Hoffman v. UNITED IRON AND METAL COMPANY, INC.

SALMON, Judge. Appellants are a group of thirty-seven individuals who live in the southwest, “Mill Hill” area of Baltimore City and the Benedictine Society of Baltimore City (the Church), which owns land in Mill Hill. Appellants sued United Iron and Metal Co., Inc., United Holding Co., Inc., and United Operating Co., Inc. (“United”), which operated a scrap metal yard and automobile shredding facility (“the Facility”) in Mill Hill until October 1, 1990. United sold the operation, but not the land, to the David J. Joseph Co., Inc. (“Joseph”), against whom appellants also filed suit.

All appellants, except for two, own or reside on property bordering the Facility’s property. Appellants sued in nuisance, negligence, trespass, and strict liability, 1 also alleging they were entitled to punitive damages. On March 1, 1995, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. In this appeal from that grant of summary judgment, appellants present the following questions, which have been rephrased for clarity: 2 ¹²⁶ I. Did the motions court err in finding that appellees had acquired a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance?

II

Did the motions court err in finding that the Facility was a permanent nuisance and, thus, that the statute of limitations barred appellants’ claims?

III

Did the motions court err in finding that there was inadequate evidence to warrant the submission of punitive damages to the jury? To answer these questions, the following legal principles are relevant: 1. Land ownership is not necessary in order to support a nuisance action; lawful possession is sufficient. 2. A minor, if a lawful occupant of land, may recover in nuisance; the nuisance action on behalf of the minor is derivative of the nuisance action filed by the parent. 3.

A prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance may be acquired by continuance of the nuisance, uninterrupted, for twenty years. 4. Successive ownership of the operation constituting a nuisance may be tacked to form the twenty-year prescriptive period if there is privity. 5. The prescriptive period does not begin to run until a party has notice of the nuisance. 6. An existing easement may be extinguished by the subsequent purchase of the servient estate by a bona fide purchaser without notice of the easement. 7.

The passage of regulations controlling air pollution does not toll the prescriptive period. 8. Adverse use for the prescriptive period results in immunity from liability on the part of the user for his acts of use during the prescriptive period. ¹²⁷ 9. A party must bring a suit for damages as a result of a permanent nuisance, which continues indefinitely, within three years of the time that the permanency of the condition becomes manifest to a reasonably prudent person because there is only one cause of action. Successive actions may be brought for damages to land caused by a temporary nuisance, which is abatable, because each day’s continuance of the nuisance constitutes a new cause of action. 10.

In order to justify a punitive damage award, a plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with actual malice. FACTS Appellee United has owned and operated the Facility on Wilkens Avenue in Baltimore City, Maryland, since at least 1915, when it opened a junkyard. The business evolved into a high-volume scrap metal processing facility. Complaints about smoke and soot from “burning automobiles for scrap metal” at the Facility began in 1939.

The complaints continued throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. On May 1, 1971, United began operating an automobile shredder, shredding approximately 60,000 to 80,000 cars per year. One of the by-products of the use of the shredder was frequent, yet irregular, explosions. If the gas tank was not removed from an automobile before it was shredded, gas or gas vapors in the tank sometimes caused an explosion during the shredding process.

The earliest recorded explosion at the Facility was on January 3, 1972. Appellants documented at least 250 explosions between that date and November 24, 1994. The shredder sustained damage from the explosions, frequently causing it to be shut down for repairs. Other byproducts were black smoke, soot, dust and “fluff’ 3 emitted by the Facility.

Particulates covered appellants’ cars, porches, windows and laundry. An inspector from the Maryland De ¹²⁸ partment of Health and Mental Hygiene sampled dust from the top of a car parked on a street next to the Facility in 1987 and found that the dust contained 5,079 parts per million of lead. Appellants tested the soil in their yards in July 1994, discovering “elevated” levels of lead, which were highest at properties closest to the Facility. Appellants introduced evidence that United tested the soil on Facility property and “fluff’ emissions for lead as early as 1988 but did not keep records of the results of these tests.

Appellants also complained of excessive, constant noise from the shredding machine and trucks entering and leaving the Facility. Appellants contend the Facility caused a variety of damage to their homes and interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property. Appellant Dianne Hoffman testified at her deposition that she first noticed the “fluff’ and dirt emitted from the Facility in 1975. She stated, “I had a pool for my son ... and I would come out in the morning and I would have to clean that pool out before he could get in and on top of the pool was this fluff____” She also alleged the United operation caused cracked windows, leaky ceilings, leaky and broken pipes, damage to the roof, and shifting of doors, windows, and the foundation of the house.

