Holmes v. State

BERGER, J. On September 8, 2011, appellant, Dewan Holmes (“Holmes”) was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Holmes was convicted of first-degree assault; using a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence; wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun; possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying felony; and discharging a firearm within the city limits of Baltimore City. Holmes was acquitted of attempted first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Holmes to 15 years imprisonment for first-degree assault; 15 years for using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence (concurrent with the assault sentence); three years for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun (also concurrent with the assault ⁴³³ sentence); five years for possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying felony (consecutive to the assault sentence); and one year for discharging a firearm within Baltimore City limits (concurrent with the assault sentence), for a total of 20 years of imprisonment.

Holmes filed a timely appeal and presents four issues for our review, which we have expanded and rephrased as follows: 1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Holmes’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. Whether the circuit court erred in replying to a jury note by deviating from the language used in Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:01. 3. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Holmes’s motion for new trial. 4.

Whether the circuit court erred in failing to merge Holmes’s sentence for wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun, with the sentence imposed for using a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence. 5. Whether the circuit court erred by invoking impermissible considerations in sentencing Holmes. 1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. We, however, merge Holmes’s sentence for wearing, carrying, or transporting a ⁴³⁴ handgun into Holmes’s sentence for use of a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On December 15, 2009, Keytwan Deputy (“Deputy”) traveled from out-of-town to visit his father, Debro Muhammad (“Muhammad”) 2 in Baltimore City.

Some time later that evening, Deputy visited a friend of his father, a man by the name of Standsberry Lee (“Lee”). In addition to Deputy, Muhammad, and Lee, a handful of other individuals were present at Lee’s house that evening, including Bruenell Coleman (“Coleman”), a man identified as “K.J.,” and another man that was referred to as “Q.” While at Lee’s house, Deputy decided to use the computer. After browsing the internet for approximately ten minutes, Deputy heard a knock at the front door. Deputy testified that K.J. stood up, opened the front door, and an individual entered the residence who sat down in the living room next to K.J. According to the record, Deputy identified the individual as Holmes through the use of a photographic array.

From his seat in the living room, Holmes called out to Deputy to inquire where he was from and what he was doing. Without answering Holmes’s question, Deputy responded: “[0]h, it’s just a little website thing with girls on here.” Thereafter, Holmes stood up, brought his chair over to where Deputy was, and sat down next to him. 3 Deputy testified that he was “uncomfortable” at this point and so he ignored Holmes for as long as possible. As Holmes persisted with criticisms and questions, Deputy finally responded by stating that: [M]an, dog, I don’t even know you. So why did you take your chair and come sit over here next to me.

Take your ⁴³⁵ chair and go back over there and sit by the front door where you were sitting at before you sat next to me. Holmes responded that “he wasn’t going nowhere [and that] he ain’t moving.” After Holmes remained on his knees for approximately 20 to 30 more seconds, Deputy then advised Holmes that if he said anything else, Deputy would “beat him up.” Holmes replied with “okay, okay, all right, all right,” at which point Holmes then “grabbed his jacket, slowly put his jacket on real nice and calm and then he left.” Moments later, Deputy heard a knock at the door. K.J. answered the door and Holmes re-entered the house. Deputy testified that: When [Holmes] came in, he shut the door behind him, he lift his shirt up.

When he lift his shirt up he’s drawing a handgun. It was a revolver from his waistband and said, talk that shit now. Deputy described the revolver as a “357” with a “western style butt” and a “long nose.” At trial, Deputy demonstrated, with his hands, the length of the barrel for the jury. After Holmes revealed the revolver, Deputy began running through the residence away from Holmes.

Deputy ran down a hallway, turned right into a bedroom, and ran straight through a glass window. Deputy testified that: When I crashed through the window—I felt down to the ground. As I’m getting up I heard something go pow and the glass was cutting my hands up from the glass being on the ground from me jumping through the window. I took off running.

Deputy further described the “pow” as a gunshot. After running for a few blocks, Deputy hid behind a house. Approximately five minutes later, Deputy “peeked” his head out from behind a wooden fence and saw an individual who he believed was Holmes and another individual with him. Deputy again took off running, and eventually came to a place with which he was familiar.

