Horsey v. State

Per Curiam. The appellant was convicted of larceny by the court sitting without a jury and sentenced to four years. He contends that the court committed reversible error in permitting an infant to testify against him, that the evidence to convict was insufficient, and that the value of the merchandise taken was not sufficiently shown to be in excess of $100. ⁸² The State produced an eleven-year-old boy, Douglas Marion, who testified he saw the appellant carrying boxes out of the store in question on the date mentioned in the indictment, May 23, 1960. The appellant contends that the witness was insufficiently qualified in that it was not shown that he understood the obligation of an oath or that one who lies is likely to be punished.

Qualification or competency is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md. 412, 419 ; Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 165 . The trial court found that the boy, who was in the fifth grade, was “well qualified” and cited evidence in the case which corroborated his testimony. It appears that the boy was examined at some length.

He testified he believed in God, although he did not know “what God would think if he told a lie”, that he knew what was meant by “telling the truth”, and when asked, “If you take an oath to tell the truth, must you tell the truth or can you tell a lie?”, he replied, “You must tell the truth.” We find no abuse of discretion. The case of State v. Ranger, 98 A. 2d 652 (Me.), relied on by the appellant, is distinguishable on the facts. The State produced the store manager who testified, on the basis of inventories taken on March 4 and May 24, 1960, that $2,900 worth of shirts and other articles of clothing were missing on the latter date. Three boxes of the merchandise were recovered from a witness, Brown, who testified that on March 14, 1960, he received them from the appellant as part payment on a car he had sold to the appellant.

He also testified he saw twelve to fourteen boxes of the same type in the appellant’s car at that time, although these were never recovered. The appellant had been an employee of the store in question and thus had access to the stockroom. He was seen at the store on May