Hoffman v. Stamper

DEBORAH S. EYLER, Judge. In a civil case in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury found Robert Beeman (“Beeman”), Suzanne Beeman, and their company, A Home of Your Own, Inc. (“AHOYO”), liable for conspiracy to defraud, fraud, and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), for perpetrating a scheme to sell the appellees, plaintiffs below, dilapidated residential properties at grossly inflated prices. Through Bee-man, AHOYO purchased the properties for small sums and quickly sold them to the appellees (whom for ease of discussion we shall from time to time call “buyers”) at huge profits. 1 Although by agreement of counsel the word “flipping” was not used at trial, that is the colloquialism for the type of fraudulent scheme practiced by the Beemans and their company. ²⁶⁴ The Beemans and AHOYO are not parties to this appeal, and their fraud and consequent liability in tort to the buyers are not in question. 2 The appellants are three co-defendants who were tried jointly with the Beemans and AHOYO: Irwin Mortgage Corporation (“Irwin”), the lender that extended FHA financing to each buyer; Joyce Wood (“Wood”), a loan officer employed by Irwin who handled the financing for each transaction; and Arthur J. Hoffman (“Hoffman”), the appraiser who performed the property valuation in each transaction. The buyers’ theory of liability against Irwin was based solely on vicarious liability for the wrongful acts of Wood.

At trial, the appellants claimed to have known nothing about Beeman’s scheme and to have been his unwitting victims. The buyers asserted, on the contrary, that Wood and Hoffman (and Irwin, through Wood) not only knew about but also participated in Beeman’s design to sell them dilapidated houses at vastly inflated prices. The jury agreed with the buyers and found Irwin, Wood, and Hoffman liable for conspiracy to defraud and fraud, and for violations of the MCPA. The buyers were awarded a total of $129,020.03, in economic damages, and $1,305,000, in non-economic damages, against all the defendants. 3 Because the court granted a motion for judgment that kept the issue of punitive damages against Irwin, Wood, and Hoffman from the jury’s consideration, that issue went to the jury against the Beemans and AHOYO only.

The jurors decided that punitive damages were warranted. Thereafter, in a separate proceeding, they awarded the buyers $1,800,000 in punitive damages against the Beemans and AHOYO. After denying post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and new trial or remittitur, the trial ²⁶⁵ court granted the buyers’ petition for attorneys’ fees under the MCPA, awarding them fees of $195,591.26, against all the defendants. The court ruled that the fee award would be reduced by the amount of fees recovered on the judgment for fraud, however.

The appellants have raised a multiplicity of questions for review on appeal. We have combined and rephrased the questions, as follows: I. Did the circuit court err in denying Hoffman’s motion for removal?

II

Did the trial court err in denying the defense motions for judgment and JNOV on the conspiracy to defraud, fraud, and MCPA claims; and Irwin and Wood’s motion for JNOV on the affirmative defense of fraud?

III

Did the trial court err in denying the defense motions for judgment, JNOV, and new trial/remittitur on the issue of non-economic damages?

IV

Did the trial court err in declining to instruct the jury on the defense of equitable estoppel; in giving an erroneous instruction on economic damages; and in declining to give a curative instruction during closing argument? [ 4 ] ²⁶⁷ The appellees noted a cross-appeal, raising two questions, which we have reworded as follows: V. Did the trial court err in granting motions for judgment in favor of Irwin, Wood, and Hoffman on punitive damages?

VI

Did the trial court err in ruling that the amount received by the buyers’ counsel for the common law claims pursuant to the contingency fee agreement would be deducted from its award of attorneys’ fees under the MCPA? For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court for compensatory damages; reverse the judgment of the circuit court on the issue of punitive damages against Irwin, Wood, and Hoffman; vacate the attorneys’ fees award against Irwin, Wood, and Hoffman; and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion on the issue of punitive damages and on the petition for attorneys’ fees. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Beginning in 1996, Beeman and his wife, Suzanne, through their company, AHOYO, embarked on a connivance to profit by buying up dilapidated residential properties in or near Baltimore City at low prices and quickly selling them to the unwary at hugely inflated prices. The Beemans and AHOYO targeted low income, unsophisticated renters in poor neighborhoods who dreamed of someday owning their own homes, and enticed them with promises that they could be homeowners for “only $500 down.” ²⁶⁸ The scheme involved tricking a prospective buyer into thinking he or she was purchasing a “rehabbed” house, or one that would be fully renovated by the time of settlement, and having Beeman illegally pay settlement and other costs, including paying off the buyer’s creditors, so the transaction could go to closing — at which time Beeman’s profits would far exceed the money he had fronted to make the deal happen.

The properties Beeman’s company purchased were in slum conditions. He would make cosmetic changes to a property and pass it off as “rehabbed.” After settlement, the buyer was left with a property that was either uninhabitable or in seriously decayed condition, and was worth far less than the mortgage loan taken to buy it. Beeman continued this practice until early 1998, when he became the subject of a federal criminal investigation. 5 This case involves eight of Beeman’s and AHOYO’s real estate transactions. Seven went to closing between July and December 1997, and one closed in January 1998.

There were two buyers in one transaction; hence, there were nine buyer/plaintiffs at trial. The basic facts of the eight transactions, showing the purchases by Beeman/AHOYO and sales to the buyers, are as follows (chronologically by settlement date): 1. 17 North Kresson Street/Buyer Jerry McFadden April 23,1997: Purchased for $14,500 July 11, 1997: Sold for $52,000 2. 612 E. 41st Street/Buyer Carl Haley June 25,1997: Purchased for $20,000 August 22, 1997: Sold for $57,200 3. 610 North Belnord Road/Buyer Gertrude Green June 18,1997: Purchased for $12,500 September 8,1997: Sold for $44,000 4. 5601 Force Road/Buyers Denise Brower and Forrest Spencer August 7,1997: Purchased for $24,000 September 24,1997: Sold for $65,900 ²⁶⁹ 5. 406 Oldham Street/Buyer Francine Henderson March 27,1997: Purchased for $17,550 October 9,1997: Sold for $65,000 6. 3132 Piedmont Road/Buyer Eva Elder September 5,1997: Purchased for $29,551 October 22,1997 Sold for $51,000 7. 6521 Lenhart Street/Buyer Toyome Stamper September 5,1997: Purchased for $41,790 December 5, 1997: Sold for $87,250 8. 1127 Carroll Street/Buyer Inez Coward September 29,1997: Purchased for $7,550 January 28, 1998: Sold for $58,000 The eight transactions were similar in most material respects and followed the same factual pattern. Through AHOYO, Beeman would buy up depressed residential properties and then advertise in newspapers in Baltimore City that he could help people with little income and with credit problems buy houses with down payments of no more than $500. Some of the buyers in this case read Beeman’s advertisements.

Most of them heard about Beeman and AHOYO through word of mouth from others who had read the advertisements or had dealt with Beeman directly. Each of the buyers wanted to own a house and called Beeman for help. The buyers had similar backgrounds. Each lived in a rental unit in Baltimore City and had been employed for at least two years in a steady job that paid a modest wage.

None had ever owned real property and none had any experience buying or selling real property. Most of the buyers had graduated from high school or held GEDs, but some had dropped out of high school. A few had taken some college courses. Each had experienced credit problems and for that reason had a marginal credit history.

All were unsophisticated in business matters. Many were renting units in crime-ridden neighborhoods and wanted to move so their families would have a safe place to live. After the buyer called Beeman and left a message on his pager, Beeman would return the call and agree to a meeting. Usually Beeman went to the buyer’s home.

At the meeting, Beeman obtained preliminary income information and ran a ²⁷⁰ credit report. After determining that the buyer’s credit problems were not so insurmountable as to preclude obtaining financing, Beeman would offer to assist the buyer in purchasing a house in a neighborhood the buyer liked in or near Baltimore City. Beeman’s sales pitch was “the American Dream.” He told his prospective buyers that nothing made him happier than to see a poor person with bad credit problems become a homeowner, and promised to “walk the buyer through” the process of purchasing a house. The buyers all believed that Beeman was representing them in the home-buying process.

Beeman seemed likeable, and all the buyers were impressed by him. As one buyer testified, Beeman was “smooth.” They thought he was a nice man and a professional, and trusted him to look out for their interests. Either on the same day as his first meeting with the buyer or soon thereafter, Beeman would drive the buyer to see various properties, like a real estate agent would do. Some of the buyers seemed to understand that AHOYO owned the properties that Beeman was showing; some did not know who owned the properties.

Most of the buyers did not seem to know that Beeman himself was the seller, ie., owned the selling company; some did know that Beeman, or at least his company, was the seller. Two of the buyers thought that Beeman was the lender in the transaction. Many had no understanding at all of Beeman’s role. All of the buyers thought that Beeman was working for them.

