Holmes v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc.

KEHOE, J. The issue before us is whether Md.Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 9-632 (1991, 2008 Repl.Vol.) entitles appellant, Larry D. Holmes, Sr., to pursue the claim of his deceased spouse, Patricia L. Holmes, for permanent disability benefits under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) 1 that might have been awarded to her had she not died prior to entry of an award. BACKGROUND The facts of the case are undisputed. On November 3, 1999, Mrs. Holmes suffered an injury in the course of her employment with Wal Mart Stores, Inc., one of the appellees. 2 On December 9, 1999, she filed a claim for compensation with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”). The Commission awarded Mrs. Holmes temporary total disability benefits.

On or about November 28, 2006, Mrs. Holmes attained the maximum amount of medical improvement from her work-related injuries; in the ⁶⁹³ normal course of events, she would have applied to the Commission for an award of either permanent partial or permanent total disability benefits. However, before she could do so, Mrs. Holmes died, on December 4, 2006, from causes not related to her injuries. On May 7, 2007, Mrs. Holmes’ attorney filed a post-mortem issue seeking, inter alia, permanent disability benefits. On September 19, 2007, the Commission held a hearing on the nature and extent of Mrs. Holmes’ permanent disability.

At the hearing, both parties agreed that the appellant’s right, if any, to pursue the claim of his deceased spouse is controlled by § 9-632 of the Act, which provides in pertinent part: (b) hi general.—If a covered employee dies from a cause that is not compensable under this title, the right to compensation that is payable under this Part IV of this subtitle and unpaid on the date of death survives in accordance with this section. (c) Surviving dependents.—-If there are surviving dependents of the covered employee, the right to compensation survives to the surviving dependents as the Commission may determine. (d) No swviving dependents; obligation to support surviving spouse.—If there are no surviving dependents of the covered employee and, on the date of death, the covered employee had a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives jointly to: (1) the surviving spouse of the covered employee; and (2) the surviving minor children of the covered employee. (e) No surviving dependents or obligation to support surviving spouse.—If there are no surviving dependents and, on the date of death, the covered employee did not have a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives only to the surviving minor children of the covered employee.

Appellant was the only witness at the hearing. He testified without contradiction that he and Mrs. Holmes had been ⁶⁹⁴ married in 1969, that they separated some time thereafter, but that they had reconciled and lived together at their residence as husband and wife for approximately three years prior to Mrs. Holmes’ death. He stated that, during that period of time, he and his wife combined his income with her workers’ compensation benefits to meet their living expenses. Appellant testified that his monthly income was approximately $1,100 and that Mrs. Holmes’ benefits amounted to $380 per week.

Finally, Mr. Holmes testified that, at the time of her death, Mrs. Holmes had no source of income, was in very poor health, and was unable to work. The parties stipulated to the Commission that appellant was not a “dependent” of Mrs. Holmes for the purposes of § 9-632(c) 3 and that Mrs. Holmes had no surviving minor children. Since appellant’s contention that he was entitled to pursue his late wife’s claim was based solely upon § 9-632(d), the issue before the Commission was whether appellant had demonstrated that Mrs. Holmes had a legal obligation to support him at the time of her death. Appellant argued to the Commission that his late spouse had a legal obligation to support him at the time of her death based upon Maryland’s criminal non-support statute, Md.Code Ann. Fam.

Law § 10-201 (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.) 4 Appellant contended that Maryland recognizes a general obligation of spouses to support one another. For their part, appellees asserted that the term “legal obligation to support ...” was intended by the legislature to be limited to court-ordered ⁶⁹⁵ alimony or support payable pursuant to a separation agreement or other contract. Appellees contended that any other interpretation of the term would render other portions of § 9-632(d) superfluous: Had the legislature intended for the right of survival to flow to a surviving spouse automatically under subsectionf ](d), there would be no need to include the language mandating a legal obligation to support the surviving spouse at the time of death. The legislature could have merely stated that if there are no surviving dependents of the covered employee, the right of compensation survives jointly to 1) the surviving spouse and 2) the surviving minor children.

The Commission determined that any right to further benefits did not survive Mrs. Holmes’ death. The Commission’s decision stated that “insufficient evidence was presented to establish that the claimant [i.e. Mrs. Holmes] had a legal obligation to support her surviving spouse.... Therefore, the right to compensation does not survive in this claim; and the issue of permanency is moot.” Appellant filed a timely petition for judicial review.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The arguments to the circuit court were, in essence, elaborations of the parties’ respective contentions to the Commission. In rendering its decision, the circuit court characterized F.L. § 10-201 as pertaining only to “really criminal non-support issues” and stated: So I think it’s a very interesting legal issue, I think it’s a very close legal issue. But, unfortunately, there are no cases exactly on point.

