Hoon v. Lightolier

SALMON, J. This is a products liability case by homeowners and their insurer against the manufacturer of a light fixture. The fixture, as one of its component parts, had a safety device that was designed to make the light blink on and off if the insulation in the immediate vicinity of the fixture got too hot. Alternating the electric current in this manner lowered the ⁶⁵¹ temperature emitted by the lightbulb and warned users of the problem. The fixture was accompanied by a label telling the installers of the fixture not to place insulation within three inches of it.

The installer of the fixture failed to heed the warning. As a result, heat from the fixture was entrapped, and the insulation ignited, causing a devastating fire. To complicate matters, the safety device, because of either a manufacturing defect and/or negligent design, did not operate properly, and the lights never blinked. In litigation that followed, the owners of the home damaged by the fire contended that their property loss had two concurrent causes: (1) the failure of the installer of the light fixture to abide by the manufacturer’s warning and (2) the failure of the safety device to prevent the fire due to its negligent manufacture and/or defective design.

Summary judgment was entered in the Circuit Court for Kent County in favor of the manufacturer of the light fixture. One of the grounds for summary judgment was that (purportedly) the sole proximate cause of the fire was the failure of the installer of the light fixture to heed the manufacturer’s warning. The .motions judge rejected the argument that the negligent manufacture and/or design of the safety device was a concurrent cause of the fire. The major issue presented in this appeal is whether the motions judge was legally correct in granting summary judgment on the ground that the third party’s failure to heed the manufacturer’s warning was the sole proximate cause of the fire.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY 1 Due to fire damages mentioned above, David and Texie Hoon (“the Hoons”) and their insurer, Federal Insurance ⁶⁵² Company, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Kent County against Lightolier, a Genlyte Thomas Company, LLC (“Ligh-tolier”), and others. Lightolier is the manufacturer of light fixtures, which were installed by Gede Installation, LLC (“Gede”), in the Chester-town, Maryland, residence of the Hoons. Lightolier affixed to each of the light fixtures a label containing the following words: WARNING-RISK OF FIRE DO NOT INSTALL INSULATION WITHIN 3 INCHES OF FIXTURE SIDES OR WIRING COMPARTMENT NOR ABOVE FIXTURE IN SUCH A MANNER TO ENTRAP HEAT. A similar warning was enclosed in the box in which the light fixtures were shipped.

On each of the light fixtures installed by Gede were self-heating thermal protectors (“SHTPs”), which were intended to cycle, i.e., regulate the electric flow to the bulb so that the light would blink on and off if the area adjacent to the fixture got too hot. As designed by Lightolier, the SHTPs were located approximately three inches from the base of the light fixture. A purpose of the blinking light feature was to alert the consumer to the insulation problem (and/or the light- ⁶⁵³ fixture problem) so that corrective action could be taken. Another purpose of the blinking lights was to lower the temperature of the lightbulb and prevent overheating.

Attached to the fixture was another label, which read: NOTICE — THERMALLY PROTECTED FIXTURE BLINKING LIGHT MAY INDICATE INSULATION TOO CLOSE TO FIXTURE OR IMPROPER LAMP. When Gede installed the light fixture in the Hoons’ residence, its agents placed the fixture flush against the insulation, thus allowing heat from the light fixture to become entrapped when the light was turned on. The parties agree that Gede acted negligently when it installed the fixture within three inches of the insulation. 2 On November 2, 1998, the ceiling in the immediate vicinity of one of the light fixtures installed by Gede caught fire. The fire caused over $1.5 million in damages to the Hoons’ residence.

It is undisputed that one of the causes of the fire was the fact that insulation was placed too close to the light fixture. It is also undisputed, at least for purposes of this appeal, that the SHTPs that were part of the fixture did not function properly because the light in the fixture did not cycle when the heat started to rise, due to the thermal insulation being too far removed from the heat source, i.e., the fixture’s bulb. Prior to the fire — exactly when is not revealed in the record — two other Lightolier fixtures, which were located in the Hoons’ kitchen, began to blink. The two fixtures were the same model as the one that did not cycle and was at the fire’s point of origin.

The Hoons and their agent recognized the significance of the blinking lights, accessed the area where these lights were installed, saw that they were covered in insulation in violation of the warnings on the fixtures, and ⁶⁵⁴ removed the insulation. Nevertheless, neither the Hoons nor their agents checked the nearby fixture whose entrapped heat caused the fire. Section N.410-68 of the National Electric Code 3 provides as follows: 410-68. Temperature.

