Hines v. Potomac Electric Power Co.

COLE, Judge. We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 48A, § 543(d) precludes the recovery of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) and Uninsured Motorist (UM) benefits where the claimant has already recovered workmen’s compensation benefits in excess of the total amount of PIP and UM coverage available to the claimant under his employer’s certificate of self-insurance or under his own personal automobile insurance policy. The facts are -straightforward. Ode H. Hines, appellant, was an employee of Potomac Electric Power Company ³⁷¹ (PEPCO) and was injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist 1 in the District of Columbia.

At the time of the accident, Hines was driving a vehicle provided to him by PEPCO and owned by Prulease, a wholly-owned subsidiary of PEPCO. The vehicle was self-insured by PEPCO, as evidenced by a certificate of self-insurance issued by the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA). The certificate of self-insurance provided for, inter alia, PIP and UM coverage. At the time of the accident, Hines maintained a policy of automobile insurance with Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO).

The policy provided for PIP benefits up to $7,500 and UM benefits up to $20,000 per person or $40,000 per accident. Hines made a claim with PEPCO, Prulease and GEICO for payment of both PIP and UM benefits from each. His claims were denied. By virtue of his employment in the District of Columbia, Hines also made claim for workmen’s compensation benefits.

He recovered approximately $35,000 in such benefits. However, feeling aggrieved by the denial of PIP and UM benefits, Hines filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for a declaratory judgment as to his entitlement to PIP and UM benefits from PEPCO, Prulease and GEICO. The Circuit Court declared that PEPCO, Prulease and GEICO had no obligation to pay PIP or UM benefits to Hines because Hines’s recovery of workmen’s compensation benefits exceeded the maximum coverage provided by PEP-CO, Prulease and GEICO. Hines appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

Prior to consideration by the intermediate appellate court, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion. ³⁷² Initially, Hines contends that the trial court erred in ruling that PEPCO’s 2 obligation as a self-insurer is limited to the minimum UM coverage required by Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 48A, § 541(c). Before determining the extent of PEPCO’s obligation as a self-insurer, it is necessary to review a number of statutes. Maryland Code (1984), § 17-104(a) of the Transportation Article provides that MVA may not “issue or transfer the registration of a motor vehicle unless the owner or prospective owner furnishes evidence satisfactory to [MVA] that the required security is in effect.” “Required security” is defined as “security in the form and providing for the minimum benefits required under this subtitle____” Maryland Code (1984), § 17-101 of the Transportation Article. Section 17-103(a)(2) of the Transportation Article provides that the required security may be either a vehicle liability insurance policy or another form of security, as long as MVA finds that the security adequately provides the benefits required by subsection (b).

MVA recognizes a certificate of self-insurance as a permissible form of security, as long as the self-insurer provides the same benefits available under a required motor vehicle liability policy. Md.Admin. Code tit. 11, § 18.02.01A (1985). Section 17-103(b)(l)-(4) of the Transportation Article establishes the required minimum benefits for a motor vehicle liability policy and for all other forms of security.

Section 17-103(b)(3) states that “the security required under this subtitle shall provide for at least the benefits required under Article 48A, § 539 of the Code as to basic required primary coverage.” These benefits are commonly referred to as PIP benefits. Section 539 requires each motor vehicle liability policy to provide for PIP benefits of up to $2,500. Section 17-103(b)(4) states that “the security required under this subtitle shall provide for at least the benefits required under Article 48A, § 541 of the Code as to required addi ³⁷³ tional coverage.” Section 541 provides that “[i]n no case shall the uninsured motorist coverage be less than the coverage afforded a qualified person under Article 48A, §§ 243H and 243-1.” Section 243-1 sets forth the required coverage as $20,000 for injury or death of any one person per accident, $40,000 for injury or death of two or more persons per accident, and $10,000 for property damage in any one accident. Because PEPCO is self-insured, Hines argues that PEP-CO’s potential liability for PIP and UM claims is not limited to the minimum coverages required by §§ 539 and 541.

In support of his argument, Hines points to the phrases “at least” and “no less than” in the statutes that establish the minimum required benefits. Based on this language, Hines asserts that the amount of uninsured motorist coverage and personal injury protection that a self-insured employer is required to provide is not limited to the minimum required coverages. In Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151 , 416 A.2d 734 (1980), Judge Davidson noted for the Court a fundamental rule of statutory construction: “Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous and expresses a definite meaning consonant with the statute’s purpose, courts must not insert or delete words to make a statute express an intention different from its clear meaning.” 288 Md. at 159 , 416 A.2d at 737 (citing Dep’t of St. Planning v. Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9, 15 , 415 A.2d 296, 299 (1980)). We think that the statutory language in question is plain and unambiguous in requiring an insurer, whether a private insurance carrier or a self-insurer, to provide only the minimum benefits as set forth in the statutes.

Clearly, insurers are free to provide more than the minimum benefits, but only the statutory amounts, and these amounts alone, are mandatory. Hines also contends that it is inconsistent to maintain that a self-insurer cannot limit its liability to a third party injured by one of its employees while in the course of his ³⁷⁴ employment, but can limit its liability to an employee who is injured in the course of his employment by an uninsured motorist. This argument ignores the basic purpose behind the statutory requirement of uninsured motorist coverage. Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court in Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721 , 436 A.2d 465 (1981) articulated the policy behind the requirement of UM coverage: The courts have repeatedly stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist statutes is “that each insured under such coverage have available the full statutory minimum to exactly the same extent as would have been available had the tortfeasor complied with the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility law.” Id. at 737 , 436 A.2d at 474 (quoting Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo.App. 1972). Thus, the purpose of mandating UM coverage is to provide some measure of compensation to the innocent victims of financially irresponsible uninsured motorists. See Rafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 303 Md. 63, 70 , 492 A.2d 290, 294 (1985). The adoption of Hines’s position would lead to an anomalous result: “[it] would give a victim of an uninsured motorist greater insurance protection than would be available if he had been injured by an insured motorist having only the minimum required liability insurance.” Rafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra, 303 Md. at 70 , 492 A.2d at 294 (quoting Yarmuth v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 286 Md. 256, 265 , 407 A.2d 315, 319 (1979)).

Indeed, the practical effect of requiring a self-insurer to maintain unlimited UM coverage would be to place the self-insurer in the shoes of the tortfeasor, the uninsured motorist, with respect to liability for the total amount of the claimant’s damages. This we refuse to do. With regard to the insurance requirements applicable to a self-insurer, MVA regulations provide that “the administration (MVA) in its discretion, may, upon the application of the person, issue a certificate of self-insurance when it is satisfied that the person is able and will continue to be able ³⁷⁵ to pay the same benefits available under a required motor vehicle insurance policy.” Md.Admin.Code tit. 11, § .18.02.-02 (1985) (emphasis supplied). Thus the certificate of self-insurance is evidence that the self-insurer is able to meet the