Finally, Mrs. Hoffman stated that the neighborhood was so “unbearable” that she would not allow her children to sit outside on the back porch. Her husband, appellant Donald Hoffman, testified at his deposition that he would see “debris and pieces of metal” on his clothes, in the air, and in his son’s pool. He also testified to the damage caused to their home. Appellant Clara B. Muffins testified at her deposition that in 1973 a “great big piece of metal, hot metal” flew through her back window.

She found it lying on her freezer after one of the explosions. She stated that United sent someone to her house to repair the window. Appellant Janét I. Greenhalgh testified at her deposition that the explosions caused cracks in the walls and made the drywall on her ceiling collapse. Mrs. Greenhalgh’s son, appellant Charles S. Hayes, testified at his deposition that he began ¹²⁹ noticing the explosions when he moved into his mother’s house in 1981.

He also claimed that the constant noise and frequent explosions aggravated his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 4 which first manifested itself in the 1970s after his tours of duty in Vietnam. Appellant Alice Clifton testified at her deposition that the explosions caused cracks in her ceilings and broke windows in her home. She stated that she could no longer sit on her back porch “because it’s nothing to look at but dirt and filth.” Mrs. Clifton’s son, appellant Ernest J. Clifton, who lives in her home, stated that noise from the trucks awakens him frequently. Appellants Marie and Edward Mezewski testified at their depositions that a “foggy mist” from the Facility has enveloped the neighborhood for the last ten to fifteen years.

Mrs. Mezewski sent envelopes full of dust balls and soot that she removed from her windows to the Baltimore City “Noise and Pollution Control” department in the late 1970s or early 1980s. One explosion knocked the basement windows out of the Mezewskis’ home while Mrs. Mezewski was in the basement. Appellant Sharon Smith testified at her deposition that she noticed cracks in the walls of her house in 1985. Her husband, appellant Robert Smith, Jr., testified at his deposition that an explosion in 1985 broke every window in the house.

Another explosion in 1988 broke several windows. He also stated that the foundation of the house was crumbling, which he attributed to the explosions. A Chrysler he bought in 1988 faded considerably within six months, damage he attributed to air emissions from the Facility. Appellant Mary Bontempo testified at her deposition that repeated explosions knocked five windows in her house out of alignment so that they would no longer open.

She also stated that large cracks developed in the bricks on the outside of her ¹³⁰ home and that she had seen mortar knocked out of the cracks as the result of an explosion. Reverend Paschal Morlino, Vice President and Pastor of the Church, testified at his deposition that explosions and soot caused damage to the Church’s stained glass windows. He also alleged that the soot, smoke, and “fluff’ emanating from the Facility have caused the Church’s buildings to require more extensive and frequent cleaning than would otherwise have been necessary. He stated that explosions have caused damage to the roof, requiring repairs, for which United paid.

Appellant Robert Smith, Sr., testified at his deposition that he heard an explosion in 1992 and “I knew something collapsed, but then I heard all this noise [sic] falling down my chimney.” The top four feet of his chimney had collapsed. In 1993, an explosion at the Facility shattered his sliding glass door and knocked down his chandelier. Appellants produced evidence of about thirty notices of violation issued to United by Baltimore City and the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) for excessive noise, vibrations, “fluff’ discharge, and other visible air emissions between March 1973 and October 1990. On July 8, 1975 and again on April 3, 1979, the Baltimore City Health Department ordered United to shut down the auto shredder and install air pollution control equipment before reopening.

There was evidence that the shredder was shut down briefly in September 1975 when pollution control equipment was installed. There is no evidence in the record that the Facility shut down as ordered in April 1979. On October 1, 1990, United sold the business to appellee Joseph. Joseph began shredding approximately 100,000 cars per year.

Between November 1990 and November 1992, more than thirty notices of violation were issued to Joseph by Baltimore City and MDE for noise violations, vibrations, and visible emissions. In March of 1993, Joseph entered into a Consent Order with MDE. The Consent Order set forth a plan that would bring Joseph into compliance with state air pollution laws. Joseph agreed, among other things, to install ¹³¹ a wet shredder, which would eliminate air and water emissions and help “dampen” the effects of sporadic explosions.

The “Hoffman plaintiffs” 5 originally filed suit on February 8, 1993. The “Roesch plaintiffs” 6 originally filed suit on April 14, 1994. These actions were consolidated. United filed motions for summary judgment, which Joseph joined, against Dianne and Donald Hoffman, Clara B. Mullins, Janet I. Greenhalgh, Charles S. Hayes, Alice Clifton, Ernest J. Clifton, Marie and Edward Mezewski, Sharon and Robert Smith, Jr., Mary Bontempo, and the Church, all of whom were Hoffman plaintiffs.