When the buyer he was meeting with expressed an interest in a particular property, Beeman would offer to help obtain purchase mortgage financing, through Irwin. 6 Then, either that day or soon thereafter, Beeman would drive the buyer to Irwin’s office in Columbia, Maryland. There, Beeman and the buyer would meet with Joyce Wood. Wood worked on commis ²⁷¹ sion and so was compensated only for work performed on loans that in fact were extended. Beeman and Wood knew each other before any of the transactions in this case took place.

In early 1997, Beeman contacted Wood, saying that he was a real estate investor involved in buying, renovating, and selling properties in Baltimore City, and that he was looking for financing sources for his buyers. Wood agreed to meet Beeman at Pargos Restaurant. At their meeting, Wood educated Beeman about the different types of loans available to first time homebuyers with little in the way of income or assets. In particular, Wood introduced Beeman to Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) backed lending, about which he knew nothing. 7 The FHA is an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and the loans it backs are governed by strict HUD regulations designed to promote home-ownership and prevent fraud.

As a loan officer, Wood was familiar with the HUD regulations governing FHA loans. She told Beeman that a qualified buyer could obtain an FHA loan for 100% of the purchase price of the property and that the seller could contribute up to 6% to the purchase price. In addition, Wood explained that the buyer could use gift money from a relative to pay for closing costs. Wood also told Beeman that such a gift would have to be verified by the lender, i.e., Irwin, by means of a gift letter signed by the donor and the buyer and evidence that the gift money had been drawn from the donor’s account.

Wood further explained that, for an FHA loan to be approved, any judgments and collections against the buyer had to be cleared by payment. Finally, Wood told Beeman that, for any given transaction, she could use Irwin’s computer software to generate a “Good Faith Estimate” of the maximum loan amount ²⁷² available, based on the buyer’s income, and to calculate the closing costs. Wood knew that, among other things, HUD regulations prohibit a seller or other interested party to a transaction from playing any role in the buyer’s obtaining a gift and gift letter for the closing costs, verifying a gift letter, furnishing funds for closing, and clearing credit problems for the buyer. She also knew that, if and when an FHA loan goes into default, and the lender ultimately forecloses, federal law requires the lender to convey the property to the FHA, and the FHA then reimburses the lender for most of its losses.

The FHA thus provides insurance to lenders, and so promotes home-ownership for the poor. Wood and Beeman stayed in contact after their initial meeting. Wood furnished Beeman with copies of the blank gift letter form that Irwin was using for FHA loans. In the case of each buyer, at the meeting at Wood’s office, the buyer gave Wood information about his or her income, assets, and credit, and signed a preliminary application for an FHA mortgage, which was filled in by Wood.

Also in each case, the preliminary application stated that closing costs for settlement were to be financed by a “gift.” Precisely what was said and done at the initial meetings between the buyers, Wood, and Beeman was critical to Irwin and Wood’s liability vel non and was hotly contested at trial. Because several of the questions presented on appeal concern the sufficiency of the evidence on the buyers’ claims, and we review those issues by considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the buyers, see John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 378 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), we shall set forth in some detail, and in chronological order by settlement date, each buyer’s testimony about what happened at the initial meeting with Wood, together with other surrounding facts for context. 1) Jerry McFadden: Beeman came to McFadden’s house, asked about his credit, ran a credit report on him, and had him sign several documents. He came back the next day and drove McFadden to see four properties. McFadden liked the ²⁷³ one on North Kresson Street.

Beeman told him the house would probably cost about $50,000, but he was not sure. Beeman also told him not to worry about financing, that he would take care of it. A few days later, Beeman drove McFadden to Wood’s office. McFadden thought Wood worked for Beeman, as his secretary or assistant.

At the meeting, Wood showed McFadden a contract of sale, with his signature, that gave the contract price as $52,000. Wood told him that was the purchase price for the house. McFadden did not know that Beeman owned the property. When the subject of closing costs came up, Wood told Beeman that McFadden would need a gift letter to get the house.

Before the meeting, Beeman had mentioned something about a gift letter. At the end of the meeting, McFadden was asked to sit outside while Wood and Beeman talked. 2) Carl Haley., 8 Beeman drove Haley by the house on 41st Street and later took him inside. Haley did not know that Beeman owned the house. Beeman took him to the initial meeting with Wood.

Haley thought that “they” were lending him money to buy the house. At the meeting, Wood and Beeman told him that the price for the house was $57,000. Before then, based on his conversations with Beeman, he thought the price was $35,000 or $40,000. Wood asked Haley about his employment, income, and credit.

Before the meeting, Beeman had asked Haley if he had a relative with a bank account. Haley said yes, that his niece did. At the meeting, the subject of a gift letter came up, and Beeman told Wood that Haley’s niece was going to give him money. 3) Gertrude Green: Beeman drove Green to the house on North Belnord Street, and she said she liked it. They got back in Beeman’s vehicle and discussed how much she could afford to pay monthly for a mortgage.

Green gave Beeman a figure that coincided with her weekly paycheck. Beeman called Wood from his cell phone. Up until then, Green and ²⁷⁴ Beeman had not discussed the sales price for the house. After the phone call, Beeman said the price was $38,000.

Green did not negotiate with Beeman about the price. She did not know that she needed a loan to buy a house; she thought she could pay for the house monthly, like paying rent. A few days later, Beeman presented Green with some papers, which she signed. Thereafter, Beeman took Green to Wood’s office.

Wood asked Green questions about her income and bank statements. Wood then presented Green with a Good Faith Estimate document that showed the sales price of the house to be $44,000. That is when Green learned the actual sales price for the house. During the meeting with Wood, the subject of a down payment or money for closing costs came up, and Wood asked about a gift letter.

Beeman interrupted, telling Wood, “all of that was taken care of.” Green did not say anything at all about a gift or a gift letter. Nevertheless, the preliminary loan application filled out that day, in Wood’s handwriting, states, “Gift from son to pay for closing and BGE collections.” Green never told Wood that. Green thought that Beeman was the person lending her the money to buy the house. For part of the meeting, Green was asked to leave, and Beeman and Wood met privately. 4) Denise Brower and Forrest Spencer: Beeman took Brower and Spencer to see three properties, including 5601 Force Road.

Before then, Beeman told them that his company, AHOYO, provided people with homes and that he would “walk [them] through every facet of buying a house and that he would take care of just about everything.” Brower signed a contract of sale the day that Beeman showed them the Force Road property. Spencer, who has a learning disability and an 8th grade education, did not remember any discussion of price then. Spencer remembers that later, Beeman said that the house would cost $65,900, and that that was a good price because others in the neighborhood were selling for $75,000 to $80,000. Brower does not remember agreeing to pay $65,900 for the house, but that is what the contract of sale reflects. ²⁷⁵ Spencer did not know that Beeman or his company owned the house on Force Road, and was not sure what Beeman’s exact role was.

Beeman told Brower and Spencer that he knew a loan officer who could help them get money to buy the house. He then drove them to Wood’s office. During the meeting, Wood and Beeman left the room several times; at one point, Bee-man had Brower and Spencer leave the room. Later, when they all were present in the room, Wood asked Brower and Spencer how they intended to pay for closing costs.

They were “a little dumbfounded” and turned to Beeman. Wood and Beeman then said in unison, “a gift letter.” When Wood brought up the subject of a gift letter at the meeting, Brower thought that a gift letter was a “standard practice” when buying a house. Wood presented Brower and Spencer with a Good Faith Estimate document that showed what their monthly mortgage payment would be. 5) Francine Henderson: Beeman took Henderson to see the house on Oldham Street, which she told him she liked. He told her the price for the house was $58,000.

Beeman then drove Henderson to Wood’s office. Wood asked about her debts, credit, and income. Henderson signed a preliminary loan application, but did not fill it out. Before the meeting, Beeman asked Henderson whether there was someone in her family “that had a bank account to give [her] a gift letter.” That was the first time she heard anything about a gift letter.

During the meeting, Wood asked Beeman whether he had the gift letter. Beeman responded that “he would take care of it.” Wood showed Henderson the Good Faith Estimate document reflecting what her monthly mortgage payments would be. Wood did some calculations and said the sales price for the house was “sixty-two thousand.” Wood then looked at Beeman, and he said, “no, sixty-five.” This is when Henderson learned the actual sales price for the house. She did not question Wood or Beeman about it. 6) Eva Elder: On three occasions, Beeman came to Elder’s house and took her to see several properties.

