Houghton v. Forrest

ADKINS, Judge. Petitioner Arnold Houghton, an officer in the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”), was sued for intentional and constitutional torts committed against Respondent Cheryl Forrest in the course of Houghton’s duties. The case was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, where a jury found against Houghton and awarded compensatory damages to Forrest. On appeal, Houghton argued that the trial verdict should be overturned on grounds of governmental immunity.

Because common law public official immunity does not apply to intentional torts, and Houghton cannot identify any other statutory basis for immunity, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with respect to both immunity and the operation of the Local Government Tort Claims Act ⁵⁸³ (“LGTCA”); we need not reach the malice issue, and will therefore vacate that part of the judgment below. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On the morning of May 25, 2005, Houghton observed a drug sale on North Eutaw Street in Baltimore City through a security camera feed. Three persons participated in the sale: the drug dealer, a male purchaser, and an alleged female purchaser who was wearing a white shirt or coat. As the transaction was being completed, Houghton contacted an arresting team, comprising Officer Timothy Williams and another officer, and instructed them to arrest the participants in the sale.

The arresting team took the dealer and the male purchaser into custody, finding drugs on each of them, but the alleged female purchaser had left the scene. Houghton then witnessed, through the video feed, the alleged female purchaser embrace a second woman nearby. Houghton assumed that the embrace concealed the transfer or sale of drugs from the female purchaser to the second woman. This second woman was wearing a black jacket, dark jeans, and carrying a red umbrella.

Houghton moved the camera back to the arrest, and in doing so, lost sight of the second woman. After monitoring the arrest, Houghton scanned the area for the female purchaser and the second woman. The female purchaser was no longer in view, but Houghton could see someone whom he believed to be the second woman. In fact, the person in Houghton’s view was Forrest, who was standing some distance away at a nearby bus stop.

Forrest was wearing different colored pants and jacket than the second woman, though both were carrying red umbrellas. Houghton instructed Williams to arrest Forrest. Williams approached Forrest, and asked if she had “anything illegal” on her person; Forrest said she did not, and consented to a search of her person. The search revealed no contraband, but Houghton nonetheless instructed Williams to arrest Forrest.

Williams suggested that Houghton review the video footage to make certain that Forrest was indeed the second woman. Houghton did not do so, but nonetheless confirmed that Forrest was ⁵⁸⁴ to be arrested. Williams handcuffed and arrested Forrest, over Forrest’s protests, and placed her with the other arrestees. Forrest testified at trial that she overheard Williams discussing the possibility that he may have arrested the wrong person, and that Williams was instructed to take her into custody nonetheless.

Forrest was moved to Central Booking, though she was not summoned to court and charges against her were eventually dismissed. In December 2006, Forrest filed suit against Houghton and Williams, alleging numerous intentional torts including assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. At trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury found that Williams was immune from liability, but that Houghton had acted with malice (and therefore that immunity did not apply), and that Houghton was liable on almost all counts. The jury awarded $171.60 in actual damages, $180,000.00 in compensatory damages, and no punitive damages.

Houghton appealed the verdict on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence in the trial court to support a finding of malice, and that he was thus immune from liability. See Houghton v. Forrest, 183 Md.App. 15, 21-22 , 959 A.2d 816, 819-20 (2008). Forrest responded that the evidence was sufficient, and alternatively, that the trial court erred in requiring a finding of actual malice because public official immunity does not apply to intentional torts. Id.

On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that: (1) common law public official immunity does not apply to intentional torts, and there are no other applicable bases for immunity, and (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding of malice. Id. The Court of Special Appeals further held that the insufficient evidence on malice was not a bar to Forrest’s recovery, as the LGTCA allows Forrest to enforce her claim against the Baltimore City Police Department. Houghton ⁵⁸⁵ appeals the first holding, and Forrest cross-appeals on the second holding.

DISCUSSION We must resolve two issues in order to completely address this case: first, whether Houghton is immune from liability on either statutory or common law grounds; second, how the operation of the LGTCA affects the application of the judgment against Houghton. We discuss each issue in turn. Immunity Houghton did not make clear in the proceedings below what particular source of immunity he relies upon for his claim. In his briefs to this Court, and during oral argument, Houghton focused primarily on the application of common law public official immunity.