Movants did not file for summary judgment against all the Hoffman plaintiffs or against any of the Roesch plaintiffs. At the hearing on the motions on January 13, 1995, the motions judge indicated he would consider the same arguments made in the summary judgment motions applicable to the Roesch plaintiffs. 7 The motions judge granted summary judgment against all plaintiffs on March 1, 1995. ¹³² STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment may be granted only when the moving party clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tele. Co. of Maryland, 104 Md.App. 1, 48 , 655 A.2d 1 , cert. granted, 339 Md. 445 , 663 A.2d 1271 (1995).

Summary judgment is inappropriate where there is evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 739 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the non-moving party’s claim, however, is insufficient to preclude the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 738 , 625 A.2d 1005 .

In reviewing a lower court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court simply considers whether the lower court was “legally correct.” Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 712 , 633 A.2d 84 (1993). The lower court’s legal determinations are not entitled to a presumption of correctness; this Court must apply the law as it understands the law to be. Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443 , 446 n. 2, 505 A.2d 113 (1986). This Court will not ordinarily affirm the granting of summary judgment for a reason not relied upon by the trial judge.

Warner v. German, 100 Md.App. 512, 517 , 642 A.2d 239 (1994). See also Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 313 Md. 301 , 314 n. 5, 545 A.2d 658 (1988) ¹³³ (“[T]he appellate court will not ordinarily undertake to sustain the judgment by ruling on another ground, not ruled upon by the trial court, if the alternative ground is one as to which the trial court had a discretion to deny summary judgment.”). I. Appellants filed complaints asserting that the operation of the Facility constituted at least four different types of nuisances: lead contamination of the appellants’ property, periodic explosions, emissions of air pollutants such as smoke and “fluff,” and excessive noise. “[Wjhere a trade or business as carried on interferes with the reasonable and comfortable enjoyment by another of his property, a wrong is done to a neighboring owner for which an action lies.” Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 645 , 197 A. 146 (1938). “Virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance so long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person.” Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. CAE-Link Corp., 330 Md. 115, 125 , 622 A.2d 745 , cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 114 S.Ct. 288 , 126 L.Ed.2d 238 (1993). A nuisance action may be brought by a landowner, see Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 421 , 24 A.2d 795 (1942), but ownership is not necessary.

Lawful possession is sufficient. See Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 76 , 73 A. 688 (1909) (holding that lawful occupant of premises may maintain an action in nuisance). Accord Vicksburg Chemical Co. v. Thornell, 355 So.2d 299, 301 (Miss.1978) (stating that a person who has property interest may bring nuisance suit on behalf of himself and all members of his family); Bowers v. Westvaco Corp., 244 Va. 139 , 419 S.E.2d 661, 668 (1992) (finding that children, as lawful occupants of land, may recover in nuisance); Restatement (2d) of Torts § 821E cmt. d (1977) (stating that family members may sue in nuisance because “occupancy is a sufficient interest in itself to permit recovery for invasions of the interest in the use and enjoyment of the land”); contra Conlon v. Town of Farmington, 29 Conn.Supp. 230 , 280 A.2d 896 (1971) (finding that ¹³⁴ children could not sue in nuisance because they were not owners of interest in property affected). The minor cannot sue unless he or she has a right to occupy the land.

This right is based on the parents’ lawful occupancy of the land. If the parent has no right to sue, neither does the minor. Thus, in this case the nuisance action on behalf of the minors is derivative of the nuisance action filed by their parents. The motions judge found that appellees’ operation of the Facility for more than twenty years “constituted a nuisance for the prescriptive period,” which he termed a prescriptive easement.

The right acquired by appellees is more accurately called a “prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance.” While the owner of land is entitled to have the air diffused over his land free from pollution by any use made of neighboring land, ... an infringement of which constitutes a nuisance, the owner of the neighboring land may acquire, by ... prescription, an easement consisting of the right to make such injurious use of his land, or, as it is sometimes said, he may acquire a right to maintain a nuisance involving the pollution of air. 3 Herbert T. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, § 763 (3d ed. 1939) (footnotes omitted). An easement is a nonpossessory interest in the real property of another. Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688 , 484 A.2d 630 (1984). A prescriptive easement arises when a party has made “an adverse, exclusive and uninterrupted use of [another’s land] for twenty years.” Furman E. Hendrix, Inc. v. Hanna, 250 Md. 443, 445 , 243 A.2d 600 (1968); accord Goldstein v. Potomac Elec.