But having considered the provisions of the—or the provisions of the Code as well as that case [5] the Court will conclude in this case that pursuant to 9-632 that Mrs. Holmes did not have an obligation to—a legal obligation to support her husband. ⁶⁹⁶ Accordingly, the circuit court denied appellant’s motion and granted the motion of appellee, thus affirming the decision of the Commission. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Appellant presents two issues in his brief, which we have consolidated and reworded as follows: Did the circuit court err in affirming the decision of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission that Patricia L. Holmes’ right to compensation did not survive her death because she did not have a “legal obligation to support a surviving spouse” on the date of her death? [6] For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that § 9-632(d) provides that a deceased worker’s right to permanent partial disability benefits survives to his or her spouse unless the surviving spouse has agreed to or has been adjudicated to have given up his or her right of support. Standard of Review Section 9-745(b) of the Act provides that decisions of the Commission are presumptively correct on appeal and that ⁶⁹⁷ a party challenging a decision of the Commission has the burden of proof to demonstrate error.

However, as we recently noted, the presumption of correctness afforded to decisions of the Commission extends to questions of fact but not of law. Simmons v. Comfort Suites Hotel, 185 Md.App. 203, 211 , 968 A.2d 1123 (2009) (citing Beyer v. Decker, 159 Md. 289, 291 , 150 A. 804 (1930), Board of Education v. Spradlin, 161 Md.App. 155, 173 , 867 A.2d 370 (2005), and Symons v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co., 10 Md.App. 498, 500 , 271 A.2d 398 (1970)). The circuit court granted summary judgment on the basis that, in light of the uncontested facts, Mrs. Holmes’ right to compensation did not devolve upon appellant pursuant to § 9-632. Review of a decision to grant summary judgment is de novo.

O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 110 , 854 A.2d 1191 (2004); Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 549-50 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004). In reaching its decision, the circuit court interpreted and applied both § 9-632 and F.L. § 10-201. When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s “interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, [the appellate court] must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006) (citing Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc., 392 Md. 374, 383 , 897 A.2d 206 (2006); Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 374-75 , 879 A.2d 1064 (2005); Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 72 , 854 A.2d 879 (2004); and Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 , 788 A.2d 609 (2002)). The Parties’ Contentions Since appellant conceded that he was not dependant upon Mrs. Holmes when she was injured, his right to enforce her claim for permanent disability benefits rests upon § 9-632(d) of the Act.

Appellant argues that the “plain language” of the statute provides that when a claimant who is under a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse dies, her claim survives to the spouse and the claimant’s minor children, if any. ⁶⁹⁸ Since the Act does not provide a definition of “a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse,” appellant looks to F.L. § 10-201. In his brief, he states: Section 10-201(a) of the Family Law Article ... states: ‘A spouse may not willfully fail to provide for the support of the other spouse, without just cause.’ Section 10-201(b) provides that a violation of subsection (a) is a misdemeanor. Hence, if the willful failure to provide spousal support is a crime, then it is a ‘legal obligation’ for a spouse to provide for the support of the other spouse, if the spouse is capable of providing support. Appellant cites Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 24 , 410 A.2d 1052 (1980), and Cruickshank-Wallace v. County Banking and Trust Co., 165 Md.App. 300, 333 , 885 A.2d 403 (2005), as support for his position that spouses in Maryland have a legal obligation to support one another.

He concludes: The plain language of the statute sub judice, ‘legal obligation to support a surviving spouse,’ therefore must be construed to include the existing obligation each spouse has to support the other in a marriage, unless modified by proper agreement between the spouses or by a court order, as reflected both in legislative policy and by common sense. Furthermore, if the plain language of the statute is given any other meaning other than the plain, clear and unambiguous meaning stated above, thereby denying the existence of the basic legal mutual support obligation of spouses as a result of marriage, then the illogical and absurd result would be a separating/divorcing spouse claiming that he/she does not have a “legal obligation” to provide any support since he/she never had such a “legal obligation” to provide support during the marriage. Construing “legal obligation to support a surviving spouse” in a way that excludes the basic spousal obligation of one spouse to support the other, as Appellee urges, would have an unintended legal effect and consequence. Appellees argue that the term “support,” when used in-reference to the legal obligations to provide the same, “tradi ⁶⁹⁹ tionally means those monetary amounts legally required to be paid under a judgment, decree, or order issued by a court ... for the support and maintenance of another.” Since there was no evidence that Mrs. Holmes was a party to any agreement requiring her to pay support to her husband and since there was no court order requiring her to do so, appellees argue that she was under no legal obligation to support appellant at the time of her death.