Deputy began knocking on doors to houses, and eventually was able to find someone who provided him with water and alerted the paramedics. While being ⁴³⁶ inspected for injuries on a porch, Deputy was told by the paramedics that he was shot. Thereafter, Deputy was transported to a hospital and treated for a gunshot wound to his right leg, along with other cuts from the shattered glass. At trial, Coleman testified that he shared a residence with Lee, and at the time that Deputy arrived that evening, Coleman was in his bedroom watching a football game.

When Deputy was using Lee’s computer to access the internet, Coleman left the residence to purchase a snack. When Coleman returned two to three minutes later, Coleman witnessed Holmes leaving the residence. Coleman then closed and locked the front door, and returned to his bedroom. Shortly thereafter, Coleman witnessed Deputy running into his bedroom through his closed glass window.

Coleman further testified that he witnessed K.J. “tussling” with Holmes near the front door of the residence. Moreover, when Coleman identified Holmes soon after the shooting through a photographic array, Coleman wrote: “[T]he person I pick out [was] the person in the door with the guns.” Lee, however, testified at trial that the individual who came back with the gun was not Holmes. Nevertheless, evidence was admitted that Lee had told Detective Jeffrey Rivera (“Detective Rivera”) during an interview that Holmes was the individual “who was in the house with the gun.” The jury began deliberations on September 7, 2011 which continued into the following day. On the second day, the jury submitted a note to the court stating that “[w]e are unable to meet an agreement on three charges.

What are our options for next steps in the proceeding? Thank you.” The court instructed the jury that they were to “[c]ontinue in [their] deliberations.” The defense moved for a mistrial, which the circuit court denied. 4 More than one hour later, the jury reached a verdict. The jury returned a guilty verdict on five of the seven counts. ⁴³⁷ Shortly after the jury rendered its verdict, defense counsel informed the court that Holmes had told her that one of the jurors saw him in shackles while he was escorted by a correctional officer in the hallway. Defense counsel explained to the court that, upon initially learning of this, she had investigated the incident by speaking with one of the correctional officers involved and with that officer’s sergeant, both of whom denied that the incident occurred.

The trial court eventually questioned the foreman and the foreman confirmed that, in delivering the jury’s “[sjecond question,” he had seen Holmes while “they was bringing him in.” In response to questioning, the foreman stated that he “didn’t notice” that Holmes was shackled at the time, and he denied that the incident impacted his verdict. Thereafter, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury foreman viewed the defendant in shackles and in custody which violated Holmes’s right to a fair trial. The circuit court denied the motion and determined that Holmes “had to have been shackled at the time” when the juror saw him, and that “there is reasonable concern of prejudice during the course of deliberation.” Nevertheless, the court found that the juror “did not see that he was being escorted,” and that “there was no prejudice of the Defendant being seen in the hallway by the juror.” Upon a review of the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as Holmes’s prior contacts with the criminal justice system, the circuit court sentenced Holmes to 20 years incarceration for all five convictions. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION I. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal trial, this Court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ⁴³⁸ (citation omitted); see also Titus v. State, 423 Md. 548, 557-58 , 32 A.3d 44 (2011); Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 71 , 935 A.2d 421 (2007). The purpose is not to “undertake a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case.” State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478 , 649 A.2d 336 (1994). Indeed, “[i]t is not our role to retry the case”, Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 185 , 999 A.2d 986 (2010), because the finder of fact has “the unique opportunity to view the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to assess the credibility of witnesses during their live testimony.” State v. Mayers, 417 Md. 449, 466 , 10 A.3d 782 (2010) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Smith, supra, 415 Md. at 185 , 999 A.2d 986 ). Accordingly, “we do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” Id. “A fact-finder is free to believe part of a witness’s testimony, disbelieve other parts of a witness’s testimony, or to completely discount a witness’s testimony.” Pryor v. State, 195 Md.App. 311, 329 , 6 A.3d 343 (2010).