Power Co., 285 Md. 673 , 677 n. 1, 404 A.2d 1064 (1979) (“To acquire by prescription the right to maintain a private nuisance, the user must continue the nuisance for an uninterrupted period of twenty years.”) (citing Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268 , 20 A. 900 (1890)). Appellees conceded at oral argument that the prescriptive period started when the automobile shredder was ¹³⁵ installed and began operation on May 1, 1971. 8 Therefore, appellees must have continued the nuisance uninterrupted until May 1,1991 to acquire a prescriptive right to maintain it. Appellants contend the appellees failed to meet their burden of proving adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted use for the prescriptive period. 9 We disagree. ¹³⁶ To be adverse, the use must be without permission or license. Clayton v. Jensen, 240 Md. 337, 343 , 214 A.2d 154 (1965).

An adverse use is “use of ... the lands of another whenever one sees fit, and without asking leave, ... and the burden is upon the owner of the land, to show that the use of the way was by license or contract inconsistent with a claim of right.” Cox v. Forrest, 60 Md. 74, 79-80 (1883). The use by appellees was clearly adverse to the rights of appellants, and appellants did not present any evidence showing that appellees had a license or contract to make use of the land. The exclusive requirement merely means “the claim of user must not depend on the claim of someone else.” Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 45 , 234 A.2d 752 (1967). “Even though a claimant may not have been the only user, it is sufficient if he used the way under a claim of right independently of others.” Id. Appellants contend that their continued use of their own land prevents appellees’ use from being exclusive. 10 This is incorrect. “By exclusive, the law does not mean that the right of way must be used by one person only, ... but simply that the right , should not depend for its enjoyment upon a similar right in others____ It must be exclusive as against the right of the community at large.” Cox, supra, 60 Md. at 80 .

Finally, to be uninterrupted, the claimant must exercise ¹³⁷ the right more or less frequently, according to the nature of the use to which its enjoyment may be applied, and without objection on the part of the owner of the land, and under such circumstances as excludes the presumption of a voluntary abandonment on the part of the person claiming it. Id. Cox, supra, 60 Md. at 80 . Appellants contend that appellees’ use was not uninterrupted because of the many complaints and objections they, other neighbors, and government officials lodged over the years.

Mere complaints, however, will not prevent the acquisition of a right by prescription without an abandonment or interruption in the use. Appellants contend that each appellee must operate the nuisance for twenty years before it can acquire a prescriptive right to maintain it. Successive ownership of the dominant estate, however, may be tacked if there is privity. See Clayton, supra, 240 Md. at 344 , 214 A.2d 154 .

United sold only the operation of the Facility to Joseph in 1990, retaining ownership of the land. The easement continued to benefit the land owned by United, and there is privity between Joseph, which continued the nuisance, and United, its predecessor. Appellants further contend that the motions judge erred by applying the same rule of tacking to the owners of the land burdened by the easement as applied to the adverse users. Clayton , as noted above, deals with tacking by adverse users, not by servient estate owners.

There is no case law in Maryland dealing with whether a change in ownership of the servient estate begins the prescriptive period anew. This Court has noted, however, that “treatises and the overwhelming majority of case law in other jurisdictions agree that ‘an easement is not binding on a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the servient estate if he purchases without notice, either actual or constructive, of the easement.’ ” Kiler v. Beam, 74 Md.App. 636, 641 , 539 A.2d 1138 (1988). It is axiomatic that no plaintiff could have had notice of any easement until the easement actually existed. Kiler stands for the proposition that an existing easement may be extinguished by a subse ¹³⁸ quent purchase of the property.

See also Rogers v. Burnopp, 263 Md. 357 , 283 A.2d 367 (1971) (change in ownership of servient estate did not affect prescriptive easement when right of way was visible for more than twenty years). It does not address the issue of whether a change in ownership of the servient estate affects the prescriptive period. The policy behind the acquisition of property rights by prescription is that “[i]t is better, says the law, that the negligent owner who has omitted to assert his right within the time prescribed by the statute, should lose his rights than one should be disturbed in his possession, and harassed by stale demands.... ” Hanson v. Johnson, 62 Md. 25, 31 (1884). This Court stated in Kiler , quoting West Virginia’s highest appellate court: “The grantee is bound where a reasonably careful inspection of the premises would disclose the existence of the easement, or where the grantee has knowledge of facts sufficient to put a prudent buyer on inquiry.