Fixtures shall be so constructed that adjacent combustible material will not be subject to temperatures in excess of 90°C (194°F). Expert testimony produced by plaintiffs and considered by the motions court showed that, although the specific ignition temperature of the insulation varied with the rate of heating and the moisture content of the surrounding material, the ignition point of the fire at the Hoons’ residence was between 350° and 500° Fahrenheit. The plaintiffs also proffered expert testimony to the motions court showing that Lightolier improperly designed the self-heating thermal protector, which allowed the fire to start. The design defect was that the heat sensor in the SHTPs was too far removed from the heat source (i.e., the bulb in the fixture); the improper location caused the SHTPs not to cycle as temperatures became excessive. 4 ⁶⁵⁵ Lightolier filed a motion for summary judgment and argued: It is undisputed that ([1]) someone misused the fixture by installing insulation within three inches of the fixture and (2) by installing insulation too closely to the fixture, Gede ... acted contrary to warnings on the fixture, to warnings in the instruction booklet accompanying the fixture, and to common knowledge in the insulation and construction industry.

According to [pjlaintiffs, had Gede adhered to the warnings on the product, their damages would not have resulted. As a result, [pjlaintiffs cannot prove that the Lightolier fixture was defective, unreasonably dangerous, or the proximate cause of their damages and Lightolier is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the [pjlaintiffs’ claims or on its cross-claim against Gede. In a supporting memorandum, Lightolier contended it “could not have foreseen [5] Gede’s disregard of the unambiguous warnings provided on and with the [light] [fjixture as a matter of law....” According to Lightolier, Gede’s failure to adhere to “clear and unmistakable warnings” constituted “misuse that precludes recovery.” Lightolier further argued: “Even if the SHTP[s] did not operate properly, plaintiffs may not recover from Lightolier because the installation of insulation within three inches of the fixture was a superseding and intervening cause of plaintiffs’ damages.” The Hoons countered by pointing out, correctly, that Maryland law is clear that “there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident.” According to the Hoons, the failure of the SHTPs to detect the excessive temperature conditions and cycle the lights was a concurrent cause of the fire inasmuch as that failure allowed the fixture to overheat and ignite the surrounding insulation. ⁶⁵⁶ The motions judge granted summary judgment in favor of Lightolier as to plaintiffs’ claims for strict liability in tort, negligence, and breach of warranty. The court explained its ruling as follows: The court finds that the warnings placed on the light fixture and in the instructions were adequate.

The court finds that the manufacturer of the light is entitled to believe that one installing the light together with any insulation that may be applied near it would heed the warnings. The failure to heed the warning in this case is the proximate cause of the fire. Further, the court finds that the plaintiffs were on further notice that there may be problems with the insulation and the cause of the fire by the fact that other fixtures operated properly causing them to blink and indicating problems. If there is a problem with one fixture with blown in insulation, the court finds that one is on notice that there may be problems with other fixtures and that they should be checked.

The court finds that the subsequent malfunction or improper design of the self-heating thermal protection switch on this particular lamp ... that its failure to operate in this particular case does not provide the plaintiffs with another avenue for the jury to make a determination because the court finds that, for the reasons stated, that the Defendant Lightolier is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Immediately after the judge announced his decision, the following exchange occurred: MR. ROSSI [counsel for appellants]: Your Honor, is that as to all causes — negligence, breach of warranty, and products? THE COURT: I believe it is under the facts of this case, Mr. Rossi.

The cause of the fire was the improper insulation. MR. ROSSI: Are you finding, as a matter of law, that that was the sole cause, Your Honor? THE COURT: I find it to be the proximate cause of this fire.

I think that’s all I need to determine. Okay? ⁶⁵⁷ The Hoons, along with their insurer, Federal Insurance Company, then filed this timely appeal. 6 II. ANALYSIS A. As a general rule, we will only affirm the grant of summary judgment on the grounds relied upon by the motions judge. See Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695-96 , 785 A.2d 726 (2001), and cases cited therein.

Appellee does not urge us to deviate from that rule, and we shall not. One of the reasons advanced by the motions judge lor granting summary judgment was based on a “finding” by the court that because the Hoons knew, prior to the fire, that Gede had installed two light fixtures too close to the insulation in violation of Lightolier’s warning, the Hoons had an obligation to check all other Lightolier light fixtures installed by Gede to see if a similar problem existed. Presumably, although the motions judge did not say so explicitly, he held the view that the failure to check all other light fixtures barred the plaintiffs’ claims either because the Hoons assumed the risk of injury or because they were contributorily negligent as a matter of law (or both). In its brief, Lightolier does not even argue that summary judgment can be affirmed on the foregoing basis.