Furthermore, we recognize that “the finder of fact has the ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation.” Smith, supra, 415 Md. at 183 , 999 A.2d 986 (internal quotations omitted). As such, we “defer to any possible reasonable inferences the [trier of fact] could have drawn from the admitted evidence.” Mayers, supra, 417 Md. at 466 , 10 A.3d 782 (citing State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 557 , 823 A.2d 664 (2003)). Additionally, we “need not decide whether the [trier of fact] could have drawn other inferences from the evidence, refused to draw inferences, or whether we would have drawn different inferences from the evidence.” Id. In the instant case, Holmes’s first contention is that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal 5 because the evidence was insufficient to establish ⁴³⁹ that Holmes was in possession of a firearm.

Holmes further argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he discharged the firearm towards Deputy, causing Deputy to be struck by a bullet. As a result, Holmes claims that all of his convictions must be reversed. The State counters that “all of Holmes’s convictions must be upheld” because the evidence was sufficient to establish that: (1) Holmes was in possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime; (2) Holmes discharged a handgun within the city limits of Baltimore City; (3) Holmes wore, carried, or transported a handgun; (4) Holmes committed first-degree assault; and (5) Holmes used a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence. We hold that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict Holmes on all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

We now turn to a review of each conviction. A. Possession of a Firearm At trial, the court instructed the jury that “a firearm is a weapon that propels a bullet or missile or projectile by gunpowder or some similar explosive.” Under the Maryland Code, a handgun “means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed on the person.” Md.Code Ann., Grim. Law (“CR”) § 4-201(c)(l) (LexisNexis 2012). To qualify as a “handgun,” a device must be a “firearm.” Further, in order to qualify as a “firearm,” it “must propel a missile by gunpowder or some such similar explosive” or “be readily or easily converted into a device capable of so propelling a missile.” Wright v. State, 70 Md.App. 616, 620 , 522 A.2d 401 (1987) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Howell v. State, 278 Md. 389, 396 , 364 A.2d 797 (1976)); see also Moore v. State, 189 Md.App. 90, 108 , 983 A.2d 583 (2009).

Accordingly, the circuit court’s instruction to the jury on the use of the term “firearm” was consistent with the law. ⁴⁴⁰ According to the record, Deputy testified that when Holmes returned to Lee’s residence, Holmes “lift[ed] his shirt up” and “at the same time [he was] lifting his shirt up he [drew] a handgun. It was a revolver from his waistband and said, talk that shit now.” Moreover, Deputy described the handgun as a “357,” “long, long nose” that appeared to have a “western type butt of a gun.” Deputy further testified that he did not hear the shot inside the residence. After Deputy “crashed” through the bedroom window, he detected the gunshot. Holmes argues that because “[o]nly one eyewitness—Mr. Deputy—testified that Mr. Holmes possessed a gun,” that testimony was insufficient evidence to prove Holmes was in possession of a firearm.

Critically, Deputy identified Holmes as the individual possessing a firearm. Furthermore, evidence was presented that both Lee and Coleman provided statements to police officers in which they stated that they saw Holmes with a firearm that evening. Although their testimony at trial differed from what they previously told police officers, both Lee and Coleman’s prior statements indicated that Holmes was in possession of a handgun. As such, the prior statements could be used as substantive evidence that Holmes was in possession of a handgun, which was properly before the jury.

Accordingly, the jury had every right to weigh and consider all of the evidence submitted at trial in reaching its verdict. The jury had the “unique opportunity to view the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to assess the credibility of witnesses during their live testimony.” Mayers, supra, 417 Md. at 466 , 10 A.3d 782 . Indeed, “we do not re-weigh the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” Id. Therefore, the evidence adduced at trial provided a sufficient basis from which the trier of fact, i.e., the jury, could conclude that Holmes was in possession of a handgun on the evening of December 15, 2009.

Further, because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Holmes was in possession of a handgun, the evidence was also sufficient to establish that Holmes was in possession of a ⁴⁴¹ regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime. In order for the jury to reach a conviction for this count, the jury was required to find that Holmes: (1) was in possession of a handgun; and (2) had a conviction that disqualified him from possessing a handgun. It is clear from the record that the first prerequisite, i.e., possession of a handgun, was properly before the jury. Additionally, the record reveals that the parties stipulated that Holmes had been convicted of a crime that disqualified him from possessing a handgun.

Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Holmes’s conviction for possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying felony. B. Discharge of a Firearm Holmes maintains that there was “no physical evidence that [he] discharged a firearm” because “[t]here was no firearms evidence found” at or near the location of the incident. Holmes further claims that “Mr. Deputy has never said he saw [him] discharge a firearm—a critical void in the prosecution’s evidence given that Mr. Deputy’s wound is in the front of his leg.” Nevertheless, the evidence submitted at trial was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude Holmes discharged a firearm. Holmes challenges the allegation that his handgun was discharged because there was a lack of any “ballistics evidence.” Critically, Holmes fails to provide any basis or reason as to why such evidence would be found or detected in Lee’s residence.

The record is clear that Deputy testified Holmes was in possession of a revolver. No evidence was presented at trial to dispute that the firearm was a revolver or that a revolver would leave behind “shell casings” or “ballistics evidence” if discharged. In addition, because Deputy was treated at a different location, a search of Lee’s residence might not contain any ballistics evidence. Further, a search of Lee’s residence did not occur until “later that day,” providing ample opportunity for Holmes, witnesses, and evidence to be affected. ⁴⁴² Moreover, the mere fact that Deputy did not witness Holmes discharge a firearm is not dispositive.

Deputy testified that after he ran through the bedroom window, he immediately heard a gunshot while he was outside of Lee’s house. Based on the evidence submitted at trial, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Holmes was the only individual in possession of a firearm that evening. Thus, the jury was presented with ample circumstantial evidence to infer that it was Holmes who fired the handgun. Similarly, Deputy’s testimony that “he was not aware of being shot” initially does not preclude the jury from inferring that Holmes discharged the firearm.

It is simply another consideration to be weighed by the jury in its deliberations. Further, Holmes asks us to speculate that the gunshot that wounded Deputy could have been fired by either of the two individuals that were witnessed with Holmes that evening. No evidence or testimony was presented at trial to support the notion that either of these persons were in possession of a firearm. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to speculate—as Holmes asks us—that Deputy “accidentally shot himself in the front of the leg ... upon falling from Mr. Lee’s window.” Indeed, there was no evidence presented at trial that Deputy was in possession of a firearm, let alone discharged a firearm.

Holmes sets forth additional hypotheses, but this Court limits its consideration to the record established at trial. Accordingly, we “defer to any possible reasonable inferences the [trier of fact] could have drawn from the admitted evidence.” Mayers, supra. Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Holmes discharged a firearm. As a result, there was sufficient evidence to convict Holmes of discharging a firearm within the limits of Baltimore City.

There was no dispute in the record that the incident in question took place in Baltimore City. As such, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Holmes discharged a firearm within the jurisdictional limits of Baltimore ⁴⁴³ City, violating the Baltimore City Code. 6 Baltimore, Md., Police Ordinances art. 19, § 59-2(a) (2012). C. Wearing, Carrying, or Transporting a Handgun The circuit court’s instruction for the charge of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun provided that “the State must prove that the Defendant wore, carried or transported a handgun that was in his reach and available for his immediate ... use.” CR § 4-203. As set forth above, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Holmes carried a handgun on his person and that the handgun was available for his immediate use.

Accordingly, Holmes’s conviction for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun is supported by sufficient evidence educed at trial. D. First-Degree Assault The jury was presented with two theories under which it could find Holmes guilty of first-degree assault. Although the jury was not required to specify the theory upon which Holmes’s conviction was based, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under either theory. The jury was instructed that it could convict Holmes of first-degree assault if it found that Holmes: (1) caused an offensive touching that was intentional and to which Deputy did not consent; (2) used a firearm to commit the assault; and (3) intended to cause serious physical injury in the commission of the assault. 7 According to the record, evidence was suffi ⁴⁴⁴ cient to prove that Holmes caused an offensive touching through the use of a firearm by aiming and shooting at Deputy.

