Hopper v. Brodie

Boyd, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, overruling special pleas of Peter E. Hopper and of the administrators of the estate of John N. Sipencer. The bill was filed by the appellee who is receiver of the Atlantic Ice Company, a corporation incorporated under the laws of Maryland, having its principal office in Baltimore City, to ascertain and enforce for the benefit of said company the liability of its stockholders and to require them to contribute ratably, according to their liability and solvency, to the payment of its debts. The plea of Peter L. Hopper alleges, “That the Court has no jurisdiction over him in said suit, as he is a i'esident of Harford County, in the State of Maryland, and is not engaged in any business in Baltimore City,” and the one of the administrators uses the same language, excepting he use® the plural instead of the singular number.

Without deeming it necessary to discuss separately the form of the plea by the administrators, which only alleges that they reside in Harford County, and that they are not engaged in business in Baltimore City, and does not allege where they took out letters of administration, we will consider the pleas together. See sec. 148 of Art. 75 of Code as interpreted in Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 474 . The brief for the appellants refers at some length to the bill of complaint-—-pointing out what are alleged to be defects in it, but there was no demurrer to the bill, and such defects are not presented for our consideration by the pleas. “A plea rests entirely upon the point by which it is intended to prevent further proceedings.” Miller's Eq. Proc. 182; Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md. 344, 356 .

In this ease the precise point ⁴⁴⁵ is whether a receiver of a domestic corporation can, in a bill for the enforcement of an alleged liability of stockholders, filed in a Baltimore City Court, join the appellants, who are residents of Harford County, with other stockholders, who are residents of Baltimore City. The appellants rely on Art. 75, sec. 147, which is as follows : “No person shall be sued out of the county in which he resides until the sheriff or coroner of the county in which he resides shall have returned a non esb on a summons issued in such county; * * * and provided further, that any person who resides in one county but carries on any regular business, or habitually engages in any avocation or employment in another county, may be sued in either county, whether before a justice of the peace or in a Court of law or equity; this section not to apply to ejectment,” and certain other actions mentioned. Inasmuch as the pleas do not include the language, “or habitually engages- in any avocation or employment in another county,” or something equivalent to that, they are not technically correct, but regardless of that, it is clear that that