Hobby v. State

WATTS, J. Ronald Alexander Hobby (“Petitioner”) was charged with, and convicted of, theft of property valued in excess of $100,000 and related offenses arising out of his unauthorized occupancy of a home for a period of approximately seven months. We must decide whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for: (I) theft; (II) theft of property valued in excess of $100,000; and (III) first-degree burglary. For the below reasons, we hold that: (I) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft; (II) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for theft of property valued in excess of $100,000, but was sufficient to support a conviction for theft of property having a value of at least $10,000, but less than $100,000; and (III) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree burglary. BACKGROUND Petitioner was indicted in the Circuit Court for Charles County on five charges: theft of property valued in excess of $100,000, forgery, uttering a false document, identity fraud, and first-degree burglary.

From March 23 to March 24, 2011, the circuit court conducted a jury trial at which the following evidence was adduced. In 2007, Dr. Coryse Brathwaite had a single-family dwelling built at 2742 Kirk Drive (“the property”) in Waldorf. Brathwaite had a mortgage on the home in the amount of approximately $900,000, and owed the builder an additional $500,000. Brathwaite’s monthly mortgage payment was approximately $6,000, and her monthly payment to the builder was between ⁵³¹ $2,500 and $3,500.

Brathwaite resided in the home from June 2007 until July 2009, at which point she moved out due to “financial difficulties]” and offered the property for sale with a realtor from Coldwell Banker. At the time that Brathwaite moved out, the property was in “[excellent condition” and “[everything was intact”; all of the doors and windows were closed and secured. Brathwaite did not know Petitioner and did not authorize him to occupy the property. Brathwaite learned of an alleged lease between herself and Petitioner 1 after receiving a letter from the successful foreclosure bidder Severn Savings Bank FSB (“Severn Bank”), which alleged that she had been using the property to collect rent money that belonged to Severn Bank.

Upon receiving the letter, Brathwaite telephoned Severn Bank to advise that she did not know of any lease involving the property. Brathwaite testified that the signature on the lease was not hers; that she never signed any lease involving the property; and that Petitioner did not have authority or permission to put her name on the lease. Brathwaite did not know an individual named “Derrick Williams” 2 and denied giving anyone named Derrick Williams permission to put her information on a lease. Kimberly Washington, a real estate agent, identified Petitioner as a former client who had used her services to list his home in Fort Washington, Maryland, for sale in 2008.

After expiration of the listing agreement, the Fort Washington home was eventually sold at foreclosure. Thereafter, Petitioner contacted Washington regarding 2742 Kirk Drive, which was for sale, and advised that he and his wife were interested in purchasing the property. Washington prepared a sales contract for Petitioner and his wife, offering $450,000 to ⁵³² purchase the home. Severn Bank rejected the offer.

According to Washington, after informing Petitioner that the offer had been rejected, she had no contact with him about the property until she received a telephone call from a detective. Andrea Colander, general counsel and vice president of Severn Bank, testified that on July 26, 2010, the property located at 2742 Kirk Drive was sold at foreclosure auction to Severn Bank. After the foreclosure sale, Colander began working on behalf of Severn Bank to take possession of the property, and was notified that the property was occupied by a tenant pursuant to a lease agreement. Colander obtained a copy of the purported lease.

Believing the lease to be legitimate, Colander filed a motion for possession of the property with the circuit court and served Petitioner with a copy of the motion. Colander noticed that the purported lease did not contain a provision designating a rental amount and that the lease term began after foreclosure proceedings had been initiated. Thus, Colander filed an “amended possessory order,” notifying the circuit court of the above. Colander believed that Petitioner and Brathwaite “were in cahoots to try to pull a fast one on the bank.” On August 4, 2010, Colander wrote letters to Petitioner and Brathwaite alleging fraud.

