Holden v. University System of Maryland

HOTTEN, J. Appellant, Paula Holden, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against appellees, the University of Maryland Eastern Shore (“UMES”) and the University System of Maryland (“USM”), alleging wrongful termination. Thereafter, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted appellees’ motion to transfer the case for venue purposes to the Circuit Court for Somerset County. Appellant then amended her complaint to add Dr. Jennifer Keane-Dawes (“Dr. Keane-Dawes”), as a defendant. Appellees moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, asserting that appellant failed to allege facts upon which USM could be held liable, and asserted statutory immunity on behalf of Dr. Keane-Dawes.

Following a hearing, the circuit court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss, indicating that appellant failed to allege a “clear mandate of public policy” for the claim of wrongful termination. Appellant appealed and presents one question for our consideration: I. Did the [circuit] court erroneously dismiss [a]ppellant’s wrongful discharge claim in finding that [a]ppellant did not articulate a “clear” mandate of public policy because Title III does not expressly prohibit the use of Title III funds for student recruitment even thought [a]ppellees clearly believed such funds could not be used for student recruitment? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In August 2009, appellant was promoted as the Coordinator of Graduate Admissions and Programs at UMES as an at-will employee.

Appellant indicated that her duties were “to compile, manage, and develop a tracking and retention mechanism of all students in Title III activity components; focus on progress to degree and degree completion in the Graduate ³⁶⁴ Program; and work with Title III activity components to strengthen and enhance curriculum.” According to appellant’s complaint, her employment was contingent upon successful recruitments to the graduate school. On August 30, 2010, appellant’s supervisor, Dr. Keane-Dawes held a meeting between appellant and two of her co-workers. During the meeting, Dr. Keane-Dawes informed appellant that she needed to recruit new students into the graduate school and was given one academic year to do so. Thereafter, appellant communicated to Dr. Keane-Dawes that she believed Title III prohibited use of its funds for recruitment activities and therefore, appellant’s employment could not be made contingent upon participation in student recruitment activities.

Subsequently, appellant exchanged emails between the Human Resources Department and the Assistant Attorney General regarding the procedures governing grievances at UMES. On October 15, 2010, 1 appellant filed a grievance, contending that her “employment and appraisal was threatened if [she did] not bring ‘warm bodies in here’ — recruitment[ ]” and that her “performance and appraisal [could not] be a condition of recruitment efforts under Title III regulations because her salary was funded entirely by Title III grant money.” On October 19, 2010, the funding for appellant’s position was modified to reflect that only half of her salary was derived from Title III funds. Appellant appealed this decision to the Vice President of Academic Affairs, Charles Williams (“Dr. Williams”), and Dr. Williams stated that appellant did not have a cause for grievance on the remaining issues. On September 20, 2011, shortly after a dispute with a coworker, UMES placed appellant on administrative leave with pay for one calendar year, at which time her termination, without cause, would be effective. ³⁶⁵ On July 18, 2013, appellant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against USM and UMES.

USM filed a motion to dismiss because appellant failed to state a claim and both USM and UMES filed motions to dismiss for lack of venue or, in the alternative, motion to transfer venue. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City ordered that the case be transferred to Somerset County because the cause of action arose at UMES in Princess Anne, Maryland in Somerset County and all individuals alleged to have participated in the wrongful acts were employees of UMES. Additionally, appellant resided in Somerset County and her complaint indicated that all the actions and events associated with the case occurred at UMES, with no reference to anything occurring in Baltimore City. The court did not rule on USM’s motion to dismiss.

On January 28, 2014, appellant filed an amended complaint, adding Dr. Keane-Dawes as a defendant, in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, alleging one count for wrongful termination. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Specifically, appellees argued that, “the complaint lack[ed] any express statutory language from Title III prohibiting recruitment activities as a use of Title III fund — a necessary requirement for [appellant’s] claim for wrongful discharge.” In response, appellant contended that her complaint should not be dismissed because “[appellees] believed § 1063 prohibited the use of Title III funds for student recruitment.” The circuit court held a hearing on April 17, 2014 and granted appellees’ motion to dismiss. 2 Appellant noted a timely appeal. Additional facts shall be provided, infra, to the extent they prove relevant in addressing the issues presented. ³⁶⁶ STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2), “a party may seek dismissal of a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. “The standard for reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court was legally correct.” Norman v. Borison, 192 Md.App. 405, 419 , 994 A.2d 1019 (2010) (citing Sprenger v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Md., 400 Md. 1, 21 , 926 A.2d 288 (2007) (citations omitted)). Upon review of the grant of a motion to dismiss, appellate courts “must determine whether the [cjomplaint, on its face, discloses a legally sufficient cause of action.” Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 234 , 973 A.2d 771 (2009) (emphasis in original). We “presume[ ] the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the [cjomplaint, along with any reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to plaintiffs.” Id.