And, in any event, such an argument would have been futile. The label on the fixture advising the consumer of the significance of the blinking light, plus the Hoons’ experience with the other two light fixtures, could have led reasonable persons in the Hoons’ position to believe that if Gede installed the fixture too close to the insulation, the lights would blink. Here, it is undisputed that the lights in the fixture that started the fire never blinked. At most, a jury issue was raised as to whether ⁶⁵⁸ the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by contributory negligence 7 on the part of the Hoons and/or by their voluntary assumption of a known risk.

B. We shall hold that the motions court also erred in granting summary judgment on its alternative ground, i.e., that the failure of Gede to heed the manufacturer’s warning was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of the fire. In support of its no-proximate-cause argument, Lightolier stresses three facts. First, the warning label on the light fixture telling the installer not to place the fixture within three inches of insulation was clear and unambiguous. Second, there was no valid reason why Gede should have ignored the warning and installed the light fixture flush against the insulation, rather than at least three inches from it.

Third, the fire would not have occurred if Gede had heeded Lightolier’s warning. Although we agree that all three of these facts were established by Lightolier, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that Gede’s failure to heed the warnings was the sole proximate cause of the fire. Lightolier’s central thesis is that there can be no liability on its part because Maryland recognizes a “heeding assumption,” i.e., “a manufacturer is entitled to assume that its warnings will be obeyed.” It is true that often a manufacturer can reasonably assume that its warnings will be obeyed. See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 671 F.Supp. 1063 (D.Md.1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir.1988) (discussed infra).

But here, the appellants produced evidence from which it could be inferred, legitimately, that Lightolier did not assume its warning would be obeyed by installers. It evidently assumed the opposite when it installed the SHTPs as a part of the fixture and labeled its product so that the consumer would be led to believe that if a third-party ⁶⁵⁹ installer of the fixture failed to heed the warning, the lights would blink a warning. According to expert testimony produced by appellants, the dual purpose of the SHTPs was (1) to lower the fixture’s temperature by making the flow of electricity to the bulb intermediate and (2) to warn the customer, by means of a blinking light, that the insulation has been installed too close to the fixture. Given the existence of such evidence, we can see no justification for applying a heeding assumption in this case.

Lightolier cites no cases, and we have found none, where any court has applied the heeding assumption when a manufacturer installs a defective safety device whose very purpose is to protect the user in case its warning is not heeded by a third party. In support of its contention that Gede’s failure to heed Lightolier’s warning was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of the fire, Lightolier places primary reliance on four cases, viz: Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581 , 495 A.2d 348 (1985); Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md.App. 199 , 527 A.2d 1337 (1987); Holliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 138 Md.App. 136 , 770 A.2d 1072 (2001), aff'd, 368 Md. 186 , 792 A.2d 1145 (2002); and Higgins, supra. We shall discuss those eases seriatim. 1. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc. 303 Md. 581 (1985) The plaintiff in Ellsworth , while in her kitchen heating tea, wore a loosely fitting nightgown made of flammable material. 303 Md. at 588 , 495 A.2d 348 .

When the plaintiff leaned over her stove, the nightgown ignited, and she was burned seriously. Id. The jury rendered a general verdict in favor of the sellers of the nightgown and the manufacturer of the textile used in it. Id. at 587-89 , 495 A.2d 348 .

On appeal, the plaintiff/appellant claimed, inter alia, that the trial judge committed reversible error when he gave an instruction concerning misuse of the product. Id. at 581 , 495 A.2d 348 . ⁶⁶⁰ The Ellsworth Court held that the plaintiff had used “the nightgown for a foreseeable purpose,” and therefore the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to consider whether the plaintiff had misused the product. Id. at 598 , 495 A.2d 348 . The Court said: We conclude that her manner of use of the nightgown, though possibly careless, was reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law.

It certainly may be foreseen that wearing apparel, such as nightgowns and robes, will occasionally be worn inside out. It is also foreseeable that a loosely fitting gown will come into contact with sources of ignition in the environment where it may be expected to be worn, and particularly when worn in a kitchen and near a stove. Momentary inattention or carelessness on the part of the user, while it may constitute contributory negligence, does not add up to misuse of the product under these circumstances. Id.