She saw a ²⁷⁶ house that she liked on the last trip, on Piedmont Street. She asked Beeman the sales price, and he said he did not know, that he would have to look in a book he had in his car to find out. He drove her back to her house without telling her the sales price. Later, when he drove Elder to Wood’s office, he showed her a contract of sale that listed the purchase price of the property as $51,000.

At the meeting, Wood did not talk to Elder about money for closing costs. Wood directed herself to Beeman and said, “this too would be a gift.” Elder did not know what that meant. 7) Toyome Stamper: Beeman took Stamper to see the house on Lenhart Street. She told him she wanted to buy it and then signed a contract of sale he furnished. The sales price on the contract was left blank.

Stamper told Beeman she would need a loan to buy the house. When Beeman said he had a loan officer he dealt with, Stamper left it to him to arrange the loan. Stamper did not know that Beeman (or AHOYO) was the owner of the Lenhart Street house. That same day, Beeman drove Stamper to Wood’s office.

Stamper waited in the reception area while Beeman and Wood met. She was then signaled to come into the conference room. Wood introduced herself and asked Stamper questions about her income. Beeman asked questions about her credit.

When Wood presented Stamper with the Good Faith Estimate document, Stamper learned that the sale price for the house was $86,500. Until then, she did not know what the sale price was. Her primary concern was that the monthly mortgage payment would be affordable, and the Good Faith Estimate showed what that payment would be. There was no discussion whatsoever at that meeting about a gift or about closing costs.

Yet, Stamper’s loan application, filled out by Wood, reflected that closing costs would be paid by a gift. 8) Inez Coward: Beeman showed Coward the house on Carroll Street and told her he would sell it to her for $40,000. He presented her with a sales contract and she signed it, but no price was written on it. Beeman then said he would take Coward to a “finance company.” He drove her to Wood’s ²⁷⁷ office. Wood asked her questions about her income and credit.

Coward signed a preliminary loan application, but did not fill it in. Wood asked whether Coward had a bank account; she said yes. Wood then asked whether she had any money. When she said no, Wood said, “there we go a gift again.” On three occasions during the meeting, Wood and Beeman left the room and then returned with documents.

They were discussing Coward’s monthly mortgage payment. Wood said the monthly payment was lower than it might have been, left the room, and then came back and asked Coward whether she thought she could pay more. Each time this happened, “the price went up.” The monthly mortgage payment went from $426 to about $450. Wood presented Coward with a Good Faith Estimate document and gave her a copy of it.

She took it with her. Later, she read it and noticed that the price for the house was $58,000, which was a “jump” from the $40,000 Beeman had said it was. Coward called Beeman about the “jump.” He told her the price for the house had gone up because she had no money and so she had to pay extra “fees.” In every case, sometime after the meeting with Wood, Beeman asked the buyer to designate a person who had a bank account who could be the “donor” of a gift that would be used for closing costs. Once the buyer had designated a “donor,” Beeman filled out one of the form “gift letters” furnished by Wood, giving the names of the buyer and the “donor,” their relationship, and the amount of the gift.

Bee-man then presented the “gift letter” to the buyer and the “donor” to sign. Once that was done, Beeman arranged to meet the “donor,” sometimes alone and sometimes with the buyer present, at the “donor’s” bank or credit union. Beeman arrived with cash, often stuffed in suitcases, in an amount equal to the “gift.” He gave the cash to the “donor” to deposit in the “donor’s” account. With Beeman standing watch, the “donor” then obtained a certified check for that amount, payable to the buyer, and handed it over to Beeman. ²⁷⁸ If a buyer questioned Beeman about the gift transaction, Beeman explained that this method of operation was necessary to provide the closing costs for the sale and that it was the usual way things were done.

The buyers all understood that their “donors” were not really making gifts; rather, the money was coming from Beeman. From what Beeman told them, however, the buyers thought the “gift letter” process was a standard part of the process for buying a house. Some of the buyers testified that Wood’s raising the “gift” transaction in the initial meeting led them to think it was a legitimate practice, if Beeman had not already raised it with them, or confirmed their thinking that it was a legitimate practice, if Beeman already had brought it up. All of the buyers testified that they did not know that the “gift” process used in their transaction was illegal and, had they known, they would not have participated in it.

In several cases, Beeman assisted buyers in correcting their credit problems so they could be approved for the FHA loans. Wood forwarded confidential credit reports of the buyers to Beeman so he could clear up credit problems that would have prevented approval of their loans. Wood did that even though Beeman, under FHA regulations, should not have been provided the reports. 9 To obtain an FHA loan to purchase property, the next step was to have the property appraised pursuant to FHA guidelines, which require that an FHA-approved appraiser inspect it, and that the appraised value reflect at least the purchase price on which the loan is being extended. For each of the eight transactions in this case, Irwin and Wood selected Hoffman to perform the property appraisal.

For many years, Hoffman had been employed by Irwin as an appraiser. Not long before the transactions at issue, his status was changed ²⁷⁹ from employee to independent contractor. He still received 99% of his income from Irwin, however. In the transactions in this case, Hoffman was paid $300 per appraisal.

In each appraisal except one, he valued the property for precisely the price on the sales contract. In the one exception, he valued the property $500 above the contract price. We shall discuss particular facts pertinent to the appraisals and to Hoffman in our discussion of the issues. In 1998, Hoffman destroyed all the files for the eight transactions in this case.

In each case, the buyer testified that the property was in poor condition when Beeman showed it to him or her, but that Beeman promised that his workers would make repairs and that the property would be in good condition by settlement time. Thus, the buyers expected that their properties would be attractive and habitable. In most cases, the buyer brought up the topic of an inspection. Beeman responded either by saying that, because the buyer had no money, Beeman would pay for an inspection, or by saying that an inspection was not necessary because the FHA was going to have the house inspected before it extended the loan.

Also in most of the cases, on the day of settlement, there was a brief “walk through” that the buyer attended with Beeman. Usually, there were workers present in the house, making repairs of a cosmetic nature. Beeman drove each buyer to the closing, which was held at a lawyer’s office. No one from Irwin attended the settlement.

Beeman brought with him the cashier’s check representing the buyer’s “gift money,” which was used to pay the closing costs necessary to effectuate the transaction. As the sellers, the Beemans and AHOYO received a check for the amount of the profit on the sale. All of the buyers testified that soon after moving into their properties, they experienced serious problems. The problems ranged from complete lack of heat, to ceilings caving in, to faulty plumbing, to non-functional appliances, to rodent and insect infestation.

When they attempted to contact Beeman, ²⁸⁰ he either did not respond, or sent workers to make slight repairs, and then would not respond. One buyer never moved into her property because it was uninhabitable; the property ultimately was foreclosed on. Five other buyers moved into their properties but then lost them to foreclosure. Three of the buyers kept their properties despite their poor conditions, and still were occupying them at the time of trial.

We -will recite additional facts as necessary to our discussion of the issues. DISCUSSION Appeal Issues I. Denial of Motion for Removal The buyers filed suit against all of the defendants in August 1998. Their amended complaint, the operative pleading in the case, was filed on March 22,1999. On August 13, 2001, four months after his motion for summary judgment on liability was denied and two days before a scheduled pre-trial conference, at which a trial date was to be selected, Hoffman filed a Rule 2-505(a) motion to remove the case on the ground that he could not receive a fair trial in Baltimore City or any contiguous county.

In a supporting affidavit, Hoffman alleged that, beginning on February 4, 1998, and until shortly before the motion was filed, the Baltimore Sun published no fewer than 39 articles or editorials on the practice of property “flipping” in Baltimore City. According to Hoffman, most of the articles commented on the role of appraisers in the practice of “flipping,” portraying them as dishonest and their appraisals as overblown and misleading, while depicting the purchasers and lenders involved in the transactions as innocent victims. Hoffman attached to his affidavit 25 of the Baltimore Sun articles or editorials that he claimed were prejudicial to him. The two ²⁸¹ earliest were published on February 4 and 12, 1998; thirteen were published between August 1, 1999, and December 16, 1999; five were published in 2000; and four were published in 2001, with the most recent article dated July 28, 2001.

Hoffman listed the other 16 articles, all of which were published in 2000 and 2001, by title and date. Hoffman also attached a videotape of a two-night investigative feature story about “flipping” that aired on Channel 18. It included a segment in which the lawyer for the buyers in this case characterized the real estate appraisals performed in “flipping” situations as “outright fraudfs].” Hoffman further attested that, in 1999, “flipping” was the subject of coverage on a local radio show and another local television news report. Based on all of this, Hoffman complained that the extensive media coverage made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial: Real estate appraisers in flipping cases have already been tried and convicted in the press.

One Baltimore Sun editorial calls for the criminal prosecution of these appraisers. One appraiser has been convicted and is now in prison.... The media coverage I have described is wide spread and has saturated the entire Baltimore metropolitan area. The entire potential pool of jurors has been exposed to this highly prejudicial and judgmental coverage.