On August 5, 2010, Brathwaite telephoned Colander, denied the existence of any lease, and told Colander that she did not know Petitioner. As a result, Colander notified the sheriffs office that she believed there was a “squatter” at 2742 Kirk Drive. Colander filed an amended motion with the circuit court, stating that the purported lease for 2742 Kirk Drive was a “fraudulent lease[.]” On September 29, 2010, Severn Bank obtained a writ of possession for the property, and Colander contacted the sheriffs office to execute the writ. According to Colander, Severn Bank’s re-sale of the property was “delayed by a number of months” as a result of issues arising out of Petitioner’s tenancy; namely, Severn Bank was unable to take action or to show the property to potential purchasers until after Petitioner had been evicted and the property had been cleaned and repaired. ⁵³³ Approximately forty-five days before the start of Petitioner’s trial, Severn Bank sold the property for $650,000.

According to Colander, Petitioner left the property in late September or early October 2010. Nathaniel Swinton lived next door to 2742 Kirk Drive and met Petitioner in late February or early March 2010. Swinton testified that Petitioner resided at 2742 Kirk Drive for approximately six months. On August 26, 2010, the lead investigator in the case, Detective Elizabeth Clark of the Charles County Sheriff’s Office, met with Petitioner at 2742 Kirk Drive.

During the meeting, Petitioner told Detective Clark that he was renting the property from Brathwaite. Detective Clark asked Petitioner for copies of checks as proof of the rental arrangement. Petitioner told Detective Clark that, although he did not have the paperwork in his possession at that time, he would provide her with the documentation at a later date. Petitioner did not mention Derrick Williams during the meeting.

On September 15, 2010, during a telephone conversation, Detective Clark informed Petitioner that Brathwaite’s signature on the purported lease was a forgery. Petitioner told Detective Clark that he was unaware of any forged signature and stated that he was renting the property from someone other than Brathwaite, and that he would contact her later with that information. Detective Clark received an affidavit signed by Brathwaite, and compared Brathwaite’s signature on the affidavit to the signature on the purported lease. According to Detective Clark, the signatures appeared to have been made by different people.

Michelle Hobby (“Michelle”), Petitioner’s wife, testified, on his behalf, that the adjustable rate mortgage on the home that she and Petitioner owned in Fort Washington adjusted and more than doubled their monthly mortgage payment, and that they ultimately lost the home in foreclosure. According to Michelle, she and Petitioner first met Derrick Williams, in 2008, when he brought potential purchasers to view their home, which they were attempting to sell. In December 2009, ⁵³⁴ Williams contacted Michelle and Petitioner and informed them that “he had a property in Waldorf that was for rent” for $3,500 per month for one year. In January 2010, Michelle and Petitioner met Williams at 2742 Kirk Drive.

According to Michelle, Williams entered a code at the front gate of the property and opened the front door of the home with a key. Two or three days after the viewing, Michelle contacted Williams to advise that she and Petitioner wanted to rent the home. Michelle testified that on February 1, 2010, Williams visited her home in Fort Washington to deliver the purported lease for 2742 Kirk Drive, and she observed Petitioner sign the lease with Brathwaite’s signature already on the document at the time. Michelle testified that she and Petitioner paid $7,000 in cash to Williams upon signing the lease to cover the first month’s rent and the security deposit.

In March 2010, Michelle, Petitioner, and their family moved into the home at 2742 Kirk Drive. Michelle and Petitioner set up utilities and cable in their own names. Michelle testified that on April 1, 2010, Williams visited the property to collect a rent payment in the amount of $3,500, which Michelle and Petitioner paid in cash. In mid-April 2010, Michelle and Petitioner received a letter in the mail from Severn Bank indicating that the property at 2742 Kirk Drive was in foreclosure.