Further, the jury could infer that shooting at a person would cause serious physical injury. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree assault under this theory. The jury was also instructed that it could convict Holmes of first-degree assault if it found that: (1) Holmes committed an act with the intent of placing Deputy in fear of an immediate physical contact; (2) Holmes had the apparent ability to bring about that contact; (3) Deputy reasonably feared that contact; (4) the assault involved the use of a firearm; and (5) Holmes intended to cause serious physical injury in the commission of the assault. Upon a review of the record, there was sufficient evidence to establish each of these elements.

Deputy testified that Holmes returned to Lee’s residence with two unidentified individuals after engaging in an argument with Deputy. Deputy further testified that Holmes removed a handgun from his waistband making a threatening remark towards Deputy. As a result, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Holmes’s act was done for the purpose of placing Deputy in fear of harm or contact. Similarly, by removing the handgun from his waistband, Holmes had the ability to cause Deputy serious physical injury.

Deputy testified that he ran quickly out of the room and took exceptional measures by crashing through a bedroom window in an effort to avoid being shot by Holmes. Further, Holmes’s display of the firearm was in relatively close proximity to Deputy, 8 which was sufficient for the jury to infer that such a display would cause Deputy serious physical injury if ⁴⁴⁵ he attempted to flee. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree assault under either of the theories presented to the jury. E. Use of a Handgun During the Commission of a Crime of Violence Holmes further argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Holmes used a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence.

In order for the jury to convict Holmes of this offense, the jury was required to find that: (1) Holmes committed a crime of violence; and (2) he used a handgun during the commission of that crime. CR § 4-204. The jury was instructed that a crime of violence included both first and second-degree assault. Indeed, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Holmes was in possession of a handgun.

Moreover, because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Holmes committed first-degree assault, the evidence was sufficient for the finder of fact to infer that Holmes committed a crime of violence. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to find that Holmes used a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence.

II

Holmes’s second contention is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to “continue in your deliberations” when the trial court received a note from the jury. The note provided that: “[w]e are unable to meet an agreement on three charges. What are our options for next steps in the proceeding? Thank you.” Holmes maintains that the trial court’s response to the jury “differs markedly from Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction (“MPJI-CR”) 2:01 and, as such, was an abuse of discretion.” 9 We disagree for two reasons.

First, Holmes’s claim was not preserved for appel ⁴⁴⁶ late review because he failed to note an objection to the court’s response to the jury’s note on the grounds he now raises on appeal. Further, assuming arguendo Holmes’s claim is preserved, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its response to the jury’s note to the court. Holmes challenges the substance of the language used in the trial court’s response in that it was “impermissibly coercive” because it deviated from the approved language in MPJI-CR 2:01. Holmes’s contention is not preserved for appellate review because he raises this claim for the first time at the appellate level.

The following colloquy ensued at the trial level: THE COURT: We just received a note from the jury that says, “we are unable to meet an agreement on three charges. What are our options for next steps in proceeding? Thank you.” I just wanted you to be aware of this communication and as such. I know you have to talk to your client and we have to discuss in the court, but do you have any idea what you want to do? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Continue deliberating.

THE COURT: Well,—just wanted you to know what was going on. And because once we get past this I’m moving my other trial along. Okay. Step to the table.

The Defendant will be in the courtroom in one minute. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. * * * THE COURT: Bring him to the table, please. At the moment unhook his hands only, please. Call your case for the record, please. ⁴⁴⁷ [PROSECUTOR]: Good morning, Your Honor. Calling State of Maryland versus Dewan Holmes, case numbers 110025014 and 15, [prosecutor] on behalf of the State. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [Defense counsel] on behalf of Mr. Holmes.

THE COURT: Counsel, be aware we received a note from the jury at 11:30. The mote [sic] from the jury reads, “we are unable to meet an agreement on three charges. What are our options for next steps in proceeding? Thank you.” [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If I could have a few moments with my client, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me interrupt you a moment, please. Be aware is that the court is about to advise the jury that they are to continue deliberation is what I’m about to advice [sic] them. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Oh. So—I’m sorry.

