not be criminally responsible for failure to report for the now-invalid sentences. The Circuit Court denied the motions to vacate the convictions, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion. We granted certiorari to determine the following question: Whether a conviction and/or sentence for second degree escape is legally [ ]valid if it is predicated on the failure “to obey a court order to report to a place of confinement,” where that court order was legally invalid.

We shall answer this question affirmatively and uphold the trial court’s denial of motions to vacate the convictions. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The facts in this case are not disputed by either party, and were summarized by the Court of Special Appeals as follows: Hill v. State ⁶⁷⁷ On March 12, 2002, Mr. Hill pled guilty to possession of cocaine, and the court sentenced him to two years of incarceration, to begin five years later, on March 12, 2007. On March 12, 2007, Mr. Hill failed to report to the Charles County Detention Center to begin his sentence. Mr. Hill was indicted on one count of second degree escape, alleging that he “did unlawfully and knowingly fail to obey a court order to report to the Charles County Detention Center.” On February 1, 2008, Mr. Hill pled guilty to second degree escape, and the circuit court sentenced Mr. Hill to a period of incarceration for one year and one day.

On July 2, 2008, and October 16, 2008, Mr. Hill filed, respectively, a “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence” and a “Motion to Vacation Conviction.” In both motions, he argued that the Court of Appeals decision in Montgomery rendered his conviction for second degree escape “void ab initio and a legal nullity.” On October 16, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing. With respect to the conviction and sentence for second degree escape, the court denied Mr. Hill’s “motion to vacate the sentence and set aside the conviction.” The court stayed execution of the sentence pending appeal. Mr. Hill noted a timely appeal. Alston v. State On October 2, 2002, Ms. Alston pled guilty to a probation violation for failing to pay restitution.

The court sentenced Ms. Alston to three years of incarceration, to begin approximately three years later, on October 31, 2005. The court advised Ms. Alston that “[i]f I am advised that the restitution has been paid in full between now and that date I will grant a Motion to Reconsider, vacate the sentence; you won’t have to serve any of it.” The court added, however, that if “it hasn’t been paid as of that date or the date hasn’t been extended at your request beyond that—if you don’t show up at the sheriffs front desk at 9:00 that morning, there’ll be a warrant out for you.” ⁶⁷⁸ Ms. Alston subsequently was indicted on one count of second degree escape, alleging that she “did unlawfully and knowingly fail to obey a court order to report to the Charles County Detention Center.” On May 12, 2006, Ms. Alston pled guilty to the escape charge, and the circuit court sentenced Ms. Alston to a period of incarceration for one year and one day. On July 24 and October 16, 2008, Ms. Alston filed, respectively, a “Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence” and a “Motion to Vacate Conviction.” She argued that the Court of Appeals decision in Montgomery rendered her conviction and sentence for second degree escape void. On October 16, 2008, the court held a hearing on Ms. Alston’s motions.

The court denied the motion to vacate the escape conviction and sentence. The court stayed execution of the sentence pending appeal, releasing Ms. Alston on her own recognizance. Ms. Alston noted a timely appeal. Yates v. State On February 10, 2004, Mr. Yates pled guilty to second degree burglary, and the court imposed a five-year sentence, to begin three years later, on February 14, 2007.

On February 14, 2007, Mr. Yates failed to report to the Charles County Detention Center to begin his sentence. On April 30, 2007, Mr. Yates was indicted on one count of second degree escape. On May 21, 2008, Mr. Yates pled guilty to the charge, and the court imposed a sentence of one year and one day. On July 2 and October 15, 2008, Mr. Yates filed motions similar to those of the other appellants, asking the court to vacate the conviction and sentence for second degree escape.

On November 13, 2008, the court denied “the motion.” Mr. Yates noted a timely appeal. (Footnotes omitted). As the intermediate appellate court’s summary reveals, the relevant facts of each case are the same: Petitioners were convicted of second degree escape for failing to report to ⁶⁷⁹ prison on a so-called “springing sentence,” and later challenged the escape conviction based on the decision by this Court in Montgomery v. Maryland, 405 Md. 67 , 950 A.2d 77 (2008). The Montgomery decision, issued by this court on June 11, 2008, invalidated certain “springing sentences.” See 405 Md. at 81 , 950 A.2d at 85-86 .