Michelle testified that, as a result, she attempted to contact Williams several times by telephone, leaving messages to no avail, and near the end of April 2010, Williams’s “[tele]phone was disconnected.” According to Michelle, at the end of April 2010, she and Petitioner telephoned Severn Bank and spoke with John Marhefka in the bank’s foreclosure department. Michelle advised that she and her family were living in the home at 2742 Kirk Drive and had received the foreclosure notice. Marhefka told them that “there was nothing that he could do” because Severn Bank did not own the property. Michelle testified that she and Petitioner did not make any rent payments afterward because they were unable to get in contact with Williams or Brathwaite.

According to Michelle, she telephoned Severn ⁵³⁵ Bank once a month for a status update and was told by Marhefka that there was “nothing [Severn Bank] could do until [it] had possession of the property.” On July 23, 2010, upon Marhefka’s request, Michelle faxed a copy of the purported lease. In September 2010, Michelle was notified that the purported lease was a forgery. Michelle testified that she and her family moved out of the property on or around October 1, 2010, which was the earliest possible opportunity after learning that the purported lease was a forgery. According to Michelle, the family used two sets of keys and a garage door opener supplied by Williams to enter the home, and Petitioner left the two sets of keys and garage door opener in the mailbox when the family moved out.

Michelle testified that, during their occupancy of 2742 Kirk Drive, neither Severn Bank nor Brathwaite asked them to pay rent, and Severn Bank never requested permission to show the house. Michelle acknowledged that no rent was paid after April 1, 2010. Marhefka, a senior vice president and chief risk officer for Severn Bank, did not recall speaking with Michelle. Marhefka recalled, however, a telephone conversation he had with Petitioner on March 19, 2010, when Petitioner told Marhefka that he was a tenant at 2472 Kirk Drive and wanted to purchase the home.

On July 23, 2010, in response to Marhefka’s request, Petitioner provided a copy of the purported lease. At the close of the State’s case, Petitioner moved for judgment of acquittal, contending that the theft charge had not been proven because the house “wasn’t taken or moved or in any way hidden[,]” and arguing that there was no testimony as to any financial loss incurred by Severn Bank. As to first-degree burglary, Petitioner asserted that there was no intent to commit theft of any property and no breaking as he was given keys and a garage door opener to enter the house. The State responded that “asportation is not a requirement for theft” and that theft can be proven through the exertion of “unauthorized control over ... property.” The State argued ⁵³⁶ that because Brathwaite testified that the house was locked and secured when she left, Petitioner had gained access into the house with the intent to exert unauthorized control over the house.

The circuit court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. After the court’s ruling, before the presentation of additional evidence, Petitioner augmented the motion for judgment of acquittal arguing as to first-degree burglary that the house was not a dwelling because it was vacant and not intended to be used as an abode and place for persons to sleep. The circuit court reserved ruling on the issue. At the close of all the evidence, Petitioner renewed the motion for judgment.

As to theft, Petitioner argued: If you look at unauthorized control or control by deception ... there has to be evidence of an intent to deprive the owner. Now, it’s a situation in which they are in a lease situation. The Hobbys — And the State has never offered any evidence indicating that [Petitioner] claiming this as his own, meaning this is, he’s exerting his dominion and control to the exclusion of anyone else. There’s no evidence that [ ] Brathwaite didn’t want to get back in there, or that if she had that they wouldn’t have left.

There’s plenty of evidence indicating that they didn’t even control, either the bank didn’t even own the property or have poss — I guess there’s still a possessory interest even if it’s attenuated but, nonetheless, there’s certainly no intent to deprive either [] Brathwaite or the bank of that property that they happen to reside in. Now, I think when you’re looking at authorizing exertion and control cases, that deprivation, what is the deprivation? I don’t believe the State’s made that case at this point and it’s not in the light most favorable to the State. I do believe there’s some serious issues here as to whether they can say deprivation.

As soon as they’re told to leave, they leave. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, the circuit court instructed the jury, without objection, as to first-degree burglary and two theories of theft — (1) willfully and knowingly ⁵³⁷ obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property and (2) obtaining control over property by willfully or knowingly using deception. The jury convicted Petitioner of theft of property valued in excess of $100,000, forgery, uttering a false document, identity fraud, and first-degree burglary.

