Holbrook v. Cummings

750 A.2d 724 (2000) 131 Md. App. 60 Thomas HOLBROOK v. Susan CUMMINGS. No. 964, Sept. Term, 1999. Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. May 1, 2000.

David B. Lamb, Washington, DC, for appellant. ⁷²⁵ Anne Meister, Washington, DC, for appellee. Argued before ADKINS, KRAUSER and PAUL E. ALPERT (Ret., specially assigned), JJ. PAUL E. ALPERT, Judge (Ret., specially assigned). On April 7, 1986, the New York Supreme Court entered a judgment of absolute divorce dissolving the marriage between appellant Thomas Holbrook and appellee Susan Cummings.

The New York Order directed Mr. Holbrook to pay child support in the amount of $250 per week effective April 7, 1986 for the couple's only child, Tanner, who was born on October 11, 1980. The Order did not specify a date on which Mr. Holbrook's obligation to pay child support would end, although under New York law, the obligation to pay child support terminates when a child reaches the age of twenty-one. N.Y. Fam. Ct. § 413 (McKinney 1999).

The New York Court also entered judgments against Mr. Holbrook in the amount of $25,939.75, pursuant to prior orders and in the amount of $10,373.54 for legal fees. Prior to the entry of the New York Order, Mr. Holbrook relocated to California. Subsequently, Ms. Cummings and Tanner relocated to Maryland. In 1993, Mr. Holbrook moved to the District of Columbia.

In October 1995, Ms. Cummings filed in Maryland an application for enforcement of the child support provisions of the New York Order. In 1996, a proceeding was instituted pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) and ultimately registered in the District of Columbia as URESA Action No. 21595. Mr. Holbrook responded by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland disputing paternity and the validity of the New York Order. Blood testing results reported a 99.88% probability that Mr. Holbrook was Tanner's father.

On June 13, 1997, Mr. Holbrook amended his complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to request visitation and modification of child support. Ms. Cummings filed a Motion to Dismiss. The circuit court ruled that the issue of visitation could proceed in the Maryland court, but the issue of modification of child support would be stayed pending resolution of the ongoing action in the District of Columbia. On September 13, 1997, Mr. Holbrook filed a motion to modify child support with the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

On September 2, 1998, that court held that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), it had jurisdiction to hear the petition for enforcement purposes only. The Superior Court determined that, pursuant to UIFSA, the issue of modification of the New York Order would have to be heard in either a state having continuing exclusive jurisdiction as stated under the act, or in the state with jurisdiction over the non-moving party. On October 13, 1998, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County lifted the stay on the issue of child support modification. A hearing was held before Domestic Relations Master Salant on February 18, 1999.

Mr. Holbrook argued that, under Maryland law, the obligation to pay child support terminates when a child reaches the age of eighteen and, therefore, his obligation to pay child support should terminate because Tanner had already turned eighteen years old. Master Salant issued his report and recommendations on February 18, 1999. He determined that, pursuant to UIFSA, New York law should apply with respect to the duration of Mr. Holbrook's obligation to pay child support and, therefore, he should be required to pay child support until Tanner turns twenty-one years of age. Applying Maryland law, Master Salant recommended that child support be reduced from $250 per week to $453 per month effective March 1, 1999.

The master determined that equity would ⁷²⁶ not be served by making the modification of child support retroactive to June 13, 1997, the date Mr. Holbrook's amended complaint was filed. In reaching this conclusion, the master considered Mr. Holbrook's pattern of obstructing enforcement of his child support obligation and the significant arrearages that had accrued. Both Mr. Holbrook and Ms. Cummings filed exceptions to the Master's Report and Recommendations. A hearing was held on May 13, 1999, and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Turner, J.) denied Mr. Holbrook's exceptions.

The circuit court determined that modification of the New York Order to provide for termination of Mr. Holbrook's child support obligation at the time Tanner reaches the age of eighteen was not permitted under UIFSA. The Circuit Court also held that a retroactive reduction would not be in the best interest of the child, who had turned eighteen on October 11, 1998. This appeal followed. Mr. Holbrook presents two issues for our consideration which we have rephrased as follows: I. Whether the Circuit Court erred in determining that, under UIFSA, New York's age of majority governs with respect to Mr. Holbrook's obligation to provide child support; and, II.

Whether the Circuit Court erred in denying Mr. Holbrook's request for a retroactive reduction in his child support obligation. We answer in the negative and affirm. I. Mr. Holbrook contends that the court below erred in concluding that the provisions of UIFSA provide the exclusive remedy for enforcement and modification of the New York Order at issue in this case. He maintains that because UIFSA is not the exclusive remedy for enforcement of support orders, Maryland law governs with respect to his obligation to provide child support for his son, including the age at which that obligation should terminate.

Preliminarily, we note the disingenuous nature of Mr. Holbrook's argument that UIFSA does not apply in this case. Mr. Holbrook relied heavily on UIFSA in his Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Lift Stay when arguing that the lower court had jurisdiction to register and modify the New York Order. This inconsistency notwithstanding, we find that UIFSA is the exclusive remedy available under the facts of this particular case. UIFSA was originally drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in an effort to revise and replace URESA (as originally adopted in 1950 and amended in 1958) and its revised version, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Act of 1968 (RURESA).

UIFSA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1992 and ratified by the American Bar Association in February 1993. In 1996, UIFSA was amended. Most United States jurisdictions have since enacted UIFSA as their local law. [1] See 9 U.L.A. 235-236, 238-243 (1999). Maryland substantially adopted the major provisions of UIFSA effective January 1, 1997, as Md.Code Ann. (1997), Fam.

Law Art. § 10-301 et seq. Section 10-303 of the Act provides that the "[r]emedies provided by this subtitle are cumulative and do not affect the availability of remedies under other law." Mr. Holbrook relies primarily on this section and two cases, Barrell v. Barrell, 288 Md. 19 , 415 A.2d 579 (1980), and Cavallari v. Martin, 732 A.2d 739 (Vt.1999), to support his contention that UIFSA is not the exclusive remedy in this case. ⁷²⁷ The Barrell case involved the issue of whether a foreign alimony order must be registered under URESA. The Court of Appeals rejected appellant's contention that a party moving to enforce a foreign alimony decree may proceed only by way of the registration provisions of URESA and may not invoke the general equity jurisdiction of the court. In deciding the Barrell case, the Court of Appeals relied upon McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308 , 123 A.2d 447 (1956).

The McCabe case also involved URESA. The issue in that case was whether a court of equity in Maryland could enforce by sanctions customarily used by equity courts a decree for alimony entered by a court of another state. The Court of Appeals held that an equity court can enforce a decree of another state, both as to alimony accrued and to accrue, and may use for its enforcement the same equitable remedies and sanctions it could use to enforce a decree it had duly entered in the first instance. Neither of these cases applies to the situation at hand.

Both the Barrell case and the McCabe case were decided when URESA was in effect and, unlike the case at hand, both dealt with enforcement of alimony decrees. Under URESA, child support and spousal support were treated the same. Under UIFSA, however, they are treated quite differently, with more stringent provisions governing modification of child support orders. Cf.

Md. Fam. L. §§ 10-348 to 10-353 and Md. Fam. L. § 11-101 et seq. Although cumulative remedies are available under UIFSA, they are not available in the situation