I thought you were asking us what we would request. THE COURT: I’m about to ask you is there anything you wish to place on the record at this time? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, understanding what Your Honor has just said, but for the record Defense would ask for a mistrial at this point. THE COURT: Your motion is denied at this time. Is that the court will ask the jury to continue its deliberations.

There’s no reason for us to conclude that a mistrial is in order at this time. I will advise you, however, in about an hour or so is lunch time and it is my intent to send them to lunch and bring them back to continue deliberation if they have no [sic] reached a verdict. You have a right to be present when that occurs or you can choose not to be present and allow—understand that the clerk will about 1:00 o’clock or 1:15 instruct them to go to lunch and return back in the jury room and continue deliberation. What’s your pleasure? ⁴⁴⁸ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We don’t need to be present, Your Honor. [PROSECUTOR]: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Would you step back to the officer, sir. Thank you very much, Move out, please. The exchange between Holmes and the court demonstrates that Holmes never raised an objection as to the particular instruction provided to the jury. 10 Indeed, when the court asked “... do you have any idea what you want to do,” Holmes’s counsel replied “[e]ontinue deliberating.” Under Patrick v. State, 90 Md.App. 475, 481 , 601 A.2d 1133 (1992), when a defendant fails to meet his or her “duty of stating distinctly at the time the specific grounds of objection” for a jury instruction, appellate consideration of such a claim will be forfeited. 11 At trial, Holmes had every opportunity to contend that the court’s instruction was coercive or an unlawful deviation from MPJI-CR 2:01.

Instead, Holmes failed to distinctly state any objection except to move for a mistrial. Accordingly, appellate consideration of Holmes’s claim has been forfeited because it plainly appears by the record that it was neither raised nor decided by the trial court. Assuming arguendo that Holmes’s claim is preserved for appellate review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury to continue its deliberations. 12 Under ⁴⁴⁹ the circumstances, the manner in which the trial court used to communicate its instruction to the jury was appropriate. Holmes relies on Ruffin v. State, 394 Md. 355 , 359 n. 2, 906 A.2d 360 (2006) to support his contention that trial courts must issue MPJI-CR 2:01 “without deviation.” 13 Holmes argues that “[i]n addition to being drastically shortened, the trial court’s instruction contained none of the pattern instruction’s emphasis on ‘individual judgment,’ or on holdouts’ adherence to their ‘honest belief[s].’ ” As a result, Holmes claims that the trial court erred in failing to issue the model instruction.

We disagree. It is well settled that “[t]he decision of whether to give supplemental instructions is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Sidbury v. State, 414 Md. 180, 186 , 994 A.2d 948 (2010) (citing Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 237 , 867 A.2d 1095 (2005)); Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 657 , 702 A.2d 261 (1997) (“Whether to give a jury supplemental instructions in a criminal case is within the discretion of the trial judge.”). Additionally, the determination to have a jury continue deliberating or to declare a mistrial is a matter largely within a trial judge’s discretion. Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 412 , 601 A.2d 131 (1992); Mayfield v. State, 302 Md. 624, 631 , 490 A.2d 687 (1985).

This particular discretion has been deemed “broad,” and a “trial judge’s decision [whether or not] to declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is ⁴⁵⁰ therefore accorded great deference by a reviewing court.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In Ruffin, supra, the appellant argued that the jury instruction given by the trial judge violated his procedural rights because key portions of MPJI-CR 2:02, 14 necessary for the jury to understand its duties, were omitted. In particular, the appellant argued that the “additions and omissions of the trial judge in his instruction to the jury on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt lowered the burden of proof necessary to convict him.” Ruffin, supra, 394 Md. at 362 , 906 A.2d 360 .

The Court of Appeals held that, “as a matter of non-constitutional Maryland criminal law, in every criminal jury trial, the trial court shall instruct the jury utilizing the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, MPJICR 2:02.” Ruffin, supra, 394 Md. at 364 , 906 A.2d 360 . As a result, the Court reversed the appellant’s convictions in Ruffin and remanded the