Appellees note that, at common law, a husband was legally obligated to support his wife at a level suitable to her station in life, but they contend that this obligation was terminated by the Court of Appeals in Condore v. Prince George’s County, 289 Md. 516, 582-38 , 425 A.2d 1011 (1981). They point out that in Condore , the Court of Appeals stated that the General Assembly had the authority to enact a statute creating a reciprocal liability for necessaries but that the legislature has declined to do so. Equating (although not explicitly) the doctrine of necessaries with an obligation to support a spouse, appellees suggest that the legislature’s failure to enact a statute providing for a reciprocal version of the common law doctrine of necessaries indicates that there is no inherent obligation of spousal support. Appellees argue that appellant’s reliance upon F.L. § 10-201 is erroneous, as that statute is “really a criminal nonsupport statute intended to criminalize voluntary impoverishment,” which does not create a mutual, affirmative obligation.

They contend that “there is no legislative history to support [ajppellant’s position that the General Assembly intended to have compensation benefits survive to a surviving spouse under § 9-632(d) solely by virtue of marriage itself.” DISCUSSION Since there are no disputes of material fact in this case, our efforts are focused upon the proper construction and application of § 9-632(d). In Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 , 659 A.2d 1347 (1995), the Court of Appeals explained that the goal of a court interpreting a statute is to ⁷⁰⁰ ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 260 , 647 A.2d 1204 (1994); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73 , 591 A.2d 481 (1991). We first examine the primary source of legislative intent, the words of the statute, giving them their ordinary and natural meaning.

See, e.g., Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559 , 644 A.2d 537 (1994); Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993); Richmond v. State, 326 Md. 257, 262 , 604 A.2d 483 (1992). If the meaning of the language is unclear or ambiguous, “we must consider ‘not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment,’ in our attempt to discern the construction that will best further the legislative objectives or goals.” Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436 , 639 A.2d 675 (1994) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986)). Our first step is to determine whether the phrase “legal obligation to support a surviving spouse” is ambiguous.

We conclude that it is. Statutory language is ambiguous when it is “reasonably capable of more than one meaning.” Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exchange, 318 (2001) (citing Webster v. State, 359 Md. 465, 480 , 754 A.2d 1004 (2000)). The Act does not define “legal obligation.” Appellant argues that the phrase “legal obligation to support a surviving spouse” was intended to embrace all married persons except for those who, by contract or court order, are relieved of the obligation of spousal support. Appellee contends that the statutory language was intended to extend only to those married persons who are obligated by contract or court order to provide for a spouse’s support.

Section 9-632, at least arguably, supports both interpretations. 7 ⁷⁰¹ In light of the statute’s ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history of § 9-682 to consider the context in which the statute was enacted in order “ ‘to discern the construction that will best further the legislative objectives or goals.’ ” Gargliano v. State, 384 Md. at 436, 639 A.2d 675 (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Ins. Co., 308 Md. at 75 , 517 A.2d 730 ). In so doing, we bear in mind that the Act is remedial. While the Act is not intended to “enrich persons who were strangers to the injured party and who were not directly affected by his loss of earning capacity,” Cambridge Mfg.

Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 248, 253 , 153 A. 283 (1930), accord Hood v. Alltrista Corp., 143 Md.App. 124, 132 , 792 A.2d 1179 (2002), if we determine that appellant is in a class intended to be benefitted by the Act, any ambiguities are to be liberally construed in his favor. Bowen v. Smith, 342 Md. 449, 454 , 677 A.2d 81 (1996); Ankney v. Franch, 103 Md.App. 83, 105 , 652 A.2d 1138 (1995), rev’d on other grounds, 341 Md. 350 , 670 A.2d 951 (1996). I. Legislative History The legislative history of § 9-632 was traced by Judge Wilner for the Court of Appeals in Meadowood v. Keller, 353 Md. at 173-84, 725 A.2d 563 . The Court began its analysis by noting that, in its current form, the Act: provides for benefits for a number of different kinds of disabilities arising from job-related injuries and diseases, among which are weekly monetary benefits for temporary disability (both partial and total), permanent disability (both partial and total), hernia, and death.

Benefits for disability and hernia are awarded to the injured employee; by virtue of §§ 9-632, 9-640, and 9-646, however, the right to collect those benefits survives if the employee dies before they are paid in full from a cause that is not itself compensable under the Act. Tn that event, the remaining benefits payable under ⁷⁰² the award are paid to the employee’s surviving dependents or, if there are no such dependents, to other persons designated in those sections. Death benefits obviously cannot be awarded to the employee but are instead awarded to persons who were dependent on the deceased employee, in accordance with §§ 9-678 through 9-686. Id. at 173-74, 725 A.2d 563 .

