Hoey v. State

COLE, Judge. We shall answer three questions in this appeal: (1) Were the defendant’s confessions, under the circumstances presented, properly admitted at trial? (2) Was the testimony of a treating psychiatrist, introduced by the State to rebut the defendant’s proof of his lack of criminal responsibility, admissible when the State failed to disclose the expert witness to the defendant during discovery? and (3) Was it constitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant to show that he was “not criminally responsible” for the crimes he committed? We summarize the facts as follows.

On January 14, 1985, John Hoey threw a Molotov cocktail at a building in Baltimore County. Detective Norman Snyder of the Baltimore County Police Department Arson Squad was called to investigate the incident. The next day police officer Jeffrey Parry, having heard a police broadcast that Hoey was a suspect, stopped Hoey at a convenience store and notified ⁴⁷⁸ Detective Snyder. When Detective Snyder arrived at the convenience store, he arrested Hoey and searched the car Hoey was driving.

Detective Snyder’s search uncovered illegal weapons. Based on these facts, Hoey was charged with attempted storehouse burning, possession of a Molotov cocktail, and wearing or carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon. A police officer took Hoey to the station, where Detective Snyder, using the Baltimore County Police Department’s standard rights and waiver form, 1 advised Hoey of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Detective Snyder read , each right out loud and underlined each word as he read it so that Hoey could read along.

Hoey placed his initials beside each line and signed the waiver form. Within fifteen minutes, Hoey orally confessed to the crimes and wrote out an inculpatory statement. Prior to Hoey’s trial, Hoey’s attorney moved to suppress Hoey’s confessions because they were “involuntary and/or elicited during custodial interrogation without the observance of mandatory procedural safeguards required by law.” At the suppression hearing, Dr. Michael Spodak, an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry, testified for the defense that he had examined Hoey on March 27, 1985, and that Hoey suffered from schizophrenia. Dr. Spodak further testified that Hoey’s mental disorder rendered him incapable of making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights.

To buttress Dr. Spodak’s conclusion, Hoey’s father testified that Hoey had been acting peculiarly and abnormally on January 14, 1985. Hoey testified that he felt fine on the day of his arrest, but that his only recollections of the police interrogation were that he was not allowed to make a phone call and Detective Snyder promised him that the State would go easy on him if he confessed. ⁴⁷⁹ In response to this testimony, Officer Parry testified that when Hoey was stopped, Hoey appeared cognizant of his surroundings and responded normally to questions and directives. Detective Snyder testified that at the time Hoey waived his rights and confessed, he appeared to understand what was happening and answered questions responsively. Detective Snyder also testified that after Hoey orally confessed, he suggested to Hoey that he make a written confession because it would protect both parties from any later disagreements as to what Hoey had actually admitted.

Detective Snyder expressly denied making any promise of leniency to Hoey in exchange for a confession. After all the witnesses had testified at the suppression hearing, the trial judge found as a fact that Detective Snyder had not promised Hoey that the State would go easy on him if he confessed. The trial judge also found that Hoey’s statements had been made freely, voluntarily, and capably. Accordingly, the judge denied Hoey’s motion to suppress.

At trial, Hoey entered both a plea of not guilty and a plea of not criminally responsible. During the State’s case in chief, Detective Snyder testified that Hoey orally admitted throwing a Molotov cocktail at the building in question. In addition, the State introduced Hoey’s written confession and corroborating evidence to support the offenses charged. Hoey then attempted to prove, through the testimony of Dr. Spodak, that he was not criminally responsible for his acts.

In rebuttal, the State called to the stand Dr. David Helsel, Hoey’s treating psychiatrist from January 15, 1985 until February, 1985. Defense counsel objected to the admission of Dr. Helsel’s testimony because the State had not disclosed its intention to call Dr. Helsel as a witness, and thus defense counsel was unprepared to cross-examine Dr. Helsel. The trial judge adjourned court early that day to permit defense counsel time to prepare. The trial judge allowed Dr. Helsel to testify the next morning.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed that the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable ⁴⁸⁰ doubt on each element of the offenses and that Hoey had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on the issue of his lack of criminal responsibility. Hoey objected to the burden of proof instruction. The jury found Hoey guilty of, and criminally responsible for, each charge. Hoey appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, but we granted certiorari before consideration by the intermediate appellate court.

I We shall first address the question of whether Hoey’s confessions were properly admitted at trial. In Maryland, a defendant’s confession is only admissible if it is (1) voluntary under Maryland nonconstitutional law, (2) voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 2 and (3) elicited in conformance with the mandates of Miranda. See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 250 , 513 A.2d 299, 308-09 (1986) {Lodowski II); Colorado v. Connelly, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Hoey contends that his confessions and waiver were involuntary because he suffered from a mental disability and Detective Snyder coerced the statements from him.