The circuit court sentenced Petitioner to five concurrent sentences of ten years’ imprisonment, with all but fifty days suspended, a fíne of $10,000, and five years’ unsupervised probation. Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, by majority, a panel of the intermediate appellate court affirmed all judgments of conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for theft over $100,000 and first-degree burglary. The Honorable Christopher B. Kehoe dissented as to the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction of theft of property in excess of $100,000.

Judge Kehoe agreed that Petitioner was guilty of theft, but disagreed that the State had presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the fair market rental value of the property during the period of Petitioner’s occupancy was in excess of $100,000. Both the majority and Judge Kehoe agreed that Petitioner had abandoned the claim that the “exert control” element of theft was not met by failing to raise the argument on appeal. Petitioner filed in this Court a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which was granted on April 22, 2013. See Hobby v. State, 431 Md. 219 , 64 A.3d 496 (2013).

STANDARD OF REVIEW In Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 129 , 73 A.3d 254, 278-79 (2013), we recently reiterated the standard of review governing appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, stating: When determining whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, we have adopted the Supreme Court’s standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 , ⁵³⁸ 573 (1979) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted), namely, “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112, 125 , 55 A.3d 25, 33 (2012), Titus v. State, 423 Md. 548, 557 , 32 A.3d 44, 49-50 (2011). In applying this standard we have stated: The purpose is not to undertake a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case. Rather, because the finder of fact has the unique opportunity to view the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to assess the credibility of witnesses during their live testimony, we do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. We recognize that the finder of fact has the ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation, and we therefore defer to any possible reasonable inferences the trier of fact could have drawn from the admitted evidence and need not decide whether the trier of fact could have drawn other inferences from the evidence, refused to draw inferences, or whether we would have drawn different inferences from the evidence.

Titus, 423 Md. at 557-58 , 32 A.3d at 50 (quotations and citations omitted). DISCUSSION I. Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for theft “in any amount.” Petitioner argues that a theft of a house did not occur, as the house was not asported to another location, and thus, the evidence is insufficient “to prove the mode of theft specifically set forth in the indictment.” Alternatively, Petitioner contends that the State failed to prove that he deprived Brathwaite and Severn Bank of the property through deception because there was no prospective purchaser or lessee “displaced” as a result of his ⁵³⁹ occupancy; i.e., there was no deprivation and thus no theft. Petitioner also asserts that the State failed to prove that he exerted unauthorized control over the property, as his action in occupying the home as a “squatter” did not constitute theft under the theory of “exerting unauthorized control.” The State responds that Petitioner’s argument regarding the “exert control” element of theft is not properly before the Court. The State contends that Petitioner failed to raise the argument at three critical points: (1) in his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) in his brief in the Court of Special Appeals, resulting in the intermediate appellate court determining that such an argument had been abandoned; and (3) in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, in which he failed to challenge the intermediate appellate court’s abandonment holding.

The State contends that the evidence is sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for theft under the theory of obtaining control by deception because the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner, through deception, “brought about a transfer of possession of the property.” The State argues that actual deprivation of the property is not required, as the statute requires proof only that the defendant “intend[ed] to deprive the owner of the property.” The State asserts that, even if actual deprivation is required, the jury could reasonably have concluded that, because Petitioner resided in the house, he deprived the owner of the opportunity to live there or to receive rental income from a lawful tenant. Maryland Rule 4-324(a), concerning motions for judgment of acquittal, provides, in pertinent part: “The defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted.” “Under [Maryland] Rule 4-324(a), a defendant is ... required to argue precisely the ways in which the evidence should be found wanting and the particular elements of the crime as to which the evidence is deficient.” Montgomery v. State, 206 Md.App. 357, 385 , 47 A.3d 1140, 1157 , cert. denied, 429 Md. 83 , 54 A.3d 761 (2012) (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fraidin ⁵⁴⁰ v. State, 85 Md.App. 231, 244-45 , 583 A.2d 1065, 1072 , cert. denied, 322 Md. 614 , 589 A.2d 57 (1991)). And, “[t]he language of the rule is mandatory.” State v. Lyles, 308 Md. 129, 135 , 517 A.2d 761, 764 (1986). If a trial court denies a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the evidence offered by the State, a defendant “may offer evidence ... without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.