The Court stated that, while the initial version of the Act “provide[d] a death benefit for dependents of employees who died as the result of a compensable accident”: The initial workers’ compensation law (1914 Md. Laws, ch. 800) did not contain a survival provision with respect to the various disability benefits payable to employees. That omission was consistent with the general rule noted by Professor Larson that a workers’ compensation award “is a personal one, based upon the employee’s need for a substitute for his lost wages and earning capacity.” 4 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 58.42 (1998). As we pointed out in Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 248, 253 , 153 A. 283 (1931), it was not the intent of the 1914 Legislature “to enrich persons who were strangers to the injured party and who were not directly affected by his loss of earning capacity” or “to create an insurance to the injured party, which upon his death would form a part of his estate.” Id. at 178, 725 A.2d 563 .

The General Assembly addressed the issue of the survival of claims for benefits for hernias and disabilities several times in the period between 1914 and 1947. Id. at 178-84, 725 A.2d 563 . We will summarize the changes pertinent to the issue before us. By Chapter 456 of the Laws of 1920, the General Assembly amended the Act to provide for survival of the right to collect benefits for permanent partial disability upon the death of the claimant.

In contrast to the death benefits, which were then and are now payable only to dependents, the benefits survived to the deceased worker’s estate. 1920 Md. Laws 772 . The ⁷⁰³ notion that a right to benefits would survive to a decedent’s estate, and thus potentially to his creditors, was inconsistent with the conceptual underpinnings of the Act and the Court of Appeals gave the statutory provision an extremely narrow construction in Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. at 255-56 , 153 A. 283 (holding that the survival provision did not extend to permanent total disability claims). The legislature revisited the issue of survival in 1945 when it enacted Chapters 336 and 462 of the Acts of 1945.

Between them, the two statutes provided for the survival of unpaid permanent total disability benefits, extended the survival provision to hernia benefits and provided that a deceased claimant’s dependants, as opposed to the claimant’s estate, were the primary beneficiaries of the survival provisions. 1945 Md. Laws 303 , 456. Chapter 895 of the Laws of 1947 was the next pertinent amendment to the Act. Chapter 895 eliminated a rebuttable presumption in the Act that wives, children and other close family members were dependent upon the deceased worker for purposes of determining their eligibility to share in a death benefit. Havre De Grace Fireworks Co. v. Howe, 206 Md. 158, 162 , 110 A.2d 666 (1955).

In addition, while Chapter 895 maintained the provision that the survival benefits would be payable primarily to dependants of the deceased employee, it eliminated the provision that the deceased employee’s estate would be the secondary beneficiary and instead provided that the benefits would be payable to the decedent’s spouse and surviving minor children, subject to certain limitations: If any employee dies from any cause or causes not compensable under this Article, the right to any compensation payable [for claims arising from permanent total disabilities, permanent partial disabilities or hernias] shall survive to his surviving dependents as the Commission may determine, if there be such surviving dependents, and if there be none such, then to his wife and children under twenty-one years of age if there ivas, at the time of his death, a legal obligation on the part of said employee to support his wife, ⁷⁰⁴ and if there was no such obligation, then to his children under the age of twenty-one, if any, alone. 1947 Md. Laws 2130 . (Emphasis added.) As Judge Wilner explained: The 1945 and 1947 legislation put the law essentially into its present posture. The provisions dealing with both the survival of employee benefits and the right to death benefits remained in the same section—eventually § 36 of Article 101—until 1991, when, through the enactment of the Code Revision [of the] Labor and Employment Article, the long, convoluted § 36, which was then twelve printed pages in length, was mercifully split into several different sections. Meadowood, 353 Md. at 183 , 725 A.2d 563 .

One of former § 36’s progeny is § 9-632 of the current Act. 8 While the language of the current § 9-632 is gender neutral, 9 it is otherwise substantively the same as that of former § 36 after the 1947 amendments. Thus our inquiry shifts to whether we can discern what the legislature intended when it used the phrase “a legal obligation on the part of said employee to support his wife” in the 1947 Act. In order to do so, we will review circumstances and case law contemporaneous to the ⁷⁰⁵ enactment of the legislative act in question. Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exchange, 369 Md. at 317-18, 799 A.2d 1264 (citing Webster v. State, 359 Md. at 480 , 754 A.2d 1004 , and Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998)).

The Common Law Obligation of a Husband to Support his Spouse In Condore v. Prince George’s County, 289 Md. 516 , 425 A.2d 1011 (1981), the Court of Appeals stated: Under the common law of Maryland, prior to the adoption of the ERA, the husband had a legal duty to supply his wife with necessaries suitable to their station in life, but the wife had no corresponding obligation to support her husband, or supply him with necessaries, even if she had the financial means to do so. Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288 , 114 A.2d 66 (1955); Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37 , 113 A.2d 82 (1955); Stonesifer v. Shriver, 100 Md. 24 , 59 A. 139 (1904). Id. at 520-21 , 425 A.2d 1011 . The common law “doctrine of necessaries” authorized a wife who was not supported by her husband to enter into contracts with third parties for necessaries, which contracts were