As a result, I cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in Baltimore City, nor in the counties contiguous to Baltimore City. Hoffman did not request a hearing on his motion. Two days after the motion was filed, and before any response was submitted, the circuit court denied the motion in a one paragraph order stating that the court found no reasonable ground to believe Hoffman’s allegation that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Baltimore City. On appeal, Hoffman contends the court erred in denying his motion for removal.

He argues that the newspaper articles and editorials about “flipping” and the television coverage of the subject, particularly the two-night investigative report on Channel 13, established reasonable ground to believe his alie ²⁸² gation that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Baltimore City or the contiguous counties; and that the court erred in finding otherwise. He further argues that under Rule 2-505, because his motion was accompanied by an affidavit alleging that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in the county in which the action was pending, and because the court properly should have found reasonable ground to believe the allegation, removal was required. 10 Finally, Hoffman argues that the jury’s award of punitive damages against the Beemans and AHOYO in twice the amount the buyers’ lawyer requested in closing argument, in addition to what Hoffman characterizes as an excessive award for non-economic damages against all the defendants, reveals an outraged jury that must have been infected by bias before the trial even started. The right of removal is guaranteed to the citizens of Maryland by Article IV of the state constitution. The pertinent provision states: In all ... cases of presentment or indictment [other than capital cases],[ 11 ] and in all suits or actions at law ... pending in any of the courts of law in this State which have jurisdiction over the cause or case, in addition to the suggestion in writing of either of the parties to the cause or case that the party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court in which the cause or case may be pending, it shall be necessary for the party making the suggestion to make it satisfactorily appear to the court that the suggestion is true, or that there is reasonable ground for the same; and thereupon the court shall order and direct the record of the proceedings in the cause or case to be transmitted to some ²⁸³ other court, having jurisdiction in the cause or case, for trial....

Md. Const, art. IV, § 8(c). The purpose and intent of the removal provisions of the Maryland Constitution, including the provision quoted above, is “ ‘to get rid of the influence of local prejudice in the community from which the jury to try the case w[ill] come, and thus, as far as practicable, to secure a fair and impartial trial by jury.’ ” Redman v. State, 363 Md. 298, 323 , 768 A.2d 656 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 860 , 122 S.Ct. 140 , 151 L.Ed.2d 92 (2001), reh’g denied, 535 U.S. 966 , 122 S.Ct. 1387 , 152 L.Ed.2d 376 (2002) (quoting Greenberg v. Dunn, 245 Md. 651, 654-55 , 227 A.2d 242 (1967)). Because the right of removal is fundamental, the constitutional provision and implementing rules, criminal and civil, must be liberally construed in favor of the right.

Greenberg, supra, 245 Md. at 657 , 227 A.2d 242 . Rule 2-505 implements the right of removal in civil actions at law. 12 It states, in relevant part: (a) Grounds. (1) Prejudice. In any action that is subject to removal ... any party may lile a motion for removal accompanied by an affidavit alleging that the party cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in the county in which the action is pending.

If the court finds that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the allegation is correct, it shall order that the action be removed for trial to a court of another county. “The right of removal ... entitles a party to have a case removed to a court in another jurisdiction if the party can demonstrate that a fair and impartial trial is impossible in the court where the action was initially brought.” Smith v. Pearre, 96 Md.App. 376, 383 , 625 A.2d 349 (1993) (citing ²⁸⁴ Ezersky, supra, 40 Md.App. at 715, 394 A.2d 1225 ); see also Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 675 , 831 A.2d 432 (2003). “If the condition for removal is satisfied, there is no discretion to deny the request.” Lennox v. Mull, 89 Md.App. 555, 560 , 598 A.2d 847 (1991). Thus, once a showing has been made of reasonable ground to believe the party cannot receive a fair and impartial trial, the court lacks discretion over whether to remove the case; the court does have discretion, however, over where to remove the case. Smith, supra, 96 Md.App. at 385 n. 4, 625 A.2d 349 . The threshold question for the circuit court on a motion for removal — whether there is reasonable ground to believe the allegation that the moving party cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in the county in which the action is pending — is a mixed question of law and fact concerning a constitutional right.

Accordingly, on appeal, we review that threshold determination de novo. See Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220-21 , 792 A.2d 1160 (2002) (reviewing de novo the judgment of the trial court on a motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial); Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310 , 765 A.2d 97 (2001) (holding that whether the defendant’s confession was voluntary was a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282 , 753 A.2d 519 (2000) (reviewing de novo the mixed question of law and fact of whether statements made by a suspect following a traffic stop should be suppressed because they were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Johnson v. State, 142 Md.App. 172, 183 , 788 A.2d 678 (2002) (holding that the question of whether the police had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo). The implementing rule for removal in non-capital criminal cases, Rule 4-254(b)(2), is substantively identical to Rule 2-505. This Court has held, in the context of Rule 4-252(b)(2), that the party seeking removal bears the burden to show that he has been prejudiced by adverse publicity and that the voir dire examination available to him will not be ²⁸⁵ adequate to assure him a fair and impartial trial by jury.

Simms v. State, 49 Md.App. 515, 518 , 433 A.2d 1199 (1981); Waine v. State, 37 Md.App. 222, 227 , 377 A.2d 509 (1977); Mason v. State, 12 Md.App. 655, 678 , 280 A.2d 753 , cert. denied, 263 Md. 717 (1971). Our interpretation of Rule 2-505 is likewise. Returning to this case, to be sure, the documents submitted by Hoffman in support of his motion for removal showed that, in the months and years before the trial, there was widespread media coverage of the fraudulent practice of property “flipping,” including coverage of the fraudulent acts perpetrated by appraisers who participated in “flipping” schemes. Yet, none of the articles or other media reports about “flipping” that Hoffman furnished the court in support of his motion drew a connection between the facts being reported and him, or this case.

Indeed, the articles and other media reports did not concern the allegations in this case and did not mention Hoffman’s name. They addressed “flipping” only in general terms. Hoffman’s assertion below, repeated in this Court, was to the effect that the general adverse media attention about appraisers committing fraud in “flipping” schemes in Baltimore City was so pervasive in the time period leading up to trial that no appraiser could receive a fair and impartial trial in that jurisdiction; and so, as an appraiser, he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Baltimore City, and was entitled to have the case removed. This assertion, and the proof offered by Hoffman to support it, clearly falls short of the standard requiring removal under Rule 2-505.

The standard is a particularized one: the party seeking removal must allege, by affidavit, facts showing personal prejudice, i.e., that “that party” cannot receive a fair and impartial trial. General, non-identifying media coverage about a type of wrongdoing that is not connected to the party seeking removal, except that it concerns the same type of wrongdoing he is accused of, is not, in and of ²⁸⁶ itself, reasonable ground to believe that that party, in particular, cannot receive a fair and impartial trial. The right of removal rule derives from and protects the right to a fair and impartial jury for a party who by pervasive adverse media attention about the allegations against him has been tried and convicted in the press, so that the panels of potential jurors from the jurisdiction are likely to have prejudged the facts in his case. See Stouffer v. State, 118 Md.App. 590, 631-32 , 703 A.2d 861 (1997), affd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207 (1998) (affirming the denial of a suggestion of removal when the defendant failed to produce evidence that any juror was prejudiced by information he or she had gathered from the news coverage of the case); Smith, supra, 96 Md.App. at 387 , 625 A.2d 349 (commenting that “[t]he media coverage of the case did not, apparently, intrude on the life of every Frederick County citizen so as to preclude the possibility of selecting an impartial jury”).

The danger the removal right seeks to avert — individual jurors being so tainted by the media coverage of the particular case that they already have decided the party’s legal fate based on the media-generated facts, and therefore will not decide it based on the facts put in evidence — is not implicated by general media coverage about a type of wrongdoing. Such coverage at most conveys the general notion that people who in fact commit certain wrongs are bad people; it does not prejudge the particular factual allegations against a party in a given case, or even suggest that a person merely accused of wrongdoing must be found liable or guilty. If that were the case, all murder defendants in Baltimore City would be entitled to have their cases removed on the ground that there is pervasive adverse media publicity in that jurisdiction about murderers; and therefore there is reason to believe that, as accused murderers, they cannot receive fair and impartial trials. That plainly is not a sufficient basis for removal.