The State argues that there was sufficient evidence presented to the trial judge to support a finding that Hoey’s confessions and waiver were voluntary. We agree with the State that Hoey’s confessions were voluntary and thus properly admitted. We explain. A. We shall first examine whether Hoey’s confessions were voluntary under Maryland nonconstitutional law.

A ⁴⁸¹ confession is voluntary under Maryland nonconstitutional law if it is “freely and voluntarily made at a time when [the defendant] knew and understood what he was saying.” Wiggins v. State, 285 Md. 97 , 102, 200 A.2d 683, 686 , cert. denied, 379 U.S. 861 , 85 S.Ct. 123 , 13 L.Ed.2d 64 (1964); see also Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 254 , 513 A.2d at 310 -311 (quoting State v. Hill, 2 Md.App. 594, 601-602 , 236 A.2d 27, 31 (1967)); Mundell v. State, 244 Md. 91, 93 , 223 A.2d 184, 185 (1966). The first step in determining whether a confession is voluntary under Maryland nonconstitutional law is to determine whether the defendant was mentally capable of making a confession. In McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394 , 89 A. 1100 (1914), the defendant claimed that his confession was inadmissible because he was mentally irresponsible at the time he confessed. There was testimony before the trial judge that on the eve of the defendant’s confession he heard groans, saw ghosts, and thought he was fighting wild beasts.

There was also testimony that the day after the defendant’s confession he spoke irrationally and incoherently. The State’s Attorney and jail physician, however, testified that while the defendant may have been excited on the day he confessed, he was far from being irrational. This Court held that the question was not whether the defendant “was mentally agitated, but [whether he] was ... so far deprived of his sense of reason as not to be responsible for what he may have done or said.” Id. at 402 , 89 A. at 1103 . Thus, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant was mentally capable of understanding what he said when he confessed.

Id. at 403 , 89 A. at 1104 . Similarly, in Wiggins, supra, the defendant argued that his confession was inadmissible because his mental condition was impaired due to alcohol withdrawal. The defendant suffered delirium tremens and had hallucinations while he was in police custody. At trial, the defendant produced evidence that the day after he confessed he told the police that “he had rabbits in his hands and had pulled ‘angel’s ⁴⁸² hair’ from his body.” Id. 235 Md. at 101 , 200 A.2d at 686 .

In addition, the defendant showed that two days after he confessed, the Crownsville State Hospital diagnosed him as having acute temporary brain syndrome. Several police officers, however, testified that the defendant’s speech was coherent and his answers were rational on the day of his confession. Moreover, the State presented evidence that the symptoms and conditions of an individual withdrawing from excessive alcohol use may vary from day to day and are easily feigned. In resolving the case, the Wiggins Court reasoned that “[t]he crucial question was not whether [the defendant] was suffering from the effects of withdrawal from excessive alcoholic indulgences when he gave [his confessions], but whether his disclosures to the police were freely and voluntarily made at a time when he knew and understood what he was saying.” Id. at 102, 200 A.2d at 686 .

The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s confessions met this test. Id. Thus, it is clear that under Maryland nonconstitutional law a defendant’s mere mental deficiency is insufficient to automatically make his confession involuntary. Rather, a confession is only involuntary when the defendant, at the time of his confession, is so mentally impaired that he does not know or understand what he is saying.

In the case at bar, conflicting evidence was presented regarding Hoey’s mental capacity to know and understand what he was saying at the time of his confession. On the one hand, Dr. Spodak testified that Hoey was too mentally disturbed to really understand what he was doing. Also, Hoey’s father testified that Hoey was incoherent and unstable on the day before he confessed. Similarly, Hoey testified that he was incoherent when he gave his confession and remembers little of it.

On the other hand, Hoey also testified that his mental condition was fine on the day he confessed and he did not hear “voices or anything” on ⁴⁸³ that day. In addition, Officer Parry testified that Hoey understood questions, spoke coherently and rationally, followed commands, and did not act peculiarly at the time he was arrested. Finally, Detective Snyder testified that Hoey comprehended questions, gave prompt, responsive answers, and did not display bizarre behavior while he was at the station after his arrest and during his confession. After being presented with this evidence, the trial judge made the following findings of fact: [A]s to [Hoey’s] understanding of [his confessions], which was raised by Dr. Spodak’s testimony, and other matters by the Defendant himself, that he didn’t know he said this, that he didn’t know he said that, I believe that he was in a position to make his decision there freely, voluntarily, capably.

We hold that there was sufficient testimony presented at the suppression hearing to conclude that the trial judge did not err in finding that Hoey was mentally capable of understanding what he was saying. We therefore conclude that Hoey’s mental deficiency, standing alone, was insufficient to make his confession involuntary. We must next determine if Hoey’s confessions were given “freely and voluntarily.” Under Maryland nonconstitutional law, a confession is inadmissible unless it is “shown to be free of any coercive barnacles that may have attached by improper means to prevent the expression from being voluntary.” Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 150 , 406 A.2d 415, 418 (1979). Thus, a confession is involuntary if it is induced by force, undue influence, improper promises, or threats.