We will address this issue below. In addition, because official immunity may derive from any one of several provisions in the Maryland code, we will examine all other possible sources for Houghton’s immunity as well. Common Law Public Official Immunity Houghton claims immunity from judgment under a common law theory of public official immunity. Common law public official immunity is reserved for public officials (as opposed to mere employees) who perform negligent acts during the course of their discretionary (as opposed to ministerial) duties.

See James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 323 , 418 A.2d 1173, 1178 (1980). We have held that police officers are public officials. Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 128-29 , 928 A.2d 795, 813 (2007). Moreover, there is no question that Houghton’s arrest of Forrest was a discretionary act, and not a ministerial one: we have long held that the word “ ‘discretion’ denotes freedom to act according to one’s judgment in the absence of a hard and fast rule.” Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 25 , 16 A.2d 861, 864 (1940).

The order to arrest an individual falls squarely within that definition. So, both criteria that this Court set forth in James are met here. ⁵⁸⁶ For more than twenty years, however, this Court has held that common law public official immunity does not apply to intentional torts. 1 See Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 258 , 863 A.2d 297, 305 (2004) (“The Maryland public official immunity doctrine is quite limited and is generally applicable only in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct.”); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 169 , 460 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1983) (“a police officer does not enjoy this [public official] immunity if he commits an intentional tort”). 2 In spite of these holdings, Houghton asks us to apply this immunity to officials committing intentional torts. But this Court will not overturn precedent in a vacuum, nor do so on a whim. See, e.g., Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 417 , 47 A.2d 365, 370 (1946) (“[I]t is a well recognized and valuable doctrine that decisions, once made ... should not thereafter be lightly disturbed or set aside.... ”).

Our “institutional devotion to stare decisis is not absolute,” State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240, 259 , 958 A.2d 295, 307 (2008), but we nonetheless remain deeply respectful of the doctrine. Adherence to stare decisis is our “preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Livesay v. Balt. County, 384 Md. 1, 14 , 862 A.2d 33, 40-41 (2004) (quoting Payne v. ⁵⁸⁷ Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 , 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). Only a fundamental change in factual or legal circumstances will justify departing from this principle.

If the state of the law as a whole has evolved, for example, so as to render a rule nothing more than “a remnant of [an] abandoned doctrine,” then we would be justified in correspondingly abandoning that rule. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 , 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (joint op.). Alternately, if our understanding of the factual underpinnings of a rule has changed unto the point where the rule is no longer justified by the status quo, then there is no reason to adhere to the rule obstinately.

See id. at 860 , 112 S.Ct. at 2811-12 (discussing the relationship between factual divergence and stare decisis). Likewise, if experience demonstrates that it is unrealistic or unwise to enforce a rule in the form expressed by this Court, then it may be modified for practical reasons. Id. at 854-55 , 112 S.Ct. at 2808 . Here, Houghton has shown us no reason to deviate from our rule denying common-law immunity to public officials who commit intentional torts.

Houghton has not presented any evidence, either in his brief or at oral argument, that the factual or legal landscape with regard to public official immunity has changed unto the point where we would be justified in departing from our precedents. Houghton advances a general policy argument, relying on language in Lee , where we stated that public official immunity is “intended to be a defense against claims that a ‘better choice’ could have been made by an official.” 384 Md. at 261, 863 A.2d at 307 . This is an accurate restatement of the purposes behind the public official immunity doctrine, but it does not support Houghton’s position. Indeed, our very next sentence in Lee states that “[t]his defense is inherently related to actions based on negligence.” Id.

We have not deviated from this principle throughout our cases addressing public official immunity. See, e.g., Lee, 384 Md. at 258 , 863 A.2d at 305 ; DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 49 , 729 A.2d 354, 370 (1999) (“[A] police officer, who might other ⁵⁸⁸ wise have the benefit of this immunity, does not enjoy it if the officer commits an intentional tort .... ”). Houghton’s actions are therefore not of the type that we have intended to protect through application of common law public official immunity. As Houghton has provided no other reason for us to overrule our precedents, we affirm our previous holdings that common law public official immunity does not apply to intentional torts other than defamation.

Houghton thus cannot claim such immunity in defense of the judgment against him. Municipal Official Immunity and the Maryland Tort Claims Act Maryland public officials may also claim immunity for their official acts on statutory