Hohensee v. Minear

Per Curiam. The appellants, Ervin and Richard Hohensee, are making their fourth attempt in this Court to rescue their land from the effects of a sale under a foreclosure of a deed of trust. In each appeal they have urged primarily that the sale is void because of fraud committed by the appellee-trustee and the note holder. The first two appeals, dismissed for appellate procedural defects (Md. Rules 825-31 and 835 b (8)), were from orders by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County ratifying the trustee’s, sale.

The third, in addition to the fraud allegations, challenged the allowance of a $7,500 fee for the appellee’s attorney. Because such objections to attorney’s fees may-only be raised by exceptions to the auditor’s account, that appeal was dismissed as being premature. Hohensee v. Minear, 253 Md. 5 , 251 A. 2d 588 (1969). This appeal, the fourth, is from an order of February 24, 1970 finally-ratifying the auditor’s account.

When the .account was filed appellants responded on. December 1, 1969 with a motion requesting an extension of time “until June 30, 1970 within which to file exceptions . . . .” They list twelve reasons for this request. 1) That no details or verification of the figures are given, and 2) that the figures on their face appear to be incorrect. Listed reasons 3) through 12) are a series of statements that may be summarized as follows: a two year delay in filing the auditor’s report, the auditor and the court lack jurisdiction, a desire to take depositions, the ⁶⁰⁵ appellant’s illness, his distant residence in Pennsylvania, the fact that he was acting in proper person, his unfamiliarity with the law resulting in a need for additional time for research, and an assertion that the property involved was valued in excess of $1,000,000. When this motion for continuance to file exceptions was set for hearing on February 24, 1970, Ilohensee twice sought a postponement, in effect attempting to continue a motion to continue.

Judge Powers denied the first request on January 2, 1970 and the second on February 20, with the comment—“In view of the past delaying tactics of defendant and the fact that this case has been pending for more than four years the court questions the bona tides of . . . [the request for postponement of the February 24 hearing] and the Motion is denied.” Appellants did not appear at the February 24 hearing and Judge Meloy signed an order 1) denying the December 1, 1969 request for an extension of time to file exceptions, 2) overruling the motion of December 1 insofar as it may raise exceptions to the auditor’s account, and 3) finally ratifying the auditor’s account. Appellants first contend that both judges erred in denying their motions for continuances. As the hearing date was not until February 24, appellants had nearly three months within which to prepare and file any objections or exceptions to the auditor’s account. That was ample time and we conclude neither trial judge abused his discretion in denying the requested postponements.

Butkus v. McClendon, 259 Md. 170 , 269 A. 2d 427 (1970). The appellants next contend the auditor’s account contains errors. If we assume, as Judge Meloy did, that the motion of December 1 contains statements which may be considered exceptions, they are not legally sufficient. Of the twelve reasons listed, only the first two can arguably be considered as exceptions and each of these is too vague, indefinite and general to merit attention.

Though it is unnecessary to list all the reasons relied on to support an exception there must be some particularity in designating an alleged error. Burroughs v. Bunnell, 70 Md. 18 ⁶⁰⁶ (1889); Young v. Omohundro, 69 Md. 424 (1888); Calvert v. Carter, 18 Md. 73 (1861); Miller’s Equity Procedure, § 545. There are, however, two classes of cases which do not require