Hilland v. Montgomery County Council

McWilliams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Arthur Hilland and his wife (the Hillands) are the owners of 4531 and 4611 High Street in Chevy Chase, Montgomery ⁵⁷¹ County. They acquired 4531 in 1957 ; 4611 in 1960. In September 1964 the appellee, the County Council acting as the District Council (the Council), reclassified a part of their property from R-60 (Residential) to C-2 (Commercial).

Apartment hotels had, for some years, been a permitted use in C-2 zones. In January 1966 the Council enacted an ordinance (No. 5-146) creating a new zoning classification (R-CBD) in which apartment hotels were declared to be a permitted use. The ordinance also provided that the construction of apartment hotels in any other zone would be prohibited unless preliminary plans were on file with the Department of Inspection and Licenses on or before the effective date of the ordinance (25 January 1966), “provided, however, that the final working plans of such proposed apartment hotel * * * are on file with said Department on or before April 25, 1966.” The Hillands failed to comply with the requirement in respect of “working plans.” On 26 April 1966 the Council adopted another ordinance (No. 5-162) the effect of which, among other things, was to delete apartment hotels from the uses permitted in C-2 zones. The Hillands, claiming to be aggrieved persons under the provisions of Sec. 70-90 of the Montgomery County Code (1965) (Laws of Maryland, 1959, Chap. 780, Sec. 1, Par. 78A), noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County from the Council’s enactment of ordinance No. 5-162.

Contending the ordinance accomplished only a text amendment and that Sec. 70-90, supra, allows appeals from map amendments only, the Council moved, pursuant to Maryland Rule 323 a (1), to dismiss the appeal. The Hillands have appealed to this Court from the order of the trial judge dismissing their appeal from the action of the Council. The Hillands argue that while the ordinance may be, in form, an amendment to the text, it is in substance, at least as to their property, an amendment to the map. The Council, they point out, instead of substituting a new symbol for the one on the map has given the existing symbol a new meaning.

This change in the meaning of the map, they urge, is in fact a map amendment. In ottr judgment the applicable statutes and ordinances compel a contrary conclusion. Sec. 70-90, supra, provides in part as follows: ⁵⁷² “* * * [A] final decision of the district council on any application for a map amendment may * * * be appealed by any person aggrieved by the decision to the circuit .court * * (Emphasis supplied.) An examination of the ordinances of the Council found in the Montgomery County Code (1965) makes apparent the clear distinction between “map amendments” and “text amendments.” Excerpts therefrom are set forth below: “Application for amendment of this chapter may be either proposals for amendment of the text of this chapter or proposals for amendment of the zoning mapSec. 111-38. (Emphasis supplied.) “Proposals for amendment of the zoning map may be made only by any governmental agency or by a person with a financial, contractual or proprietary interest in the property to be affected by the proposed amendment.

Proposals for amendment of the text of this chapter may be made by any interested person or governmental