There, a criminal defendant admitted to violating his probation, and was ordered to serve the remaining ten years of his sentence with a deferred start date of three years after the sentencing hearing. Id. at 69-70 , 950 A.2d at 79 . In ordering the deferred start date, the trial court reasoned “if you are of good behavior between now and three years from now I will reconsider it and vacate it and not make you serve another day.” Id. The defendant challenged this “springing sentence” as being unauthorized by statute and being illegal, and the issue eventually reached this Court.

We first concluded that, although a deferred sentence was allowed at common law, it would not be allowed for the reasons stated by the trial judge; i.e. to monitor good behavior and give the defendant an opportunity to avoid imprisonment. See Montgomery, 405 Md. at 79 , 950 A.2d at 84 . 2 We next analyzed Maryland Rule 4-348(d), which states that a sentence “may be stayed upon terms the court deems proper.” After reviewing the development of that rule, we concluded that a stay was intended to allow the defendant “take care of his or her personal, financial or other commitments[,] [including] such things as winding up business affairs [and] making arrangements for the care of children or other dependents[.]” Id. at 81 , 950 A.2d at 85 . We thus held that “[t]he purpose of the provision was not to allow a trial judge to monitor the defendant’s behavior for several years[,]” and that the sentence was illegal. Id. at 81 , 950 A.2d at 86 . ⁶⁸⁰ The State has conceded that the underlying, springing, sentences are illegal under Montgomery .

The single issue in this Court, then, is whether Petitioners’ failure to report for their sentences, which were later invalidated, supports a conviction for second degree escape. DISCUSSION The Petitioners each pled guilty to second degree escape under Maryland Code (2002, 2005 Supp.), § 9-405 of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”), which provides in pertinent part: (a) Prohibited—(1) A person who has been lawfully arrested may not knowingly depart from custody without the authorization of a law enforcement or judicial officer. (2) A person may not knowingly fail to obey a court order to report to a place of confinement. (c) Penalty.—A person who violates this section is guilty of the misdemeanor of escape in the second degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both.

(Emphasis added). The current form of the escape statute is the result of amendments in 1999, in which the Legislature included, among other things, a “fail[ure] to obey a court order” as an “escape.” 3 The Legislature described the purpose of these revisions, contained in Senate Bill 355, and its companion House Bill 463, as follows: ⁶⁸¹ This bill [makes] one uniform provision applicable to temporary leave and home detention in all counties[, and] mak[es] the failure to report to a correctional facility as required by a court order an escape. [House Bill 463] further codifies existing law concerning escape while on leave or otherwise not in a correctional facility. Although the current statute only refers to escape from a correctional facility, case law has adopted the concept of constructive custody to apply this statute to persons who escape while on leave or are otherwise outside of the correctional facility (e.g., in a hospital). This bill explicitly covers persons on leave.

By defining escape to retain its judicially determined meaning, it also includes those taken out of a correctional facility for other reasons, such as to a hospital or court. Floor Report to Senate Bill 355, quoted in Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724, 742-43 , 816 A.2d 88, 98-99 (2003). 4 As this history demonstrates, the Legislature intended to treat a failure to report for imprisonment identically to an active escape from confinement. Thus, we turn to case law regarding escape from physical confinement. The Court of Special Appeals has previously upheld an escape conviction despite the defendant’s claims that the underlying conviction was illegal.

See, e.g., Vucci v. State, 18 Md.App. 157, 160 , 305 A.2d 483 (1973). In Vucci , the ⁶⁸² defendant attempted to escape from prison by cutting a hole through a perimeter fence, and was charged with escape. On appeal, the defendant argued he was being illegally detained because of a procedural defect; “he had not been examined for the purpose of determining his status as a defective delinquent within six months from the date he was received by the [prison], as required by” statute. Id. at 159 , 305 A.2d at 483 .

This illegality, he argued, gave him “the absolute right to depart from the confines of [imprisonment.]” Id. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed: [I]t is clear in Maryland that even if a person is illegally confined because of defects in the procedure by which he was arrested and imprisoned, he is not entitled to resort to self-help but must apply for his release through regular legal channels. We think it is