Even in cases in which there has been media coverage of a particular crime, the fact of such coverage, standing alone, ²⁸⁷ is not sufficient to demonstrate a reason to believe the defendant on trial for the crime will not receive a fair and impartial trial. The defendant in such a circumstance must show not only that there has been publicity about his case but also that there is reason to believe the publicity about him will prejudice his rights. Waine, supra, 37 Md.App. at 227 , 377 A.2d 509 ; Cleveland v. State, 12 Md.App. 712, 716-17 , 280 A.2d 520 (1971). Here, Hoffman did not even show that the publicity in question was about him, let alone that it was prejudicial to him.

The voir dire process, not removal, serves the function of eliminating from the venire pool potential jurors who carry with them general prejudices, including prejudices that are a product of media coverage about crime and about civil wrongdoing in general. See Smith, supra, 96 Md.App. at 386 , 625 A.2d 349 (“Because the purpose of removal is to eradicate local prejudice from the jury, voir dire may be used to weed out prospective jurors who are subject to such prejudice.”). Hoffman offered nothing in support of his motion for removal to show that the voir dire process could not be used to address the general prejudices he thought might affect potential jurors, and he offers no argument on appeal that the voir dire process was not effective in doing so. Finally, there is no merit in Hoffman’s after-the-fact argument that the amounts of the punitive damages award against Beeman and AHOYO and the non-economic damages award against him and Irwin and Wood reveal such prejudice against him that it is clear that the circuit court erred by not removing the case from Baltimore City.

Such circular reasoning was rejected by the Court of Appeals in Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 525 , 682 A.2d 1143 (1996), in which the Court concluded that verdicts against the defendants in the case were not proof that defendants were prejudiced by the trial court’s instructions to the jury. We find no fault with the circuit court’s determination that Hoffman did not demonstrate reason to believe that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Baltimore City. ²⁸⁸ II. Denials of Motions for Judgment and for JNOV on Liability Issues At the close of the buyers’ case-in-chief, the appellants and the other defendants all moved for judgment on various grounds as to the claims in the amended complaint and punitive damages. The trial court denied the motions, except that it deferred its decision on punitive damages until the close of all the evidence.

At the close of all the evidence, the motions were renewed. After hearing lengthy argument, the court denied the motions for judgment as to the three claims but granted Irwin, Wood, and Hoffman’s motions respecting punitive damages. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the buyers, and after a separate punitive damages proceeding against the Beemans and AHOYO, the appellants and the other defendants all filed motions for JNOV. The buyers filed oppositions, and the court held a hearing.

On May 13, 2002, the court issued a 39-page memorandum opinion denying the JNOV motions. In a civil jury trial, if there is any evidence adduced, however slight, from which reasonable jurors could find in favor of the plaintiff on the claims presented, the trial court should deny the defendant’s motion for judgment at the close of the evidence and submit the claims to the jury for decision. See Md. Rule 2-519. It is a question of law whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to make his claim a jury issue.

Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 209-10 , 783 A.2d 194 (2001); Glover v. State, supra, 143 Md.App. at 321, 794 A.2d 735 . In deciding this question, the trial court should view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Md. Rule 2-519(b); see also Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 155 , 816 A.2d 930 (2003).

When a party’s motion for judgment is denied at the close of all the evidence, he may move for JNOV on the same grounds advanced in support of the earlier motion. See Md. Rule 2- ²⁸⁹ 532. The trial court must decide the JNOV motion using the same analysis as if it were a motion for judgment made at the close of all the evidence. See Jacobs v. Flynn, 131 Md.App. 342, 353-54 , 749 A.2d 174 (2000); Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Mgmt.

Co., 86 Md.App. 533, 552 , 587 A.2d 569 (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 326 Md. 663 , 607 A.2d 8 (1992). Thus, for purposes of appellate review, the issues of whether the trial court erred in denying motions for judgment and motions for JNOV are identical. See Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker, 152 Md.App. 166, 176 , 831 A.2d 481 (2003); Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Kirson, 128 Md.App. 533, 542 , 739 A.2d 875 (1999). Because they are questions of law, we review them de novo.

Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 473 , 805 A.2d 372 (2002). A. Civil Conspiracy to Defraud A civil conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons by an agreement or understanding to accomplish an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal with the further requirement that the act or the means employed must result in damages to the plaintiff.” Van Royen v. Lacey, 262 Md. 94, 97-98 , 277 A.2d 13 (1971) (commenting that for a civil conspiracy to be actionable there must be a confederation of two or more people, some unlawful act done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and actual legal damage resulting to the victim-plaintiff); Robb v. Wancowicz, 119 Md.App. 531, 546 , 705 A.2d 125 , cert. denied, 350 Md. 278 , 711 A.2d 869 (1998); Yousef v. Trustbank Savings, F.S.B., 81 Md.App. 527, 538 , 568 A.2d 1134 (1990). Conspiracy is not a separate tort capable of independently supporting an award of damages, absent other tortious injury to the plaintiff. Alleco, Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Inc., 340 Md. 176, 189 , 665 A.2d 1038 (1995); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Associates, Inc., 336 Md. 635 , 645 n. 8, 650 A.2d 260 (1994); NRT Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Innovative Properties, Inc., 144 ²⁹⁰ Md.App. 263, 287, 797 A.2d 824 (2002). “ ‘[A]n act which, if done alone, constitutes no ground of action on the case, cannot be made the ground of action by alleging it to have been done by and through a conspiracy of several.’ ” Alexander & Alexander, supra, 336 Md. at 645 n. 8, 650 A.2d 260 (quoting Kimball v. Harman and Burch, 34 Md. 407, 410-11 (1871)).

The principles controlling the admission of evidence to prove a criminal conspiracy and a civil conspiracy are the same, although the quantum of proof is different. Larche v. Car Wholesalers, Inc., 80 Md.App. 322, 330 , 562 A.2d 1305 (1989). To prove the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, it is enough to show that the conspirators came to a tacit understanding about the unlawful purpose; it is not necessary to show that they reached a formal agreement. Acquah v. State, 113 Md.App. 29, 50 , 686 A.2d 690 (1996) (citing Quaglione v. State, 15 Md.App. 571, 579 , 292 A.2d 785 (1972)).

The existence of a conspiracy may be shown circumstantially, “by inferences drawn from the nature of the acts complained of, the individual and collective interests of the alleged conspirators, the situation and relations of the parties, their motives and all surrounding circumstances preceding and attending the culmination of the common design.” Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 292 , 286 A.2d 95 (1972); Vandegrift v. State, 82 Md.App. 617, 640 , 573 A.2d 56 (1990) (holding that evidence to prove a conspiracy need only be such that reasonable jurors could infer that the parties entered into an unlawful agreement). “The concurrence of action by the co-conspirators on a material point is sufficient to allow the jury to presume the concurrence of sentiment and, therefore, the existence of a conspiracy.” Hill v. State, 231 Md. 458, 461 , 190 A.2d 795 , cert. denied, 375 U.S. 861 , 84 S.Ct. 127 , 11 L.Ed.2d 88 (1963); see also Acquah, supra, 113 Md.App. at 50 , 686 A.2d 690 . Once a conspiratorial agreement has been proven, “any act done by one of the conspirators is in legal contemplation the act of all.” Western Maryland Dairy, Inc. v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 243 , 23 A.2d 660 (1942). Accordingly, “ ‘[w]hen the mischief contemplated is accomplished, the ²⁹¹ conspiracy becomes important, as it may affect the means and measure of redress. The party wronged may look beyond the actual participants in committing the injury, and join with them as defendants all who conspired to accomplish it[.]’ ” A civil conspiracy to defraud “is the confederation of two or more persons to cheat and defraud, when the design has actually been executed,” thus harming the victim.

Checket-Columbia Co. v. Lipman, 201 Md. 494, 502 , 94 A.2d 433 (1953). See also Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 461 , 62 A.2d 354 (1948); Rent-a-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 Md. 249, 260 , 156 A. 847 (1931). A defendant who has entered into an agreement to defraud a plaintiff, with resulting actual damage, is liable to the defrauded plaintiff “irrespective of the degree of [that defendant’s] activity in the fraudulent transaction or whether he shared in the profits of the scheme.” Etgen v. Washington County Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 184 Md. 412, 418 , 41 A.2d 290 (1945).

Because fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, a civil conspiracy to defraud likewise must be proven by that standard. (i) Irwin and Wood Irwin and Wood offer two arguments to support their contention that the trial court erred in denying their motions for judgment and JNOV on conspiracy to defraud. In their first argument, Irwin and Wood assert that a jury instruction the trial court gave about “willful blindness” had the effect of telling the jurors they could find that Wood (and hence Irwin) entered into a conspiratorial agreement with Beeman based solely on a finding that Wood knew about Beeman’s fraudulent practices — without evidence of any conduct by Wood to support an inference that she entered into such an agreement. The buyers respond that the jury instruction had no such effect. ²⁹² Irwin and Wood’s second argument is tied into their first.

