Hill v. State

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. This case involves the enforcement of a bail bond filed with a power of attorney in the District Court. The bail bond exceeded the limit authorized by the surety in the power of attorney. The sole question is whether that bond may be forfeited later in the circuit court against the ³³ surety.

We hold that under the facts of this case the surety may not be held liable on the amount in excess of the limit stated in the power of attorney. We will explain, but initially we will review the facts of this case. On July 25, 1989, Peter Hill was charged with a violation of the Maryland narcotics laws. The District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City set bail at $50,000.

Bail bondsperson Gladys Williams presented a bail bond for that amount on July 29. Williams signed the affidavit required by Rule 4-217(d)(3), stating that she was “authorized to engage the Surety Insurers shown on the attached bail bond, as surety on that bail bond, pursuant to a valid general or special power of attorney.” She submitted 10 separate power of attorney forms, the numbers of which were recorded on the bail bond. Those powers of attorney were limited to $5,000 each and contained, in bold-faced type, thé express limitation that the power was “void if used with other powers of this company, void if used to furnish bail in excess of the stated face amount of this power, and can only be used once. The obligation of the company shall not exceed the sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS.” The surety is American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (American Bankers), appellants. 1 A criminal information was filed against Hill in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on September 25, 1989.

When Hill failed to appear on November 1, 1989, a bench warrant was issued and the bond was ordered forfeited. Williams, through her business name of Advantage Bail Bonds, sought and was granted an extension on the forfeiture to bring Hill into court. On March 22, 1990, counsel purportedly for American Bankers sought a second extension. On May 7, 1990, the surety filed a petition to have its liability ³⁴ limited to the authorized $5,000 and to strike the forfeiture of the remaining $45,000.

A hearing on this petition was held on May 7, 1990. An employee of the bail department of the circuit court testified that the bond was sent to the circuit court from the District Court with the affidavit of the bondsperson and the powers of attorney. She also stated that the circuit court would not have accepted the bond because it had been notified by American Bankers that it did not allow “stacking.” 2 She further testified that she understood that a directive of the District Court did allow stacking and that the circuit court was aware of this practice. No directive was offered in evidence nor are we aware of any.

The witness made no representation regarding whether American Bankers knew of the District Court policy or had acceded to it. The bond itself, dated July 29, 1990, contained a statement that the full fee for the $50,000 bond had been charged. The circuit court denied the petition of American Bankers to strike any part of the forfeiture. The court ruled that laches applied in this case and, in support of that proposition, found: (1) the District Court had issued a directive to accept stacked powers; (2) bail bondsperson Williams certified that she received a premium for the $50,000 bond and defendant was released on the basis of the stacked powers posted with the court; (3) the District “Court was not advised or aware that there was any limitation on the power of Ms. Williams, the bondsman, to file the bonds which were filed”; and (4) the stacking had been going on for some time and was a practice which apparently had been approved by the District Court and engaged in by the bonding company.

He concluded that in the “absence of some evidence that this Court engaged in some improper activity, the equities of” the situation demanded the surety pay the full amount. The circuit court judge later conceded that the circuit court would not have ³⁵ accepted the bond in the initial circumstances, and stated: “If our Clerk’s Office had accepted this bond in its form, then I believe you would probably be correct and I would have ruled in favor of the bonding company.” Scope of Review Preliminarily, the State claims that in order to prevail appellant must establish that the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in refusing to set aside the forfeiture and cites Allegheny Mutual Casualty Co. v. State, 234 Md. 278, 286 , 199 A.2d 201 (1963), and United States v. Nolan, 564 F.2d 376, 378 (10th Cir.1977). That principal is applicable where an unchallenged bond is at issue, a defendant has failed to appear, and the surety seeks full or partial relief from the forfeiture. This, however, is not a question of the discretion of the court to enforce an unchallenged bond; this is a question of law regarding whether the bond itself is enforceable.

Only if the bond is enforceable does the issue of the discretion of the court to set aside a forfeiture arise. Agency The authority of the agent to act for the principal is the essence of the relationship between a principal and an agent. See Proctor v. Holden, 75 Md.App. 1, 20 , 540 A.2d 133 , cert. denied, 313 Md. 506 (1988). The authority may be actual or apparent.

Progressive