It is not necessary that the.easement be in constant and uninterrupted use. The purchaser of property may assume that no easements are attached to the property purchased which are not of record except those which are open and visible.” 74 Md.App. at 642 , 539 A.2d 1138 (quoting Fanti v. Welsh, 152 W.Va. 233 , 161 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1968)). It is logical to conclude that, because prescriptive rights are designed to disadvantage those who sleep on their rights, the prescriptive period did not begin to run against the adult plaintiffs until they had notice, either actual or constructive, of the nuisance. 11 ¹³⁹ Appellees presented no evidence at the motions hearing as to when the Roesch plaintiffs knew about the explosions and air emissions coming from the Facility. Likewise, they failed to show when some of the Hoffman plaintiffs knew about the explosions and emissions.

Therefore, it was improper for the motions judge to grant summary judgment against all plaintiffs, because appellees failed to demonstrate clearly that there was no genuine dispute as to when each plaintiff found out about the nuisance. Finally, appellants contend that a party may not obtain a prescriptive easement to perform an illegal act, 12 relying on an out-of-state case. 13 The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the enactment of a state pollution law “tolled any prescriptive right gained by [defendant] or its predecessor in ownership.” Vicksburg Chemical Co., supra, 355 So.2d at 301 . Appellants argue that, when Maryland enacted the regulations cited in note 12, supra, in 1980, it became impossible for the appellees to obtain a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance. We reject appellants’ argument.

Just as the legality of a business is not conclusive as to whether its operation constitutes a nuisance, Stottlemyer v. Crampton, 235 Md. 138 , 200 A.2d 644 (1964), illegality of certain conduct is not conclusive as to the same question. We see no reason to hold that the passage of regulations controlling air pollution in 1980 tolled the prescriptive period. See Booth Glass Co., Inc. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615 , 500 A.2d 641 (1985) (holding that where legislature has not ex ¹⁴⁰ pressly provided for exception in statute of limitations, court will not allow any implied equitable exception to be grafted upon it). Appellees have carried their burden in proving that they have acquired a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance as to some appellants.

They were not entitled, however, to summary judgment against every appellant for all four types of nuisance. There is no dispute that the Facility began operating its automobile shredder on May 1, 1971 and that at least 250 explosions occurred between January 3, 1972 and November 24, 1994, causing damage to many of appellants’ homes. The shredder caused air emissions in the form of smoke and “fluff’ to fall upon appellants’ property. Similarly, the excessive noise complained of by appellants has continued at least as long as the shredder has been operating.

There is no evidence in the record, however, that the lead contamination has existed for more than twenty years. In 1987, a dust sample taken from the top of a car parked on the street near the Facility showed high lead levels, but it was not until July 1994 that tests of soil revealed high lead levels in the backyards of plaintiffs’ houses bordering on the Facility. Summary judgment should not have been granted against any appellant on the issue of the lead contamination because appellees, as the moving party, did not clearly demonstrate that they had acquired a prescriptive easement to continue the lead emissions by adverse, exclusive and uninterrupted emission for the twenty-year period. We affirm the granting of summary judgment against any plaintiff who has owned or lived in Mill Hill for a continuous twenty-year period before filing suit on the nuisance count for the other three types of nuisances alleged. 14 Kluckhuhn v. ¹⁴¹ Ivy Hill Ass’n, Inc., 55 Md.App. 41, 48 , 461 A.2d 16 (1983) (filing of suit tolls the statute), aff'd, 298 Md. 695 , 472 A.2d 77 (1984).

We also affirm the grant of summary judgment on the nuisance count against the minor child Lewis Wills, Jr., for the remaining three types of nuisance even though he has not lived in the neighborhood for twenty consecutive years, because his cause of action is derivative of his father’s. With the exception of Lewis Wills, Jr., we shall reverse the granting of summary judgment against any plaintiff who has not owned or resided in Mill Hill for a continuous twenty-year period before filing suit. We shall also reverse the granting of summary judgment on the nuisance count against any plaintiff about whom appellees did not introduce any evidence indicating when they had notice of the easement. 15 Appellants also filed claims for trespass, 16 strict liability, and negligence. Appellees argue that their acquisition of a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance gives them a “privilege” to operate that precludes legal action for any torts arising out of those operations. “Adverse use for the prescriptive period results in an immunity on the part of the user ¹⁴² from liability for his acts of use during the prescriptive period.” Restatement (First) of Property § 465 (1944).

Until the last moment of the prescriptive period, the acts of adverse use are generating new causes of action. For those immediately preceding the running of the prescriptive period, the statutory period cannot have run. Nevertheless, upon the running of the prescriptive period and the consequent creation by prescription of an easement, all acts of adverse use contributing to the creation by prescription of such easement become privileged retroactively. Even though the statute of limitations has not run on the causes of action created by them, they become privileged under the easement to the creation of which they have