Hopkins v. State

Per Curiam. The appellant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon at a trial by the court in the Criminal Court of Baltimore and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 15 years. 1 On appeal from the judgment he contends that (1) the ²⁸⁶ trial court erred in denying a motion to strike the testimony of Martin E. Spriggs, a witness for the State, and an alleged accomplice in the commission of the crime, and (2) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. (1) The basis of the claim of error with regard to the first contention is the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States; Art. 22, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Maryland.

Here the privilege was not asserted by the appellant to bar his self-incrimination; he attempted to invoke the privilege as to the witness, Spriggs, who testified against him. But the privilege is a personal one, belonging to the witness, not to the appellant. It is intended for the witness only and does not involve any right of the appellant. The testimony given by the witness was not subject to objection on the ground of privilege at the instance of the appellant, but was competent evidence and admissible against him, if material.

The materiality of the challenged testimony was not disputed at the trial nor is it alleged on appeal that it was not material. Even if a witness makes a claim of privilege and it is improperly disallowed by the trial court, it is not reversible error on behalf of the defendant. 2 Butz v. State, 221 Md. ²⁸⁷ 68; Boone v. State, 3 Md. App. 11 . There was no error in the denial of the motion to strike the challenged testimony. (2) The appellant claims that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction for the reason that the testimony of the accomplice, Spriggs, was not corroborated.

We agree that Spriggs was an accomplice but it is clear from the record, and the appellant does not argue to the contrary, that if Spriggs’ testimony may be properly considered, the evidence was sufficient to prove the corpus delicti of the crime of which the appellant was convicted and his criminal agency. In Maryland a conviction may not be founded upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Kitt v. State, 2 Md. App. 306, 310 . Not much in the way of corroboration however, is actually required.

Barton v. State, 2 Md. App. 52, 56 . But the corroborative evidence must be as to some of the material facts which tend to show that the accused was either identified with the perpetrators of the crime or had participated in the commission of the crime itself. Boone v. State, supra, 19-20. “Whether the testimony has in fact been sufficiently corroborated must, of course, depend upon the facts and circumstances, and the inferences deducible therefrom, in each case.” Wright v. State, 219 Md. 643, 650 . In the instant case the substance of Spriggs’ testimony was that on 31 January 1964 about 12:50 P.M. he, the appellant and Ernest Terry went to the Keystone Realty Company in the 900 block of Whitelock Street “to rob a real estate office * * * We just rang the bell and the man let us in and we went in and robbed him, that’s all * * * We got him to open the safe and we tied him with adhesive tape.” They took money, money bags, an apron and a wallet from Mr. Katzoff. “We had knives.” They went to Terry’s house and split up the money, Terry keeping the Masonic apron and the wallet.

Spriggs and the appellant left, went down to North and Mt. Royal Avenues and were arrested.- The victim, Robert D. Katzoff, testified that he was the office manager of