In so doing, the defendant withdraws the motion.” Md. R. 4-324(c). In other words, a defendant is required to renew a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence or to argue anew why the evidence is insufficient to support a particular conviction. See generally Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 487-88 , 554 A.2d 1238, 1245 (1989) (“When a party makes anew a motion for judgment at the conclusion of all the evidence and states that the motion is based upon the same reasons given at the time of the original motion was made, or when a party ‘renews’ a motion for judgment and thereby implicitly incorporates by reference the reasons previously given, the reasons supporting the motion are before the trial judge.”). On appeal from a jury trial, appellate review of sufficiency of evidence is available only when the defendant moves for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence and argues precisely the ways in which the evidence is lacking.

The issue of sufficiency of the evidence is not preserved when [the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal is on a ground different than that set forth on appeal. Anthony v. State, 117 Md.App. 119, 126 , 699 A.2d 505, 508 , cert. denied, 348 Md. 205 , 703 A.2d 147 (1997) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a] defendant may not argue in the trial court that the evidence was insufficient for one reason, then urge a different reason for the insufficiency on appeal in challenging the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal.” Tetso v. State, 205 Md.App. 334, 384 , 45 A.3d 788, 817 , cert. denied, 428 Md. 545 , 52 A.3d 979 (2012) (citation omitted). ⁵⁴¹ Before this Court, where a prior appellate decision exists, Maryland Rule 8 — 131(b)(1) governs: Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals ..., the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. Whenever an issue raised in a petition for certiorari or a cross-petition involves, either expressly or implicitly, the assertion that the trial court committed error, the Court of Appeals may consider whether the error was harmless or non-prejudicial even though the matter of harm or prejudice was not raised in the petition or in a cross-petition.

Here, as to theft of the house pursuant to Criminal Law Article (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) (“C.L.”) § 7-104(a) of the Maryland Code (under the “exerting unauthorized control” theory), we conclude that Petitioner failed to preserve an issue as to whether the State proved the element of exerting unauthorized control. On brief, Petitioner contended for the first time that the State failed to prove that he exerted unauthorized control over the property because “whatever crime a ‘squatter’ might commit, it is not theft under a theory of exerting unauthorized control[,]” and the General Assembly did not intend to criminalize a squatter’s conduct as theft. A review of the motion for judgment of acquittal Petitioner made in the circuit court reveals that he did not raise the argument he now raises before this Court.

Before the trial court, Petitioner contended that there was no evidence demonstrating that he exercised unauthorized control “to the exclusion of anyone else[,]” in that there was no evidence that Brathwaite wanted to move back into the home, or that if Brathwaite had wanted to move back in, that Petitioner would not have left. Petitioner’s point as to control was that the State was required to prove actual deprivation under the theft statute. In moving for judgment of acquittal, however, Petitioner failed to argue with specificity that the exerting unauthorized control type of theft is not applicable to the actions of a “squatter,” or that ⁵⁴² the General Assembly intended the acts of a squatter to not constitute theft under the consolidated theft statute. See Md. R. 4-324(a) (“The defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion [for judgment of acquittal] should be granted.”).

