Holly v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund

Menchine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Joann Holly (Holly) and Mary Ann Josiah (Josiah) sustained injuries in an accident on October 31, 1971 while passengers in an automobile operated by an uninsured motorist. After obtaining judgments against the motorist for $2500.00 and $15,000.00 respectively, Holly and Josiah petitioned for payment thereof under the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law. (Article 66V2, § 7-601 through § 7-635 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1970 Replacement Volume). 1 In separate answers to the petitions, the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (Fund) denied responsibility for payment of the judgments upon the ground that the judgment creditors were not residents of the State of Maryland on the date of the accident within the meaning of the statute governing their claims.

The trial court, after hearing, concluded that neither Holly nor Josiah were “qualified persons” within the meaning of former Article 66V2, § 7-602 and thus not entitled to receive payment of the judgment from the Fund. Initially enacted as Article 66V2, § 145A by Ch. 836 of the Acts of 1957, the section underwent codification identity changes to § 150 (Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957) and to § 7-602 (Annotated Code of Maryland, 1970 Replacement Volume) but without change in the definition of the term “Qualified Person.” 2 That constant definition reads as follows: “(g) ‘Qualified person’ means a resident of this ⁵⁰⁰ State or the owner of a motor vehicle registered in this State or a resident of another state, territory, or federal district of the United States or province of the Dominion of Canada, or foreign country, in which recourse is afforded to residents of this State, of substantially similar character to that provided for by this part * * *.” Appellants concede, as indeed they must, that the word “resident” as used in the section has been equated with “domiciliary” by judicial interpretation. In Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172 , 186 A. 2d 482 (1962), it was said at 179 [485]: “It is our opinion that the design and the terms of the Act require the conclusion that Sec. 150 (g), defining a ‘qualified person’ as a ‘resident of this State’, contemplates one who possesses or has acquired a domiciliary status, in the legal sense, in this State, as distinguished from one who merely has a temporary abode in Maryland. It seems obvious that the Legislature intended, in enacting this statute, primarily to protect its own citizens, particularly those least able financially to bear the loss or injury inflicted by irresponsible or unidentified motorists, many of whose victims otherwise would require medical and welfare attention at public costs.

A further significant factor is the reciprocity provision in Sec. 150 (g). This provision (which uses the words ‘resident’ and ‘residents’) could logically and effectively apply, we feel, only to domiciliariés of Maryland and of the reciprocating jurisdictions, and not to temporary sojourners. Our conclusion that ‘resident’ must be equated with ‘domiciliary’ in this statute is fortified by the fact that the Fund is produced by taxes imposed on all motorists, insured as well as uninsured, whose vehicles are registered in Maryland, and on liability insurance premiums collected in this State. Transients, unless covered by portions of Sec. 150 (g) other than the residence ⁵⁰¹ provision, would not seem to come within the scheme of this legislation.” In Walsh Admr. v. Crouse, 282 Md. 386 , 387, 194 A. 2d 107, 108 (1963) and in Rumbel v. Schueler, 236 Md. 25, 27 , 202 A. 2d 368 (1964) the holding in Maddy, supra, was expressly reiterated.

Compare: Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 26 Md. App. 296 , 338 A. 2d 363 (1975). Nonetheless, appellants urge upon us that the residency requirement of the statute is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection or Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or under Article IV § 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

They argue that judicial interpretation of the word “resident” as equated with “domiciliary” under Maddy, Walsh and Rumbel , all supra, “did not flow out of an analysis of the nature and purpose of the UCJ Law nor does it now comport with constitutional standards.” Constitutionality Appellants rely upon Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 , 94 S. Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 , 92 S. Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 89 S. Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). Their reliance is misplaced. The statute in each of the cited cases imposed durational residential requirements upon: (a) health and welfare essentials (hospital care); or (b) a fundamental political right (voting); or (c) the basic necessities of life (welfare payments). The very language of the Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital, supra, at page 255 [1080-81], [313] itself demonstrates the distinction between the statutes struck down in the three cited cases and the subject statute: “Even a bona fide residence requirement would burden the right to travel, if travel meant merely movement.

But, in Shapiro, the Court explained that ‘[t]he residence requirement and the one-year ⁵⁰² waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites? for assistance and only the latter was held to be unconstitutional. Id., at 636, 22 L Ed 2d 600 . Later, in invalidating a durational residence requirement for voter registration on the basis of Shapiro, we cautioned that our decision was not intended to ‘cast doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements. ’ Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 342, n. 13 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 , 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972).” (Emphasis added) In the subject case the statute imposed no durational residential requirement inhibiting the fundamental right to migrate from state to state. Section 7-602 applied equally to all persons within the boundaries of the State.

Its accruing benefits were not conditioned upon durational prerequisites. A person claiming its benefits was required only to demonstrate that she was a resident of the State as that status had been “appropriately defined and uniformly applied” to all sojourners within its borders. There was, in short, no impingement of fundamental constitutional rights. In the absence of such impingement, the State is not required to make a showing that the statute is “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Shapiro, supra, at 634 , [1331], [615].

Rather, validity of the statute will be determined under the test clearly and succinctly stated in Md. St. Bd. of Barber Exmrs. v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 507 , 312 A. 2d 216, 222 (1973): “In cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not involving so-called ‘suspect classifications’ or ‘fundamental personal rights,’ the Supreme Court and this Court have applied the more traditional ‘rational relationship’ or ‘fair and substantial relation’ tests, which require, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some ‘rational relationship’ to a legitimate state purpose.” ⁵⁰³ The previously quoted language in Maddy, supra, clearly demonstrates that the statute meets this test and is valid. Applicability of § 7-602 to Appellants Wfc^t we have said thus far applies equally to both appellants. Each is bound by the terms of this valid statute and must show that she qualifies as a domiciliary of this State. Common to both HI ants is the critical circumstance that they were minor:, (Holly age 18 years) (Josiah aged 19 years) at the time of arrival within the State of Maryland and at the time of the accident in which they were injured. 3 It is uniformly held that the domicile of the father is in legal contemplation the domicile of a minor child, and an infant cannot acquire a domicile on her own volition. 25 Am.Jur.2d Domicile, § 63 (1966); 1 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (2d) § 22 (1971); Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46, 50 , 88 Atl. 26, 28 .

The mere fact that the appellants were minors does not mean, however that this universally recognized rule of law is necessarily dispositive of the subject case. This is so because there is, in some jurisdictions a recognized exception that an emancipated child may acquire a domicile of choice. The exception is thus stated in 1 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, supra, at page 90: “f Emancipated child. An emancipated child may acquire a domicil of choice.

A parent has no power to control the domicil of an emancipated child.” We pass, accordingly, to a consideration of the question whether the appellants were emancipated. The early case of Mercer v. Walmsley, 5 H & J 27 (1820) ⁵⁰⁴ makes plain that emancipation of an infant