Operating on the premise that the jurors were in effect instructed that they could infer, from a finding that Wood had actual knowledge, based on “willful blindness,” of Beeman’s fraudulent acts, that Wood and Beeman had entered into an agreement to defraud the buyers, they argue that there was no evidence other than such an inference to support a finding of a conspiracy, and therefore the evidence could not sustain a finding that they were part of a conspiracy, as a matter of law. They maintain that the evidence about Wood’s conduct merely showed that she engaged in the ordinary business tasks of a loan officer. The buyers respond that there was evidence of conduct by Wood to support the jury’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that she entered into a conspiratorial agreement with Beeman. The Court of Appeals has recognized that willful refusal to know a fact, i.e., “willful blindness” to a fact, is the equivalent of actual knowledge of that fact.

Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 337 Md. 216 , 235 n. 10, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995); OwensIllinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 462 n. 23, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). See also State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458-61 , 583 A.2d 250 (1991) (Chasanow, J., concurring) (observing that “knowledge exists where a person believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth”). The trial court in this case instructed the jury about “willful blindness” as follows: Now, in determining whether someone had knowledge of something you may look at all the evidence in the case and use your own common sense in determining whether that person really knew what was going on. You may draw reasonable inferences from facts but you must take care to avoid guess work or speculation.

You may consider the willful and knowing violation of a known duty as evidence of such knowledge. You may also consider whether the person involved willfully refused or deliberately refused to look at the facts in the face of obvious facts because ²⁹³ such willful refusal to know in the face of obvious facts may be deemed knowledge. If you fínd that a person was willfully blind or made a conscience [sic] effort not to know something than [sic] you may determine under all the facts in the case that the person actually knew it. (Emphasis added.) The instruction was not objected to by any party.

Irwin and Wood’s first argument about conspiracy to defraud is a thinly disguised effort to challenge on appeal the “willful blindness” instruction, even though, not having been objected to, it is not properly subject to appellate review. Md. Rule 4-825(e); Bowman v. State, 337 Md. 65, 67 , 650 A.2d 954 (1994). In any event, the “willful blindness” instruction, given as one of a series of preliminary instructions, simply informed the jurors of the legal concept of actual knowledge based on “willful blindness.” It did not tell the jurors that a finding, based on “willful blindness,” that Wood had actual knowledge of Beeman’s fraudulent acts, could in and of itself support a further finding that Wood had entered into an agreement with Beeman to defraud the buyers. Indeed, the trial court gave the jurors a separate instruction about conspiracy to defraud, stating: To prove there is a civil conspiracy to commit fraud it must be shown that there was, in fact, an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish fraud and that such fraud resulted in damage to the Plaintiffs....

The existence of a conspiracy may be shown by inference drawn from the nature of the acts complained of, the individual and collective interests of the alleged co-conspirators or conspirators, the situation and relationship of the parties, their motives and all the surrounding circumstances preceding and attending the culmination of a common design. The Plaintiff — each Plaintiff must, however prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was an actual agreement between two or more Defendants as well as intentional conduct of some kind by each such Defendant as a result of the agreement. An agreement plus an act in furtherance of it.... The evidence must show from the Defendant’s ²⁹⁴ own acts or statement that he or she was a willing participant.

Once it’s determined from the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that the Defendant that you’re considering was one of the members then all of the acts and statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy and any during the — and during the existence of the conspiracy can be considered by you as evidence against all others of co-conspirators even though the statements and acts may have occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of the Defendant. (Emphasis added.) This instruction, which also was not objected to, properly explained the concept of a civil conspiracy, including that the buyers were required to show “an actual agreement [to defraud] between two or more Defendants.” For the same reasons, the premise to Irwin and Wood’s second argument is faulty. In addition, we agree with the buyers that there was ample evidence of conduct by Wood from which jurors reasonably could infer that Wood and Beeman entered into a conspiratorial agreement to defraud the buyers into purchasing and financing the properties at inflated prices. To be sure, Wood testified that she merely was following an innocuous business routine in her every action in the relevant transactions: that by taking applications for FHA loans and processing them for potential buyers, she did nothing out of the ordinary and nothing that could not be explained by customary business practices.

The jurors could have chosen to credit Wood’s testimony, interpreting her actions innocently and disregarding the evidence that supported inferences that she was acting in step with Beeman. See State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 534 , 823 A.2d 664 (2003); Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 281 , 619 A.2d 111 (1993); Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md.App. 167, 197 , 655 A.2d 1292 (1995) (observing that jurors are entitled to weigh the evidence, make credibility assessments, and accept all, some, or none of any given witness’s testimony). On a sufficiency review, however, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that could be drawn ²⁹⁵ from the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, which, in this case, means most favorable to the buyers. Viewed in that light, the evidence showed that, at their initial lunch meeting, in early 1997, Wood taught Beeman the “ins and outs” of FHA lending.

Wood knew then that Bee-man was an investor whose business was buying and then selling residential properties; but that, in seeking out a lender such as herself, he was to some extent involving himself in the borrowing side of the transaction, which concerns the buyer. Wood also knew that, as the seller in a transaction, Beeman would be prohibited by FHA regulations from obtaining gifts or gift letters for buyer/borrowers. She nevertheless explained to him the process Irwin used for verifying gifts, and gave him blank gift letter forms. The jury reasonably could infer that, from the very outset of their relationship, Wood expected Beeman to have some sort of involvement in arranging gifts for buyers, if only to give them gift forms to use.

According to the evidence, the eight transactions at issue took place not long after Beeman and Wood established their relationship, and all within a six-month period. In each case, Beeman referred the financing transaction to Wood at a point in time after he had created the false impression for each buyer — by words and conduct — that he was representing the buyer in the purchase transaction, and was looking out for the buyer’s interests. At the initial meetings with Wood, notwithstanding her knowledge that Beeman was the seller in the transactions, Wood treated Beeman as if he were representing the buyers, by directing questions to him that properly should have been posed to the buyers and by accepting his answers on their behalves. This conduct ran contrary to the knowledge Wood had, as an experienced mortgage lender, about the role of the seller and lender vis-a-vis the buyer in such transactions.

Wood’s actions during the initial meetings were such as to validate the impression that Beeman’s role in the transactions was as the buyer’s representative. Reasonable jurors could find that Wood’s conduct was not merely coincidental to ²⁹⁶ Beeman’s pre-meeting conduct; rather, that Wood knew, before each initial meeting, that Beeman had led the buyer to think he was representing him (or her) and that, during the meeting, she was actively participating in that charade. In all the transactions, Wood either knew from the documents or from Beeman’s remarks in the initial meeting that the sales prices for the properties had not been established, were not clear, or were being changed. She participated in generating Good Faith Estimate documents showing monthly loan payment amounts calculated based on income, not on loans based on sales prices.

In some of the transactions, Wood watched as Beeman, in the guise of acting on the buyers’ behalves, used the Good Faith Estimates to persuade them to agree to sales prices that were not based on value. She tacitly gave credence to that method of establishing a sales price. In other of the transactions, Wood actively involved herself in using the Good Faith Estimates to generate or increase a contract price, performing calculations and conversing with Beeman to arrive at a price. Reasonable jurors could infer from this evidence and the evidence that Wood was experienced in and knowledgeable about real estate sales and mortgage financing; that she knew Beeman was using the Good Faith Estimates to generate inflated sale prices; that she was participating in a pretense designed to lend legitimacy to that practice; and that she was allowing Irwin’s computer system to be used as a tool for Beeman to perpetuate a false impression about his role in the transaction and about sales pricing for consumer realty.

The evidence showed that Wood was familiar with the FHA regulations that prohibited Beeman from having any involvement in arranging gifts for sellers to use for closing or other costs in the transactions and any involvement in clearing buyers’ credit problems. The evidence also showed, however, that Wood routinely listed “gift” as the source of funds needed for closing, even when she did not have information from the buyers from which to know that. This evidence raised a reasonable inference that Beeman was communicating directly with Wood about gifts and gift letters in these transactions. ²⁹⁷ In the initial meeting with Brower and Spencer, Wood and Beernan announced, in unison, that the problem of closing costs would be taken care of by “a gift letter” — without the buyers’ participating in the discussion. Likewise, in the initial meeting with Inez Coward, Wood remarked, “there we go a gift again.” These comments by Wood were fraught with meaning.