The argument now raised by Petitioner is not preserved for this Court. See Tetso, 205 Md.App. at 384 , 45 A.3d at 817 (“[A] defendant may not argue in the trial court that the evidence was insufficient for one reason, then urge a different reason for the insufficiency on appeal[.]” (Citation omitted)); Anthony, 117 Md.App. at 126 , 699 A.2d at 508 (“The issue of sufficiency of the evidence is not preserved when [the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal is on a ground different than that set forth on appeal.” (Citations omitted)). Not only did Petitioner fail to preserve the lack of exerting unauthorized control argument in the trial court, but Petitioner also failed to raise the argument in the Court of Special Appeals. In its unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court specifically observed: The State notes that [Petitioner] did not argue that he did not “exert control” over the house by living in it for several months because it was “land.” Although [Petitioner] raised this argument in his motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied by the trial court, we agree that Hobby has, consequently, “abandoned any such claim” by not raising a “control” or “land” argument on appeal.

Indeed, in dissent, Judge Kehoe agreed that “[t]he Majority had no choice but to accept the State’s reasoning because the issue was not raised on appeal.” “[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.” State v. Jones, 138 Md.App. 178, 230 , 771 A.2d 407, 438 (2001), aff'd, 379 Md. 704 , 843 A.2d 778 (2004) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Compounding the problem, Petitioner failed to raise his lack of exerting unauthorized control argument in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed with this Court or to challenge the ⁵⁴³ Court of Special Appeals’s determination that he abandoned the argument. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8 — 131(b)(1), our review is confined ordinarily to only those issues that have “been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition[.]” We have not hesitated to disregard issues raised in a petitioner’s brief that were not properly included in the petition for certiorari. See Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112 , 130 n. 6, 55 A.3d 25 , 36 n. 6 (2012); Huger v. State, 285 Md. 347, 354 , 402 A.2d 880, 885 (1979).

As such, we decline to address the contention. As to the merits of the preserved arguments, C.L. § 7-104 of the Maryland Code prohibits theft committed in several ways, including the following two: (a) Unauthorized control over property. — -A person may not willfully or knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control over property, if the person: (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property; (2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in a manner that deprives the owner of the property; or (3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property. (b) Unauthorized control over property — By deception. — A person may not obtain control over property by willfully or knowingly using deception, if the person: (1) intends to deprive the owner of the property; (2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in a manner that deprives the owner of the property; or (3) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property. “Obtain” is defined, in relevant part, in C.L. § 7 — 101(g) as “(1) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of interest in or possession of the property!)]” “Property,” as ⁵⁴⁴ used in the theft statute, “means anything of value[,]” C.L. § 7-101(i)(l), and includes “real estate” as well as “a thing growing on or affixed to, or found on land, or part of or affixed to any building[.]” C.L. § 7 — 101(2)(i) and (2)(vi). Contra Sheffield v. State, 708 So.2d 899, 900, 902, 906, 910 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), cer t. denied, 708 So.2d 911 (Ala.1997) (The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama held that a person could not steal real property, specifically an “interest in land,” because Alabama’s theft statute failed to explicitly include “real property” within the definition of “property”; the Court further observed: “[I]n most states, the evolution of [the types of property that can be the subject of theft and theft-related offenses] has produced a broader definition of ‘property’ than it has in Alabama — a definition that, in most instances, explicitly and specifically includes real property.”).

In Maryland, the common law crime of larceny was traditionally defined as “the intentional taking, without legal warrant, of the personal property of another with the unlawful intention to deprive the owner of such property.” Murray v. State, 214 Md. 383, 386 , 135 A.2d 314, 315 (1957) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). “[M]odern [theft] statutes[, however,] have generally covered other kinds of property as well.” Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.4 (2d ed.) (updated Oct. 2013). In Maryland, “[b]y chapter 849 of the Acts of 1978, ... the General Assembly ..., effective July 1, 1979, consolidated a number of theft-related offenses ... into a single newly created statutory offense known as theft.” Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 326 , 493 A.2d 1062, 1063 (1985). 3 By Chapter 849 of the Acts of 1978, the General Assembly expanded the common law definition of “property” to include, among other things, “real estate” and “things