Id. at 151 , 415 A.2d at 419. Whether particular police conduct is deemed improper depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession, and a number of factors should be considered: the defendant’s age and education, the defendant’s physical condition and mental capacity, the length of the interrogation, the manner of questioning, and whether there was any physical mistreatment of the defendant. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 254-55 , 513 A.2d at 311 . ⁴⁸⁴ In the case at bar, evidence was presented on two possible incidents of improper police conduct. First, Hoey testified that during his interrogation Detective Snyder promised Hoey that the State would go easy on him if he confessed.

Detective Snyder, however, testified that he did not make such a promise. Second, Detective Snyder testified that after Hoey orally confessed, he suggested to Hoey that he put his confession in writing to ensure that there would not be a disagreement later as to what Hoey actually admitted. Hoey acted on Detective Snyder’s suggestion and reduced his confession to writing. After reviewing this evidence, the trial judge expressly found as a fact that Detective Snyder did not make any promise of leniency in exchange for Hoey’s confessions.

The trial judge also found that Hoey’s confessions were made “freely and voluntarily.” We hold that the trial judge was not mistaken in finding that Hoey’s confessions were voluntary. We therefore conclude that they were properly admitted under Maryland nonconstitutional law. B. We must determine next whether Hoey’s confessions were voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In reviewing the issue of whether a confession is voluntary under the Fourteenth Amendment, we accept the trial judge’s factual findings as correct unless they are clearly erroneous, and from these findings, along with a review of the entire record, make an independent determination of “the ultimate fact, namely, the existence or nonexistence of voluntariness.” Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 711 , 490 A.2d 1228, 1238 (1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 1078 , 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986) (Lodowski I); Watson v. State, 282 Md. 73, 84 , 382 A.2d 574, 580 , cert. denied, 437 U.S. 908 , 98 S.Ct. 3100 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1978).

The Supreme Court recently examined the voluntariness of a mentally impaired defendant’s confession in Colorado ⁴⁸⁵ v. Connelly, supra. There, the defendant, Francis Connelly, approached an officer of the Denver Police Department and informed the officer that he had committed a crime and would like to discuss it with the police. The officer immediately gave Connelly the Miranda warnings. Connelly stated that he understood his rights, but would still like to talk to the police.

When a detective from the police department arrived, Connelly was again advised of his Miranda rights. Connelly then proceeded to recount in detail his murder of a young girl. At a preliminary hearing, Connelly moved to suppress all of his statements. A psychiatrist employed by the state hospital testified that Connelly suffered from schizophrenia and that this disorder prevented him from making free and rational choices.

On this evidence, the trial court concluded that Connelly’s statements were involuntary and thus inadmissible. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court reversed. In finding that Connelly’s confession was voluntary, the United States Supreme Court stated that “by virtue of the Due Process Clause ‘certain interrogation techniques ... are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.’ ” Id. 107 S.Ct. at 520 , quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S.Ct. 445, 449 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). The Court stressed that the focus of an inquiry into the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement must be on “the crucial element of police overreaching.” Id.

Consequently, the Court concluded that “[ajbsent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.” Id. The Court further noted that although a defendant’s mental condition is relevant to his susceptibility to police coercion, an examination of the defendant’s state of mind alone is insufficient to conclude the due process inquiry. A contrary rule, reasoned the court, would “require sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear ⁴⁸⁶ on the defendant by the State.” 3 Id. 107 S.Ct. at 522 . As the police did not coerce Connelly in any manner, and merely allowed him to confess, the Court held that his statements were voluntary.

Applying the Supreme Court’s test for voluntariness under the Due Process Clause, we look first to determine if there was any police coercion. The only factual finding by the trial court that could amount to police overreaching was Detective Snyder’s suggestion to Hoey, after Hoey had orally confessed, that a written confession would benefit Hoey. We find this action to be innocuous. Even considering Hoey’s mental impairment, Detective Snyder’s action cannot be deemed coercive.

Rather, his action can only be viewed as neutral, if not helpful, to Hoey. Hoey had already orally confessed when Detective Snyder suggested reducing his confession to writing, and Detective Snyder merely sought to protect himself and Hoey from the conflicts that often arise when oral statements are the only evidence of an occurrence. Consequently, we find that Detective Snyder’s actions were not “so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.” Under our independent review Hoey’s confessions, therefore, were not involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. C. We now examine one last issue regarding the admissibility of Hoey’s confessions.

Under Miranda , a state may not use any self-incriminating statement made by a defendant during custodial interrogation unless the State proves that the defendant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. ⁴⁸⁷ 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628-29 . In Connelly , the Court held that “Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.” 107 S.Ct. at 524 (emphasis added). The Connelly Court concluded: “There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a ‘voluntariness’ inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context.”