They disclosed her understanding of what was taking place, as a matter of routine, in all the Beernan sales: that, regardless of the individual circumstances of the buyers, including their lack of financial resources, they were managing to come up with substantial gift money to enable them to consummate their purchases. From the evidence of that understanding and the evidence of Wood’s conduct in educating Beernan about gifts and gift letters and furnishing him gift letter forms, reasonable jurors could infer that Wood knew all along that Beernan was arranging or in some manner facilitating the “gifts” necessary to make the transactions happen, in violation of federal law. Likewise, from the evidence that Wood furnished Beernan with information about the credit problems some of the buyers faced as obstacles to completing their transactions, reasonable jurors could find that Wood knew Beernan was playing a role in removing those obstacles, also in violation of federal law. The jury had before it direct evidence of an established relationship between Wood and Beernan; of Beeman’s deceptive conduct in roping the buyers into thinking he was advancing their interests when in fact he was positioning them to purchase dilapidated housing at inflated prices; that, in many of the initial meetings, Wood and Beernan spoke privately, and that, in all of the meetings, Wood treated the buyers as Beernan did; and that Wood and Hoffman, also an actor in all the transactions, had a long-standing relationship.

Not unlike many conspiracy cases, there was no direct evidence in this case of an agreement between Wood and Beernan to defraud the buyers. Yet, there was compelling circumstantial evidence that Wood was acting in step with Beernan in creating the impression for the buyers that what was false was true; and in enabling him to violate federal laws ²⁹⁸ to consummate the transactions, not because her innocent business routines happened to suit Beeman’s scheme, but because she was part of the scheme and was acting in aid of its execution. Reasonable jurors could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Wood’s behavior in the initial meetings with the buyers and in her interactions with Beeman only could be sensibly explained by her having reached an understanding with Beeman to use the meetings to deceive the buyers into agreeing to inflated sales prices and to misuse and violate the FHA mortgage financing process to accomplish closings in the buyers’ transactions, when closings otherwise would not come to fruition (and profits therefore would not materialize). The evidence of Wood’s conduct thus was sufficient to prove that Beeman and Wood (and hence Irwin) had entered into a conspiracy to defraud the buyers.

(ii) Hoffman Hoffman contends the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment and JNOV on the issue of conspiracy because there was not “a shred of evidence” to show he had entered into an agreement with Beeman to defraud the buyers. He maintains that, at most, the evidence established that in two of his eight appraisals — those for the 1127 Carroll Street and 5601 Force Road properties — Beeman gave him information about recent home sales in the neighborhoods that he then used as comparable sales for valuing the properties; and, as all the appraiser experts who testified at trial opined, it is an accepted practice in the appraising industry to use comparable sales as the basis for an opinion about a property’s value. Hoffman maintains that he simply performed his appraisals at Irwin’s request, with his $300 per appraisal fee in no way depending on the outcome of the appraisal, and that his limited contacts with Beeman and well-defined role with Irwin could not support a finding that there was a “meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement.” He adds that the ²⁹⁹ evidence that in 1998 he discarded his files in these eight transactions was insufficient, in and of itself, to show that he had entered into a conspiratorial agreement. The buyers respond that there was evidence that Hoffman participated in Beeman’s fraudulent scheme; and that the jurors reasonably could have inferred from that conduct that Hoffman had reached an understanding with Beeman to perpetrate the fraud.

They maintain that the adverse inference that permissibly could be drawn from Hoffman’s destruction of his records was in addition to the affirmative evidence showing that he had entered into a conspiratorial agreement. Again, in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence contention, we consider the evidence adduced in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Todd, supra, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d 930 . The evidence showed that for the Force Road property, Hoffman could not find any comparable sales in the immediate neighborhood to justify the $65,900 sales price.

He resorted to using two comparable sales outside the immediate neighborhood and a comparable sale that he obtained from Beeman, of another Beeman property. The prior Beeman comparable was of a house that Beeman had purchased for $23,200 and then sold six weeks later for $75,000, in a transaction financed by a sub-prime lender. The transaction in that comparable sale had taken place within the prior year — but Hoffman’s appraisal omitted that fact, representing, instead, that for that comparable sale there were “no other recent sales (none within 1 year).” For the Force Road property itself, even though Hoffman knew that Beeman had purchased the property for $24,000 only 20 days prior, Hoffman stated in his appraisal that there had been “no other recent sales.” Likewise for the Carroll Street property, Hoffman could not find any comparable sales in the immediate neighborhood to support the sale price of $58,000. He resorted to using three comparable sales furnished by Beeman.

Two were prior sales by Beeman himself, and one was a prior sale by a business associate of Beeman. The properties all had been bought by Beeman (or his associate) in the prior year and quickly resold at huge profits. Yet, Hoffman falsely represented with re ³⁰⁰ spect to those properties that there had been “no other recent sales (none -within 1 year).” For the Carroll Street property itself, Hoffman stated, “Last Sale Unknown,” even though the evidence showed he knew that Beeman had recently purchased the property for $7,500. The evidence respecting these properties showed that when Hoffman could not justify contract sales prices by using comparable sales figures in the immediate neighborhoods, he went to Beeman and used information furnished by Beeman to justify the prices.

Hoffman knew from the information at his disposal that, if the sales went through at the contract sales prices, they would result in huge profits to Beeman. Using information from Beeman, Hoffman fashioned the appraisal reports so as not to disclose that Beeman was the source of the data used to justify the contract sales prices and to conceal that the information in fact was tainted and unreliable. The evidence that Hoffman acted together with Beeman to craft misleading and inaccurate appraisals to justify inflated sales prices supported a reasonable inference that Hoffman was participating in a scheme with Beeman to trick the buyers into purchasing the properties at inflated prices. From the evidence that Hoffman was acting together with Beeman in carrying out the scheme to defraud, the jurors reasonably could conclude that Hoffman had entered into an agreement with Beeman and Wood to perpetrate the scheme.

Other evidence lent further support to that conclusion. Hoffman’s appraisal of the Lenhart Street property stated that the house was built on a slab, despite the obvious presence of a crawl space. As it turned out, the crawl space was filled with standing water, a condition that, if disclosed, would have precluded FHA financing, and thus derailed settlement. In appraising the 41st Street property, which was a rowhouse, Hoffman used a comparable sale of a single family house in a neighborhood that was not nearby, and did not use comparable sales of rowhouses in the immediate neighborhood that would not have supported the contract sales price.

For the Oldham Street property, Hoffman used a comparable sale of a house built 40 years after the subject property, and that ³⁰¹ was located on the other side of the tunnel thruway. Hoffman acknowledged in his own testimony that his estimations of the distances between the subject properties and comparable properties in this case were inaccurate about 60% of the time. The buyers’ expert witness in the field of home appraisals testified at length about the misleading entries in Hoffman’s appraisals and that the values Hoffman arrived at for five of the eight properties greatly exceeded even the highest possible value ranges. Hoffman’s interactions with Beeman in performing these appraisals, quite apart from his later destruction of the pertinent records, supported a reasonable finding that he was actively participating in Beeman’s scheme to sell the properties in question at inflated prices.

Hoffman’s conduct showed a “concurrence of action [with Beeman] on a material point” that was sufficient to allow the jurors to find “a concurrence of sentiment” and therefore a conspiratorial agreement. Hill v. State, supra, 231 Md. at 461 , 190 A.2d 795 . See also Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 618-19 , 556 A.2d 236 (1989) (stating that evidence tending to show participating in a crime is sufficient so sustain a conspiracy conviction); Levy v. State, 225 Md. 201, 206 , 170 A.2d 216 (1961) (finding evidence of a defendant’s participation in the uttering of a false check sufficient to support his conspiracy conviction). The jury also was entitled to add to that evidence an adverse inference that the records Hoffman destroyed would have showed his participation in the fraud, and hence his conspiratorial agreement with Beeman. 13 The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding, under a clear and convincing evidence standard, that Hoffman entered into a conspiracy with Beeman to defraud the buyers.

B. Fraud The elements of a civil action for fraud are: ³⁰² “(1) that the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) that its falsity was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless indifference as to its truth, (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it, and (5) that the plaintiff suffered compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation.” Maryland Environmental Trust v. Gaynor, 370 Md. 89, 97 , 803 A.2d 512 (2002) (quoting VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation, 350 Md. 693, 703 , 715 A.2d 188 (1998) (in turn quoting Nails v. S &R, Inc., 334 Md. 398, 415 , 639 A.2d 660 (1994))); see also Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 257-58 , 630 A.2d 1156 (1993); Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 333-34 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982). The misrepresentation element of the tort of fraud may be based on an affirmative misrepresentation of fact; a concealment of fact, which includes a partially misleading disclosure; or a non-disclosure of fact in the face of a duty to disclose. See Lubore v. RPM Assocs., Inc., 109 Md.App. 312, 329-31 , 674 A.2d 547 (1996). A person commits fraud by concealment when he engages in a deceptive act or contrivance intended to hide information, mislead, avoid suspicion, or prevent further inquiry into a material matter.