The Ellsworth Court recognized the difficulty in understanding the meaning of the term “misuse” in the context of product liability litigation, viz: Misuse has been defined as: a use not reasonably foreseeable; a use of the product in a manner which defendant could not reasonably foresee; a use of a product where it is handled in a way which the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen or expected in the normal and intended use of the product and the plaintiff could foresee an injury as the result of the unintended use; a use or handling so unusual that the average consumer could not reasonably expect the product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it — a use which the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and provide for; use of the product which constitutes wilful or reckless misconduct or an invitation of injury. Id. at 594-95 , 495 A.2d 348 (citations omitted). In defining the term “misuse,” the Court quoted, with approval, from the case of Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.1977), where the Jones Court said: ⁶⁶¹ In inadequate warning eases misuse means that the seller had no duty to warn against unforeseeable uses of its products, while in design cases misuse means that the manufacturer had no duty to design a product so as to prevent injuries arising from unforeseeable uses of that product.... In defective manufacture cases, however, misuse means that the injury was not caused by some inherent defect in the product but by the consumer’s abnormal use of it. ...

Id. at 1285 n. 4 (emphasis added). The case sub judice is one where the warning was adequate. The factual issue presented was whether the SHTPs were negligently manufactured or defectively designed. The Ellsworth Court also said: Misuse of a product may also bar recovery where the misuse is the sole proximate cause of damage, or where it is the intervening or superseding cau,se. [8] For example, a high speed electric drill may be defective because a manufacturing defect causes it to short circuit and produce a shock during normal usage.

A plaintiff who attaches a brush to that drill and in attempting to clean his teeth suffers injury to his mouth from the high speed of the brush will lose because his misuse is the sole cause of his misfortune, and the defect in the drill is not in any way related to the harm. ⁶⁶² Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 596 , 495 A.2d 348 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Lightolier does not contend that Ellsworth is factually analogous. It does contend, however, relying upon the drill being used as a toothbrush example, that the principles enunciated in Ellsworth preclude recovery by appellants. Lightolier argues: Even assuming the SHTP[s] did not work as intended, it was Gede’s failure to follow the clear instructions provided with the [fjixture that rendered the product a factor in [appellants’ damages.

If Gede had complied with the provided warnings and instructions, the SHTP[s] on the [fixture would have been immaterial. The misuse in this case is even more egregious than that discussed in Ellsworth: Gede was specifically instructed not to install insulation within three inches of the [fjixture, received specific warnings of what would happen if it failed to follow these instructions, knew a,bout this potential hazard due to ind,using-wide practices, and nonetheless installed insulation within three inches of the [fjixture. The allegation that the SHTP[s] did not work as intended does not change the fact that Lightolier was not obligated in the first instance to foresee that Gede would disregard its clear warnings. (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.) We fail to see how the “more egregious [misuse] than that discussed in Ellsworth ” argument has validity.

In the example of misuse set forth by the Ellsworth Court, the defect in the product (short circuit causing a shock during normal usage) had no effect on the injury the plaintiff suffered. The mouth injury to the consumer was caused by the plaintiffs misuse of the drill, i.e., by using the high-speed drill to clean teeth. Here, the defect in the product was the failure of the SHTPs to cycle when the fixture became too hot. It cannot be said that the defect in the SHTPs was in no way “related to the harm.” Nothing in Ellsworth supports Lightolier’s argument that Gede’s failure to heed the manufacturer’s warning ⁶⁶³ was either “the sole proximate cause of the fire or an intervening or superseding cause.” 2.

Simpson v. Standard Container, Inc. 72 Md.App. 199 (1987) Ramesh Oza (“Mr.Oza”) was a neighbor of four-year-old Lorenzo Simpson, Jr. Mr. Oza bought a gasoline can, which had a warning on the side admonishing the user not to store the can in living areas. 72 Md.App. at 206 , 527 A.2d 1337 . Another warning proclaimed, “Keep Out of Reach of Children.” Id. at 207 , 527 A.2d 1337 . Despite the warning, Mr. Oza put gas in the can and stored it in the basement of his house. Id. at 201 , 527 A.2d 1337 .

Later, Lorenzo Simpson, Jr., and Mr. Oza’s son, who was also four years old, were playing in Mr. Oza’s basement. Id. at 202 , 527 A.2d 1337 . One of the four-year-olds removed the cap from the gasoline can and poured, or spilled, the contents on the basement floor. Id.

The gas vapors ignited and Lorenzo Simpson, Jr., was severely burned. Id. Mr. Oza’s son was killed. Id.

Lorenzo Simpson, Jr.’s, father, on behalf of his son, sued Standard Container Company, the manufacturer of the gasoline can, under theories of strict liability in tort, negligence, and breach of warranty. Id. at 202, 207 , 527 A.2d 1337 . The Simpsons contended that the gas container was defective because it was designed without a child-proof cap. Id. at 202 , 527 A.2d 1337 .

In Simpson , we rejected the plaintiffs strict-liability claim and said: In this case, the Ozas stored the gasoline can in the basement of their home, ignoring the admonitions on the sides of the can