(citation omitted). Additionally, “[i]t is well established in Maryland that, in an appeal from a final judgment, the appellate court may affirm the court’s decision on any ground adequately shown by the record.” Norman, 192 Md.App. at 419 , 994 A.2d 1019 (citations omitted). Therefore, “dismissal is proper only if the alleged facts and permissible inferences, so viewed, would, if proven, nonetheless fail to afford relief to the plaintiff.” Litz v. Maryland Dept. of Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 639 , 76 A.3d 1076 (2013) (quoting Arfaa v. Martino, 404 Md. 364, 380-81 , 946 A.2d 995 (2008) (citations omitted)). DISCUSSION Appellant avers that the circuit court erred in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss and dismissing her wrongful termination claim.

She maintains that she was terminated by appellees for refusing to recruit students using Title III funds. In response, appellees’ contend that appellant failed to establish that her termination violated a clear mandate of public policy. Generally, at-will employment may be terminated by the employee or employer at any time for any reason. ³⁶⁷ Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 106 Md.App. 470, 494 , 665 A.2d 297 (1995).

However, the tort of wrongful discharge is a narrow exception, defined as “the willful termination of employment by the employer because of the employee’s alleged failure to perform in accordance with the employer’s expectations and the termination is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.” Id. at 495 , 665 A.2d 297 (quoting Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 76 Md.App. 642, 652 , 547 A.2d 1105 (1988)). An employee must establish the following three elements to assert a claim for wrongful termination: “(1) that the employee was discharged; (2) that the dismissal violated some clear mandate of public policy; and (3) that there is a nexus between the defendant and the decision to fire the employee.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 139 Md.App. 642, 649 , 779 A.2d 408 (2001) (quoting Shapiro v. Massengill, 105 Md.App. 743, 764 , 661 A.2d 202 (1995) (citation omitted)). “When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his or her grievance is anything more than a private dispute regarding the employer’s execution of normal management operating procedures, there is no cause of action for [wrongful] discharge.” Id. at 650, 779 A.2d 408 (quoting Lee v. Denro, 91 Md.App. 822, 833 , 605 A.2d 1017 (1992)). Appellant maintains that pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1063b(c), student recruitment is not an authorized expense and that the terms “recruit” or “recruitment” do not appear within the uses as outlined by the statute. However, appellees argue that the limitations provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1062 (c), which provides the unauthorized uses for Title III funding, does not prohibit activities related to recruitment. 20 U.S.C. § 1062 (c) states: (1) No grant may be made under this chapter for any educational program, activity, or service related to sectarian instruction or religious worship, or provided by a school or department of divinity....

(2) Not more than 50 percent of the allotment of any institution may be available for the purpose of constructing or maintaining a classroom, library, laboratory, or other instructional facility. ³⁶⁸ According to 20 U.S.C. § 1063b(c), Title III funds may be used for: (1) purchase, rental or lease of scientific or laboratory equipment for educational purposes, including instructional and research purposes; (2) construction, maintenance, renovation, and improvement in classroom, library, laboratory, and other instructional facilities, including purchase or rental of telecommunications technology equipment or services; (3) purchase of library books, periodicals, technical and other scientific journals, microfilm, microfiche, and other educational materials, including telecommunications program materials; (4) scholarships, fellowships, and other financial assistance for needy graduate and professional students to permit the enrollment of the students in and completion of the doctoral degree in medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, veterinary medicine, law, and the doctorate degree in the physical or natural sciences, engineering, mathematics, or other scientific disciplines in which African Americans are underrepresented; (5) establishing or improving a development office to strengthen and increase contributions from alumni and the private sector; (6) assisting in the establishment or maintenance of an institutional endowment to facilitate