U.S. v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 898-900 (4th Cir.2000). When one intentionally produces a false impression to mislead another person, or to entrap or cheat him, or to obtain undue advantage of him, there is a positive fraud. McKeever v. Washington Heights Realty Corp., 183 Md. 216, 225 , 37 A.2d 305 (1944). Concealment of a fact can be the basis for fraud when the concealment is effected by misleading and deceptive talk, acts, or conduct, or is accompanied by misrepresentations, or where, in addition to a party’s silence, there is any statement, word, or act on his part, which tends affirmatively to the suppression of the truth, or to a covering up or disguising of the truth, or to a withdrawal or distraction of a party’s attention from the real facts. ³⁰³ Schnader v. Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 57-58 , 182 A. 881 (1926) (citations omitted); see also Lubore, supra, 109 Md.App. at 330 , 674 A.2d 547 .

The elements of the tort of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. VF Corp., supra, 350 Md. at 704, 715 A.2d 188 (quoting Gross, supra, 332 Md. at 257-58 , 630 A.2d 1156 ; Everett v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 307 Md. 286, 300 , 513 A.2d 882 (1986)). (i) Irwin and Wood Irwin and Wood’s challenge to the trial court’s denials of their motion for judgment and motion for JNOV on the fraud claim also is two-fold. First, they argue that there was no evidence to support a finding that Wood made a misrepresentation of fact, one of the elements of a fraud claim.

The buyers respond that, to satisfy the misrepresentation element of the tort of fraud, it is enough to prove a statement made or conduct performed for the purpose of creating a false or misleading impression of a material fact, by concealing the truth; and that the evidence against Wood was sufficient on that point. Second, in a somewhat convoluted argument, Irwin and Wood renew their indirect attack on the trial court’s “willful blindness” instruction, arguing that the instruction gave the jury free reign to find the “knowledge of falsity” and scienter elements of the tort of fraud against Wood on legally insufficient evidence. The buyers respond that the “willful blindness” jury instruction was not objected to and in any event the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a reasonable finding of knowledge of falsity and intent to deceive on Wood’s, and therefore Irwin’s, part. Because, for the reasons we have discussed, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Irwin and Wood conspired with Beeman to defraud the buyers, and because the evidence plainly established (and it is not disput ³⁰⁴ ed) that Beeman defrauded the buyers, Irwin and Wood properly were held liable for fraud.

We also conclude, however, that there was sufficient evidence against Irwin and Wood to make them independently liable for fraud, irrespective of the conspiracy finding. As noted above, in Schnader, supra, the Court of Appeals recognized that “[f]raud may consist of the suppression of the truth as well as the assertion of a falsehood.” Id. at 57 , 132 A. 381 . In Lubore, supra, this Court added to the discussion of when a concealment or non-disclosure will amount to fraud: [O]rdinarily when one owes no legal obligation to speak, mere silence is not actionable; but if what is stated amounts to a “partial or fragmentary” disclosure, that misleads because of its incompleteness, the “legal situation is entirely changed.” Brager v. Friedenwald, 128 Md. 8, 31-32 , 97 A. 515 (1916). See also Prosser & Keaton, Law of Torts § 106, at 738 (1984)(“if the defendant does speak, he must disclose enough to prevent his words from being misleading____”) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551, cmt. g (“A statement that is partial or incomplete may be a misrepresentation because it is misleading, when it purports to tell the whole truth and does not----When such a statement has been made, there is a duty to disclose the additional information necessary to prevent it from misleading the recipient.

In this case there may be recovery either on the basis of the original misleading statement or of the nondisclosure of the additional facts.”). 109 Md.App. at 330-31 , 674 A.2d 547 . In a recent case discussing a claim of fraud by concealment, the federal district court in Maryland, applying Maryland law, further explained: In order to prevail on a claim of intentional misrepresentation by concealment, or fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to disclose a material fact; (2) Defendant failed to disclose that fact; (3) Defendant intended to defraud or deceive Plaintiff; (4) Plaintiff took action in justifi ³⁰⁵ able reliance on the concealment; and (5) Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the Defendant’s concealment. See Green v. H & R Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 525 , 735 A.2d 1039, 1059 (1999)(citing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 231-32 , 469 A.2d 867, 888 (1984)).' Plaintiff must prove either that Defendant had a duty to disclose a material fact to them and failed to do so, or that Defendant concealed a material fact for the purpose of defrauding Plaintiff.... In the context of a claim of intentional misrepresentation by concealment, a duty to disclose arises where the defendant makes an active misstatement of fact, or only a partial or fragmentary statement of fact, which misleads the plaintiff to its injury.

See Lubore [, supra, 109 Md.App. at 330-31 , 674 A.2d 5471 ; Walsh v. Edwards, 233 Md. 552, 557 , 197 A.2d 424, 426-27 (1964). Odyssey Travel Ctr. v. RO Cruises, Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 618, 628-29 (D.Md.2003)(footnote omitted). Here, as we have explained, there was evidence showing that Wood participated in creating a number of false impressions for the buyers, by words and conduct amounting to partial and fragmentary disclosures. First, in conducting each initial loan application meeting, Wood treated Beeman, whom she knew to be the seller in the transaction, as if he were the buyer’s representative.

She engaged Beeman in discussion that validated one of two false impressions: either that Bee-man was not the seller in the transaction, when he was, or that it was a permissible business practice for the seller to be taking on the role of buyer’s representative. Second, Wood actively participated in using the Irwin computer system to generate and then misuse Good Faith Estimates to set or increase the sales prices for the properties. The jury could have inferred from the circumstances surrounding many of the initial meetings that the buyers did not understand mortgage financing and that an arm’s length ³⁰⁶ negotiation of a sales price is rarely arrived at by working backward from a monthly payment — and Wood knew they did not understand that. Yet, she participated with Beeman in misusing the Good Faith Estimate forms to create and then perpetuate that misimpression, and either establish sales prices not yet negotiated or inflate already agreed to sales prices — all to Beeman’s financial benefit.

At the same time, Wood did not inform the buyers of Beeman’s actual role in the transaction, of the impropriety of the role he was assuming, and that the Good Faith Estimate process was being misused to the buyers’ detriment. Finally, Wood’s statements and conduct during the initial meetings contributed to misleading the buyers into thinking it was proper for Beeman to be arranging gift letters, and hence gifts, to effectuate the transactions. On several occasions, Wood included a gift letter as part of the application, without any confirmation by the buyer. Other times, Wood raised the prospect of a gift letter, and directed the issue to Beeman, not the buyer.

Yet other times, Wood and Beeman in unison announced, in front of the buyer, that a gift would be part of the transaction. Wood thus conducted herself before the buyers so as to make it seem acceptable for Beeman to be involved in making a gift happen in each case. She did this, all the time knowing that Beeman was prohibited by federal regulations from having anything to do with the buyers’ obtaining gifts to effectuate closings. By her words and conduct, Wood gave the buyers enough information about the gift letter process to know it could be part of a prescribed plan of action for obtaining financing, but not enough information to know that it was improper for Beeman to be involved in the process.

Wood thus made partial and fragmentary disclosures that created and perpetuated a false impression, and were misleading. For these reasons, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding against Wood (and hence Irwin) on the misrepresentation element of the tort of fraud. In their second argument, Irwin and Wood complain that because (in their view) there was no false represen ³⁰⁷ tation by Wood, the only “knowledge of falsity” the jury could have found on her part was her knowledge, based on the legal concept of “willful blindness,” of false representations by Beeman. They argue that mere knowledge by Wood that Beeman was making false representations could not support a finding that she knew of the falsity of her own representations (of which, they assert, there were none) or that she acted with an intent to deceive the buyers. 14 In the context of the fraud claim against Irwin and Wood, “knowledge of falsity” meant that Wood knew that the impression she was creating about Beeman’s proper role in the transactions, both as the buyer’s representative and as the facilitator of gifts, and about the method for setting sales prices, was false; that is, she was consciously aware that she was creating a false impression.

Reasonable inferences from the evidence supported that finding. From the evidence about Wood’s experience as a loan officer, the jurors could find that she knew that neither her role nor Beeman’s role as the seller properly included using a Good Faith Estimate form to create or increase sales prices; but, that the impression she was creating by her conduct in the initial meetings with the buyers was exactly the contrary. Wood testified that she was familiar with the federal regulations making it illegal for Beeman to participate in arranging gift letters and gifts. The jurors could infer from Wood’s conduct validating Beeman’s involvement in the gift letter process that she knew she was drawing a picture about that process that was inaccurate.

With respect to the scienter element of fraud, from a finding that Wood knew she was creating a false impression for the buyers, the jurors reasonably could conclude that Wood did so with the intent to